

work, the lack of the necessary experience and time, there was a constant lack of construction equipment and materials, and most importantly, very often there were no troops at the right time to occupy ready-made defensive zones. Only in the Battle of Kursk was this avoided. Here, for the first time, the depth of the tactical defense zone reached 15-20 km. In the operational zone, to a depth of 250-300 km, 5-6 defensive lanes and a rear defensive line were equipped. Finally, a state line of defense was created on the left bank of the Don. The first defensive line was covered by engineering barriers with a density of up to 2,000 mines per | km of the front, which was 2-3 times higher than in the first period of the war. And most importantly, unlike the summers of 1941 and 1942. in the directions of probable enemy actions, the first three lanes to a depth of 50-70 km, as well as the rear line, were occupied in advance by troops with a high density of forces and means.

The main method of conducting strategic defensive operations during the war years was the stubborn holding of defensive lines in combination with counterattacks and partial offensive operations.

Of great importance, for example, was the stubborn holding by the Soviet troops of the Dnieper line, large cities and naval bases, especially the Brest Fortress, Kiev, Odessa, Sevastopol, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Novorossiysk, etc. Their staunch defense made it possible to tie down significant enemy forces for a long time, inflict heavy losses on them, disrupt the plans of the German command to develop the offensive.

Similar goals were also achieved by the stubborn resistance of the encircled groupings of troops in the event that they retained combat capability for a long time. In practice, however, various decisions were made depending on the situation: in some cases, encircled troops were ordered to take up defensive positions and hold out to the last; in others - to break through from the environment in any way. The last method was the main one. This was the case, for example, when the enemy encircled the 3rd and 10th armies of the Western Front west of Minsk; the 6th and 12th armies of the Southern Front - in the Uman region; 19th and 20th armies in the Smolensk region; four armies of the Western and Reserve fronts in the Vyazma region; 3rd and 13th armies of the Bryansk Front south of Bryansk. In most of these cases, it was possible to withdraw only a part of the personnel from the encirclement, as a rule, without heavy weapons (with the exception of Smolensk). The troops remaining in the encirclement usually lost their combat effectiveness relatively quickly. Thus, the encircled grouping of troops west of Minsk fought for only 10 days, in the Uman region - 8-9 days, west of Kiev - 7-10 days, in the Vyazma region - 8 days.

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In all strategic defensive operations, special attention was paid to ensuring a high level of defense activity. Counterattacks were undertaken at the first opportunity, even in a completely hopeless situation. In most cases, they were carried out along the flanks of the advancing enemy strike groupings, but in some cases they were carried out head-on or undertaken in adjacent directions, as was the case, for example, in the Battle of Smolensk, when, in order to ensure defensive actions, the 19th and 20th The 1st Army in the Smolensk region organized a short strike by the forces of the 21st Army in the Bobruisk direction, and then by the forces of the 28th Army in the Roslavl region.

In a number of cases, due to insufficient preparation, such counterattacks did not produce the expected results. But very often, including in defensive operations in 1941, they were almost the only most effective means of pinning down enemy forces, weakening his strike groupings and gaining time to organize defense on rear lines. Thus, in the Stalingrad defensive operation, counterattacks and private offensive operations of the Stalingrad (Don) Front in September-October 1942 forced the Nazi command of the troops of the 6th Field Army, as well as the 3rd Romanian and deploy the th Italian army with the front to the north, which weakened the enemy grouping that was advancing directly on Stalingrad, and later made it possible to maintain bridgeheads from which the Soviet troops launched a strategic counteroffensive.

The highest manifestation of activity was the defense of Soviet troops in the Kursk direction in the summer of 1943. Counterattacks in the zones of the Central and Voronezh fronts by forces of individual rifle and tank corps and a tank army were launched already on the first day of the operation. They continued in the following days. Of particular importance in disrupting the offensive of the German Wehrmacht was the counterattack of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Armies, which resulted in an oncoming tank battle in the Prokhorovka area in July 1943, in which up to 1,200 tanks participated on both sides. and SAU.

One of the most complex and important problems of strategic defense during the Great Patriotic War was the restoration of the disrupted strategic front. This task was solved by restoring the combat readiness of the groupings of troops operating in the breakthrough zone, creating a new strategic defensive line, regrouping forces between different directions and sectors of the front, and, finally, by bringing strategic reserves into battle.

The first experience of restoring the integrity of the strategic defense front was obtained in the summer of 194] when it was breached by the enemy in the northwestern and western directions. As a result of the enemy breaking through the defenses of the North-Western and Western fronts at the end of June 1941, encircling and defeating a significant part of their forces, extensive gaps were formed and there was a threat of his quick exit to Pskov, Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev, and then development attacks on Leningrad and Moscow. To restore the strategic front, the Headquarters of the Civil Code decided to organize defense on a new strategic defensive line based on the Pskov and Ostrov fortified areas in the Northwestern Front and on the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers in the western direction. Removing this line from the line of contact between the Soviet troops and the enemy by 150-200 km made it possible to gain at least 10-15 days to organize defense in depth.

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The Headquarters of the Civil Code transferred 5 combined-arms armies (36 divisions) from its reserve to the Western Front. Later, 13 combined-arms armies (104 divisions and 33 brigades) were sent here in order to create a large strategic grouping. In the same way, the stabilization of the front in the northwestern and southwestern directions was achieved, where more than 140 rifle divisions and 50 rifle brigades were sent.

Even greater efforts were required during the second restoration of the broken strategic front in the western (Moscow) direction in October 1941. In total, 150 rifle divisions were regrouped in this direction from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and from other sectors of the front during the summer-autumn campaign of 1941. - Vision and 44 rifle brigades.

The restoration of the grouping of troops on the new defensive lines was carried out in different ways. On the outskirts of Moscow, for example, in October 1941, reserves were mainly advanced to the Mozhaisk line of defense, and the retreating troops were concentrated behind them, put in order, then again brought into the first line. In contrast, in Ukraine, after the collapse of the South-Western Front, to cover the Donbass, the retreating troops immediately took up defensive positions in direct contact with the enemy, and suitable reserves were successively advanced here. Part of the incapacitated divisions was sent to the rear, where they were understaffed and reorganized. In this way, 23 divisions were restored on the Western Front, and 27 divisions on the South-Western Front.

The restoration of the strategic front in the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 took on a fundamentally different character. front. Enemy breakthrough. This line and the forcing of the Don in the lower reaches led to the emergence in the strategic defense of the Soviet troops of a gap up to 500 wide, 150-400 km deep, which quickly expanded in the direction of Stalingrad and the North Caucasus. In the current situation, it was decided to create a new strategic line of defense along the river. Don in its middle course, and further along the Stalingrad-Astrakhan-Great Caucasian Range line with the deployment of reserve armies on it, prepared in advance by the Supreme Command Headquarters, as well as individual divisions transferred from the Far East.

The private offensive operations undertaken by the Soviet troops in other sectors of the Soviet-German front also played an important role in stabilizing the restored strategic defense front in this direction. Their implementation fettered the enemy's actions in the northwestern direction and near Moscow, deprived him of the opportunity to transfer his forces from here to Stalingrad and the Caucasus. This also played an important role in preparing favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops in the fall of 1942 to the counteroffensive.

In the strategic defensive operation near Kursk, the problem of restoring the disrupted strategic front was no longer a problem. It did not arise in subsequent defensive operations conducted in the autumn of 1943 near Krivoy Rog and in the Zhytomyr region, in 1944 in the Proskurov region and on the Sandomierz bridgehead, and finally, in 1945, near the lake. Balaton. These operations, as a rule, did not go beyond the operational framework and were of a short-term nature. However, useful experience was gained in these operations, especially in the fight against strong enemy tank groupings.

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5. Strategic offensive

The Great Patriotic War fully confirmed the basic position of Soviet military science that only as a result of a decisive offensive can one win a war. The strategic offensive was the main and decisive type of action of the Soviet Armed Forces. Of the nine military campaigns, seven were strategic offensives. In time, they accounted for more than 70% of the entire duration of hostilities against Germany and militaristic Japan. Soviet troops have gained experience in conducting offensives on an ever-increasing scale, under a variety of military-political and strategic conditions, and a different balance of forces and means.

Starting from the second period of the war, the domestic military strategy reached, in essence, a new, higher level of planning, organizing and conducting not only individual operations, but also offensive military campaigns, which were a whole system of interconnected and subordinated to the common goal of strategic operations. and actions of all branches of the Armed Forces. Simultaneously, the forms and methods of strategic offensive operations developed. They became more and more large-scale, dynamic and effective.

This trend can be clearly seen in Table 6.

Winter campaign 1941/1942 was the first offensive military campaign of the Soviet troops. In its course, they carried out five strategic offensive operations: Moscow, Tikhvin, Rostov, Rzhev-Vyazemskaya, Kerch-Feodosiya landing, as well as a number of separate front-line offensive operations of the Tsll.

It was carried out in two stages. The basis of the first was counter-offensive operations near Moscow, Tikhvin and Rostov. At first, the Soviet troops managed to seize the strategic initiative on the flanks. On November 10, 1941, the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front and the Novgorod Army Group of the North-Western Front launched a counteroffensive. Then the Volkhov Front joined the operation. Having captured Tikhvin and inflicted a defeat on the Tikhvin grouping of troops of the North Army Group, which was making its way to join the Finns, they, on the one hand, eliminated the threat of a double encirclement of Leningrad, and on the other hand, created the conditions for launching an offensive in the northwestern direction and moving to counteroffensive near Moscow. A few days later, the troops of the Southern Front launched a counteroffensive. Having defeated the tank divisions of the 1st Panzer Army of Army Group South that had broken through to Rostov, they pushed the enemy back 60-80 km to the west, and, consequently, the danger of a breakthrough by German troops into the Caucasus was eliminated.

Meanwhile, the main events unfolded in the Moscow direction. True, this was preceded by important changes in the situation: by the beginning of December, the Supreme Command Headquarters was completing the formation of 11 armies, 5 of which were sent to the west. The fact that the Army Group Center, which had suffered heavy losses, used up all its reserves, was no longer able to continue the offensive, and at the same time, had not yet created a defensive grouping of troops, also played its role. Taking advantage of this, the troops of the Western, Kalinin and right wing of the Southwestern Fronts, without waiting for all the reserves to arrive, launched a counteroffensive north and south of Moscow.

With flank attacks on Volokolamsk, Kaluga, Stalinogorsk and Yelets, the enemy was driven back 30-60 km from the capital in a few days. Moreover, he was forced to start a retreat along the entire central sector of the front. On December 18, the Bryansk Front, newly formed at the junction of the Western and Southwestern fronts, went over to the counteroffensive. This made it possible to increase pressure on the flanks.

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Army Group Center and create a real threat to its encirclement. By the beginning of January, the enemy had been pushed back 100-250 km. Its main strike force suffered its first major defeat. This has not happened to the Wehrmacht troops since the beginning of the Second World War. Moscow and the entire Moscow industrial region got rid of the mortal threat, and in addition, conditions were created for the transition of the Soviet Armed Forces to a general offensive.

In January-April 1942, i.e., in the second stage of the campaign, offensive operations were carried out in all the main strategic directions. The most important of these was the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya strategic operation, which was carried out jointly by the Western and Kalinin fronts. During its course, another serious defeat was inflicted on the enemy: the main forces of Army Group Center were engulfed from the northwest, east and south and put in an operational disadvantage.

At the same time, Soviet troops achieved major success in the northwestern direction. Having defeated the southern wing of Army Group North, they reached Staraya Russa and Velizh, on the approaches to Vitebsk and Smolensk. At the same time, in the southwestern direction, as a result of the Barvenkovo-Lozovskaya offensive operation, an operational ledge was formed south of Kharkov, opening the way to the Donbass, and in the south, as a result of the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, the Kerch Peninsula was liberated and an operational bridgehead was created in the Crimea .

In a word, with a rather limited composition of forces, 9 out of 10 Soviet fronts achieved significant strategic results. Even if only temporarily. but the Soviet troops seized the strategic initiative. Significant damage was inflicted on all the main strike groupings of the enemy: more than 50 of his divisions lost their combat capability. On a front of about 2,000 km (almost 50% of the total length of the Soviet-German front), the enemy was driven back 150-400 km. His attempts to hold important lines for organizing a new offensive failed. Fascist Germany was faced with the inevitability of a protracted war for which she was not prepared. The morale of its army and population was markedly affected by defeats and heavy losses. The successes of the Soviet troops had a great influence on the rallying of the anti-fascist forces and contributed to the rise of the liberation movement in the occupied territories. However, the first winter offensive

left unfinished. The reason is the lack of mobile troops, the unjustified dispersion of efforts in many directions, the poorly organized introduction of reserves into battle, and other miscalculations. None of the directions failed to encircle and destroy the main enemy groupings, not to mention the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad. The offensive in the Donbass and Crimea did not receive its development. Under such conditions, a very careful assessment of the situation and careful preparation of subsequent operations were required. Unfortunately, this did not happen, and in the spring of 1942 the enemy again seized the strategic initiative.

The second offensive military campaign was carried out in the winter of 1942/1943. Just like the campaign of the first military winter, it included two stages and was carried out after repulsing a powerful enemy strategic offensive. But there were also differences from the counteroffensive near Moscow. It was prepared in advance, for a long time and took place in a more favorable environment, with an approximately equal, but constantly changing balance of forces and means in favor of the Soviet troops, and with a consistent expansion of the strategic offensive front.

As part of this campaign, Soviet troops conducted four strategic offensive operations: Stalingrad, Voronezh-Kharkov, to break the blockade of Leningrad and the North Caucasus, as well as a number of independent front-line (groups of fronts) operations with particular tasks. The campaign started with a move

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South-Western, Don and Stalingrad fronts in a counteroffensive, as a result of which the 330,000-strong Stalingrad grouping of the enemy was surrounded, the Romanian and German-Italian troops on the Middle Don were defeated, and an attempt to unblock it was thwarted. Then, at the second stage, in the course of a series of successive operations, the German and Hungarian troops on the Upper Don were defeated, the encircled enemy grouping in the Stalingrad region was liquidated, the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh and Voronezh-Kastornoe enemy groups were defeated, most of the Northern Caucasus. Developing success, the Soviet troops liberated Kursk and Kharkov, reached the approaches to the Dnieper. But as a result of a powerful German counter-offensive in the Donbass and near Kharkov and a sharp weakening of the offensive capabilities of the Soviet troops, they were driven back in these areas by 100-120 km and were again forced to go on the defensive.

Despite this, the strategic offensive of the Soviet troops in the winter campaign of 1942/1943 was of great importance. It led to a sharp change in the situation on the entire Soviet-German front, marked the beginning of a radical change in the Great Patriotic War and in the entire Second World War. The enemy suffered huge losses: 1,700,000 men, over 3,500 tanks, 24,000 guns and mortars, 4,300 combat aircraft. For the first time, it was possible to surround and destroy a number of its large groups. Almost 100 German, Romanian, Italian and Hungarian divisions were defeated. In the central, southwestern and southern directions the enemy was pushed back 300-700 km to the west. In the northwestern and western directions, the blockade of Leningrad was broken, the enemy grouping in the Velikiye Luki region was defeated, and the Demyansk and Rzhev-Vyazma bridgeheads were liquidated. The expulsion of the invaders from the occupied Soviet territories began.

After an operational pause and the reflection of the third strategic offensive of the Wehrmacht near Kursk in the summer and autumn of 1943, Soviet troops conducted eight strategic offensive operations. The most important of them were Orel, Belgorod-Kharkov, Donbass, Smolensk and Kiev. From August to November 1943, the offensive was carried out on a front stretching over 2,000 km. 9 out of 12 Soviet fronts took part in it. The total depth of the advance of troops ranged from 300 to 600 km.

During the offensive, Soviet troops inflicted a serious defeat on the Army Groups "Center" and "South", liberated the Donbass, the Left-bank Ukraine and the Taman Peninsula, as well as such large cities as Orel, Kharkov, Belgorod, Smolensk, Gomel, Poltava, Dnepropetrovsk and Kiev. On a 750-kilometer stretch, they crossed the Dnieper and broke through the so-called "Eastern Wall", with the help of which the enemy hoped to stabilize the front. Thus, a radical turning point in the war was completed. During the campaign, Soviet troops defeated 118 enemy divisions, in other words, up to half of all Wehrmacht forces concentrated on the Soviet-German front by the beginning of the summer of 1943.

And although the German command in late November and early December once again tried to launch powerful counterattacks in order to eliminate the bridgeheads captured by Soviet troops on the Dnieper and return Kiev, it did not achieve its goal. From that time until the end of the war, the Soviet Armed Forces firmly held the strategic initiative.

In the winter-spring offensive campaign of 1944, the strategic offensive was carried out mainly in the northwestern, southwestern and southern sections of the Soviet-German front. A number of separate front-line, three major strategic offensive operations were carried out: the Dnieper-Carpathian, Leningrad-Novgorod and Crimean. They were attended by 10 fronts, a separate Primor

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the army, the forces of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, as well as the Azov military flotilla.

During them, the blockade of Leningrad was completely lifted, Right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea were liberated, including strategically important ports and naval bases on the Black Sea - Sevastopol, Odessa, Nikolaev and Kherson. The enemy again suffered significant losses. 172 divisions and 7 brigades were defeated, of which 30 divisions and 6 brigades were completely destroyed®. For 2.5-3.5 months, Soviet troops advanced 220-280 km in the north-western direction, and from 250 to 450 km in the south. They crossed the Southern Bug, Dniester and Prut rivers, reached the approaches to southern Poland, Czechoslovakia, and invaded the northern regions of Romania. Thus, for the first time during the years of this war, hostilities were transferred outside the USSR.

The summer-autumn offensive campaign of 1944 turned out to be even more difficult and intense. In the course of its strategic offensive spread to the entire Soviet-German front. It was conducted by all 11 fronts, 9 of them, and even 10 at the same time. For 6.5 months, they carried out nine strategic offensive operations, very diverse in form, content and methods of operation of the troops. At first, the main efforts were concentrated in the center, and then on both wings of the Soviet-German front. Sequentially inflicted powerful blows, as a rule, took the enemy by surprise, forced him to rush about, hastily transfer forces from one direction to another, constantly being late, he did not have time to occupy the prepared rear defensive lines.

In June and August, three Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts carried out the largest Belorussian strategic offensive operation of the war. As a result, its Soviet troops inflicted a decisive defeat on one of the most powerful enemy groups - Army Group Center, liberated Belarus and the southern part of the Baltic states, entered Poland and invaded East Prussia.

With a certain ledge in time, the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive operation conducted by the 1st Ukrainian Front began. In the course of it, Soviet troops reached the Vistula and captured a bridgehead on its left bank. In August 1944, the forces of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts carried out the Iasi-Chisinau operation, as a result of which Romania was withdrawn from the war on the side of Germany, and in addition, conditions were created for the development of an offensive in the territories of Hungary and Bulgaria.

In September and November 1944, with the participation of 9 fronts, four strategic offensive operations were carried out - East Carpathian, Baltic, Belgrade and Petsamo-Kirkenes. The Budapest strategic offensive operation, which began at the same time, ended only the following year.

The operations carried out in the summer and autumn of 1944 were, as a rule, distinguished by their large scope. They included the entire arsenal of strategic actions related to breaking through the heavily fortified enemy defenses, cutting, encircling and destroying large enemy groupings, successively forcing water barriers, overcoming mountainous areas and repulsing powerful enemy counterattacks. In the course of them, Soviet troops destroyed and captured 96 divisions and 24 brigades, defeated 219 divisions and 22 brigades of the Wehrmacht and Germany's allies, advanced 600-1,100 km to the west, reached lines that made it possible to inflict final blows on the enemy! ".

At the same time, these operations were of great political significance. As a result, the military-political and economic position of Germany deteriorated sharply: it almost completely lost the occupied territories in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, lost most of its European allies (Romania,

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History of the Second World War 1939-1945

Scheme 46. Counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow (December 5, 1941 - January 7, 1942)

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Bulgaria, Finland), lost the last oil sources in Romania and Hungary. In addition, by the end of 1944, the neutral states had stopped supplying Germany with strategic materials. Starting from the second half of 1944, its industry began to sharply reduce the production of weapons, military equipment and other important products. The morale of the Wehrmacht personnel and the population was rapidly declining. All this created a favorable environment for the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition for a victorious end to the war.

In the final offensive military campaign in Europe (from January to May 1945), the national offensive strategy reached its highest level in its development. During this period, the strategic offensive was carried out simultaneously by 8-9 fronts on the entire Soviet-German front. In a strip more than 2,100 km wide, from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans, Soviet troops on the territory of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria, as well as directly in Germany itself, conducted eight strategic offensive operations. Vistula-Oder, East Prussian, East Pomeranian, Berlin and Prague are the largest of them. During them, the Soviet troops, together with the allied armies, completely defeated the armed forces of the Third Reich and forced Nazi Germany to unconditional surrender.

Almost all offensive operations of this campaign developed at a high pace. For 4 months, the Soviet fronts advanced more than 800 km in the center of Europe, took Berlin, joined the Allied forces in Schleswig-Holstein, on the Elbe, in the Sudetes and in Western Austria. Such a finale is clear evidence of the triumph of the national military strategy.

During the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces used two forms of strategic offensive operations: strategic counter-offensive and strategic offensive operations. Both of these were usually carried out by a group of fronts with decisive goals.

A counteroffensive is a special type of offensive, for it is closely connected with the preceding defense and has its own characteristic features and peculiarities. The conditions necessary for a counteroffensive were usually created in the course of heavy defensive battles. In turn, the counteroffensive completed the defense and created a favorable environment for the transition of the Armed Forces to a general strategic offensive.

Counteroffensive operations are most characteristic of the first period of the war. It was with them that the first three offensive campaigns began: winter 1941/1942, winter [942/1943 and summer-autumn 1943].

The main goal of a strategic counteroffensive was usually to complete the defeat of the main strike groupings of the enemy, disrupt his offensive, capture strategically important areas or lines, and seize the strategic initiative. Most often, the counteroffensive was carried out by 2-4 fronts with the involvement of large strategic reserves. In a number of cases, not only the fronts defending in a given sector were involved in it (as was the case in the counteroffensive near Moscow), but also the fronts operating in adjacent directions (the counteroffensive near Stalingrad and Kursk).

The most important factors that determined the need and possibility of going over to the counteroffensive were: the depletion of the enemy strike groupings, the formation of weak and vulnerable spots in his operational position, the stabilization of the front of the defending troops, even if in separate sectors; approach to them with fresh reserves. These conditions were decisive in the transition of the Soviet troops to the counteroffensive in 1941, and 1942, and 1943. But they were formed and implemented in different ways. So, the counteroffensive near Moscow several

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weeks. And the weakening of the enemy groupings was achieved mainly due to the stubborn resistance of the defending troops in combination with frontal counterattacks. The transition to the counteroffensive was carried out by the defending fronts, reinforced by reserves. Moreover, strikes against enemy groupings were inflicted at a time when these groups were still continuing active offensive operations.

Near Stalingrad, the counteroffensive was being prepared for 2 months during intense defensive battles. The enemy's shock groupings were bled to death primarily with the help of counterattacks on the flanks, combined with stubborn defense at the tip of the "wedge" of his offensive. The transition to the counteroffensive was carried out by groupings of troops created in advance, when the enemy had already gone over to the defensive, but had not yet created defensive lines in depth.

Finally, near Kursk, the general preliminary preparation for the transition to the counteroffensive lasted 3 months, but due to the rapid development of events during the defensive stage of the battle, its direct preparation was carried out as soon as possible. The counteroffensive began in those directions where the enemy had been creating a system of heavily fortified defensive lines for a long time and had a grouping corresponding to them (the Oryol direction). Then it spread to the areas where the German troops had just retreated after the failure of their offensive (the Belgorod-Kharkov direction). Moreover, the Soviet troops exhausted the enemy strike groups during the defense, primarily with their powerful counterattacks.

In view of the different balance of forces, the conditions for the development of the counteroffensive were also not the same. Near Moscow, during the transition to the counteroffensive, the numerical superiority in personnel, tanks and artillery was on the side of the enemy. Near Stalingrad, the Soviet fronts, having approximately the same number of personnel and combat aircraft as the Germans, had 1.5 times more guns and mortars, 2.2 times more tanks! Near Kursk, both in terms of the number of personnel and in the number of all types of military equipment, Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy by 2-3 times in the Oryol direction and 1.3-4 times in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction! 3.

Depending on the situation, the transition to a counteroffensive was carried out at the final stages of defensive operations, either by developing counterattacks into an offensive by the main forces (near Moscow), or by a simultaneous and sudden strikes in adjacent directions in combination with an offensive from the front (near Kursk).

As experience has shown, the success of a counteroffensive depended on many factors: taking into account the balance of forces and means and the dynamics of its development; correct choice of the direction of the main shock; the ability to create favorable conditions for the transition to a counteroffensive in the course of defense by inflicting heavy damage on the enemy, holding important lines and bridgeheads; the timely covert regrouping of forces, the creation of strong reserves and their timely entry into battle; the expedient determination of initial lines for the deployment of troops, the preservation of forces until the transition to a counteroffensive; skillful choice of the moment of transition to the counteroffensive; ensuring the secrecy of preparation and suddenness of the transition of troops to offensive operations.

Of particular importance was the correct choice of the directions of strikes and the moment of transition to the counteroffensive. Most often, strikes were delivered against the weakened flanks of the enemy strike groupings (Stalingrad, Kursk), but in some cases they were also carried out from the front (near Moscow). The moment of transition to the counteroffensive

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was chosen in such a way as to take the enemy by surprise, to attack him at the moment when he was no longer able to continue the
offensive and at the same time was not quite ready for defense, since he did not have time to regroup and gain a foothold on the
achieved lines. In essence, this was the case near Moscow, and near Stalingrad, and near Kursk.

It is characteristic that the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops was carried out using the most decisive methods of defeating the
enemy. These are the encirclement and annihilation near Stalingrad, the dissection of a large strategic grouping with a powerful blow to a
great depth and the destruction of it in parts in the Belgorod-Kharkov operation near Kursk, the fragmentation of the enemy's
strategic grouping into isolated parts with their subsequent destruction by a series of powerful blows in several directions with the
development them in depth and towards the flanks (near Moscow, the Oryol operation near Kursk). These operations, especially in the
counter-offensive near Stalingrad and Kursk, were distinguished by high intensity and dynamism due to the use of large masses of armored
and mechanized troops (tank armies, separate tank and mechanized corps), as well as a constant build-up of the efforts of
troops by bringing fresh army troops into battle. associations from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The
introduction of such forces reliably ensured the achievement of the objectives of the operation.

In the course of the war, the scale of the counter-offensive, its scope, increased from campaign to campaign. This is especially

manifested itself in the quantitative composition of the attracted forces and means, as a result of which the effectiveness of the actions of the troops increased. In all cases (especially in the winter campaign of 1942/1943), a successfully carried out counteroffensive, as a rule, dramatically changed the general military-political and military-strategic situation and created the conditions for a transition to a general strategic offensive. In fact, counter-offensive operations were the first stage of such an offensive.

Typical strategic offensive operations were prepared and carried out either after more or less long operational pauses, or after a successfully carried out counteroffensive, or as a development of previous offensive operations. Depending on the situation, their preparation was carried out at different times - from several weeks to several months. If the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sought to launch the offensive as early as possible, then the front commanders, on the contrary, most often asked to extend the preparation. It is extremely difficult to determine unequivocally who was right here. On the one hand, the extension of the preparation period for the operation ensured a more complete readiness of the troops, but on the other hand, this was often fraught with the loss of surprise, the favorable moment for striking the enemy, not to mention the fact that he also got the opportunity to better prepare for reflection of blows. The specific time for the start of operations was usually set by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command itself, based on the nature of the tasks facing the troops and their real, even if partial, READINESS.

The methods of conducting strategic offensive operations and their development were, of course, greatly influenced by the plans of the Wehrmacht command, its views on the role and construction of strategic defense, the features of its organization in various campaigns of the war and in various strategic directions.

In the winter campaigns of 1941 / 1942 and 1942 / 1943, when the German leadership had not yet lost hope of victory, in strategic defense it pursued the goal of exhausting and bleeding the Soviet troops, gaining time and preparing the conditions for the resumption of the strategic offensive. At that time, the German defense was distinguished by exceptional stubbornness in the battles for holding the occupied lines, which was combined with flexible maneuver of troops and strong counterattacks (for example,

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measures near Moscow, Stalingrad and Kharkov). For such a defense, the Wehrmacht paid with heavy losses, but it nevertheless played its role, because in many cases it made it possible to restrain the offensive of the Soviet troops, and even seize the initiative again. In any case, it was precisely in this way that the military leadership of Germany managed to overcome the crisis both in the winter of 1941/1942 and in the winter of 1942/1943, restore the stability of the front, create conditions for the second and third strategic offensives, first in the south, and then on the central sector of the Soviet-German front.

From the summer of 1943 until the end of the war, the Wehrmacht command on the entire Eastern Front switched to strategic defense as the main type of military operations. In the campaigns of 1943-1945. the general goal of the German defense was to enable the Third Reich to survive, to drag out the war in the expectation that the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition would begin disagreements that would lead to its split. These plans, however, were constantly frustrated. Under the blows of the Soviet troops, first on one, then on the other sector of the front, vast gaps arose, and more and more forces were required to eliminate them.

Meanwhile, the German leadership did not have unity in its approach to solving the problems that arose in connection with this. The General Staff of the Ground Forces (OKH) and most of the commanders of the army groups demanded a reduction in the front line in order to release troops and create reserves. On the contrary, Hitler and the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) sought to hold the occupied lines to the last opportunity. However, both one and the other way allowed only for some time to stabilize the front.

In ensuring the stability of the defense, the Germans paid special attention to the retention of natural boundaries: large rivers, lacustrine-swampy and mountainous regions, the advance equipping of defensive zones, echeloned to a depth of 200-250 km or more. Too much importance was also attached to the holding by comparatively small garrisons of the besieged cities (Velikie Luki, Velizh, Poznan, Breslavl, Kustrin, Budapest, Koenigsberg), which were declared "fortresses" by Hitler's order.

In the Wehrmacht, the defensive operation of an army group was considered the main form of strategic defense. As in the offensive, it usually included from 2 to 4 armies, 50-80 infantry and tank divisions. The width of the defense zone of an army group varied from 200-300 km to 800-1000 km, and the depth from 60 to 100 km. Up to 80% or more of the forces were usually deployed in the first echelon in the tactical zone, and a minimum was left in reserve.

When holding important lines and areas, the enemy troops showed great stubbornness and high activity. Defensive actions were usually accompanied by strong counterattacks, which in some cases developed into a counteroffensive (in the Donbass, near Kharkov and Kiev in 1943, near Lake Balaton in 1945). The Germans constantly improved the defense, which required new and ever-increasing efforts to overcome it. The weak point of the strategic defense, as well as the strategic offensive, was the absence of strong reserves in the German high command.

The goal of most strategic offensive operations carried out by the Soviet troops in the first two periods of the war was usually the defeat of large enemy strategic groupings (from 30-40 to 60-80 divisions), the capture of politically, economically and strategically important areas (for example, the Northern Caucasus, Donbass, Crimea, Kiev industrial region) or strategic borders (for example, along the Desna, Dnieper, Vistula rivers, state border), liberation of administrative territories (Baltic,

Belarus, Moldova). In the third period of the war, the goals of strategic offensive operations were also set: the liberation of the countries occupied by the enemy (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia), the consistent withdrawal from the war on the side of Germany of its allies (Romania, Finland, Hungary), the completion her destruction. Of course, to achieve these goals, not one, but several operations of various sizes were required.

In most cases, strategic offensive operations were carried out by a group of fronts (2-4). But sometimes important strategic tasks were also solved by the forces of one front (for example, in the Kyiv, Lvov-Sandomierz, Petsamo-Kirkenes, etc.).

Two main methods were used in the strategic offensive system: successive operations along the front and in depth, and simultaneous operations in several, and sometimes in all strategic or operational directions. The choice of each of them was carried out taking into account the situation, the capabilities of friendly troops and the enemy, as well as the probable nature of his actions.

Successive strategic offensive operations along the front were carried out in the campaigns of 1942-1944, when there was no possibility of securing a decisive superiority over the enemy in all directions, with a total length of the Soviet-German front of 4,000-6,100 km. The use of this method of action made it possible to beat the enemy in parts, to shake his strategic front. At the same time, the Soviet troops had the opportunity to consistently concentrate the required amount of forces and means in chosen directions, choose the time convenient for going on the offensive in certain sectors of the front, and achieve major operational results, which then ensured overall strategic success. Meanwhile, the enemy, forced to disperse his forces, was late in taking the necessary response measures.

This is exactly what happened in the winter of 1942-1943. The Stalingrad, North Caucasian, Ostrogozhsk-Rossoshansk, Voronezh-Kastornensk and Kursk groups of the enemy were successively defeated. In the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, which completed the Oryol and Belogorodsk-Kharkov operations, carried out a major strategic operation to liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine, and after forcing the Dnieper, they conducted new operations in the Gomel, Kiev-Zhytomyr and Kirovograd directions. In 1944, Soviet troops successively shifted their efforts from the north-western direction to the south (Crimean operation), then to the western direction (Belarusian operation), and then to the south-west (Lvov-Sandomierz and Yassy-Kishinev operations) and , finally, again to the northwest (Baltic operation).

Usually, each new strategic grouping began to operate at the moment when the enemy opposing it was already significantly weakened due to the transfer of forces to other areas where Soviet troops were advancing. Thus, the crushing blows and the rapid offensive of the Soviet troops in Belarus and Western Ukraine in June and July 1944 forced the German command to transfer significant forces here from the Baltic states and Romania and thereby weaken the army groups "North" and "Southern Ukraine". ". This was immediately taken advantage of by the Soviet command, which at a favorable moment launched operations in the northwestern and southwestern directions.

Carrying out successive operations in depth has found wide application. The military actions in the Balkans are especially indicative in this respect. Here in 1944, almost without operational pauses, five operations were carried out one after another for 4 months: Iasi-Chisinau, Transylvania, Debrecen

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Skye, Belgrade, Budapest. The total depth of advance of the Soviet troops amounted to | 100 km.

In the 1945 campaign in Europe, when the power of the Soviet Armed Forces increased even more, in the conditions of a sharp reduction in the length of the Soviet-German front (to 2,200 km), the strategic offensive was carried out through simultaneous operations in all strategic directions. With this method, in the shortest possible time, fragmentation and dissection of the enemy's strategic front of defense, encirclement and liquidation of his groupings simultaneously in a number of strategic directions were achieved, while the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to maneuver forces and means to repel the blows of Soviet troops.

As part of a strategic offensive operation, several simultaneous operations of fronts of the first echelon were usually carried out. In turn, each front carried out in its direction two, and sometimes even

three consecutive operations. At the same time, there were cases when the fronts of the first echelon launched an offensive not simultaneously, but successively.

The scope of strategic offensive operations was characterized by a significant number of forces and means participating in them, a large width of the offensive zone, a constantly increasing depth of troop advance, different duration of operations and offensive rates. In the course of the war, the range indicators for all these parameters changed. This is clearly seen from the data in Table 7.

First of all, the number of troops and combat assets participating in the operations steadily increased. Thus, the composition of forces and means involved in the final strategic offensive operations, in comparison with the first period of the war, increased by 2-2.3 times in terms of personnel, 4.4-5.4 times in terms of guns and mortars, tanks and self-propelled guns - 6.7-9 times, and for aircraft - 5-7.5 times! In the largest operations of 1944/1945. Usually from 100 to 216 divisions, from 16 to 41.6 thousand guns and mortars, from 1.9 to 7 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, from 2 to 7.5 thousand aircraft took part.

In the course of operations, the Stavka tried, to the extent possible, to strengthen the composition of the advancing troops. For example, with the development of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky strategic offensive operation in 1942, the Western and Kalinin fronts received an additional 29 divisions and 33 brigades; in the Stalingrad offensive operation in the winter of 1942/1943. - 5 tank and 3 mechanized corps, as well as 6 brigades; in the North Caucasus in January-February 1943 - 5 divisions and 6 brigades; in the Dnieper-Carpathian operation of 1944 - 6 tank and 2 mechanized corps, as well as 33 divisions, etc. 106

At the same time, the composition of the enemy forces was gradually reduced, which contributed to an increase in the spatial indicators of the scope, especially the depth and pace of the offensive. Thus, if in 1943 strategic operations developed in most cases to a depth of 100 to 300 km, with an advance rate of rifle troops from 1.5-2.5 to 7-10 and tank and mechanized formations from 4 to 15 km in day, then in the operations of 1944 the depth of advance of troops reached 300-600 km, with an average daily rate of advance of rifle troops of 20-25, and of tank troops, 30-65 km per day. The average width of the offensive zone of a group of fronts was 400-800 km, and in major operations it reached 1,000-1,400 km. The duration of operations ranged from 10 to 51 days, although some operations were stretched for 2-3 months or more! 7.

As the experience of the war showed, in most cases the success of a strategic offensive was decisively determined by the skillful choice of the directions of the main attack and the resolute concentration of superior forces and means on them.

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When choosing the direction of the main strike, the Supreme Command Headquarters usually proceeded from the requirements of strategy, politics and economics. Most often, the main blow was delivered on the most vulnerable sectors of the enemy's front, in the directions that provided access to the rear of the most powerful grouping of his troops and its defeat. At the same time, the possibility of a massive use of large military masses in this direction was taken into account, and in the political and economic plan, the presence of important political and economic objects, as well as the possibility of the priority defeat of German allied troops. At the same time, in one case, priority was given to political, in the other case, to economic considerations. But strategic motives almost always played a decisive role. Because of this, most often strikes were delivered primarily against the most dangerous enemy groupings that threatened the vital centers of the country or covered such centers.

So, in the winter campaign of 1941/1942. The main efforts of the Soviet troops were concentrated in the western direction directly against the enemy's main strategic grouping, Army Group Center, which was advancing on the capital of the USSR. This made it possible to avert a direct threat from Moscow, to provide favorable conditions for the operation of the Moscow industrial region and the most important economically and strategically important railway junction of the country.

Winter 1942/1943 the main efforts were concentrated in the southwestern direction, where the most powerful and active enemy grouping was again operating. Moreover, this time the blows were delivered on the weakened flanks of Army Group B, and then from the front and along the flank of Army Group A and at the junction of Army Groups B and Center. The defeat of these forces led to a sharp change in the situation on the entire Soviet-German front, created the prerequisites for the liberation of the Kharkov industrial region and the Donbass. Subsequently, an attempt was made to shift the main efforts to the western direction, but it failed due to the lack of free forces and the need for an urgent transfer of reserves near Kursk and Kharkov to repel the German February-March counteroffensive.

In the summer of 1943, the main efforts of the Soviet troops were also initially concentrated in the southwestern and southern directions, and then they were transferred to the center. Moreover, in connection with Stalin's instructions about the need to quickly oust the enemy from the occupied territories, the blows were delivered not on the flanks of the main groups of enemy troops, but from the front.

In the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the main blow was first delivered in the western direction. This led to the defeat of the enemy's strongest central grouping and the breakdown of its entire strategic front, made it possible to complete the liberation of Belarus and the Lithuanian SSR, the eastern regions of Poland, opened the way for the deployment of a subsequent offensive in the shortest, Warsaw-Berlin direction to the heart of Germany. In addition, the choice of this direction ensured the achievement of surprise. The German command was firmly convinced that in the summer of 1944 the main operations of the Soviet troops were deployed in the southwestern direction and kept the strongest grouping of troops here. When the enemy weakened this direction, the Soviet troops shifted their main efforts here. This made it possible to release

Let's ask Ukraine, withdraw Romania from the war and transfer hostilities to the territory of Hungary. Moreover, this time the blows were delivered mainly on the flanks of the enemy's main strategic groupings with the aim of their successive encirclement and destruction separately.

In the 1945 campaign in Europe, the main blow was dealt in the western direction. Soviet troops advanced by the shortest route to the central regions of Germany, to Berlin, and aimed against the main enemy forces, the destruction of which led to the final defeat of the Wehrmacht. It was also taken into account

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that in this direction, which had a good network of roads, it was possible to deploy and use large masses of troops and military equipment (in particular, 5 tank armies), as well as to best coordinate the efforts of the Soviet troops with the actions of the allies advancing from the turn of the river. Rhine to the east. Attacks on the enemy in this campaign were delivered both from the flanks and from the front. As a rule, they were directed at the most important administrative, political and economic centers of the enemy, primarily at Berlin, Koenigsberg, Prague, Vienna, Budapest and Belgrade.

The transition to such large-scale strategic offensive operations raised with particular acuteness the question of how to create powerful strike groupings in the main axes. In the early years of the war, this art was mastered by one enemy. Gradually, the Soviet command also mastered it.

In the first period of the war, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, when organizing an offensive, very often allowed for the dispersal of forces. Its desire to solve problems on a broad front, with a general lack of troops, only led to the fact that in the main directions too weak groupings were often created, which were unable to overcome the enemy defenses, not to mention the development of success in great depth. However, with each successive campaign, more and more powerful groupings of troops were created in the directions of the main attacks, the degree of massing of forces increased, and an ever greater superiority over the enemy was ensured.

At the beginning of the winter campaign of 1942/1943, for example, two operational groupings of troops were created in the Stalingrad direction, two in the North Caucasian direction, and two in the Voronezh direction. And to conduct the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, 4 strategic strike groups were formed: in the Smolensk, Oryol, Belgorod-Kharkov and Donbas directions. A year later, before the start of the summer-autumn campaign, 4 strategic strike groups were also deployed: in Eastern Karelia and on the Karelian Isthmus, in Belarus, in Western Ukraine and in Moldova. Each of them included several front-line formations, from 600,000 to 2.5 million people, up to 40,000 guns and mortars, over 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, from 700 to 7,000 or more combat aircraft !®.

The deployment of such forces made it possible to achieve a significant advantage over the enemy in the area of the most important strategic operations. Thus, in the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, 36.3% of the personnel, 37.1% of guns and mortars, 73.2% of tanks and self-propelled guns, 41% of all aviation in the army. This made it possible to achieve here superiority over the enemy in terms of troop personnel by 2 times, in artillery - 3.8 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns - 5.8 times, and in combat aircraft - 3.9 times! An even more tangible advantage in manpower and equipment was achieved in the Warsaw-Berlin direction in the 1945 campaign in Europe. With a general superiority over the enemy by the beginning of this year in personnel by 1.8 times, in artillery - 1.9 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns - 1.5 times, in combat aircraft - 3.6 times times, the Soviet troops during the Vistula-Oder operation had on a 480-kilometer section (22% of the total length of the Soviet-German front) an almost 4-fold superiority in people, 5.7-6.7-fold superiority in artillery and tanks, almost 8-fold in aviation! 0.

To conduct strategic offensive operations, in turn, 3-4 operational groupings of troops were created, which included 70-80% of all forces and means of the fronts. At the same time, great importance was attached to their qualitative characteristics: strike and fire power, maneuverability, and combat stability. In the second and third periods of the war, the main strike groups

1. The encirclement of the enemy grouping The application of two simultaneous strikes in converging directions

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Yassko-Chisinau operation (August 20-29, 1944)

2. Dissection of the enemy grouping Delivering a deep cutting blow to the entire depth of the strategic location of the opposing enemy grouping

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m. th ARMY GROUP "CENTER"!

East Prussian operation (January 13 - April 25, 1945)

Scheme 49a. Forms of strategic offensive operations and methods of defeating enemy groupings in the Great Patriotic War

3. Crushing the enemy grouping Deploying a number of Idars on a wide front in several directions with the development of an offensive in depth and towards the flanks

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Oryol operation (July 12-August 18, 1943)

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4. A combination of several forms of operations and methods of defeating enemy groupings At the first stage, the encirclement of the Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Minsk groupings At the second stage, the fragmentation of the enemy grouping by developing an offensive along divergent directions

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Belarusian operation (June 23-August 29, 1944)

Scheme 496 Forms of strategic offensive operations and methods of defeating enemy groupings in the Great Patriotic War

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wok, as a rule, included tank armies, tank and mechanized corps. Their use made it possible to ensure the rapid development of a tactical breakthrough into an operational one, to quickly reach deep behind enemy lines, surround his main forces, and, if necessary, transfer efforts from one direction to another.

Forms and methods of defeating the enemy in strategic offensive operations differed greatly: encirclement and destruction of its large groupings; cutting his forces with a powerful blow to a great depth and defeating them in parts; crushing the opposing strategic grouping with a series of powerful blows in several directions with the development of success in depth and towards the flanks. In many operations, these methods were combined. The choice of this or that method of defeat was carried out taking into account the specific situation, the balance of forces, the nature of the theater of operations, the outline of the front line, the position and capabilities of friendly troops and the enemy. Therefore, each new offensive operation, as a rule, differed from the previous ones.

An important achievement of the national military strategy during the war years was the conduct of operations to encircle and destroy large groupings of enemy troops. They found especially wide application in the second and third periods of the war. During their conduct, two forms of maneuver were mainly used: inflicting simultaneous strikes in two directions with a breakthrough of the defense on the flanks of the enemy grouping and the development of an offensive in depth along converging directions (Stalingrad, Korsun-Shevchenko, Iasi-Kishinev, Prague, Manchurian operations); inflicting one powerful enveloping strike with pressing the enemy grouping to the sea and other insurmountable obstacles (operations to liberate the Baltic states, East Prussian and East Pomeranian operations). The encirclement was carried out both at the very beginning of the operation and during its development, as a result of operational pursuit (105 thousand people in the Minsk region in July 1944 and 60 thousand people in the Poznan region in Jan: Var 1945) !'.

A classic example of the encirclement of a large enemy grouping was the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation in the winter of 1942/1943. Aud: But in this case, the destruction of the encircled troops dragged on for a long time - 62 days. Subsequently, this task was usually solved much faster. In 1944-1945. the destruction of the encircled enemy groupings was carried out most often in 2-8 days (in Vitebsk and Bobrusk - within 2-3, and in Minsk - in 7 days) without slowing down the pace of the advance of troops on the outer front of the encirclement. This was achieved through the improvement of methods for creating internal and external fronts of encirclement, the rapid fragmentation, dismemberment and destruction of encircled troops in parts. In the last operations of the war, the encirclement, dismemberment and destruction of the enemy essentially merged into a single process.

The success of encirclement operations was ensured by the use of large forces of armored and mechanized troops. This made it possible to achieve high rates of attack, to carry out the encirclement earlier than the enemy.

managed to organize resistance. It was also of great importance that, along with the isolation of enemy groupings on the ground, they were blockaded from the air, and from the sea in coastal areas.

From the second period of the war, operations with the dissection of opposing enemy strategic groupings began to be widely used in the strategic offensive system. The most characteristic in this regard were the Belgorod-Kharkov operation (August 1943), the operation of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts in the Right-Bank Ukraine (March-April 1944), and the Vistula-Oder operation (Jan.

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var-February 1945). In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, for the first time in the years of the war, the main blow was delivered by the adjacent wings of the troops of two fronts (Voronezh and Steppe) with the introduction of two tank armies into battle to develop success. Such a massive use of troops in the direction of the main attack ensured a decisive superiority over the enemy (in the areas of breakthrough - 3-4 times in terms of people and more than 10 times in terms of artillery), a quick breakthrough of his defense, and then dissection to great depths."

Among the offensive operations to cut the enemy's strategic grouping, the Vistula-Oder operation is especially indicative. Along with the rapid advance of strike groupings of troops in depth, during it, a maneuver was skillfully used by formations to bypass and cover German troops in the Warsaw region and in the Silesian industrial region, as well as to secure the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front from enemy attacks from Eastern Pomerania .

Dissection operations were carried out more and more decisively from year to year. Their spatial scope steadily increased; ever larger enemy groupings were subjected to defeat. Thus, if in the Belgorod-Kharkov operation a cutting blow was delivered to a depth of about 140, in Proskurovsko-Chernivtsi - 250, then in the Vistula-Oder - already to a depth of almost 500 km!3. In general, the experience of the war has shown that cutting operations are the most effective way to defeat large enemy groupings.

Under favorable conditions, such as the development of such a method of defeating the enemy, operations were carried out with the crushing of the enemy's strategic grouping by inflicting a series of powerful blows on it. Moreover, they were carried out on a broad front and in several areas with their development in depth along parallel or divergent directions. As a result, the grouping could be divided into isolated parts, which then made it easier to destroy the enemy separately. A striking example of such actions can be the Oryol offensive operation (July-August [943), the Chernigov-Poltava operation (August-September 1943), the Nizhnedneprovsk operation (September-December 1943), the East Pomeranian Ransky operation (February-April 1945). The use of this method made it possible to covertly prepare the operation, made it difficult for the enemy to determine the directions of the main attack, and dispersed his attention and forces on a wide front.

In many strategic offensive operations, especially in the final campaigns of the war, various methods of defeating the enemy were organically combined, complementing each other. Typical in this respect is the Belorussian strategic offensive operation (June-August 1944). In the course of it, the enemy's defenses were broken through simultaneously in six sectors that were far from one another, which led to the crushing of his forces into parts. Then, groups of German troops were dissected, surrounded and destroyed in three areas: near Vitebsk, Bobruisk and east of Minsk. After that, the fronts delivered powerful blows in divergent directions to dismember the enemy grouping in its entire depth.

An important role in ensuring the success of the offensive was played by questions of preparing strategic operations and achieving surprise in troop actions. Strategic offensive operations during the war years were prepared either in the course of counter-offensive operations that preceded them, or during the period of operational or strategic pauses, or at the end of offensive combat operations that had previously been carried out in the same strategic directions. The most thorough preparation was carried out during strategic pauses, which usually lasted from 2 to 4 months. In all other cases, it was carried out in a short time, as

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as a rule, in a dynamic environment, which forced us to constantly refine plans for future actions.

Along with operational planning, special attention during the preparatory period was usually paid to replenishing troops with people and military equipment, stockpiling materiel, creating reserves, combat training, equipping starting areas, organizing interaction, command and control, and, finally, deploying shock troops. groupings of troops in the breakthrough areas.

Surprise, as one of the main success factors, was a matter of special concern for the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the commands of directions and fronts, both in preparation and in the course of strategic operations. Surprise was of the greatest importance in the operations of the first and second periods of the war, when the superiority of Soviet troops over the enemy was relatively small. However, it retained its significance in all subsequent operations, as it made it possible to achieve tangible results in a shorter period of time and forced the enemy to make major miscalculations.

To achieve surprise, the following were usually of decisive importance: the concentration and unexpected deployment of large reserves into battle for the enemy, the delivery of the first blows of greater force than the enemy expected, the use of powerful tank groupings in the main directions, the conduct of deep offensive operations at high rates, rapid transfer of efforts from one strategic direction to another, building up successive strikes in operational and strategic depth. Operational camouflage and strategic disinformation also played a large role in achieving surprise. In many cases, in this way it was possible to disorient the enemy. False actions often forced the German

command to make erroneous or ill-considered decisions.

In the Moscow strategic offensive operation, for example, the following factors contributed significantly to the achievement of surprise: the transition to a counteroffensive without an operational pause, the preliminary deployment of front-line counteroffensive operations near Tikhvin and Rostov, on the southern and northern wings of the Soviet-German front. It was they who diverted the attention of the Wehrmacht command from the main danger for its troops.

In the winter campaign of 1942/1943, during the Stalingrad counter-offensive operation, an important role was played by the deep secrecy of all measures for the preparation of the offensive, especially the regrouping of strategic reserves, the successful operational camouflage in the fronts, the active operations of the Soviet troops against army group "Center" in the Velikoluksky and Rzhev-Vyazma directions, the formation and location of strategic reserves mainly to the east and southeast of Moscow. All this made it possible to "convince" the enemy that, as if in the winter of 1942/1943, the main events will unfold precisely on the central, and not on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. The strike on the right flank of the Stalingrad grouping of German troops was a complete surprise for the Wehrmacht command.

It was much more difficult to achieve surprise when preparing offensive operations in the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. The enemy learned in advance and quite accurately about the intentions of the Soviet command after the completion of the Kursk strategic defensive operation. And it was difficult to hide them with such a concentration of forces in the areas of the Oryol and Kursk ledges. Along with the development of the Oryol operation, an important role here was played by the delivery of a powerful cutting blow on the Belgorod-Kharkov direction by the adjacent wings of the two fronts, and without a long operational pause, and then the introduction into battle

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Steppe Front to Belgorod, Kharkov and further to the west, as well as the rapid expansion of the offensive front with strikes in adjacent directions.

The measures taken by the Soviet command for strategic disinformation in the strategic offensive operations of the winter-spring campaign of 1944 did not achieve their goals, but the surprise was nevertheless ensured due to the continuity of the offensive of the Soviet troops on a wide front from Polesie to the Black Sea, despite thaw.

On the contrary, in the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, it was precisely strategic disinformation that played a role in achieving surprise, especially the imitation of the preparation of the main attacks in the Ukraine and the Baltic states. Of great importance was the fact that 4 tank armies out of 5, as well as the bulk of the tank corps, remained in the southern and southwestern directions. German intelligence constantly kept them under their supervision, and since they did not budge, they came to the conclusion that the summer offensive of the Soviet troops would most likely begin here. Meanwhile, the Soviet command secretly regrouped and concentrated on the central sector of the Soviet-German front 5 combined arms, 2 tank, air armies, 1st Polish army, 5 separate tank, 2 mechanized, 4 cavalry, 11th aviation corps, dozens of individual regiments and brigades of all types of troops.

Finally, in the strategic operations of the final campaign of the war in Europe, surprise was based on measures aimed at diverting part of the enemy's main strategic grouping from the Warsaw-Berlin direction to the flanks of the Soviet-German front. Subsequently, this largely contributed to the successful development of the main attack on Berlin.

During the war years, the domestic military strategy also solved a number of complex problems in the development of strategic offensive operations in the changed conditions of warfare. Among them, the problem of breaking through the German defenses was of particular importance.

A successful breakthrough of the enemy's strategic front was achieved by concentrating superior forces and means on the main strike directions, creating high operational and tactical troop densities in the breakthrough areas, effective fire suppression of enemy defenses, inflicting a powerful initial strike on it, and decisively developing a breakthrough in depth. and to the sides of the flanks, the timely deployment of armored and mechanized troops into battle, massive air operations, high rates of advance and preemption of the enemy in building up his efforts from the depths.

It should be noted that in the first period of the war, many attempts to break through the German defense ended unsuccessfully. At least three times the blockade of Leningrad failed. Operations to break through defenses in various sectors of the Volkhov Front failed six times. Seven times they failed to break through the defenses in the so-called "Ramushev corridor" and liquidate the enemy's semi-encircled Demyansk grouping. Eight times the attempts to break through the German defenses by the fronts of the Western strategic direction turned out to be futile. Repeatedly, it was not possible to develop a tactical breakthrough into an operational one in many operations. The main reasons for this were usually the hasty and inept preparation of a breakthrough, the weak opening of enemy defenses by reconnaissance, the low effectiveness of its fire suppression, the lack of mobile troops to build on the success achieved, poor interaction, etc.

As the technical equipment of the troops grows, their strike power and maneuverability increase, combat experience is mastered and methods of action are improved, Soviet troops more often and with greater reliability in any conditions

the situation broke through the heavily fortified, deeply echeloned defenses of the enemy. This task was most successfully solved in the Stalingrad, Chernigov-Poltava, Belorussian, Iasi-Kishinev, Lvov-Sandomierz, Baltic, Vistula-Oder and East Prussian operations. Expedient ways were found to break through the defenses in the northern, wooded-swampy and mountainous regions, complete the breakthrough of the tactical zone using mobile troops, and rapidly develop success in depth. In the most important offensive campaigns of 1944 and 1945. a breakthrough was usually carried out simultaneously in a number of sections up to 10-20 km long with an average density of artillery and mortars of 200-250 barrels and 60-80 tanks per | km front.

The fascist German command usually needed a long time to eliminate the breakthrough and create a new front of defense. Sometimes it was forced to withdraw troops to a depth of 500-600 km or transfer from 30 to 60 divisions to the breakthrough site. The enemy was able to create a new front of defense mainly on large natural lines (on rivers or in the mountains), and even then only with the approach of his reserves.

The experience of the war convincingly confirmed the importance, and at the same time, the great complexity of developing the success achieved to a considerable depth. It became completely obvious that in offensive operations of any scale, primarily strategic, this problem is associated, firstly, with preempting the enemy in building up efforts, secondly, with the rapid transfer of efforts to the operational depth, and thirdly, with flexible maneuver of troops, forces and means.

In the strategic offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War, efforts were built up by going on the offensive on new fronts in adjacent directions, bringing second echelons, operational and strategic reserves into battle while isolating the enemy's first echelon from his second echelons and reserves, inflicting defeat on parts. In most operations of the second and third periods of the war, efforts were increased by bringing tank and mechanized corps, combined arms and tank armies into battle. In a number of cases, as has already been pointed out, entire fronts were brought into battle. This was the case, for example, in the winter of 1942/1943. and when the Central Front was brought into battle in the Kursk direction, and in the summer of the same year when the Steppe Front was brought into battle in the Kharkov direction.

The order of increasing efforts was usually determined during the planning of operations and refined in the course of them, taking into account the specific situation. In this case, the right choice of time and directions for building up efforts was of great importance. As experience has shown, the premature introduction of second echelons and reserves into battle led to their being drawn into heavy battles, prematurely exhausting them and weakening them, and delay - to the loss of momentum and favorable conditions for the rapid development of success, since it gave the enemy additional time to consolidate its defense in depth and complicated the conditions for its breakthrough. In most operations, the second echelons of the armies, fronts, and reserves of the Supreme High Command Headquarters were brought into battle in the direction of the main attack. But sometimes the situation itself forced them to be used on the flanks or on newly opened operational axes to repel enemy counterattacks and consolidate the success achieved.

On the eve and in the course of almost all strategic offensive operations, major regroupings of troops and flexible maneuver of troops, forces and means were carried out. Often, entire formations were transferred from one direction to another, which made it possible to build up attacks on the enemy, strengthen their most important groupings of troops, and, if necessary, create new ones, depending on the situation.

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ki and the nature of the tasks that arose to shift efforts to other areas, fend off enemy counterattacks.

Before the start of military campaigns and new strategic offensive operations, as a rule, the largest strategic regroupings of troops were carried out. Usually they were carried out over long distances using all modes of transport, with the aim of shifting efforts from one strategic direction or theater of operations to others. The most significant strategic regrouping is considered to be the transfer from the West to the Far East and Transbaikalia, that is, to a distance of 9-12 thousand km, two front-line departments, three combined arms and tank armies, a large number of aviation units, as well as formations and units of military branches, special troops, rear and materiel. for the Manchurian strategic offensive operation. Three times during the war, entire fronts were regrouped in new directions. Thus, in the winter campaign of 1942/1943, as already noted, a significant part of the forces of the Don Front, after the liquidation of the encircled enemy group near Stalingrad, was transferred to the Kursk direction, thanks to which it was possible to condense the strategic front there. In the final campaign of 1945 in Europe, the 2nd Belorussian Front, after completing tasks in Eastern Pomerania, was transferred to the line of the lower reaches of the river. Oder to participate in the Berlin offensive operation. After the completion of the Crimean operation, the 4th Ukrainian Front was deployed in the Carpathian direction.

No less large were the regroupings of individual armies and formations of various branches of the armed forces. So, in 1944, from the Crimea and from the Right-Bank Ukraine, 3 combined arms were transferred to Belarus, | tank army and artillery formations of the RGK; from the Baltic regions, Leningrad and from the Balkans to the Warsaw-Berlin direction - 8 combined arms armies and artillery formations of the RVGK; from Moldavia to the region of Lvov - 3 combined arms and tank armies. Intra-front regroupings were carried out on a large scale. This made it possible to maintain the operational initiative, increase the pace of the offensive in the most important directions, and confront the enemy with the need to solve new problems that suddenly appeared before him.

complex tasks.

One of the conditions for the successful development of a strategic offensive to a great depth was the prohibition of the enemy's retreat, the disruption of his planned retreat, and the preemption of the capture of rear defensive

Skillfully organized persecution often led to major successes. The most instructive example in this regard is the Belorussian operation of 1944, when the troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts conducted a parallel, and the 2nd Belorussian Front - frontal pursuit, as a result of which a 105,000-strong group of German troops was surrounded and destroyed. -fascist troops east of Minsk. However, very often the persecution did not produce the expected results. So, in the North Caucasian strategic offensive operation of 1942/1943, despite repeated attempts to intercept the enemy's retreat routes, the German command was able to withdraw most of the 1st Panzer Army from the North Caucasus to the Donbass without any special losses and in a fairly organized manner. In the spring of 1943, the Soviet troops also failed to prevent the commands of the Army Groups "North" and "Center" from withdrawing their troops from the Demyansk and Rzhev bridgeheads.

It is also important to note that, along with successful ones, a number of operations during the Great Patriotic War remained unfinished. This led not only to unnecessary casualties, but also to the failure to fulfill important operational and strategic tasks, with all the ensuing negative consequences. Yes, due to unfinished

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the features of the Old Russian offensive operation of the North-Western Front in 1941 failed to disrupt the enemy's exit to Leningrad; Failure to fulfill tasks by the troops of the Bryansk Front in the Roslavl-Novozybkovskaya operation of 1941 led to a breakthrough of the 2nd German tank group in the rear of the Southwestern Front, etc.

And subsequently, many offensive operations did not achieve their goals. In particular, the 2nd and 3rd Sinyavinsky operations of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts in 1942, the 1st Rzhev-Sychevsk operation of 1942 of the Kalinin and Western fronts, and winter operations of the Northwestern, Kalinin and Western fronts remained unfinished. in 1943. The unsuccessful outcome of these and other operations was the result of the General Headquarters ignoring the real situation, the capabilities of its troops and the enemy, and the desire to achieve success "at any cost". The lack of proper experience among the command of the fronts and armies also had an effect. Haste in making decisions, attempts to blindly follow a previously developed plan, and setting unbearable tasks for the troops often led to the fact that the troops quickly lost their combat capability and the offensive did not develop. In the future, many of these shortcomings were overcome. In any case, most of the strategic and front-line operations conducted in 1944 and 1945 reached its goals.

From year to year and from campaign to campaign, the effectiveness of strategic offensive operations increased. The indicators of their spatial scope increased, the pace of the offensive increased, and their operational results became more and more significant. In the course of the most important strategic operations, 50-90 or more enemy divisions were often defeated. Especially effective were the strategic operations of the summer-autumn campaigns of 1943 and 1944, during which a total of 118 and 338 enemy divisions, respectively, were defeated!?. A number of operations led to the liberation of vast territories and the withdrawal of entire states from the war. Thus, the defeat of large enemy forces in the Iasi-Kishinev operation played a major role in the withdrawal of Romania from the war; The Vyborg-Petrozavodsk and Petsamo-Kirkenes operations contributed to the withdrawal of Finland from the war, and the Budapest strategic operation contributed to the withdrawal of Germany's last ally, Hungary.

Ultimately, it was thanks to the successfully conducted strategic offensive operations, the rationality of the national offensive strategy, that the war was brought to a victorious conclusion.

6. Formation and use of strategic reserves in war

Strategic reserves were the most important means by which the Soviet Supreme High Command actively influenced the development of strategic operations, military campaigns and the war as a whole. Unlike the High Command of the Wehrmacht, which constantly underestimated their role, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command always paid special attention to their formation, restoration and expedient use.

During the war, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had in its reserve combined arms, tank and air armies, rifle, tank, artillery and aviation corps and divisions, special units and formations for various purposes, reserves of weapons, ammunition, fuel and other material and technical means. What was new in domestic and world practice was that at certain stages of the war, not only armies, but also entire fronts were in the reserve of the Headquarters: the Reserve Front - in the Moscow direction in 1941, the Steppe Front - near Kursk in 1943.

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The specific composition of the reserves at the disposal of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command at the beginning of the main military campaigns is given in Table 8.

Table 8 Composition of strategic reserves!

Time about-	General-	Tank!	Rifle Tank	Artillery-	Air	Aviation education	field armies	(airborne and	and mechanical data
army cavalry divisions,	divisions	DIVISIONS	December 1, 1941	8 — 50 — — —	November 3, 1942	5 1 36 — — —	4	July 1943	9 2 78
13 8 1 15	January 1, 1944	6 2 19 12 4	4	June 1944	2 36 16 11	36 Jan 1	1945	2 — 31 4 5 2 4	

Depending on the specific conditions of the military-political situation, the creation of strategic reserves during the war years was carried out in various ways.

In the first period of the war, when the Soviet troops had to conduct strategic defense twice, the main source of formation of strategic reserves was the mobilization of new contingents of those liable for military service. The reserves were created mainly through the formation of new formations in the rear of the country (85%) and partly through the withdrawal of troops from the active fronts for resupplying (15%). This method of creating reserves was dictated by the fact that in the conditions of the loss of the strategic initiative and the conduct of forced defense, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had limited opportunities to withdraw troops to the reserve from the active fronts. In addition, fresh forces were sometimes required to stabilize the front where the enemy managed to break through it.

During this period, the Headquarters formed 28 departments of combined arms armies, 2 tank armies, 29 tank and mechanized corps, 367 rifle divisions, 336 separate brigades (rifle, tank, mechanized, artillery), 480 separate regiments (tank, mechanized, artillery). It withdrew from active fronts and re-equipped 3 directorates of all-army armies, 2 tank and mechanized corps, 73 rifle divisions, 130 separate brigades, and a separate artillery regiment! "

In the second period of the war, the conditions for creating strategic reserves changed significantly. The numerical superiority of the enemy in military equipment and weapons was eliminated. The military industry not only adequately equipped the troops at the front with military equipment and weapons, but also ensured the creation of strategic reserves. With the transfer of the strategic initiative into the hands of the Soviet command, the best opportunities were created for the withdrawal of troops from the active fronts to the reserve for resupplying, training and their subsequent use in the right areas. Therefore, in this period of the war, 70% of the strategic

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Russian reserves were made up of troops withdrawn from active fronts, and only 30% were new formations. In total, at that time, 565 formations, formations and units were withdrawn from the active fronts, and only 231118 were re-formed.

With this method of creating reserves, more favorable conditions were provided for their preparation and coordination. First of all, the combat backbone of personnel was preserved in the withdrawn formations (an average of 3.5 thousand people in a rifle division). Hardened in battle, he played an important role in training incoming recruits in combat skills. Thanks to this, the quality of field training of personnel improved, which in turn contributed to a reduction in the time required to bring reserve formations into combat readiness. In the final campaigns of the war, the deployment of new formations and formations in the rear of the country practically ceased.

Strategic reserves were widely used to carry out both defensive and offensive missions. At the beginning of the war and in the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, they were mainly used for defense purposes: to restore the strategic front, strengthen defensive groupings and increase the depth of defense in the most important areas. Such their use in many cases made it possible to overcome the crisis that had arisen in the situation. But often the reserves did not cope with the tasks assigned to them. The fact is that the bulk of the strategic reserves at that time were new formations, prepared in an extremely limited time frame. Due to the lack of time for cohesion and combat training, many of them were sent to the active army understaffed and insufficiently trained, which drastically reduced their combat capabilities.

The most important and complex task, which was solved in defensive campaigns with the help of reserves, was to restore the strategic front of defense in the most important areas. In any case, most of the strategic reserves sent to the west in the summer and autumn of 1941 were used precisely for this purpose. The deployment and commissioning of the reserves of the Headquarters of the High Command also made it possible to stabilize the front in the northwestern and southwestern directions. In the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, 72 rifle divisions were used to stabilize the front in the Stalingrad direction, 11 | tank and mechanized corps, 2 cavalry corps, 38 tank brigades and other formations and units! 3.

Particularly large reserve forces had to be simultaneously deployed when the enemy managed to create a large gap in the strategic defense of our troops, as, for example, during the collapse of the Western Front in early July 1941. Similar tasks, albeit on a somewhat smaller scale, arose in August 1941 in the north-western direction, then in September 1941 in the south-west after the enemy surrounded and destroyed large forces of Soviet troops near Kiev and, finally, in October 1941 after the encirclement and destruction of significant forces of the Western and Reserve fronts:

In some cases, strategic reserves were used only to reinforce the existing fronts in the main directions, increase the depth of the defense and secure the flanks. This made it possible to strengthen the most responsible areas, the most important defensive groupings, and gradually change the balance of forces and means in their favor. So, if at the beginning of October 1941 the Western Front had 30 rifle divisions, then in the first days of December it already had 50. The number of rifle brigades increased from 1 to 16, air divisions - from 65 to 8, cavalry divisions - from 3 to 16, tank brie

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reptiles — from 3 to 22, artillery regiments of the Supreme Command Headquarters reserve — from 28 to 53, guards mortar battalions — from | up to 30, separate anti-aircraft divisions - from 11 to 16'2 °.

During the war years, early deployment of reserves on rear lines was widely used. This made it possible to increase the depth of separation of the strategic defense and thereby increase its stability. For example, in the battle of Smolensk, when the Front of reserve armies was deployed on the Vyazemsky defensive line behind the troops of the Western Front. And then, when repelling the second German offensive against Moscow, when the strategic reserves occupied the Mozhaishk line of defense.

A special role was assigned to strategic reserves in delivering counterattacks, conducting partial offensive operations, and in ensuring the transition from defense to counteroffensive. This gave the strategic defense an active character. In late November and early December 1941, in order to deploy active offensive operations near Moscow, the Supreme Command Headquarters transferred, in addition to 3 combined arms armies, 9 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions, 8 rifle and 6 tank brigades to the Western Front only to the Western Front. From November 27 to December 3, 30 divisions and 12 rifle brigades were transferred to this direction as part of reserve armies. In total, during the first six months of the war, 221 newly formed and 8 restored divisions, 110 rifle and tank brigades, as well as a large number of artillery, aviation and engineering units, and air defense units were transferred to the fronts. 97 pre-war divisions were also sent from the Stavka reserve to the active army!?. Immediately before the start of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad and during it, from October to December 31, 1942, to create an offensive grouping of troops, the Supreme Command Headquarters transferred to the fronts from its reserve 45 rifle divisions, 9 tank and 7 mechanized corps!?, 7 separate tank brigades, 25 artillery regiments and 2 aviation corps.

In the summer of 1943, in order to conduct a strategic defense near Kursk and go on a counteroffensive to strengthen the Central and Voronezh fronts, from April to July 1943 the reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were transferred: 10 rifle divisions, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades, 13 separate fighter anti-tank artillery regiments, 14 artillery regiments, 8 guards mortar regiments, 7 separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments and other units. From March to July, 5,635 guns and 3,522 mortars, as well as 1,294 aircraft were placed at the disposal of these fronts!?. And during the counter-offensive, as noted, the Steppe Front was brought into battle, which included more than half of all reserves available at that time at the disposal of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

In offensive operations, strategic reserves were used mainly in the main axes to create strike groupings, reinforce the fronts that performed the most critical tasks, build up efforts during the development of the offensive, secure flanks, repel enemy counterattacks, shift the main efforts to new axes, and solve other tasks.

Thus, when preparing strategic offensive operations in the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, in order to create powerful strike groups in the Belarusian direction, from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were transferred to the 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts 7 combined arms and 2 tank armies, 76 rifle divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps, | 1 artillery and mortar divisions, 33 aviation divisions, a significant number of artillery units and formations, over 210 thousand people of march reinforcements!^. Even more mass

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Headquarters Headquarters reserves were involved in the preparation of the final campaign of 1945 in Europe.

In order to build up the efforts of troops in the Leningrad-Novgorod strategic offensive operation, 3 armies, 30 divisions and 6 brigades were additionally brought into battle, in the Belarusian operation - 2 armies, a tank corps and 24 divisions, in the East Carpathian operation - 2 tank corps and 5 divisions, in the Baltic operation - | army, 6 divisions and a brigade, in the East Prussian operation - 1 army and 9 divisions, etc. 25 In the Kiev strategic offensive operation of 1943, the 1st Ukrainian Front, which had used up most of its forces in repulsing the enemy counterattack near Zhitomir, was reinforced from the Headquarters reserve by a combined arms army, which allowed it not only to stop the enemy, but also continue the advance.

To strengthen the formations participating in offensive operations, groups of fronts, the following were introduced from the reserve of the Headquarters: in the first period of the war - 12 armies, a total of 142 divisions (calculated); in the second period - 28 armies, 249 divisions in total; in the third period - 57 armies, a total of 415.5 divisions!?.6.

In general, the skillful use of strategic reserves made it possible for Soviet troops to successfully resist the enemy, thwart his plans, seize and hold the strategic initiative, build up the power of their strikes, and effectively solve suddenly arising tasks.

7. Strategic use of the branches of the Armed Forces

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the national military strategy proceeded from the premise that victory in it could only be achieved through the joint efforts of all branches of the Armed Forces and the use of strong sides of each.

The decisive role in achieving the goals of the war was assigned to the Ground Forces, most of which (about 57%) were in the active army. They formed the basis of strategic groupings both on the defensive and on the offensive. The characteristic features of their strategic use are: massing of troops, forces and means and concentrating their efforts in the most important areas to carry out the most important operational strategic tasks; flexible maneuver by associations and connections; close interaction with aviation, the Air Defense Forces, and in coastal areas with the forces of the fleet.

During the war, the Ground Forces bore the brunt of the armed struggle. With the support of the Air Force and the Navy, they defeated the main ground groupings of the enemy, which had a decisive influence on the course and

the outcome of not only the Great Patriotic War, but the Second World War as a whole. More than three times more enemy divisions were defeated by their efforts than the armed forces of our allies did.

The Air Force was used to support the troops of the fronts (armies) and conduct independent air operations. In the course of the war, they made more than 3 million combat sorties, dropped over 30 million bombs on various enemy targets with a total weight of more than 660 thousand tons!77.

In strategic operations, the main efforts of the Air Force were directed to actions directly in the interests of the troops, to support them. From 40 to 56% of sorties in each strategic operation were used to perform related tasks! 78.

In defensive operations, the frontal aviation air armies assisted the ground forces in repulsing the enemy offensive; suppressed and destroyed enemy aircraft; covered the main groups from air strikes

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troops; fought against enemy reserves, and also carried out aerial reconnaissance. New in the use of front-line aviation was the conduct of aviation counter-training in order to weaken the attacks of the advancing enemy. The main objects of the Air Force's actions in defense were the enemy strike groupings, especially the troops of his first echelon, operational reserves, communication centers and command posts. Their destruction was carried out throughout the entire defensive operation.

In the first strategic defensive operations, Soviet aviation did not provide effective assistance to ground forces due to the heavy losses incurred. At this time, the German Air Force reigned supreme in the air. Only from the middle of 1942, and especially in 1943, in the strategic defensive operation near Kursk, did the Soviet Air Forces begin, in the main, to successfully solve the tasks assigned to them. An important role in this was played by the transition to the massive use of aviation by concentrating significant forces on the directions of the enemy's main attacks, the creation and use of aviation reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the widespread use of new types of aircraft, the proximity of the basing of all branches of aviation to the defending troops, which made it possible to increase the residence time of aircraft over the battlefield.

Aviation took an active part in delivering counterattacks by the Soviet defending troops. Thus, in the Kursk strategic defensive operation, in order to support the counterattacks of the Central and Voronezh fronts, the 16th and 2nd air armies, as well as long-range aviation, conducted over 7 thousand sorties in 4 days, or more than 30% of all sorties, committed during the defensive battle'9.

In defensive operations, the role and scale of the use of aviation turned out to be much greater than was envisaged before the war. She solved her tasks in defense not in the army, but in front-line and even strategic defensive operations.

Starting from the second period of the war, the air offensive became the main form of operational use of aviation in strategic offensive operations. Its essence consisted in the continuous operations of the Air Force in close cooperation with the advancing combined arms and tank armies of the fronts. The first experience of the air offensive was acquired near Stalingrad, and it was most fully developed in the operations of the third period of the war. This was an important step in the development of the operational art of the Air Force: from episodic and disparate strikes, Soviet aviation moved on to massive operations on the axes of the main strikes of the fronts, well coordinated with the actions of the troops.

In the course of an air offensive, the following tasks were usually assigned to the Air Force: air preparation for the offensive (preliminary and direct) in order to suppress the enemy's defenses; support for ground troops when they break through tactical and operational defenses; covering the main groupings during the preparation and in the course of the offensive; ensuring the entry into battle of mobile groups, second echelons and reserves; participation in repelling enemy counterattacks; the fight against his aircraft and reserves; air blockade of the encircled enemy group; air reconnaissance. A reliable solution of these problems was ensured by the massive use of aviation in the main directions and at the decisive moments of the operation. To this end, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command carried out a flexible maneuver with its aviation reserves. So, to participate in the counter-offensive near Stalingrad, 4 air corps and 7 separate air divisions were transferred to this direction. To conduct strategic offensive operations during the battle of Kursk and after it, the Headquarters allocated 18 aviation corps from its reserve

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owls!3°. This, as well as a bold maneuver by the aviation of the fronts, made it possible to continuously intensify air strikes against the defending enemy.

During the war, for the first time, the problem of using aviation in encirclement operations was solved, methods of combat operations were developed when creating internal and external fronts, repulsing counterattacks, and also during the destruction of encircled troops.

A completely new phenomenon in the operational art of the Air Force was the successful implementation of an air blockade of encircled enemy groups near Stalingrad, Korsun-Shevchenkivsky, Bobruisk, Vitebsk, Minsk, Yassy, Kishinev, Koenigsberg, Breslau, and Berlin.

From the very beginning of the war, independent air operations occupied an important place in the strategic actions of the Air Force. Usually they were carried out with the aim of defeating enemy air groupings and gaining air supremacy, suppressing and destroying the political and economic centers of the enemy, his ports and

naval bases, to blockade and defeat the encircled German groups, to provide assistance to the partisans.

All branches of the Armed Forces took part in gaining air supremacy, although the main role in this belonged to the Air Force. The main way to solve this problem was to destroy enemy aircraft in air battles. Of the total number of German aircraft destroyed on the Soviet-German front, 57% were shot down in air battles, 17% were destroyed at airfields, and 6% were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire! Air operations to defeat enemy air groupings at airfields also played an important role. The first operations of this kind, as already noted, were carried out by the aviation of the Northern Front, the Baltic and Northern Fleets from June 25 to 30, 1941, when airfields in Finland and Norway were attacked. Then, on August 7, 1941, long-range aviation bi attacked airfields on the territory of Belarus. In November of the same year, the air forces of the Kalinin, Western and Bryansk fronts, as well as long-range aviation and the Moscow defense zone, during a defensive battle near Moscow, raided the airfields of a German aviation group that attacked the Soviet capital. In late 1942 and early 1943, air operations to destroy enemy aircraft at airfields were carried out by the forces of the 8th Air Army and long-range aviation in the Stalingrad direction, and by the forces of the 4th and 5th air armies, the corps of the long-range Aviation and Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet - to the north

Caucasian direction.

The largest and most effective were air operations to gain air supremacy, carried out in May-June 1943. The first of them, from May 6 to 8, involved 6 air armies. The strikes were carried out on 24 airfields in a strip with a width of more than 1 thousand km to a depth of 200 km. In the second operation in June, 3 air armies and long-range aviation were used. In both operations, about 750 enemy aircraft were destroyed, which was one of the reasons for the loss of strategic air supremacy on the entire Soviet-German front!?. During the war, more than 58,000 sorties (about 2%) were carried out to attack airfields, as a result of which fascist German aviation lost 13,300 aircraft, i.e., 23% of the total number destroyed on the Soviet-German front. This was an effective form of fighting enemy aircraft. On average, only 5 sorties were spent on each enemy aircraft put out of action at the airfield, while up to 30 sorties were required to destroy one aircraft in the air, that is, 5-6 times more!

Air operations to suppress and destroy economic facilities, administrative and political centers, ports and naval bases of the enemy due to

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Lack of forces and means during the war years were rarely carried out, but already from June 24 to July 3, 1941, two corps of long-range bomber aviation of the High Command, together with the Air Force of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, attacked military-industrial facilities in Koenigsberg, Danzig, Warsaw, Bucharest. On the night of August 8, 1941, Berlin was raided for the first time. Subsequently, only episodic strikes were inflicted on the objects of the deep rear of the enemy. Only at the end of the war, air operations with strikes deep behind enemy lines began to be carried out more often, although in comparison with the British and American Air Forces, the actions of Soviet aviation did not cause serious damage to the enemy due to a lack of forces.

A special place in the strategic actions of the Air Force was occupied by air transport operations. In total, during the war in these operations, about 110,000 sorties by long-range aviation and the Civil Air Fleet were made to assist the partisans, including 13,000 landings at the sites near the partisans. More than 83,000 people were transported to the rear of the enemy and from partisan areas to the "mainland", and a large amount of ammunition, weapons, medicines and other cargo (17,000 tons) was delivered to the partisans! 34.

In general, the Soviet Air Force has gained a lot of experience in solving operational and strategic tasks. Their actions had a significant impact on the course and outcome of military campaigns and the entire war.

The Air Defense Forces of the country were the main means of covering the most important groupings of troops and important facilities of the country in the front-line areas and in depth. The conditions for their strategic use during the war were constantly changing. It was one thing at the beginning of it, when German aviation, having air supremacy, showed great activity not only on the battlefield, but also at great depths. It was then that the importance of reliable cover for important economic, administrative and political centers of the country increased. To solve this problem in 1941-1942. from 60 to 87% of fighter aircraft and from 60 to 80% of air defense anti-aircraft artillery were allocated! In the second and third periods of the war, air supremacy gradually passed to the Soviet Air Force. The enemy was forced to concentrate the main efforts of his aviation in the front-line areas to support the ground forces. In this regard, the main efforts of the Air Defense Forces of the country were shifted to cover the strike groups of the fronts, important objects of the operational rear, primarily front-line communications to a depth of 300-500 km from the front line. About 50% of the forces and means were spent on this.

The greatest effort from the Air Defense Forces of the country was demanded by actions to repel massive enemy air strikes on large cities - Moscow, Leningrad, Gorky, Stalingrad, Kiev, Minsk, etc. The first German air raid on the capital took place on the night of July 22. More than 220 enemy aircraft from the best aviation units, which already had experience in destroying large European cities, took part in it. However, the raid was thwarted: 22 enemy aircraft were shot down by fighters and anti-aircraft artillery. Only single bombers broke through to the objects of strikes, the rest dropped their bombs without reaching their intended targets. Subsequently, German aviation carried out systematic raids on Moscow in groups of 50-80 to 100-120 aircraft. In total, 12,100 sorties were made in this direction. Nevertheless, the country's air defense fulfilled its task. The enemy was unable to cause any significant damage to Moscow, but he himself lost more | 300 planes!

The enemy's attempt to paralyze the vital activity of Leningrad also turned out to be futile. raids on this city

began in July 1941. Subsequently, they were undertaken almost daily. Only in September, the enemy inflicted 12

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attacks on Leningrad and Kronstadt in order to destroy the ships of the Baltic Fleet, but to no avail. Starting from October, German aviation abandoned massive daytime raids on Leningrad and basically switched to echeloned night operations!9".

In the front-line areas, the Air Defense Forces interacted with fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery of the fronts and fleets. At the same time, special attention was paid to covering the front-line railways. The forces allocated for their defense in 1944 increased in comparison with 1942 for medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery by 5 times, and for small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery - by 22 times! 8. The system of covering communications was also improved. Along with covering the main railway junctions and bridges, mobile air defense groups began to be used to defend the most important sections of the railways, the so-called "roaming groups" for operations from ambushes, as well as mobile groups of anti-aircraft weapons to escort railway echelons.

Since 1943, in connection with the advance of Soviet troops to the west, the air defense system of the front-line areas has been consistently built up through maneuvering forces and means from the depths of the country. For example, in May and June 1944, 2 fighter aviation divisions and more than 40 anti-aircraft artillery units were relocated from the rear areas of the Southern Air Defense Front to the front zone of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts. In the summer and autumn of the same year, 5 air defense corps were advanced outside the USSR to cover objects in the front line from the depths of the country!35.

An integral part of the Air Defense Forces of the country was the local air defense (LAD). Being under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, it relied on a developed system of local units and various services (fire fighting, medical and sanitary service, communications, etc.). The entire population of threatened areas from 16 to 60 years old had to take all possible part in local air defense activities. In 1942, the number of various formations of the MPVO exceeded 6 million people "°. The MPVO system played an important role in eliminating the consequences of enemy air raids, extinguishing fires, preventing various accidents at national economy facilities, neutralizing unexploded bombs, etc.

The effectiveness of the actions of the Air Defense Forces was continuously increasing. This was facilitated by a more resolute concentration of forces and means on the defense of important objects, the enlargement of groupings of troops, the maneuver of air defense forces following the advancing troops of the fronts, and the improvement of the methods of using fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery. In general, over the years of the war, the Air Defense Forces destroyed 7,313 enemy aircraft, of which 4,168 aircraft were fighters. This played an important role in gaining air supremacy, ensuring the successful development of front operations and the life of the front-line regions of the country. They also inflicted tangible damage on the ground enemy, destroying | thousand tanks, about 1.5 thousand guns and mortars, as well as many other military equipment and manpower of the enemy\".

The experience of the war has shown the importance of creating a country's air defense system in peacetime as a single system throughout the defended territory, that the successful solution of the tasks facing the country's Air Defense Forces is directly dependent on the availability of reliable means of detection, warning and

connections.

The Navy during the war, due to the continental nature of hostilities, concentrated its main efforts on assisting the operations of the Ground Forces, but at the same time conducted independent combat operations.

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In the most difficult conditions, due to enemy dominance in the air and the loss of the most important base areas, as well as due to the reduction of the ship repair base in the first period of the war, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets performed their tasks. Throughout the war, they most closely interacted with the coastal fronts. In strategic defensive operations, these fleets assisted the fronts in repulsing enemy offensives in coastal areas and covered the flanks of their troops from the sea. Of great importance was their defense, jointly with the Ground Forces and the Air Force, of coastal cities and large naval bases, including Libau, Tallinn, Novorossiysk, Khanko, but especially Odessa and Sevastopol. The complexity of solving such a problem lay in the fact that most of the bases were not prepared in advance for defense from land, so it had to be created already in the course of hostilities when the enemy was rapidly advancing along the coast.

The special task of the fleets was to ensure the evacuation of troops and naval bases from isolated sections of the coast. As a rule, it was carried out by the fleet by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, when their further retention became inexpedient or impossible, or it became necessary to use the troops defending these areas in other directions. The scale of the evacuation was significant. Thus, during the evacuation of troops and civilians from Tallinn and Hanko, the fleet took out all the troops (more than 42.5 thousand people) with weapons, military equipment, ammunition, food and other cargo, which then joined the defense of Leningrad From Odessa, the Black Sea Fleet evacuated to the Crimea a significant amount of weapons, military equipment, about 25 thousand tons of various cargoes, 86 thousand military personnel and 15 thousand residents of the city, most of whom took part in its defense, and then defended Sevastopol? When a threat loomed over him, several thousand fighters were evacuated to the North Caucasus. However, due to the belated decision to evacuate in this case, a significant part of the equipment and personnel could not be taken out.

In strategic offensive operations, the fleets covered coastal groupings of the Ground Forces from enemy attacks from the sea, participated in artillery and aviation preparations for the offensive, assisted them in encircling and destroying enemy troops pressed to the sea, and carried out independent and joint landing operations of various scales. The largest and most important of them were: the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of 1941-1942, the Novorossiysk and Kerch-Eltigen landing operations of 1943 on the Black Sea, the Moonsund landing operation of 1944 in the Baltic, the Kuril landing operation of 1945. on the Pacific Ocean. In total, over the years of the war, the fleets ensured the landing of more than 110 operational and tactical amphibious assault forces with a total number of over 250 thousand people. "The main goals of such operations were: to seize bridgeheads on the enemy's coast for further offensive in new operational directions (Kerch-Feodosiya, Kerch- Eltigenskaya), capturing important island territories (Moonzundskaya, Kurilskaya), attacking the flank and rear of the defending enemy grouping (Novorossiyskaya). Not all landing operations were successful, but in general they played an important role in solving strategic tasks in the coastal flanks of the Soviet-German front.

The most important strategic tasks that the Navy solved in independent operations were combating the enemy's sea lanes and protecting its own sea lanes. For the Northern Fleet, these tasks turned out to be the main ones. They stemmed from the need to ensure strong two-way communication between the main members of the anti-Hitler coalition (USSR, USA, Great Britain) across the Atlantic.

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Fighting on enemy lines of communication was carried out both in the course of daily combat activities of the fleets (during the first and second periods of the war) and in special operations. Winter 1943/1944 such operations were carried out mainly in the Norwegian and Barents Seas. Since 1944, they began to be undertaken in the Baltic and Black Seas, including with the aim of blocking the Crimean and Courland groupings of German troops. Their performance gradually increased. From 1942 to 1944, for example, the number of enemy transports sunk increased 2.5 times. In total, during the war years, the Navy sank about 1,300 enemy transports. The most effective means of combating communications were aviation and submarines, which accounted for almost 88% of ships!

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The war confirmed the importance of reliable protection of their maritime communications. During its course, the Navy ensured the transportation of more than 105 million tons of various cargoes and 10 million people of the military and civilian population. The Northern Fleet alone spent more than 2.5 thousand ships in its operational zone as part of internal convoys and about 1.5 thousand transports as part of allied convoys! "In the Baltic and Black Seas, this task was especially acute in the first period of the war during the defense of Leningrad, Odessa and Sevastopol. It retained a certain value in the future as well.

Mine warfare at sea took on a large scale from the very beginning of the war. Both sides widely used the laying of minefields, both to protect their bases and communications, and to block enemy bases. In 1941 alone, the Soviet fleets spent about 32,000 various mines on the creation of mine and artillery positions. However, mistakes were made in solving this problem. In particular, there were cases of unreasonable laying of some minefields in 1941. in the Black Sea Subsequently, they hampered the combat activities of the Black Sea Fleet.

On the whole, considerable progress was achieved in the strategic employment of the Navy during the years of the war. However, the forces of the fleet operated mainly in coastal areas. Methods for defeating the groupings of enemy naval forces in the struggle for supremacy at sea were not developed and mastered.

8. Strategic leadership of the armed struggle

The strategic leadership of the armed struggle in the Great Patriotic War consisted in the constant and purposeful activity of the highest military-political and state bodies aimed at mobilizing forces and means for waging war, improving the construction of the Armed Forces, their technical equipment and strategic use, determining the most effective effective forms of armed struggle, campaigns and strategic operations, organization of strategic interaction between fronts, groups of fronts and branches of the Armed Forces, management of the course of armed struggle and its comprehensive support.

The outbreak of the war, with its huge spatial scope, unprecedented intensity and dynamism of military operations, the use of large masses of troops and military equipment, huge material costs and losses, required a radical change in the entire system of political, state and military leadership.

In connection with the mobilization of all the forces and resources of the country, their use in the interests of achieving the goals of the war, it became necessary to maximize the

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ralization of state leadership with the concentration of all power in the hands of one authorized body. This body was formed on June 30, 1941 by decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR State Defense Committee (GKO). During the war, he, who had full power in the country, united the military, political and economic leadership. Stalin was appointed chairman of the GKO, V. M. Molotov was appointed deputy chairman, and K. E. Voroshilov, L. P. Beria, and G. M. Malenkov were members. Some time later N.A. Bulganin,

Based on the general political goals of the war, the State Defense Committee set military-political tasks for the Supreme High Command and the Armed Forces in general and provided the necessary forces and means for their implementation. He also established the size of the Armed Forces, based on the needs of the armed struggle, the needs of the economy and the availability of human resources, determined the structure of the Armed Forces, the direction of their technical equipment and the general nature of their use in the war, made decisions on changing the bodies of the highest military command and on the appointment of leading cadres of the central and front-line apparatus. The People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy were the working bodies of the State Defense Committee on military issues, the direct organizers and executors of its decisions. The strategic leadership of the armed struggle was carried out by the GKO through the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The creation of the State Defense Committee and the concentration of all power in its hands played a decisive role in the development of the system of strategic management and increase in its effectiveness.

The situation with the organization of the strategic leadership of the Armed Forces was more complicated. The system of governing bodies that developed in the prewar period essentially corresponded to the experience of the First World War and the Civil War, when a limited number of front-line formations were at the disposal of the High Command, and did not meet the new requirements and conditions of the armed struggle, did not provide the necessary centralization of leadership of the Armed Forces. - mi. The party and state leadership of the country did not take into account the experience and lessons of the Second World War that began in the West and did not take any steps to revise and update the structure of the command and control apparatus of the Armed Forces. The proposal of the General Staff, prepared in May 1940, on the creation of the High Command as an emergency control body of the Armed Forces in wartime was also not accepted. The approval of this project (which, according to G.K. Zhukov, provided for the appointment of the chairman of Stalin's Headquarters) was repeatedly postponed and, in the end, did not take place until the very beginning of the war. "The existing provision remained in force that military operations in the event of a major war would be led by the Main Military Council headed by the People's Commissar of Defense" - this is a statement by Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky!48. It should be noted that this structure of strategic leadership bodies has not been tested either in strategic exercises or in field trips and exercises with troops.

As a result, the reorganization of the highest bodies of military command took place already during the war, when expedient forms and methods of their functioning had to be developed purely empirically, which was often associated with major miscalculations in the leadership of troops. The situation was further complicated by the fact that before the war the organization of the High Command and its working apparatus for managing the army in the field had not been thoroughly thought out. We are talking about personnel, structure, command posts, communication system, accommodation, logistics and life support. For example, it was assumed that

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the leadership of the army from the General Staff will be carried out from regular workplaces by regular means of communication from office offices, and communication with the fronts and armies was planned to be provided mainly through the national network, etc.14

On the first day of the war, the military operations of the Soviet Armed Forces were directed, as it was planned, by the Main Military Council, headed by the People's Commissar for Defense. The next day, in accordance with the draft of the creation of the High Command developed on the eve of the war, at the suggestion of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Headquarters of the High Command was created. It included People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Timoshenko (chairman), Chief of the General Staff General of the Army G.K. M. Molotov, Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, Chairman of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Marshal S. M. Budyonny, First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, People's Commissar of the Navy!®. According to Marshal Zhukov, "its composition was somewhat different from the project proposed by the People's Commissariat of Defense." The proposal to appoint Stalin as Commander-in-Chief and to include in the Headquarters the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff N. F. Vatutin was not accepted!

The weak point in the entire system of leadership was the haste with which the highest governing bodies were created in the difficult conditions of the outbreak of war. The initial structure, composition and methods of work of the Headquarters of the High Command and the State Defense Committee were not thought out in advance and required further improvement. Therefore, the composition of the Headquarters had to be adjusted already on July 10. As the very first days of the war showed, the appointment of the People's Commissar of Defense as the Chairman of the Headquarters turned out to be erroneous. The dynamism of military operations with rapid and abrupt changes in the situation on a huge front required high efficiency in command and control of troops. Meanwhile, Marshal Timoshenko could not independently, without the consent of Stalin, make any decisions on the leadership of the Armed Forces. As Marshal Zhukov notes in his memoirs, in the first days of the war there were, as it were, "two commanders-in-chief: People's Commissar S.K. Timoshenko - legal, in accordance with the decree, and I.V. command and control and inevitably led to unnecessary waste of time on making decisions and issuing orders"!??.

In order to ensure centralized and more efficient control of the Armed Forces and in connection with the creation of the Main Commands of strategic directions, the GKO decided to transform the Headquarters of the High Command into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, and appoint Stalin as its chairman. At the same time, Admiral Kuznetsov was withdrawn from its composition and Marshal Shaposhnikov was included!?. The appointment of Stalin as chairman of the Headquarters greatly contributed to the streamlining of service relations within this body. Despite the fact that the GKO resolution did not legally define personal duties, including the chairman of the Stavka, the decisive word always belonged to Stalin, who, not to mention the fact that

held key positions in the state (general secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and State Defense Committee), enjoyed unlimited authority in the country, the party and the Armed Forces. As a result of these transformations, the role of the Stavka in the leadership of the armed struggle increased noticeably.

Nevertheless, the Headquarters continued to experience great difficulties, primarily because of the split in the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense. In order to eliminate this shortcoming, on July 19, 1941, Stalin was appointed People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, and on August 8, in connection with the renaming of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command into Headquarters

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Supreme High Command (VGK), — Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR!”.

Since that time, a clear order in the work of the Headquarters (reports on the situation and the development of decisions) has gradually been approved. First of all, it was established that the orders of the Stavka were signed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff. The functions of the Stavka representatives were defined. Its personal composition changed insignificantly during the war years. Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov (since July 1941), Colonel General A. M. Vasilevsky (May 11, 1943), General of the Army A. I. Antonov (February 17, 1945). The last change in the composition of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command took place in February 1945, which was due to the situation that had developed by that time. The GKO Decree of February 17, 1945 determined the following composition: I. V. Stalin, G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky, A. I. Antonov, N. I. Bulganin and N. G. Kuznetsov!?

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command carried out the strategic leadership of the Red Army, the Navy, the border and internal troops, and partisan forces. She dealt with an extremely wide range of military-strategic issues: assessment of the military-political and strategic situation; defining strategic tasks for the Armed Forces in accordance with the military-political goals of the war; making decisions on the preparation and conduct of military campaigns and strategic operations; the creation of strategic groupings of troops; organization of interaction between them and operational formations of various types of the Armed Forces and partisans; coordinating the efforts of the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the allied states; organization of strategic reconnaissance and camouflage; preparation and use of strategic reserves; material and technical support of the troops, taking into account the assigned tasks; summarizing the experience of combat activity of the Armed Forces and other important problems of armed struggle!6.

Its working bodies were the General Staff and the departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy. In July and August 1941, their radical reorganization was carried out, as a result of which the functions of each of them in war conditions were clarified, and a number of new departments were formed. To manage the formation of reserves, prepare marching replacements, manage spare and training units in the People's Commissariat of Defense, the Main Directorate for the Formation and Staffing of Troops (Glavupraform) was created. To coordinate the work of the Logistics of the Armed Forces, the Main Directorate of Logistics was formed, the post of chief of the Logistics of the Red Army was established with the headquarters of the Logistics, reporting directly to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

The General Staff concentrated its main efforts on the operational-strategic leadership of the Armed Forces. To this end, he was relieved of many functions not directly related to the leadership of military operations. Thus, in accordance with the GKO resolution of July 23, 1941, the functions of mobilization, commissioning, conscription, organization of the Armed Forces, supplies, military transportation, and management of military educational institutions were removed from the General Staff. The Organizational and Mobilization Directorates, the Directorate for Arranging and Manning Troops, the Road Directorate, the Directorate for Arrangement of Logistics, Armaments and Supply, as well as a communications center were withdrawn from its composition. Unfortunately, not all of these measures have justified themselves. Thus, the removal from the General Staff of the functions of managing organizational and mobilization work and military communications turned out to be erroneous. In 1943-1944. these tasks were again entrusted to the General Staff.

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“As a result of the reorganization,” recalled Marshal Zhukov, “the General Staff became a more efficient, operational body and was able to carry out the tasks assigned to it much more efficiently ...”!8 The General Staff, performing such a colossal amount of work, in the full sense of the word was the creative laboratory of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. He collected and carefully analyzed data on the situation on the fronts with the preparation of conclusions and proposals to the Supreme High Command. On the basis of the decisions taken, the General Staff developed plans for the use of the Armed Forces, preparation and conduct of military campaigns and strategic operations, organized strategic interaction between the branches of the Armed Forces and fronts, brought decisions, orders, directives of the Supreme High Command to the troops, exercised control over their implementation, supervised military intelligence, controlled the formation of reserves and their use in accordance with the decision of the Supreme High Command, monitored the condition, provision and combat effectiveness of the troops, and resolved a number of other issues. He was the main organizer of the practical implementation of strategic concepts and plans of military operations.

However, in the first years of the war, the Supreme Commander himself underestimated his role. Apparently, considering himself an unsurpassed commander, Stalin often not only ignored the proposals of the General Staff, but often made decisions contrary to all his advice. Most often, this led to heavy failures at the fronts. In the first year of the war alone, five chiefs of the leading department of the General Staff, the operational department, were replaced. Many generals from among the leading staff of the General Staff, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, were sent to the active army. In a number of cases, this was indeed caused by the objective need to strengthen the headquarters of the fronts and armies with experienced workers, but most often, according to Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevsky, other authoritative military leaders, this was a consequence

underestimation of the role of the General Staff in command and control and Stalin's peculiar view of the methods of his work.

Only towards the end of the first period of the war did relations between the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the General Staff normalize to a large extent. Stalin began to rely more on the General Staff, even to perceive it as an important body of strategic leadership. Yes, and the General Staff by this time gained rich experience, began to work more organized. Therefore, it is no coincidence that, starting from the summer of 1942, Stalin, as a rule, did not take a single decision without first hearing the opinion of the General Staff.

Other measures were also taken to improve the system of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces. Thus, in connection with the expansion of the scale of armed struggle, the increase in the number of formations and units of the branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms in the active army and the need for their more effective use in the course of hostilities, the positions of commanders of the Air Force were established. , the Air Defense Forces of the country, long-range aviation, armored and mechanized troops, restored the position of chief and then commander of artillery of the Red Army, abolished in 1940, established the position of commander of guards mortar units and commander of airborne troops with their subordination directly to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command . In 1942, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was created to lead the partisan struggle! 9.

Along with the reorganization of the central bodies of strategic leadership, there was a continuous search for ways to develop management at the operational-strategic level, increase its efficiency, and establish closer interaction between the fronts deployed in adjacent operational areas. For these purposes it was

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a decision was made to move from a two-tier system of strategic leadership (the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command — Front) to a three-tier one.

The question of creating an intermediate command post between the Headquarters and the front arose already in the first days of the war, when, in a rapidly changing situation, in the absence of stable communications with the fronts and timely, reliable information on the position of the troops, the Headquarters was systematically late in adopting l eat decisions, made gross mistakes. Attempts to eliminate this shortcoming by sending the leaders of the People's Commissariat of Defense to the fronts did not produce results. Therefore, by the Decree of the State Defense Committee of July 10, 1941, three Main Commands of strategic directions were created. The High Command of the troops of the North-Western direction, headed by Marshal Voroshilov, was entrusted with coordinating the actions of the Northern and North-Western fronts, as well as the Northern and Baltic fleets. The main command of the troops of the Western direction, headed by Marshal Timoshenko, was supposed to coordinate the actions of the Western Front and the Pinsk military flotilla, and later the Western Front, the front of reserve armies and the Central Front. The High Command of the troops of the South-Western direction, headed by Marshal Budyonny, was to coordinate the actions of the South-Western, Southern, and then the Bryansk fronts. The Black Sea Fleet was also transferred to its operational subordination!®.

The task of the High Commands included the study and analysis of the operational-strategic situation in the direction zone, informing the Stavka about the situation on the fronts, directing the preparation of operations in accordance with the plans and plans of the Stavka, coordinating the actions of formations in the strategic direction, and directing the partisan struggle in the rear. The experience of the war showed that the introduction of intermediate bodies of strategic leadership in the difficult conditions of the first period of the war was completely justified. enemy.

Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, the commanders-in-chief failed to improve the leadership of the fronts. This is mainly explained by the fact that they not only did not have clearly defined functions and sufficiently broad powers, but also did not have the necessary reserves of forces and material resources to actively influence the course of hostilities of their subordinate troops. Therefore, all their activities were often reduced to the transfer of information from the fronts to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and, conversely, the orders of the Headquarters to the fronts. In essence, even in the presence of commanders-in-chief of directions, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command was often forced to continue to directly control the combat activities of fronts, fleets and armies.

Along with objective reasons, a subjective factor played a significant role here: the low level of leadership shown by those military leaders who were appointed commanders in chief. First of all, this concerns Voroshilov and Budyonny. An assessment of Voroshilov's activities as Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the North-West direction and commander of the troops of the Leningrad Front was given in April 1942 in an unprecedented resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: "1. To admit that Comrade Voroshilov did not cope with the work entrusted to him at the front. 2. Send comrade Voroshilov to rear military work!?" Nevertheless, in the future, Stalin twice sent Voroshilov to the front as a representative of the Headquarters (in January 1943 to the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, in December to the Separate Primorsky Army), and in the spring of 1944 he, together with Vasilevsky coordinated the actions of troops in the Crimean strategic offensive operation.

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Marshal Timoshenko was more successful in leading the troops as commander-in-chief. Under his direct leadership, the plans for offensive operations in the Oryol-Bryansk and Donbas directions were developed, and in January 1942 the Barvenkovo-Lozovskaya operation was successfully carried out. However, he also made gross miscalculations, especially in May 1942 in the Kharkov offensive operation, which ended in the defeat of a large group of Soviet troops.

As the situation became more and more stable and experience was gained in command and control of troops on the part of the command and staffs of the fronts, and the connection between the Headquarters and the front departments became more and more stable and reliable, the need for an intermediate link of strategic control disappeared. Therefore, the main commands of the strategic directions were abolished one by one. The main command of the troops of the Western direction was abolished on September 10, the North-West - on September 29 and the South-West - in December 1941.¹⁸³ However, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command did not completely abandon them. Already at the beginning of 1942, the Main Commands of the troops of the Western and Southwestern directions were again restored. True, there were some innovations: the commanders-in-chief were now at the same time the commanders of the fronts and received relative independence in resolving operational issues. In February 1942, the Stavka entrusted the commander of the Western Front, General of the Army Zhukov, with the duties of Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction to coordinate the military operations of the Western and Kalinin Fronts during the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation. Similarly, the commander of the Southwestern Front, Marshal Timoshenko, as commander in chief of the Southwestern direction, had to coordinate the actions of his own and the neighboring Bryansk Front. As practice has shown, such a combination of the positions of the commander-in-chief of the direction and the commander of the front turned out to be inappropriate, since it narrowed the ability of the commander-in-chief to coordinate the actions of other fronts, which the Headquarters itself was forced to do, and soon they had to abandon such a control system. The main command of the troops of the Western direction of the second formation was liquidated on May 5, 1942, and the South-Western one on June 21, 1942.^{186*}

On April 21, 1942, to direct the actions of troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the High Command of the troops of the North Caucasian direction was formed (commander-in-chief - Marshal Budyonny) with the Crimean Front, the Sevastopol defensive region, the North Caucasian military district, the Black Sea fleet and the Azov military flotilla. But it did not last long: a month later, this command was abolished.

The Headquarters resorted to a similar system of strategic leadership, but in a more perfect form, only in 1945, during the military campaign in the Far East. Taking into account the remoteness of the theater of military operations from the Center, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed the main command of the Soviet troops in the Far East (the commander-in-chief was Marshal Vasilevsky). Moreover, unlike the main commands of the troops of the directions 1941-1942. it, having at its disposal large forces and means, was endowed with much greater independence in resolving issues of preparing and conducting military operations, although here, too, the Supreme Command Headquarters retained the right to control the fronts and the Pacific Fleet.

Beginning in the summer of 1942, the Headquarters led the fronts and fleets directly, that is, without an intermediate link. This system received the greatest application and development during the war, since in the presence of one strategic front of the armed struggle, it ensured high efficiency and effectiveness in commanding the combat operations of troops. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, having direct contact with the fronts and fleets, had the opportunity to directly monitor the development

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the situation in the area of their operations, respond in a timely manner to its changes and influence the combat activity of the troops.

From September 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command passed to the leadership of the combat operations of the fronts through its representatives. This began in 1941, when General A. A. Novikov, Deputy Commissar of Defense for Aviation, General N. N. Voronov, Head of the Red Army Artillery Directorate, and General N. N. Voronov, Head of the Main Armored Directorate, General Ya. N. Fedorenko and others. But then their functions were limited to studying the situation and assisting the front command in solving purely specific tasks.

The institution of representatives of the Headquarters of the All-Russian Supreme Command was fully developed by the beginning of the winter campaign of 1942/1943, when Zhukov and Vasilevsky left for the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts in preparation for the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. On the spot, they did all the work to refine the planning and organization of upcoming operations, to coordinate the plans and actions of the fronts. Subsequently, representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were regularly sent to where a crisis situation arose or where, according to the plan of the Supreme High Command, important tasks were solved. Most often, this role was played by G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky, S. K. Timoshenko, K. E. Voroshilov, A. I. Antonov, S. M. Shtemenko, N. G. Kuznetsov, A. A. Novikov, N. N. Voronov, L. Z. Mekhlis and others. - power in the preparation of operations, coordinated the actions of adjacent fronts, exercised control over the implementation of the instructions of the Headquarters, contributed to the rapid resolution of those issues that required the intervention of the Supreme High Command.

In addition to the plenipotentiaries who directly implemented the decisions of the Headquarters directly on the ground, special representatives were often sent to the fronts. They went to the troops in order to help the command of the troops and the main representatives of the Headquarters in the use of various types of the Armed Forces and branches of the military.

The volume of duties and rights of the main representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command increased during the war. If at first they could not make independent fundamental decisions on their own initiative, change the composition of the fronts and the dividing lines between them, then from the middle of 1944 the situation changed dramatically. Zhukov, Vasilevsky and other key representatives of the Headquarters were entrusted with the direct command of the troops of the front group. This made it possible to increase the specificity and efficiency of strategic management.

The institute of representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command existed until the end of 1944. In the future, the need for it

fell away due to a significant reduction in the strategic front of the armed struggle and the increased skill of the commanders and staffs of the fronts. Therefore, most of the largest operations in 1945 were already carried out without the participation of representatives of the Headquarters. The direction of the actions of the fronts in these operations (East Prussian, Vistula-Oder and some others) was carried out directly by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief through the General Staff.

From the very beginning of the war, the rapidly changing operational-strategic situation on the wings of the Soviet-German front required close cooperation between the fleets and the troops of the fronts operating in the coastal areas. Initially, fleets and flotillas for this purpose were transferred to the operational subordination of coastal fronts. However, their commanders did not always fully orient the fleets about the general tasks and prospects for their activities, and often did not pay due

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much attention to the fulfillment by the fleets of independent tasks in maritime theaters. In connection with this, and also in view of the complication of the situation at sea, a need arose for a radical improvement in the operational-strategic leadership of the forces of the fleets. The directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of March 31, 1944 established the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of the USSR, who was appointed the People's Commissar of the Navy. According to the same directive, the Baltic Fleet was left operationally subordinate to the Leningrad Front, while the Northern and Black Sea Fleets were directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The same directive stated that henceforth the tasks of the fleets would be set by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. From now on, the use of naval aviation on land fronts was allowed only in exceptional cases, and then only with the permission of the Headquarters. The commanders of the coastal fronts were responsible for the defense of the coast in maritime theaters, and at the same time the degree of participation and responsibility of the fleets for the solution of these tasks was determined. Moreover, the commanders of the fronts were forbidden to interfere in tactical maritime issues and the internal service of the fleets subordinate to them in operational terms. In general, the new command and control system of the Naval Forces provided more independence to the naval command, which made it possible to more successfully solve purely naval tasks based on the general instructions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

The style and methods of work of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme Command were constantly improved during the war. The work of these bodies became more and more concrete and businesslike.

The former head of the Logistics of the Red Army, General A. V. Khrulev, recalled: "... There were no meetings of the GKO in the usual sense, that is, with a specific agenda, secretaries and protocols." At first, on behalf of the GKO, issues were considered solely by its chairman or individual members; subsequently, the preparation and adoption of GKO resolutions, including on military issues, were carried out in a narrow circle of people: as a rule, these were some members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. and GKO!65. Each member of the GKO had a specific assignment and was responsible for the production of certain types of military equipment.

Approximately according to the same principle, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command worked. "The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command," noted Marshal Zhukov, "was the collective body for directing the military operations of the Armed Forces. Its work was based on a reasonable combination of collegiality with unity of command" '5. In essence, it was a collective body of strategic leadership, however, according to the testimony of Zhukov and Vasilevsky, it never met in full force. Some of its members, as a rule, were in the army, others performed special tasks. The Stavka meetings were usually attended only by those who were invited by Stalin himself. Collegiality, however, was manifested in the fact that all the most important strategic decisions were made after their careful preparation at the General Staff with subsequent discussion at the Headquarters, most often with the participation of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, some members of the State Defense Committee and leaders of the General Staff. In a number of cases, senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the Navy were invited to meetings at Headquarters. In further work on the preparation of plans of operations, the most active part was taken by the commanders of the branches of the Armed Forces and the branches of service. Stalin kept in constant contact with the absent members of the Headquarters and, if necessary, asked their opinion on this or that issue. All this made it possible to consider issues deeply and comprehensively, to develop appropriate solutions, to promptly carry out

them into life.

However, the Stavka did not come to this immediately. In the first period of the war, and especially in its first months, the principle of collegiality was practically not respected. The style of her work was greatly influenced by the practice that had developed in the prewar years of resolving strategic issues in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (in military conflicts

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tach by the lake Hasan, r. Khalkhin-Gol and especially in the Soviet-Finnish war) and the leadership of the military operations of the Armed Forces, according to the Commissar of the Navy Admiral Kuznetsov, "by orders coming from the office of I.V. Stalin" '6". In the first months of the war, when making decisions, Stalin, as a rule, very rarely consulted with the leading officials of the General Staff, the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy, and the front commanders. Almost all decisions were made by him alone, and often, due to his insufficient operational-strategic preparation, not entirely expedient. Stalin's attempts to suppress the initiative of the front commanders and, at the same time, his desire to interfere in their activities over trifles, had an extremely negative impact on the course of operations. He never admitted his mistakes and more than once shifted all the responsibility for them to his subordinates with tragic consequences for them. Suffice it to recall the reprisals against the command of the Western Front. And in the future, he unjustifiably often replaced one commander with another. So, only in 1941-1942. 17 front commanders were replaced, 12 of whom stayed in this position for no more than a month! 8. According to Marshal Vasilevsky, the turning point in the deep restructuring of Stalin's style of work as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Supreme Command Headquarters as a whole was September 1942. It was from that time that he began to constantly rely on the collective experience and mind of military leaders! 3. The role and authority of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in directing the military operations of the Armed Forces began to grow steadily.

As experience was gained and the conditions of warfare changed in favor of the Soviet Union, the number of mistakes and miscalculations became less and less. A relatively coherent system of preparation and adoption of both fundamental long-term and private current decisions has developed. Clear principles of strategic planning, development of ideas and plans for military campaigns, strategic and front-line operations were developed and mastered.

The war confirmed that when economically and militarily powerful countries or coalitions of countries clash, when hostilities cover vast areas and are conducted for a long time simultaneously on land, sea and in the air, the ultimate goal of the war can be achieved only through the consistent achievement of intermediate military-political and strategic goals. With this in mind, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff in the course of the war successively moved from solving individual urgent strategic tasks by executive order to advance planning of front operations, then strategic operations of groups of fronts, and, finally, military campaigns.

The planning of military campaigns is an important achievement of the national military strategy, a new stage in its development. Each campaign had its own characteristics, was distinguished by its unique character and peculiar features. Its goals, content and scope depended on the specific conditions of the military-political situation. Therefore, the principles of planning defensive and offensive campaigns, as well as each military campaign separately, were different.

The first defensive military campaign of 1941] was carried out without a clearly defined plan. This is understandable: after all, it was carried out in difficult conditions, when the initiative was in the hands of the enemy, and the Soviet troops, under the blows of superior forces, retreated to a considerable depth. In this situation, the goals, content and plans of the actions of the troops were formed already in the course of repulsing the enemy offensive. Not only strategic, but also all front-line operations were prepared and carried out in an administrative manner. In the same way, issues of interaction and support for combat operations were resolved.

The second summer-autumn defensive military campaign of 1942 was originally planned as an offensive one. Her idea began to develop in March.

However, the prepared plan was frustrated by the heavy defeats of the Soviet troops on the southern wing of the Soviet German front. Further planning of the campaign was carried out, as in 1941, in the course of stubborn defensive battles, accompanied by the withdrawal of Soviet troops to Voronezh, Stalingrad and the foothills of the Caucasus. Therefore, the basis was once again placed on the administrative order with the definition and setting of tasks depending on the specific situation.

Only at the beginning of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, when the enemy had lost the strategic initiative, was the defense planned and organized in advance in strategic, operational and tactical terms.
links.

Offensive military campaigns, as a rule, were planned in advance in all cases. Their training was carried out in more favorable conditions. Many measures (regrouping of troops, construction and restoration of roads, organization of the strategic and operational rear, accumulation of stocks of materiel) began at the end of previous campaigns. However, the planning of each specific offensive campaign also had its own characteristics and fundamental differences. Thus, the planning of the winter offensive campaigns of 1941/1942. and 1942/1943 encountered difficulties associated with the lack of certainty of the situation, the instability of the front line, and the lack of forces and material and technical means. For the winter campaign of 1941/1942. Fronts were initially assigned tasks only for the period of transition to the counteroffensive. Subsequent offensive operations were planned taking into account the concrete results achieved in the counteroffensive near Tikhvin, Rostov and near Moscow.

Winter campaign plan 1942/1943 developed more thoroughly. The first strategic operations near Stalingrad (Operation Uranus), on the Middle Don (Operation Saturn) and in the North Caucasus were planned with particular care. At the same time, the tasks of the groups of fronts in all other strategic directions were also determined in advance, right up to the end of the campaign. As the situation cleared up, they were embodied in specific plans for the corresponding strategic and front-line operations.

Starting from the summer of 1943, the planning of military campaigns gradually took on more and more clear forms. This was facilitated by the fact that the strategic initiative finally passed to the Soviet troops. Therefore, it became possible to predict the development of military events with greater certainty and for a considerable period of time ahead. Since that time, military campaigns have been developed more thoroughly. Their planning and preparation usually took place two or even three months before they began.

Thus, the planning of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 began immediately after the repulse of the German counteroffensive in the Donbass and near Kharkov. At the same time, plans were developed for both defensive and offensive strategic operations. But the question of what kind of operations to start the campaign remained open for a long time. Only at the end of April was it finally decided to meet the enemy's impending attack with a deliberate defense. However, the planning of offensive operations did not stop. On the contrary, it has acquired a more concrete character, taking into account the forthcoming transition of troops from defense to strategic counteroffensive. Already in mid-June, the development of plans for the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operations (Operations Kutuzov and Commander Rumyantsev) was completed. Then the Smolensk strategic operation ("Suvorov") and, finally, the autumn strategic operations (Donbass, Nizhnedneprovsk, Chernigov-Poltava, Kiev, etc.) were successively planned.

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In connection with the achieved radical change in the war after 1943, the question arose of a new form of military campaigns with operations not in one or two directions, but on the entire Soviet-German front with successive strikes against the enemy. This requirement was taken as the basis for planning the winter-spring, and then the summer-autumn campaign of 1944.

Planning for the summer-autumn campaign of 1944 began at the end of March, when the front commanders received instructions from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to develop their ideas for the summer of 1944. In early April, these ideas were received by the General Staff, where they were carefully studied and summarized. . Based on this, the goals, the general plan of the campaign and the plans of the first strategic operations were determined. On April 12, they were considered and, with some amendments, approved at the GKO meeting. After that, the General Staff, with the direct participation of the commanders of the fronts, began the detailed planning of the first strategic operations in sectors. By the end of May, the development of the plan for the first stage of the 1944 summer campaign was fully completed. It provided for the conduct of four major strategic offensive operations from June 10 to the end of August, of which the Byelorussian strategic operation ("Bagration") was considered the most important, and in September-December - four more strategic operations. In the second group of operations, the Baltic strategic offensive operation was recognized as the most ambitious.

Planning for the final military campaign in Europe began during the summer-autumn campaign of 1944. Its plan was developed gradually. At the beginning of November, the first version of the plan was basically ready. The entire campaign was planned in two stages. At its first stage, it was planned to carry out offensive operations in East Prussia, Poland and in the direction of Vienna. At the second stage - to launch decisive offensive operations in the Berlin and Prague directions.

The plans for the military campaign to defeat the Japanese Kwantung Army were prepared in the winter of 1944/1945, and its direct planning began in April 1945.

In general, the planning of military campaigns, as a rule, consisted in determining their goals, strategic intent, as well as in establishing the number of strategic operations, distributing forces and means in directions, calculating the composition and formation of strategic groupings of troops, planning the first strategic operations, organizing strategic interaction between groups of fronts and branches of the Armed Forces, development of measures for the material and technical support of the Armed Forces. At the same time, the first strategic operations were developed most fully and comprehensively; D.

Of course, this entire list covers only a part of the most important issues that were developed during the planning of each military campaign, but it also gives an idea of how complex and multifaceted this work was. The operational part of the plan of military campaigns was usually worked out on a generalized map. In addition to it, detailed considerations were prepared with the definition of the concept and tasks of the fronts, calculations of the distribution of forces and means, plans for the deployment (regrouping) of reserves, the accumulation of material reserves, and other documents. The plans of the first offensive campaigns most often reflected strategic operations carried out in the main directions, and operations in auxiliary

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directions were often developed especially in the course of already unfolding hostilities. In general, they constituted the general content of the military campaign.

In all cases, the planning of military campaigns was based on taking into account specific operational intelligence data about the enemy, on forecasts of his possible actions, as well as on an assessment of the possible increase in military production by both sides and the likely development of the situation in other theaters of the Second World War. The planning of strategic operations within the framework of each military campaign was carried out by the General Staff with the involvement of front commanders and their headquarters.

This process can be traced in detail from the memoirs of Zhukov: "When developing the next operation, I. V. Stalin usually called the chief of the General Staff and his deputy and painstakingly examined the operational-strategic situation on the entire Soviet-German front together with them: the state of the troops fronts, data from all types of reconnaissance and the progress in the preparation of reserves of all branches of the armed forces.

Then the head of the rear of the Red Army, the commanders of various branches of the armed forces and the heads of the main departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, who were to provide this operation, were called to the Headquarters.

After that, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Deputy Supreme Commander and the Chief of the General Staff discussed the operational and strategic capabilities of our troops. The Chief of the General Staff and the Deputy Supreme Commander were given the task of thinking over and calculating our capabilities for one or those operations that were planned to be carried out. Usually the Supreme Commander gave us 4-5 days for this work. At the end of the term, a preliminary decision was made. After that, the Supreme Commander instructed the Chief of the General Staff to request the opinions of the Military Councils of the fronts on the upcoming operation.

While the command and headquarters of the front were working, the General Staff was doing a lot of creative work on planning the operation and interaction between the fronts, tasks were outlined for reconnaissance agencies, long-range aviation, partisan forces located behind enemy lines, and military communications agencies for the transfer of replenishments and reserves of the Supreme High Command, material reserves.

Finally, a day was appointed when the front commanders were to arrive at Headquarters to report on the plan of the front's operation. Usually the Supreme Commander listened to them in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff, the Deputy Supreme Commander and some members of the GKO.

After careful consideration of the reports, I. V. Stalin approved the plans and timing of the operation, indicating what exactly to pay attention to. It was determined who was personally sent by a representative of the Headquarters to coordinate the actions of the fronts and who would exercise control over the material support of the troops, the timely regrouping of troops and reserves of the Supreme High Command!'⁵.

Sometimes the Headquarters demanded from the front commanders their proposals on front-line operations even before the development of the concept of this or that strategic operation. In such cases, the plans presented by the commanders were considered by the General Staff from the point of view of their compliance with the general plan of the military campaign. Proceeding from this, a consolidated plan of the strategic operation was then developed and, if necessary, clarifications were made to the plans of the fronts. For example, on the basis of the master plan for the Korsun-Shevchenko strategic operation, the Headquarters changed the direction of the main attacks of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts, since initially they did not ensure the encirclement and destruction of the enemy's Korsun-Shevchenko grouping planned by the strategic plan.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command attached great importance to the specific formulation of tasks for the fronts. Usually they were set by operational directives. In addition, a directive on the rear was developed, instructions were given on other types of support. in opera

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A rational directive usually determined the purpose and time of the operation, indicated the forces and means involved in its implementation, the direction of concentration of the main efforts, the procedure for interaction with neighbors, long-range aviation and fleet (on coastal directions), and other initial data. In preparation

Offensive operations, the directive, as a rule, indicated the immediate and further tasks of the front, the width of the breakthrough sectors, the density of forces and means on them, the operational formation of the front's troops, and the methods of using mobile groups and second echelons. In some cases, the goals and tasks were determined not only of the front, but also of the armies, even of individual formations. This manifested the desire of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to organize the operation as best as possible and ensure clearer interaction, but in practice this was the initiative of the front commands.

During the development of most strategic operations, the plans for the first front-line offensive operations carried out within their framework were often considered with the summons of the front commanders to Moscow, where, after joint consideration, they were approved by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. During the preparation of subsequent front-line operations, due to time constraints, the Headquarters usually did not call the commanders. In such cases, on the basis of the instructions received, the commanders most often submitted only detailed decisions to the Headquarters for approval. This is how the East Pomeranian operation of the 2nd Belorussian Front (February 1945), operations to defeat the Nazi troops in Hungary and Yugoslavia (autumn 1944) by the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts were prepared. Often, the front commanders themselves turned to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command with proposals for the further conduct of operations.

The following practice was also established: the Headquarters of the Supreme Command informed the front commanders of the upcoming tasks in advance. This took place, for example, at the final stage of the Belarusian operation. In the summer of 1944, the commanders were informed in advance of the nature and general content of further tasks, which served as the basis for the development of plans for subsequent operations.

In general, during strategic offensive operations, especially in the final period of the war, summoning front commanders to the Headquarters was rarely practiced. The necessary instructions were usually given to them through personal negotiations over a direct wire. The commanders reported on the situation and their thoughts on further actions and, as a rule, immediately received new tasks. Sometimes the Stavka, bypassing the fronts, set tasks directly to the armies in the same way. But she resorted to this method only in exceptional cases, when the situation did not allow even the slightest delay in taking the necessary measures.

As for the fleets, specific issues of their strategic and operational use, in agreement with the General Staff, were developed by the People's Commissar of the Navy and the Main Naval Staff. They were worked out in more detail at the headquarters of the troops of the directions, as well as at the headquarters of the fleets and coastal fronts. The planning of the actions of the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces of the country was carried out in a similar way. The headquarters of the Supreme Command determined only their general tasks. Specific planning was carried out by the Commanders-in-Chief and the headquarters of the corresponding branches of the Armed Forces. Plans for conducting partisan struggle were developed by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement and the Military Councils of the fronts.

In the course of operations, the decisions made and the plans developed were usually subjected to serious adjustments. The directions of strikes and methods of action of the troops were often revised. Sometimes there was even a need for additional operations.

On the whole, the system of strategic planning in the Soviet Armed Forces became quite effective during the war years. As Marshal Zhukov noted, the Stavka

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The Supreme High Command "saw farther and better than Hitler's strategic leadership ... she understood better than the enemy and the specific situation that determines the course of events on the fronts." ... "Our Headquarters," according to him, "clearly imagined the likely actions of the German fascist command, took measures to destroy its intentions and achieve its goal. All this, taken together, ensured the high efficiency of our military planning!"

One of the most important tasks of strategic leadership during the war was the organization of strategic interaction by coordinating the efforts of the fronts, fleets and associations of other branches of the Armed Forces to achieve the goals set.

The foundations of strategic interaction were laid by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command during the development of ideas and plans for campaigns and strategic operations. They found their expression: in defining the tasks of strategic groupings, the role and place of fronts and other formations in operations, in developing coordinated methods of conducting a strategic offensive and defense, in establishing the sequence of tasks and in providing mutual assistance. Particular attention was paid, first of all, to coordinating the strikes of the fronts operating in adjacent directions, creating more favorable conditions for the actions of those groupings that performed the most important tasks, and mutually using their success in various directions.

In strategic defensive operations, great attention was paid to the coordination of counterattacks, which were launched in the zones of various fronts, as was the case, for example, when repulsing the enemy offensive on Stalingrad and in the Battle of Kursk. Very often, at decisive moments in a defensive battle, one front launched counterattacks in order to eliminate the crisis that had arisen on a neighboring front: in 1944, the 54th Army in the interests of the Leningrad Front, the Central and Bryansk Fronts in the interests of the Southwestern Front. Often the efforts of the air armies of several fronts were concentrated in the zone of one front, where a particularly tense situation was created. It also provided for the transfer of reserves from one direction to another to close the gaps formed in the defense.

In strategic offensive operations, when organizing strategic interaction, all attention was focused on coordinating successive operations and strikes in various directions with

in order to split up the enemy's front, defeat his main groupings one by one, and gradually expand his front of the strategic offensive. When carrying out simultaneous operations in several axes, coordinated measures were taken to secure the flanks of the advancing groupings, disrupt the maneuver of enemy reserves from one axis to another, and securely consolidate the success achieved in each of the axes.

The strategic interaction of the fronts with long-range aviation was usually ensured by involving formations of long-range bombers in accordance with the plans of the Stavka and the fronts to deliver strikes in the directions of the main strike groupings of troops to suppress important enemy resistance centers, weaken its reserves, and destroy aircraft at airfields, communications nodes and other facilities in its operational rear.

Interaction between the fronts and the Air Defense Forces of the country was ensured mainly by coordinating the air defense of the rear of the fronts and troops by means of the country's air defense and strengthening the air defense of some of the country's front-line facilities by front-line means.

The interaction of the fronts with the fleets was carried out by coordinating their tasks and actions in coastal areas and organizing joint operations.

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In many operations, the offensive and defensive actions of the fronts were supported by partisan formations operating behind enemy lines. Usually, for this purpose, partisan strikes on enemy communications were intensified.

Most often, organized strategic cooperation fully justified itself, so it was effectively maintained throughout the operation. But sometimes it was violated from the very beginning or at the critical moments of the operation, which, as a rule, led to a disruption in the fulfillment of the assigned tasks. Thus, in August-September 1941, it was not possible to properly coordinate the operations of the Central, Bryansk and Southwestern fronts, and this, as you know, ended in a catastrophe near Kiev. In May 1942, during the Kharkiv offensive operation, interaction between the Southwestern and Southern fronts was disrupted from the very beginning. As a result, the enemy broke through the zone of the Southern Front to the rear of the main strike force of the troops of the Southwestern Front, and it suffered a heavy defeat. In the course of the struggle to destroy the enemy's Courland grouping in 1945, it was not possible to achieve coordinated actions between the fronts and the Baltic Fleet. The enemy was not blocked from the sea, which not only delayed his elimination, but also allowed the Wehrmacht command to freely transfer about ten of its divisions from Courland to the Berlin direction.

The development of the strategic communications system of the Armed Forces played an important role in improving strategic leadership. In the course of the war, in order to ensure stable leadership, it was necessary to create signal troops of the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and apply new methods of organizing communications with the widespread use of redundant channels both at the operational level and at the strategic level. The system of special purpose communication centers (USON) of the General Staff since 1943 has become the basis for organizing communications on the entire front. Since 1944, the communication of the General Staff was organized along strategic and operational lines. At the final stage of the war in Europe, special-purpose communications centers (USSN) began to be created, which provided communications not only for the military command, but also for the bodies of the Soviet military administration.

On the whole, by 1945 the system of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces basically corresponded to the nature of military operations, the general requirements of the military and military strategy. Distinguished by high reliability, it ensured stable, continuous and effective command and control of troops and fleet forces, and the successful fulfillment of the entire range of military-political and strategic tasks.

9. Strategic problems of conducting a coalition war

The war against strong and insidious opponents demanded from the states that entered the anti-Hitler coalition the unification of political, economic and military efforts, a clear coordination of the actions of their armed forces. First of all, it was necessary to establish and agree on the goals of the armed struggle in the main and other theaters of military operations, the sequence of deployment of major strategic operations on them, the timing and scope of the opening of a second front in Europe, and then coordinate joint actions to defeat the enemy's armed forces. In the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, the approach to all these issues was often different, which complicated and delayed the achievement of the final goals in the Second World War.

Joint solutions to all arising problems of a political, and sometimes purely military nature, were worked out in the process of correspondence between the heads of state, as well as at bilateral meetings and conferences. Of particular importance were

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conferences of the heads of government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain in Tehran in 1943, in Yalta in 1945 and in Potsdam in 1945. Thanks to the trips of Churchill to Moscow (1942 and 1944) and Molotov to London and Washington (1942), the visits of Responsible representatives of the United States and Great Britain managed to agree on a number of key issues of coalition policy and military strategy in Moscow. Their further development was carried out through the ministries of foreign affairs and the general staffs of the respective states. This was largely facilitated by the exchange of military missions.

For example, in 1941 and early 1942, military missions were established under the Soviet General Staff.

allies: the American was headed by General Dean; British - General Burroughs, French - General Delatre-de-Tassigny, Norwegian - Colonel Dahl. The Soviet military mission in England was first headed by Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov, then by Rear Admiral N. M. Kharlamov, and at the end of the war by Lieutenant General A. F. Vasiliev. Major General I. A. Susloparov!?? was with the US Expeditionary Forces in France.

The problem of coordinating the strategic efforts of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain became especially acute after the opening of a second front in Europe. Since that time, there has been a need for closer coordination of military operations conducted both in the West and in the East, in order to make it difficult for the enemy, who is forced to simultaneously repel attacks from the armies of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, to transfer forces and means from West to East and back. . An urgent need arose to coordinate the air bombardment of objects on the territory of Germany and other countries of the fascist bloc. One of the striking examples of the coordination of military operations are the events of December 1944-January 1945, when the German troops, having suddenly launched a counteroffensive in the Ardennes region, put the Anglo-American troops in a difficult situation. It was then that Churchill turned to Stalin with a request to speed up the start of the offensive on the Soviet-German front and thereby assist in eliminating the threat of defeating the Allied forces in the Ardennes. The Soviet Armed Forces fulfilled their allied duty by launching a decisive offensive in January 1945, which was planned somewhat later. It had a great influence on the change in the military-political situation in Europe and provided enormous assistance to the Allied forces, which enabled them to prepare and launch an offensive operation on the Rhine. In the final campaign of the war in Europe, the allies had to coordinate in place and time the strikes of the groups of troops advancing towards each other, establish the boundaries of their meeting, the zone of fire and air operations, and jointly resolve administrative issues in Germany.

The coordinated actions of the allied fleets to ensure the escort of convoys delivering Lend-Lease cargo from the USA and Great Britain to the northern ports of the USSR acquired great importance. In their operational zones, the Northern Fleet of the USSR and the British Navy, in the main, successfully ensured their protection. However, in a number of cases, interaction was disrupted, unilateral, often unjustified decisions were made, which led to large losses of transport ships, as happened, for example, in 1942 with the RO-17 convoy. Then, at the most difficult moment for the USSR, when the enemy was rushing towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus, the Anglo-American side unilaterally, despite the protests of the Soviet leadership, suspended military supplies along this route. After that, there was a sharp cooling in Soviet-American relations.

An important role in the war was played by coordinated bombing of industrial facilities on the territory of the Reich, including those carried out by the US Air Force during the so-called "shuttle" operations. Bombers take off from airfields

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England, bombed targets in Germany, and then continued flying east. They landed at the airfield of the Poltava airfield hub. There they refueled, replenished with ammunition and delivered repeated strikes against specified targets with a landing in England. Thanks to this, the intensity of air raids on Germany increased significantly.

The system of strategic interaction between the Soviet Armed Forces and the Allies that took shape during the war in Europe made it possible to successfully solve some joint tasks. However, it did not receive proper development. Until the end of the war, no single body was created that would better coordinate the actions of the allied armies. Perhaps that is why in recent operations there were many inconsistencies during the meeting of the allied forces. Although the line of advance of the Soviet and American-British troops was established in advance, it was often violated by both.

The interaction of the Soviet Armed Forces with the Czechoslovak, Polish, Romanian and Bulgarian formations operating on the Soviet-German front, and during the period of the Far Eastern campaign with the People's Revolutionary Army of Mongolia, was of a different nature. In essence, the problem of developing the principles of a coalition strategy confronted the Soviet military leadership for the first time. As the war developed, especially with the transfer of hostilities beyond the borders of the USSR, it acquired exceptional acuteness. Shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet troops then fought six combined arms armies, several corps, dozens of divisions of allied forces from the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Under such conditions, it was no longer possible to conduct operations using the old methods. It was necessary to assess the peculiarities of each allied army, to establish politically and strategically expedient methods of their operational use, to determine the procedure for creating and deploying coalition groupings of troops, to find rational forms and methods of operational, special and logistic support, taking into account the national characteristics of the allied forces. associations and connections. All these issues had to be resolved in the course of hostilities, in the absence of any experience.

Already in the first period of the war, the USSR provided comprehensive assistance in the formation on its territory of the first units, formations and associations of Polish and Czechoslovak troops, which then actively participated in the fight against the Nazi invaders, first on Soviet territory, and then in the liberation of their countries. Subsequently, these formations became the backbone of the new armed forces of their states. The Romanian and Bulgarian troops were then successively included in the forces fighting on the side of the Soviet Union. At the end of the war, two Polish, two Romanian, two Bulgarian armies, the Czechoslovak army and Polish tank corps, as well as a number of formations of all branches of the armed forces. Included in the Soviet fronts and armies in agreement with the governments of the respective states, they carried out the tasks assigned to them according to the plans of the Soviet command.

Interaction was carried out through permanent representation, personal meetings of leading persons and correspondence between them, contacts between the command of interacting troops. Representatives of the Soviet command, the General Staff, operational groups, advisers, and instructors were sent to each of the foreign formations, and representatives of the allied forces were in the Soviet front and army headquarters. With their direct participation, combat plans were developed, information was exchanged. Such a system ensured a unity of understanding of operational tasks and purposeful management in joint actions, fully took into account national characteristics and sovereignty with

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southern troops. Together with specialists from foreign formations, Soviet advisers and instructors were engaged in organizing the training of troops, equipment, all types of support, interaction, control and communications. These formations were provided with ammunition and fuel from Soviet warehouses, and with food, clothing and some special equipment - at the expense of the resources of their own countries.

Allied troops took an active part in the Vistula-Oder, Budapest, West Carpathian, East Pomeranian, Vienna, Berlin and Prague offensive operations. They crossed the Vistula and Oder, crossed the Carpathians, stormed Berlin. The experience accumulated during the performance of these combat missions was then effectively used in the construction and training of the armies of the Warsaw Pact member states.

10. Strategic rear

In the first days of the war, the Soviet government took drastic measures not only to mobilize the country's economic resources, to restructure the national economy on a war footing, but also to radically restructure the Logistics of the Soviet Armed Forces in all its units - military, operational, strategic.

The new Logistics system began to take shape after the generalization of the experience of military operations in the first month of the war. How

already mentioned above). On August 1941, the State Defense Committee decided to create the Main Directorate of Logistics of the Red Army and introduce the post of Chief of Logistics - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. Directly subordinated to him were such departments as food supply, commissariat, automobile, road, military communications, military sanitary, fuel supply, financial and veterinary. And the supply of artillery, armored, engineering and other special equipment remained in the hands of the commanders of the armed forces. However, the issues of transportation, evacuation and deployment of their supply units were resolved at the headquarters of the Logistics of the Red Army. The rear of the Air Force and the Navy was also reorganized.

The head of the Logistics of the Red Army invariably had one main goal - to centralize the provision of military operations, to streamline the connection of the Logistics agencies with the national economy. The direct functions of the Main Directorate of Logistics were: the supply of all means of support to the fronts, the transportation of people, the wounded and sick, horse reinforcements; organization of bases and warehouses, their distribution between fronts and military districts; distribution of procurement areas in accordance with government decisions; organization of evacuation from the theater of operations and from frontline zones; management of sanitary and veterinary services.

In the fronts and in the armies, the positions of chief of logistics were also introduced and headquarters of the rear were formed. One of the members of the military councils of the fronts and armies was responsible for the work of the rear. In the formations and institutions of the rear, political departments of the rear of the armies and fronts were formed. All organs of the Home Front were constantly strengthened by qualified personnel.

The system of central control organs of the Rear was continuously improved. At the beginning of 1942, the dual subordination of the railway troops was eliminated, from now on they were under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissar of Railways. The situation with the road service was similar: in 1943 it was divided into independent services - automobile and road. In the same year, the rear units of the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command began to form. In the summer, the State Defense Committee decided to change the delivery system. Now responsible for bringing all kinds of mother

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al funds to subordinate troops was entrusted to the senior commander. The next step is the formation of an additional number of motor transport brigades, regiments and battalions. In connection with the growth of material reserves transferred from the national economy to the active army, the number of warehouses and bases of the center increased. Rear management at all levels has improved dramatically.

During the Great Patriotic War, a huge amount of material resources was spent. This was due to the intensity of hostilities, the large number of troops, the continuous growth in the number of weapons and military equipment. During the war years, 10 million tons of ammunition, over 16 million tons of fuel, about 40 million tons of food and fodder were used up!

The organization of the rear and logistical support of troops in strategic operations is a new phenomenon in Soviet military art. In preparing military campaigns and strategic operations, the Supreme High Command took the most vigorous measures to accumulate the necessary material and technical resources in the fronts and in the navy. The need for them grew rapidly. So, in the final period of the war, when conducting major strategic operations, in which two to four fronts participated, about | million tons of ammunition, over 300 thousand tons of fuel, several tens of thousands of tons of food and fodder. True, the rear coped with the supply of such a quantity of material resources with great difficulty.

In the second and third periods of the war, with the increasing depth of the strategic rear, the depth of the operational rear was reduced to 200-300 km. Gradually, the rear units and institutions approached the troops, while at the same time, the maneuverability and mobility of the rear increased. In all links of the Rear, a system of transport from top to bottom ("from oneself") and evacuation of the wounded ("to oneself") was firmly established. The structure of the supply corresponded to the new nature of the war. If in the First World War almost two-thirds of the deliveries in the Russian army accounted for food and fodder, then in the Great Patriotic War the first place in the delivery was occupied by ammunition (over 29%), fuel (about 28%), military equipment and other goods (over 23%), and the share of food and fodder in the transported cargo did not exceed 20%!"4

During the years of the last war, the protection and defense of rear facilities acquired considerable importance. There was a need for interaction between the rear organs of the allied armies of Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. In addition, outside the USSR, the Soviet command, the military administration and the Home Front faced many other problems related to the need to restore normal living conditions for the population in large cities badly destroyed by the war, supplying them with food, fuel, water, etc. d.

A huge amount of work on operational and supply transportation fell on the railways. A particularly heavy load fell on them in 1941-1942. due to the large scale of evacuation movements. Only in the second half of 194] 1.5 million wagons were required to evacuate factories, industrial enterprises, institutions and the population from threatened areas to the central and eastern regions of the country. In order to somehow streamline transportation, it was necessary to create a special Transport Committee under the State Defense Committee, which resolved the issues of the coordinated use of all modes of transport and its development.

The difficulties in the work of the railways were enormous. Due to the fact that the production of rolling stock almost completely stopped, as well as due to the losses incurred, the wagon and locomotive fleet decreased, while the volume of rail traffic increased, the working conditions of the railways became more complicated. The requirements for the urgency of transportation have sharply increased. So, the transfer of military echelons was required to be carried out with

operational speed from 300 to 350 km per

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day. The intensity and urgency of supply shipments also increased. All this led to extremely high tension in the work of the railways.

After the transition of Soviet troops to a strategic offensive, a new problem came to the fore: the restoration of railways. In 1941-1942. restored at 2.5-3.5 km per day, in 1943-1945. - 8-12 km, and in some directions even more!?. New railroads also had to be built. Thus, after the blockade of Leningrad was broken in January 1943, a railroad was built along the southern shore of Lake Ladoga. Thanks to this, Leningrad finally received direct contact with the rear of the country. Roads were built on the Stalingrad and Kursk directions. It was especially difficult to restore large railway junctions and build bridges on wide rivers. Only the dedication of the personnel of the bridge-building units made it possible to restore the bridge across the Dnieper near Kyiv with a length of 1,059 m in 13 days, build bridges near Kremenchug and Dnepropetrovsk!"7. Permanent railway crossings were built across the Dnieper at Dnepropetrovsk and through the Dniester Estuary.

As the front moved to the west, railroad communications lengthened as well. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the western state borders of the USSR, along with the restoration of the railways, a new and very difficult task arose: the conversion of railways to foreign territories from Western European to domestic gauge. On the Warsaw-Berlin direction in the strip of each front, one railway direction was changed! ". For the organization of transportation on foreign territory, authorized chiefs of military communications (VOSO) of the Red Army were allocated to Poland, Romania, Hungary. Transshipment bases were created at the junctions of railway communications center, where supplies were supplied to feed the troops.

The railways played a huge role in the preparation and conduct of the Far Eastern campaign in 1945. They accounted for almost the entire volume of transportation of the Ground Forces, Air Force, special troops, rear units and institutions from the Western European to the Far Eastern theater at a distance of almost 10 thousand km

The following data testify to the enormous scope of restoration work on the railways during the war: 120,000 km of tracks were restored and rebuilt, 15,000 bridges were restored and built, and 12,000 km of new railway lines were laid."

The total volume of rail traffic during the war reached 19.6 million wagons (which is equivalent to almost 300 million tons, of which half was used for operational transportation. Railways carried out three-quarters of all transportation to provide for the army in the field!*" Usually, each front was allocated 1-2 railway lines, the rest of the traffic fell on the work of road, sea, river and air transport.

During the war, the role of road transport constantly increased. At the very beginning, 265,500 motor vehicles and tractors were mobilized from the national economy, which made it possible to almost double the composition of the Armed Forces motor transport, but it was still not enough in all links of the Home Front. Therefore, even then it was required to transport materiel to the troops from the bases and warehouses of the center by motor transport of the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Thus, from the bases located near Moscow, in July 1941, 19.5 thousand tons of cargo were delivered, and in August of the same year - 35.2 thousand tons of materiel!'. In the autumn, when the front line approached the capital, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command again helped the Western Front in delivering supplies to the troops with their own vehicles. In July 1941, a motor transport brigade and 5 separate motor transport battalions of the reserve of the Headquarters of the All-Russian High Command, 8 air groups and detachments of civil transport aviation, as well as the Moscow Special Air Group were formed as a means of the Headquarters of the High Command.

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At the very beginning of the war, a system of military highways (VAD) was created, although the lack of road and motor transport units made their maintenance very difficult. Such a road to the besieged Leningrad was of great strategic importance. In winter, it passed on the ice of Lake Ladoga, in summer, cargo was transported on boats. The troops of the Leningrad Front and the population of the city were supplied in a continuous stream along this "Road of Life", people, valuable factory and scientific equipment were evacuated. Beginning in 1943, the fronts, as a rule, had two or even three military motor roads. In the main strategic directions, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had its own military motor roads leading from the center to the front line. In the course of the war, the coefficient of use of motor vehicles and the length of the average daily mileage increased. In the Vistula-Oder operation (1945) there were cases when cargo was delivered to the troops at a distance of 500-600 km.

In the campaign in the Far East, Soviet troops had to face poorly developed communication routes over a vast area, difficult geographical conditions (mountains, taiga, waterless regions). The military automobile road of the 1st Far Eastern Front had a total length of 1.5 thousand km, and that of the Trans-Baikal Front - about 2.3 thousand km.

By the end of the war, there were more than 664,000 vehicles in the Armed Forces, of which 80% were in the operational rear and central subordination automobile troops. The total volume of transportation carried out by road transport during the last war amounted to 145 million tons of various cargoes!2.

A serious problem in the activities of the rear was medical support. A huge network of stationary hospitals was deployed on the territory of the country, and the lack of deployment of hospitals in the operational rear was gradually eliminated. As a result of the measures taken, out of the total number of rear units and

Medical institutions began to account for 45-50%. The evacuation of the wounded and sick (mainly by military hospital trains) from the operational rear to the interior of the country acquired a large scale. The formulation of the medical case was continuously improved. Through the heroic efforts of medical personnel, more than 72% of the wounded were returned to duty¹⁸³.

The improvement of technical support contributed to the rapid return to service of damaged weapons and military equipment. By the forces and means of the repair bodies of the Armed Forces, 304,129 units of artillery systems, 20,365 thousand small arms and mortar weapons, 25,998 rocket artillery combat vehicles were restored, more than 622 thousand repairs of tanks and self-propelled guns were performed, over 82.3 thousand capital repairs of tank engines. About 2 million only medium and major repairs of cars were made. The Baltic, Black Sea and Northern Fleets carried out 8,800 ship repairs¹⁸⁴.

All this testifies to the fact that during the war a centralized and strong, well-managed rear was created in the Soviet Armed Forces. Having established interaction with the central and local party and national economic bodies, he played a great role in achieving victory over the enemy.

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The Great Patriotic War was the most important stage in the development of the national military strategy. It was in this war that its basic principles were most fully formed and polished, and the most important problems of conducting an armed struggle on a huge scale were solved. It lasted 1,418 days and nights, during its various stages, from 8 to 12.8 million soldiers acted on both sides.

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people, from 84 to 163 thousand artillery pieces and mortars, from 5.7 to 20 thousand self-propelled guns and assault guns, from 6.5 to 18.8 thousand aircraft¹⁸⁵. World history has not yet known such a concentration of army masses and military equipment on one front of the armed struggle.

The lessons of the initial period of the last war call for the constant maintenance of high readiness of the Armed Forces to repel a surprise attack by an aggressor, their ability to carry out the tasks assigned to them at any moment.

The experience of war teaches that it is necessary to use all known types of strategic actions, means and methods of struggle, depending on the specific situation that is developing. The Soviet Armed Forces, in accordance with the military-political situation and the state of the country's military-economic base, conducted a strategic defense, went over to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive on a broad front. The increase in the scale and intensity of the armed struggle, the decisiveness of goals and tasks characterized both defense and the offensive, the most complex types of strategic actions, during which the most active methods of conducting operations were used. Defensive and offensive operations, which had grown to unprecedented scales in the past, the huge number of forces and means used in them, and the high effectiveness of these operations radically changed the strategic and military-political situation in the main directions and on the entire Soviet-German front.

The war contributed much to the development of the theory and practice of preparing and conducting a strategic offensive and strategic defense. A major achievement of the national military strategy was the solution of such an important strategic problem as the transition from strategic defense to counteroffensive and its development without any pauses into a general strategic offensive. The creative nature of the strategy was manifested in the skillful application of various methods of conducting a strategic offensive, which most fully corresponded to the political, economic and military situation at each stage of the war and ensured the achievement of the intended goals, various methods of defeating the enemy in operations. An indicator of a high level of development is the successful solution of the issues of choosing the direction of the main strike in campaigns, massing forces and means on it and achieving surprise in its delivery, carrying out operations to encircle and destroy large groupings of enemy troops.

On the whole, the successful solution of the problem of preparing and conducting a strategic offensive in campaigns at great depth and on a broad front was a significant step in the development of the national military strategy. The experience of solving it has not lost its significance for modern conditions, when the scope of hostilities, the volume and content of strategic tasks are significantly increasing. Particularly noteworthy is the experience of fighting to seize and hold the strategic initiative, prepare and use reserves, ensure high rates of offensive and actions by groupings of the Armed Forces in conditions of rapid and abrupt changes in the situation, and achieve surprise strikes.

Military strategy during the war also solved the complex, actually new to itself, problem of strategic defense. The organization and conduct of strategic defense, which ultimately ensured the disruption of the enemy's offensive plans and the creation of the necessary conditions for the Soviet troops to go on the counteroffensive, is convincing evidence of its high level. To solve such a problem was beyond the power of any of the states of Western Europe, which was subjected to fascist aggression. The experience of solving the problem of restoring a disrupted strategic front by strategy and preserving its integrity deserves the greatest attention.

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A great achievement of the strategy was the development and successful application of a fundamentally new form of strategic actions in the form of operations by groups of fronts.

In the course of the last war, such important problems of strategy as the preparation of strategic reserves and their most expedient use, the creation of a clear structure of strategic leadership and the development of firm centralized command and control of troops at all levels, the organization of the rear structure of the Armed Forces and and, finally, the improvement of the organizational structure of the Armed Forces in accordance with the nature of the war, the capabilities of the military-economic base and changes in strategic tasks. In the course of the war, a cadre of talented military leaders who showed great skill in command and control of troops grew, tempered and strengthened. managing operations of a large scale.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War enriched Soviet military art, raised strategy to a higher level and serves as one of the most important sources for its further development in modern conditions. Its in-depth study contributes to the expansion of the strategic outlook of military personnel, allows a deeper understanding of the patterns of development of the theory and practice of armed struggle. He teaches a creative approach to solving the problems of military art, the ability to see the leading trends in its development, and to fully take into account the requirements of modern conditions. The experience of the war once again clearly revealed the importance and necessity of continuous development and improvement of military strategy, a creative approach to the development and solution of its most important problems.

Chapter Five

MILITARY STRATEGY AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

After the last war and until the beginning of the 1990s, the domestic military strategy went through a complex and rather contradictory path in its development. The distinctive features of this time are extremely sharp and profound changes in politics, economics, technology, and, consequently, in military affairs, but especially in strategy. In turn, the strategy was characterized by ups and downs, achievements and failures. At the same time, the persistent search for new and completely non-traditional solutions was accompanied by a sharp struggle between polar points of view, concepts and views on the development of the Armed Forces, the nature, forms and methods of warfare. In methodological terms, the process of reform and the evolution of military strategy in those years had at least three fundamental features.

The first is the unprecedentedly radical and all-encompassing nature of changes in approaches to solving the most important tasks of the strategy, and in all its areas. Never before have the fundamental principles, and even more so the principles of military strategy, its eternal and seemingly unshakable postulates, been subjected to such a serious and radical breakdown. Most of the classical positions were almost simultaneously replaced not just by new, but by diametrically opposed views, views and requirements. Almost all previous ideas about the spatial and temporal parameters of military operations, about their organization and conduct, about the main objects of armed struggle and methods of defeating the enemy, about the role of the correlation of forces and means, as well as other factors in achieving strategic success, about the distribution efforts of the Armed Forces and forms of their strategic application. In essence, a complete restructuring of the entire system of military development, military theory and practice, and military thinking was required.

The second feature is that all the most important concepts, guidelines and requirements of the new strategy were developed and approved mainly on the basis of speculative conclusions and theoretical calculations. The fact that they passed a full-scale test in practice was out of the question due to the difficult to predict consequences of a nuclear war. Only certain elements of some strategic guidelines received experimental confirmation, but they made it possible to form only a partial, and therefore very distant idea of the possible shape of a war with unlimited use of all means of struggle.

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This led to the lack of certainty of a number of strategic requirements and their presumptive nature.

Finally, in the 1970s and 1980s, for the first time, we had to face such a situation, when the huge growth of the potential possibilities of the strategy entered into a deep contradiction with the probability of their practical implementation. In this regard, it became necessary to search for and develop compromise methods of action with a deliberate limitation of the scale, areas and time of use of the most destructive types of weapons. As a result, from a certain moment the development of the strategy went on a new spiral with an increasing return to the traditionally classical, but many times improved means of struggle and to some of the former strategic settings, however, in a deeply modernized and transformed form.

In general, after the Second World War, six main stages can be distinguished in the development of the national military strategy. All of them are associated with major changes in the military-political situation, in the state of their Armed Forces and the armed forces of potential adversaries.

The first stage, which covers eight and a half years - from 1945 to 1953, is politically associated with a new alignment of military-political forces, the beginning of the Cold War and the formation of two opposing blocs - the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance. In military-technical terms, it is due to the transfer of the Armed Forces to a peaceful position, their reorganization and technical modernization. At that time, full mechanization and motorization of the army was carried out, technical renovation of all branches of the armed forces was carried out, jet aviation was created and the Air Defense Forces of the country were formed.

Accordingly, the Soviet military strategy was reoriented towards new adversaries - the United States and European NATO countries. The US superiority in nuclear weapons was countered by the line of creating and maintaining an overwhelming advantage in conventional means of warfare. At the same time, more cardinal forms of solving strategic tasks in the continental theater were developed and mastered, and measures were taken to strengthen the protection and defense of the country's most important facilities. However, in matters of principle, those views and strategic guidelines with which the USSR came to the end of the Great Patriotic War remained in force.

The second stage took a six-year period - from 1954 to 1960. It is characterized by the intensification of confrontation between the USA and the USSR, the emergence of acute crisis situations in various regions of the planet, which more than once brought the world to the brink of a new big war. In military-technical terms, it is notable for the massive equipping of all types of the Armed Forces with nuclear weapons, the creation and introduction of new types of weapons and military equipment, the restructuring of the organizational structures of the troops and fleet forces, taking into account their actions with the use of weapons of mass destruction. It was then that a strategy was developed for conducting a nuclear war in various theaters of military operations, based on solving the most important military-political and strategic tasks by inflicting massive nuclear strikes on the enemy.

The third stage includes the next ten years - from 1961 to 1970. It was a turning point, and therefore was distinguished by the highest intensity of the political, economic and military confrontation between the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact with the USA and NATO, the indirect involvement of the Soviet Union in local military conflicts in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, as well as a sharp change in relations with China — from friendship to open confrontation along all lines. in during

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military-technical field - this was a decade of the creation and super-priority development of strategic nuclear forces, primarily their main core - the Strategic Missile Forces, the mass introduction of missiles for various purposes and basing into all types of the Armed Forces, the emergence of military space assets, a sharp leap in the development of information and control systems, a radical revision of all areas of military construction.

It was at this stage that a new global military strategy was formed - the strategy of an unlimited nuclear missile war, views on the conditions, nature, course and outcome of armed struggle radically changed, a theory of large-scale strategic operations was developed with their spread to all continents, oceans and seas, near-Earth air and outer space.

The fourth stage also lasted ten years - from 1971 to 1980. It is notable for the fact that within its framework a struggle was launched to achieve military-political and strategic parity between the USSR and the USA, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This stage was characterized by a significant change in the forms of military-political confrontation between them. In connection with the inevitable disastrous consequences for both sides of the use of accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons, there is an urgent need to resolve a number of international problems by political means. Although a new, intense round of the arms race unfolded, it became possible, in the conditions of the approximate balance of military forces that had formed, to conclude an agreement on limiting certain types of strategic weapons, as well as to begin developing joint measures to prevent a nuclear collision.

A sharp qualitative breakthrough occurred in the state of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Their strategic potential has increased several times. It became possible to guarantee the destruction of numerous pinpoint and highly protected targets by strategic weapons. At the same time, there was a major breakthrough in the development of conventional means of struggle.

It was then that the strategy of phased warfare was formed and established. Various options for the development of military operations were developed with a gradual transition (depending on the level of threat) to the use of more destructive and exterminating types of weapons.

The fifth stage began in 1981 and continued until 1991, i.e. until the collapse of the USSR. Politically, it was characterized by a sharp struggle of rather contradictory tendencies, stabilizing and destabilizing factors. In this regard, periods of some reduction in international tension alternated with periods of their next exacerbation. The Soviet Union had to reckon with the possibility of a coordinated action against it by both the NATO countries and China and, in accordance with this, build its foreign policy. All attempts by the Soviet leadership to split NATO and at the same time strengthen their positions in the South and East often led to the opposite result. The Armed Forces were involved in a long and completely hopeless Afghan war, which ended in a disgraceful failure for the USSR. In the middle of the stage, the process of gradual disintegration of the Warsaw Pact began, culminating in its collapse, and with it the collapse of the Soviet coalition strategy.

In military-technical terms, the arms race has entered a stage of intense competition for new military technologies. Since the mid-1980s, its main distinguishing feature has been the accelerated development and mass introduction of high-precision guided weapon systems into the Armed Forces. In this regard, the nature of military operations with the use of conventional means of combat has changed dramatically, the possibility of guaranteed destruction of the most

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large areas and reliable performance of tasks in a short time.

Under these conditions, a strategy of equal readiness to conduct both nuclear and conventional wars in the new

its forms and reflection of aggression by response, mostly adequate actions.

The sixth stage began in 1991] when, simultaneously with the collapse of the USSR, the unified Soviet Armed Forces ceased to exist, and the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Russian Federation and its Armed Forces were formed. This dramatically changed the entire military-political and strategic situation in the world, and most importantly, the Cold War ended. But at the same time, Rossini's geopolitical position and its economic and military capabilities changed. The country's defense system, created over many years, turned out to be violated. The direction of some possible military threats waned, but others emerged. All this required the development of a fundamentally new Russian military doctrine, and with it a new military strategy.

On the whole, the domestic military strategy after the Second World War developed in leaps and bounds, with maximum emphasis on the latest achievements of science and technology, the economic and scientific and technical capabilities of the state in the context of a tense and extremely sharp struggle with the USA and NATO for military technical, and therefore , and strategic superiority. The strategy of the USSR in all areas without exception actively opposed the American and NATO military strategy. This by no means ruled out a certain identity in the methods of solving the most important strategic tasks, and sometimes even mutual borrowing of individual provisions. Both in military policy and technology, and in military strategy, even a minor breakthrough by one side in any area immediately evoked an adequate reaction from the other. The question was how to pre-empt potential adversaries in developing more advanced means of combat, more effective forms and methods of their use in order to constantly retain the initiative, to have political, military-technical and strategic advantages.

1. Factors that determined the post-war progress of the strategy

Shortly after the end of World War II, new trends arose in the world that significantly increased the influence of politics, economics, and scientific and technological progress on military strategy.

In the field of politics, those profound shifts that had taken place in the balance of military and political forces were of great importance. The world has changed from multipolar to bipolar. The victory won in the Second World War not only swept away the most aggressive forces from the historical arena, but also abolished the former international structure; a different world order emerged, which was determined by the dominance of two superpowers. Two world socio-political systems were formed, deeply hostile to each other, two camps: on the one hand, led by the USSR, and on the other hand, led by the USA. Former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition turned into adversaries. In all spheres of public life, without exception, an irreconcilable struggle unfolded between them and the countries grouped around them. It has acquired a special form - the "cold war" with a dangerous brinkmanship of the "hot" war.

This phenomenon, unique in socio-political and military aspects, has no analogues in history. Unprecedentedly tough confrontation in politics, economics, ideology, but especially in military affairs, has become a breeding ground for constant clashes, acute crises and conflicts. At the same time, powerful deterrent factors did not allow politicians to take everything to the extreme, forced

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to deal with the consequences of a direct military clash, which are extremely dangerous for each side, forced them to make compromises and look for workarounds to achieve military-political goals.

The foreign policy of both the USSR and the United States of America at that time was actively offensive. Moreover, it included elements of political and military extremism. Both sides sought to strengthen their political, economic and military positions by any means. However, the conditions and opportunities for achieving the set goals were not the same, and their orientation turned out to be diametrically opposed. The Soviet Union became one of the few states that received territorial gains as a result of the Second World War. At the same time, its economy suffered the most. Therefore, the leadership of the USSR concentrated its main efforts on restoring the national economy as quickly as possible and, at the same time, sought to ensure guaranteed protection of its conquests, preserve the territorial integrity of the state within the expanded borders, strengthen its position in the countries of Eastern Europe, to create favorable conditions for the widespread dissemination of communist ideas and Soviet regimes in all regions of the world.

In turn, the leading capitalist states, as a result of victory in the war, eliminated their political and military rival in Central Europe, but at the same time they themselves lost control over a number of small countries. Their sphere of influence narrowed due to the rapid disintegration of the colonial system. The British and French empires collapsed right before our eyes. It is no coincidence that ex-Prime Minister of Great Britain W. Churchill then repeated more than once that "victory in this war turned out to be unnecessary and even meaningless." The United States alone has benefited greatly from it: its political, economic, and military power has become overwhelming. Moreover, the economic and military center of the entire capitalist world has moved to the American continent.

In military-strategic terms, the circumstance that the Americans seized and for almost five years continued to maintain a monopoly on nuclear weapons was of decisive importance. This allowed them to keep the whole world in fear, to make plans for the conquest of world domination, to rely on the policy of nuclear blackmail and open military pressure. In April 1949, American President Harry Truman frankly declared that he "won't hesitate to decide to use the atomic bomb if the welfare of the United States of America or the democracies of the world is at stake."

In any case, the United States and its European allies used every opportunity to block

The Soviet Union and other countries that have taken a course towards a socialist orientation. They made great efforts to stop and eliminate the "communist threat", restore their influence in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, and achieve an undivided leading role in world politics and economics. It was precisely this goal that was pursued by the so-called foreign policy "Truman Doctrine" adopted in 1947, which essentially substantiated the right of the United States to interfere in the affairs of any country if American interests were affected, and the "Marshall Plan", which opened the way for the American economic program in Europe and the revival of the German economic and then military potentials.

Objectively, the USSR at that time was most interested in maintaining peace and, like the United States, in carrying out political transformations by peaceful means. But the logic of the struggle constantly pushed them to extreme measures, and sometimes to openly aggressive actions. Moreover, the initiative most often belonged to the United States.

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The Soviet Union and its friendly Eastern European states, as well as China in Asia, were surrounded by a ring of hostile military-political groups, surrounded by a network of numerous American military bases. Already in 1949, the North Atlantic bloc (NATO) was created, which was supposed to confront the USSR in Europe. Then, in various regions of the world, other military-political alliances of an anti-socialist and anti-Soviet orientation arose: in 1954 - SEATO, in 1955 - CENTO, in 1966 - AZPAK.

At the same time, an arms race of unprecedented scale is unfolding. The military budgets of the states and military alliances of both sides are constantly growing. So, if in 1949 NATO spending on military purposes amounted to 18.8 billion dollars, then in 1953 they reached 65.5 billion dollars, and in 1974 - 132 billion dollars, i.e. increased by more than 7 times. In the United States, military appropriations in 1949 amounted to 13.5 billion, in 1960 - 47.4 billion, in 1970 - 77 billion dollars? The military spending of the USSR grew even more intensively. Although officially they did not exceed 17-18% of the budget, in reality they reached 40-45%. Specific figures, however, constituted a state secret.

Since 1950, the composition of the armed forces has been rapidly increasing. The number of combined NATO forces, for example, from 1949 to 1952 increased almost 4 times. In the 80s, it amounted to 4,933 thousand people. The Soviet Armed Forces, when they were transferred from a military to a peaceful position, were reduced from 12 million to 2,874 thousand people. Then their number increased by 1.5 million people, in 1960 there was a new reduction - by 1.2 million. However, since 1982 the composition of the Soviet Armed Forces began to increase and by the beginning of the 90s it .8 million people?.

Even more serious changes occurred in the qualitative state of the armed forces of both sides. At an ever-increasing pace, new types of military equipment and weapons, moreover, of great destructive and striking power, were supplied to equip them.

The vast majority of the economic and military potential of the capitalist world was concentrated in the United States. Already at the end of the 1950s, the share of American industrial production in world capitalist production exceeded 46%. The American monopolies controlled important branches of industry in the other leading capitalist states and, of course, all sources of strategic raw materials in many developing countries. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States accounted for 95% of nuclear weapons production, 90% of rocket production, and about 60% of conventional weapons production.

In those years, the American armed forces had 98% of the stocks of nuclear weapons and 43% of the conventional weapons of the capitalist states. 80% of the main strategic means of warfare, which posed the greatest threat to the USSR, were deployed on the territory of the United States. Proceeding from this, and most importantly, taking into account the irreconcilably hostile direction of American foreign policy, since the late 1940s, the Soviet military strategy considered the United States as enemy number one.

The Western European allies of the United States in NATO, primarily Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, were seen as enemy number two. It was believed that the combined military-industrial potential of these states, human resources and powerful technical equipment of the armed forces posed a direct threat to the USSR. However, the leadership of NATO itself substantiated the creation of such a military-political organization by the urgent need to ensure the security of the West from possible expansion by the Soviet Union. One way or another, the entire structure of the North Atlantic bloc, the organization of its armed forces, their

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groupings, the training system, and equally the plans for combat use were subordinated to a possible collision between the West and the East. In a word, Europe was again turning into the main arena of political and military confrontation.

A dangerous hotbed of tension also arose in the Middle East, where the interests of the Soviet Union, the United States and other Western powers clashed. Their direct intervention in permanent conflicts on the side of different countries, of course, heated up the situation and destabilized the entire system of international relations.

As for the Asia-Pacific region, the victory of communist China, it would seem, created favorable conditions here for strengthening the positions of the USSR. But in fact, a very complex knot of contradiction was being tied up: after all, in addition to the USSR, both China and the United States sought to strengthen their position. The possibility of an early restoration of the Japanese industrial and then military potentials was not ruled out. Tried

to revive their former influence in the England and France. The resulting Korean War (1950-1953), the conflict between the PRC and Taiwan (since 1949), the Franco-Vietnamese (1945-1954), and then the war of resistance of the Vietnamese people that began in 1959, brought the situation in this region to the highest pitch.

Based on a subjective idea of the situation in the world, the nature of real military threats and the general direction of the policy pursued, the Soviet leadership carried out a set of various measures to ensure the security of the state. It came up with a number of initiatives aimed at strengthening peace and international stability, including negotiations on the settlement of Soviet-American relations (1948), on the adoption of a Peace Pact and on the beginning of gradual disarmament (1949), on the conclusion of a pan-European treaty on Collective Security in Europe (1954) and others. All of them, however, were rejected by the Western powers. The USSR also took more active steps: having thwarted all attempts by the West to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, it itself imposed a pro-Soviet course of development on them. At the same time, the USSR began to implement a system of large-scale defensive measures and accelerated military preparations.

In May 1955, the Warsaw Pact Organization was created, which included eight (since 1962, seven) states*. In accordance with the concluded Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries were formed, headed by a joint military command. From now on, political, economic, and even more so military cooperation has become all-encompassing. The transition to a system of coalition military planning has begun. As a result, the military-political confrontation has grown to the level of two hostile coalition blocs. Accordingly, the principles of the nuclear age coalition strategy began to be developed.

A new serious turn in the military-political situation, and then in strategy, took place in the early 1960s, when relations between the Soviet Union and China sharply deteriorated. Due to objective and subjective reasons, the ideological contradictions between them grew into an open confrontation. At the same time, there has been a rapprochement between China and the United States. The Soviet leadership had to take into account the possibility of their joint (alternate or simultaneous) action against the USSR.

Thus, from the main ally of the USSR, China turned into an enemy. Moreover, in view of the unpredictability of Chinese foreign policy and the possibility of large-scale provocations on its part, some military political figures of the USSR were inclined to consider their recent ally as against

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Nick number one. This forced us to radically reconsider the direction of the military policy of the USSR, to adjust its strategy in the east. First of all, new powerful groupings of the Armed Forces were created in Primorye and Transbaikalia, and large-scale work was launched to restore and develop the military infrastructure. It was necessary to revise all military-strategic plans, not only for the Far East, but also for all other theaters of military operations. By that time, the formation of the concept of a multivariate war, under which an appropriate material and ideological base was laid.

This situation continued until the end of the 1970s. In military-political terms, this was perhaps the most difficult period in the post-war development of the USSR. He demanded the adoption of radical decisions on the entire range of military-political and defense tasks. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the aggravation of Soviet-American and Soviet-Chinese relations coincided with a number of acute international crises, local clashes and conflicts that directly affected the state interests and national security of the USSR. The most significant and dangerous were the Caribbean crisis (1961), the Czechoslovak crisis (1968-1969); the Arab-Israeli wars (1964 and 1973), the American-Vietnamese war (1964-1975), the Soviet-Chinese conflict near Damansky Island (1968), the Vietnamese-Chinese war (1979) and a number of others.

One way or another, the Soviet Union itself participated in them directly or indirectly, because it provided political and economic assistance to the party politically connected with it, facilitated the supply of weapons, ammunition, fuel, military property, technological equipment and military specialists. In some military conflicts, separate units and units of the Soviet expeditionary forces were used, which mainly performed the tasks of air defense.

As for the Caribbean and Czechoslovak crises, they were accompanied by major military measures both in the Soviet Armed Forces and in the armies of other Warsaw Pact countries. The experience gained at the same time had important consequences: it forced adjustments not only in military policy, but also in strategy and other components of military affairs. Moreover, the chain of interrelated crises and conflicts that then spread to all continents and many regions of the world forced the USSR to develop a special area of strategic methods related to the coordination of military actions in remote areas without direct participation or with partially open or covert use of its own Armed Forces.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, some new tendencies of a rather contradictory nature began to appear in the military-political situation. On the one hand, the process of negotiations has been developed. Several important treaties were signed aimed at reducing military confrontation in the world: the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-2); the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe; treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (START); an agreement on the elimination of intermediate and short-range missiles; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and others. At the same time, relations with China improved somewhat.

However, in 1979 the Soviet Union got involved in a long and completely hopeless Afghan war. On this basis, relations with the United States, other NATO countries, and a number of Arab states sharply worsened again. The search for expedient solutions in such conditions led to a more prudent political course and, accordingly, to the strengthening of defensive aspects in the field of military

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strategies. As a result, the system of military threats was clarified, the methods and options for possible response to the actions of potential adversaries were revised, the directions for the development and training of the Armed Forces were adjusted accordingly, and a start was made on the formation of a strategy for deterring and preventing WAR.

Thus, the foreign policy of the Soviet state in the post-war years either became tougher or became more flexible and balanced. The nature of military strategy changed accordingly. But, of course, the military-strategic views that were taking shape at that time were determined not only by objective conditions and subjective political processes, but also by their ideological interpretation. In any case, many military-strategic provisions were based on officially adopted state guidelines. For example, it was believed that after the Second World War the world entered a new era of irreversible transition from capitalism to communism. Among the most important features of the post-war situation, a special role was assigned to the formation of two opposite world socio-political systems, two military-political blocs with the prospect of a steady expansion of the socialist camp while simultaneously narrowing the sphere of influence of capitalism. Proceeding from this postulate, the main military-political task in the USSR was the strengthening of peace, the protection of socialism from "imperialist intrigues", and the active support of revolutionary, anti-imperialist and national liberation forces. The corresponding military-strategic tasks flowed from it: strengthening the defense might of the countries of the socialist Commonwealth and repulsing possible aggression.

The geopolitical and geostrategic position of the USSR was considered rather tendentiously. It was assumed that its foreign policy and strategic positions would be constantly strengthened, that the alignment of military and political forces would change under the influence of the ever-increasing influence of the socialist countries, and the strengthening cooperation of the Soviet Union with the developing states and the expansion of the world communist movement in the end ultimately ensure the general crisis of capitalism. In relation to this conclusion, a strategy for the defense of the USSR and the entire world socialist system was developed.

Subsequent events showed how one-sided and short-sighted these attitudes were. But at that time they seemed unshakable and natural.

In the 1950s and 1980s, the dependence of strategy on the economy became even more significant and multifaceted. The economic capabilities of the USSR were the decisive criterion for building up and maintaining the defense potential at the proper level, and all the structural elements of the economy turned into one of the main subjects of the armed struggle.

After the end of the Second World War, the Soviet economy had to solve a whole range of complex tasks. It was necessary to restore the national economy destroyed by the war as soon as possible, create conditions for a rapid increase in the material and technical base, put into operation economic facilities for radical restructuring and improve the country's defense, and create an effective system of economic assistance to the allied states.

In the second half of the 1940s and early 1950s, the main efforts were focused on the transfer of the national economy from a military to a peaceful position, the fastest restoration and modernization of the most important industrial sectors of agriculture and transport, and in the defense sector - on creation and expansion of new production capacities in the tank, aircraft, and radio-electronic industries. Particular attention was paid to facilities related to the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

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The restoration of the national economy is yet another heroic page in the history of the Soviet state. By the end of 1948, the pre-war level of industrial production, coal and oil production, and electricity generation was reached. Yes, in general, the subsequent years were characterized by high rates of development of all industrial sectors. The Soviet Union, having entered into a total confrontation with the United States and other Western powers, rapidly increased its economic power. This was most fully reflected in the growth of the country's national income. If in 1961-1963. this indicator amounted to 840 billion rubles, then in 1968-1970. — | trillion 166 billion rubles, in 1971-1975. - 1 trillion 674 billion rubles, in the 10th five-year plan it increased by another 400 billion rubles. In 1983, the national income exceeded 530 billion rubles, while in the five pre-war years (1936-1940) it was only 154 billion rubles. The main indicators of the development of the national economy in 1945-1983. are shown in Table 9.

Table 9. Main indicators of the development of the national economy of the USSR in 1945-1983

Types of products Level of industrial production in 1945| 1955| 1965| 1970 | 1975| 1980 | 1985

Electricity, billion kW / h

Oil (with gas cond.), million tons Gas, billion cubic meters m. Coal, million tons

The industries associated with scientific and technological progress and the strengthening of the defense of the state developed especially rapidly: electric power industry, chemical and petrochemical industries, mechanical engineering, machine tool and instrument making, and radio electronics.

Mass production of nuclear weapons was established, and a powerful missile industry was created. The aviation industry has mastered the production of jet aircraft of various types. New facilities for the production of artillery systems, armored vehicles, air defense equipment, new means of communication, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, ammunition for various purposes were put into operation.

The highest level of industrial production reached in the period 1983-1985. Compared with 1945, the national income at that time increased 20.4 times, industrial output 28 times, and agriculture 4.8 times. In the same years, in absolute terms, the USSR achieved the maximum output of most types of military and civilian products. The range of manufactured products has sharply expanded. The production of many new types of rocket, aviation and space technology was mastered. The shipbuilding industry has expanded the construction of warships of new designs, including nuclear submarines, missile and aircraft carriers.

However, starting from the 1960s, the pace of economic development began to gradually decrease. So, if from 1950 to 1960. industrial production in the country as a whole increased by 264%, then in the next decade (from 1960 to 1970) the increase

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decreased to 230%, in the 70s it was only 150%. Subsequently, the growth rate slowed down even more. Moreover, in the production of certain types of products, production began to decrease, although the military sectors in those same years developed with no less intensity.

By 1985, the Soviet Union was second in the world in terms of total industrial output and first in Europe. Its economic potential amounted to almost 80% of the US economic potential, and the total share of the socialist CMEA member states in global production reached 32%. But in terms of national income, the USSR was more than three times inferior to the United States of America.

It was only thanks to extreme tension and limited appropriations for social programs that it was possible to withstand the unfolding arms race and maintain a military balance with the countries of a potential enemy. Nevertheless, the powerful economic base of the USSR made it possible even at that time to focus on an offensive strategy, quickly develop the Armed Forces, constantly update their technical arsenal and set the most decisive goals for them. Relying on this base, the Soviet Union hoped to successfully resist the United States, NATO and China in both short-term and long-term war with repeated restoration of the Armed Forces. G

Nevertheless, the progressively growing role of the economic factor in the war forced the leadership of the USSR to reconsider the methods of employing the Armed Forces and reassess the main objects of strategic efforts. Of particular importance was the protection of their economic objects from enemy attacks and the reliable destruction of their similar objects. The approach to the issues of fighting for territory, capturing the enemy's vital areas, and surviving in a nuclear war has also changed.

The third and main factor, under the influence of which profound changes in strategy took place during that period, is connected with scientific and technological progress. In the past, too, the development of science and technology had a tremendous impact on all aspects of military affairs, led to the creation of new, more effective means of armed struggle, and then to a sharp turn in the methods of warfare and combat operations. A real revolution in the military sphere was caused at one time by the appearance of firearms, and then the appearance of tanks and aircraft, motorization and mechanization of armies similarly influenced. But never before has scientific and technological progress led to such abrupt and radical changes in the nature of war, in the art of war, especially in strategy, as happened in the second half of the 20th century. This short period of time is notable for the chain of successive revolutions in military affairs. Caused by grandiose scientific breakthroughs in nuclear physics, optics, solid state physics, radiophysics, gas dynamics, thermal physics, space, electronic and laser technology, chemistry, mathematics, cybernetics and other scientific fields, and then the creation of fundamentally new means based on these achievements armed struggle of great destructive power, they led to a real revolution in the views on war and the methods of its

reference.

Global changes in military affairs are associated with the creation and supply of nuclear weapons to the Armed Forces in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This was followed by several more major revolutionary upsurges caused by the emergence of missiles for various purposes, especially intercontinental range missiles, jet weapons and jet engines, electronic warfare equipment, automated command and control systems for troops and weapons, high-speed

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digital communication means of space support systems and, finally, high-precision guided and homing weapons.

Taken together, all these means not only fundamentally changed the conditions for conducting armed struggle on land, in the air and at sea, but also led to the possibility of extending it to outer space, creating the prerequisites for the instant destruction of large groupings of troops and thousands of various objects. on huge

spaces. The military faced the prospect of solving many strategic tasks in this way, which even the most daring dreamer could not think of before.

On the whole, in the 1950s and 1980s, several new directions of the military-technical plan, which had a dominant effect on the military strategy of the leading countries of the world, primarily the USSR and the USA, the participants in the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic bloc. There are at least five such areas.

The first is the creation and development of nuclear weapons, which were based on the use of intra-atomic energy released during chain reactions of fission and nuclear fusion.

First created in the USA, the nuclear bomb was tested in August 1945. A month later, the Americans used it to bomb the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, although there was no longer a military need for this. In the USSR, nuclear weapons appeared in the late 1940s, and in the 1950s, Britain, France, and China successively became nuclear weapons holders. Today Israel, India and Pakistan still have these weapons. Scientific developments are also carried out by other countries.

Already at the initial stage, nuclear weapons in terms of their combat power surpassed by two or three orders of magnitude all the means of armed struggle used before. With its creation, the possibility of complex destruction of objects appeared both by direct impact due to a shock wave, light radiation, penetrating radiation, and as a result of secondary damage due to radioactive contamination of the terrain, water areas and atmosphere in vast zones and regions. This immediately singled out this tool in a special class of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, the armaments system was divided into two sets of means of armed struggle that were qualitatively different from each other, and their skilful combination in military operations was one of the most important tasks of the strategy.

Initially, nuclear weapons existed in the form of aviation atomic bombs and, therefore, were considered exclusively as a strategic weapon designed to destroy large objects, mainly administrative, political and industrial centers, the most important cities. Nevertheless, even then it, having changed the whole face of a probable war, turned into a powerful instrument of politics. In any case, this is how the military-political circles of the United States tried to use it, embarking on the path of open nuclear blackmail at a time when the Soviet Union did not yet have such weapons.

Fortunately, the American monopoly on nuclear weapons did not last long - only 4 years. The appearance in 1949 of nuclear weapons in the USSR balanced the chances of the parties and thus played a large role in preventing a third world war, although it created a critical situation of nuclear confrontation, in which one wrong step threatened all of humanity with catastrophic consequences.

Since the 1950s, the nuclear arms race has become one of the determining factors in international relations and military confrontation between the two systems. The Soviet Union sought at all costs to catch up and surpass the United States in the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons. In turn, the United States of America

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The sides tried to maintain and increase their advantages. There was an intensive build-up of nuclear arsenals, new, more advanced and powerful nuclear munitions were forcibly created, and the composition of their means of delivery to targets was expanded.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, in connection with the creation of thermonuclear charges, and then intercontinental missiles with thermonuclear warheads, the strategy received at its disposal the means of enormous destructive power for a massive impact on the territory of the enemy, destroying objects in any point on the globe. This predetermined the potential likelihood of unleashing and waging a general global war that knows no boundaries.

In the USSR, nuclear weapons began to be actively introduced into all branches of the Armed Forces and the main types of troops without exception. It came to equip the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Navy and the Air Defense Forces of the country. New modifications of advanced aviation atomic bombs of small, medium and large caliber, aviation and naval cruise missiles with nuclear charges, nuclear torpedoes, artillery nuclear shells and mines, nuclear and thermonuclear warheads for ballistic missiles for various purposes, special charges for anti-aircraft missiles, deep nuclear bombs, engineering nuclear land mines, etc. In a word, it became possible to widely use nuclear weapons on a strategic and operational-tactical scale, in various operations, and even directly on the battlefield.

Along with the continuous improvement of nuclear weapons, their stockpiles grew rapidly. Soon, the amount of accumulated nuclear weapons in the USA and the USSR far exceeded all reasonable limits, i.e., reached a level at which multiple destruction of all life on Earth was ensured.

In the 1970s, third-generation nuclear weapons appeared: nuclear warheads with a variable TNT equivalent, neutron nuclear warheads, small-sized nuclear charges, etc. The largest scientific and technological achievement that had a huge impact on the strategy was the creation of warheads with homing elements. In the future, this made it possible to increase the number of objects hit by several times, and most importantly, to ensure the reliable destruction of highly protected targets, and at any range.

Only since the 1980s has the quantitative growth of nuclear arsenals slowed down. In accordance with the agreements concluded between the USSR and the USA, part of the warheads was destroyed, and planned disposal began.

onsole nuclear weapons. But, despite the ban on conducting nuclear tests in three environments, the process of their improvement did not stop. Moreover, both in the USA and in the Soviet Union, work began on the creation of fourth-generation nuclear weapons and directed-action weapons (laser and beam)*.

The second direction of military-technical progress is the development of rocket science and the mass introduction of missiles into all branches of the Armed Forces. Their development began immediately after the end of the Second World War, initially on the basis of the German FAU-I and V-2, and then on fundamentally new technologies with the expectation of creating ultra-fast, low-vulnerability and long-range carriers of nuclear weapons.

Initially, priority was clearly given to cruise missiles. But very soon, all attention in this regard was focused on the creation of ballistic missiles, first of medium, and then of intercontinental range.

In the Soviet Union, the first missile system was created and tested in 1954, and intercontinental ballistic missiles - in 1959. Around the same

* Superweapon, the principle of which is based on the use of powerful energy of electromagnetic radiation

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At the same time, similar tests were carried out in the USA. Somewhat later, land-based and sea-based ballistic missile systems appeared in Great Britain, France and China.

With the deployment of fairly large groupings of medium-range and, later, intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, new factors came into play that determined not only the possibility of a surprise attack, but also the inevitability of strikes against targeted objects and targets, the guaranteed probability of their destruction literally in minutes. From now on, the former invulnerability of geographically remote objects and territories is a thing of the past. The threat of a possible nuclear missile attack hung over all countries, from which at that time there was no protection, except for adequate response actions.

From the moment of the unification of nuclear and missile weapons into single missile-nuclear complexes, the future war began to be regarded as a nuclear-missile one. A triad of strategic nuclear forces began to form as the main means of its conduct. There was also a system of views on the methods of strategic actions of the armed forces in such conditions.

The 70s became a new important stage in the development of missile weapons. At that time, intensive improvement of land-based, sea-based and air-based strategic missiles continued. Nuclear submarines with intercontinental-range ballistic missiles entered service. The indicators of combat readiness, security and accuracy of missiles were continuously improved. The circular probable deviation of warheads of missiles with multiple warheads from the aiming points from several kilometers was reduced to several hundreds and even tens of meters. The degree of protection of ground-based missile systems increased from 2-3 to 20-30 kg/sq.cm, and then to several hundred kg/sq.cm. Solid propellant rockets were created. Mobile missile systems of intermediate, medium and intercontinental ranges appeared.

Missile weapons for operational and tactical purposes were intensively developed. In ever-increasing quantities, it came to equip all types of the Armed Forces. Various types of tactical and operational tactical missiles of the ground-to-ground, air-to-ground, ground-to-air, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ground-to-ship, "ship-ship", "ship-air". With the advent of high-precision guided and self-guided missiles, the possibility of their wide use not only in nuclear, but also in conventional equipment for hitting a wide variety of targets in all types of operations and combat actions could be realized. Thanks to this, it was possible to push back the so-called "nuclear barrier", that is, the moment of transition to the unlimited use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, in all spatial spheres, operations and combat operations have acquired new features. The most important factor in their conduct was the missile fire defeat of the enemy and protection from similar impact on his part.

In the 1980s, missile systems for various purposes in the armies of the ATS and NATO countries formed the basis of offensive and defensive weapons. At that time, numerous modifications of ground, sea and aviation missile systems, anti-aircraft anti-tank and anti-radar missiles appeared. Along with ballistic missiles, new-generation cruise missiles have acquired special significance. The fleets were equipped with effective coastal and shipborne systems of sea cruise missiles. Low-altitude and low-observable medium and long-range strategic cruise missiles were created. This made it possible to significantly expand the scope of strategic, operational and tactical tasks to be solved using missile weapons.

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The third direction is the modernization and improvement of the so-called classic weapons based on the creation and use of new materials and designs, the introduction of jet, turbojet and gas turbine engines, high-performance on-board equipment, stabilizing and new aiming systems, ammunition of increased power and volumetric explosion.

The most significant qualitative changes have taken place in aviation, artillery, armored forces and air defense forces. All aviation became jet and missile-carrying, and its combat capabilities increased 10-18 times. The flight speeds of combat aircraft reached 2-3 speeds of sound (2-3 M). In the conduct of hostilities, army aviation acquired a special role, the basis of which was helicopters of various destination.

Artillery, especially rocket artillery, developed in leaps and bounds. The basis of field artillery was self-propelled artillery mounts. The firing range of artillery systems has increased by 3-6 times, and the accuracy of hitting targets by 2.5-5 times.

The armored forces were also completely transformed. Now the tanks have turned into the most complex combat systems: their protection with the use of multi-layer armor and dynamic protection has increased by 10-12 times, and their firepower - by 5-7 times or more. Infantry fighting vehicles became the most important combat weapon of the ground forces, which dramatically increased their combat maneuverability.

The air defense troops underwent a radical structural and technical restructuring. Anti-aircraft missile systems capable of hitting aerodynamic targets in a wide range of altitudes and speeds formed the basis of air defense systems. The Air Defense Forces, along with anti-aircraft weapons, now have missile attack warning, anti-missile and anti-space defense systems.

In just over forty years, the armed forces of the United States, the USSR, other NATO states and the Warsaw Pact have changed 3-5 generations of conventional weapons and military equipment, and as a result, operations and combat operations using conventional weapons have acquired brand new look. Particularly deep shifts in the methods of their conduct occurred at the turn of the 70s and 80s, when a new trend emerged in the development of classical types of weapons associated with the development and widespread introduction of high-precision guided weapons, including reconnaissance and strike systems. As a result, it became possible to ensure the destruction of point targets at large spatial distances from one or two shots, and with a minimum consumption of ammunition. In essence, the capabilities of conventional weapons have reached the parameters of low-yield and ultra-low-yield nuclear weapons. As a result, combat operations acquired an unusually tense, highly dynamic and destructive nature, which required a revision of many principles of their conduct on an operational-tactical and strategic scale.

The fourth direction of military-technical progress is the rapid development of military radio electronics. On the one hand, this led to a genuine revolution in the field of command and control of troops and weapons, which made it possible to increase the effectiveness of combat systems by several times, to provide the possibility of creating qualitatively new combat weapons and to achieve a reliable solution to many operational and strategic tasks associated with ultra-fast processes, and on the other hand, brought to the fore another area of armed struggle - electronic warfare.

Starting from the 1950s, electronic computers began to be used in military affairs, first for solving a number of calculation problems and designing

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military equipment, then for command and control. In the 1960s, the first automated control systems were created. Subsequently, they were intensively introduced into all units of the Armed Forces. ACS of the second, third and fourth generations appeared with ever-greater speed and sharply increased capabilities. On this basis, the control of the Strategic Missile Forces, the country's Air Defense Forces, the Air Force, the Navy, and artillery was automated, which means that their combat effectiveness increased several times. The armies of the USSR, the USA and a number of other countries received automated control systems for tactical and operational levels. As a result, a higher degree of optimization of decisions was achieved, the efficiency and quality of planning increased sharply, and the time for collecting and processing information was reduced.

In the 1970s and 1980s, it was possible to solve the problem of automating the management of the highest echelons of command of the Armed Forces. It became possible to use automated systems to increase the reliability and accuracy of assessing the military-political and strategic situation, to develop and select various options for military operations, to predict operations and war in general. In a word, not only the entire process of strategic planning has been transformed, but there have also been serious changes in the methods of strategic actions of the Armed Forces, the organization of the work of the highest bodies of military-political and strategic leadership in peacetime and wartime.

The appearance and development of electronic warfare had an even greater influence on the methods of military operations. Already in the 1950s, it became obvious that their use could almost completely paralyze the control of enemy aircraft and air defense systems, and reduce their combat effectiveness by several orders of magnitude. In the future, electronic warfare spread to all other areas of military operations. Various means of electronic, optoelectronic and hydroacoustic suppression, homing missiles and bombs were created. Various means and methods of electronic protection of their own command and control systems for troops and weapons were rapidly developed. The ratio of the capabilities of the parties in conducting electronic warfare has become one of the decisive indicators of the combat potential of the Armed Forces

The fifth direction is a breakthrough into space, the creation of space-based combat and supporting means. For military purposes, space began to be used already in the late 60s. And in the next decade, satellite systems of general and detailed reconnaissance, communications, navigation were developed, meteorological and topographic satellites were launched into near-Earth orbits. The USSR and the USA deployed space attack warning systems. At the same time, intensive development of space and anti-space combat systems was carried out. In the 1980s, the first ground-based and air-based anti-space systems appeared. Various combat strike systems of the "space-to-space" and "space-to-earth" types were designed and created.

In other words, space was turning into another area of armed struggle, becoming a very important theater

Military actions. The conquest of dominance in space on a strategic scale has become even more important than strategic dominance in the air or at sea. The use of military space assets radically changed all ideas about the scale and scope of armed struggle, gave all strategic operations unprecedented features, and made it possible to several times increase the efficiency of solving many strategic tasks.

At the same time, in the development of military-technical progress, another direction was identified related to the development of weapons based on new physical principles.

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groin. Since the beginning of the 1980s, almost simultaneously, research work in the field of laser, beam (neutron), microwave, infrasonic, and kinetic weapons has begun in the USSR and the USA. Ideas for the creation of genetic, kinematic and geophysical weapons appeared. Perhaps we can say that at this point the Rubicon has been crossed: the prerequisites for the creation of fundamentally new means of struggle of global action have appeared; now humanity was threatened with mass annihilation over vast expanses and on a scale never seen before.

True, in the future, serious scientific, technical and financial difficulties arose along this path. This circumstance, as well as the change in the military-political situation in the world, led to a partial curtailment of such work, but in principle they were not completely abandoned. The possibility of such funds appearing is quite real. This alone makes it necessary to clarify strategic plans and concepts in advance, to take appropriate preventive measures of a preventive nature. There was no doubt that a new major turn in military affairs was brewing, primarily in the strategy of warfare.

Throughout the post-war years and until the collapse of the USSR, Soviet military strategy developed under the sign of confrontation between the US and NATO military strategies. That is why many of its provisions were formed taking into account certain military-strategic concepts of the Pentagon, which received official recognition in NATO.

In the early 1950s, the United States adopted a strategy of "massive retaliation." It was based on its own superiority in nuclear weapons and, in any case of a war, it consisted in the immediate infliction of massive nuclear strikes on the enemy using the entire accumulated nuclear potential to achieve victory in the shortest possible time.

In accordance with this concept, the Americans developed several plans for waging war against the USSR, and from year to year the number of nuclear warheads proposed for use and the number of target cities hit increased. So, in 1947-1948. 15-20 cities of the Soviet Union were planned to be subjected to nuclear strikes, in 1950 - already 129, and in 1953 - more than 200. Judging by the "Dropshot" plan, developed in 1949, 300 nuclear bombs. In subsequent plans, the number of nuclear weapons was already in the thousands. For example, according to the plan relating to the end of 1967, 72 nuclear strikes were planned to be delivered to the Moscow industrial region.

However, as the Soviet nuclear missile potential increased, the United States increasingly lost its invulnerability. Moreover, it became quite obvious that in the event of a nuclear attack, America itself could be subjected to a devastating Soviet nuclear strike. In the United States, both among politicians and in military circles, cautionary assessments appeared on this score.

Thus, former US Secretary of Defense R. McNamara pointed to the catastrophic vulnerability of the 200 largest American cities, where about 75% of industrial production is concentrated. The American scientists T. Martin and D. Lztem noted in their book "Strategy of Survival" that almost 96 million people live in 218 industrial centers of the USA. According to these specialists, who were closely involved in civil defense issues, US losses from nuclear strikes could be colossal - at least 130 million people. The Western press widely covered the conclusions of the American physicist H. Kann, made by him in the event of the defeat of the American economy by nuclear weapons. He wrote that if the US losses amount to 100 million people, then it will take at least 100 years for the country's economic recovery. Scientists have also calculated the probable losses of the United States from the retaliatory strike of the Soviet Union on American air bases, navy and

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missile bases. The conclusion was disappointing: 56 million Americans would die immediately, and more than 100 million people would receive a lethal dose of radiation.

Under pressure from public opinion, the Pentagon developed more prudent military-strategic variants of the "massive retaliation" strategy, including the concept of counterforce actions, which provided for the initial delivery of nuclear strikes against Soviet missile bases.

In the early 1960s, instead of the strategy of "massive retaliation" in the United States, the strategy of "flexible response" was adopted. Since 1967, it has become the official strategy of NATO. In accordance with it, various options were allowed for the start and conduct of conventional and nuclear wars with the dosed and selective use of nuclear weapons, the use of various options for delivering pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes. As before, it was based on the principles of maintaining superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. At the same time, the accelerated development of conventional weapons and the creation of conditions for monitoring the development of local military conflicts were envisaged.

The implementation of these principles was accompanied by the continuous growth of American ground, air and sea-based nuclear forces. In the mid-60s, the US already had | | 173 strategic installations

ballistic missiles, including 304 submarine-launched missiles, and | 110 strategic aircraft, including 630 B-527 bombers. At the same time, the total strength of the armed forces increased. The combined armed forces included 60 divisions, | 1-12 thousand tanks and 5.5 thousand aircraft.

The "flexible response" strategy allowed for all-out nuclear war, limited nuclear war, war with conventional weapons, and finally war starting with conventional weapons but then moving to the use of nuclear weapons. As if in the development of this strategy in the mid-60s, several more concepts were developed. Most notable among these are the concepts of "assured destruction" and "limited damage".

The concept of "assured destruction" provided for the ability to absolutely reliable destruction of any adversary with various options for starting and conducting a war. What strategic plan the Pentagon put into this concept can be seen from the report of US Secretary of Defense McNamara at a meeting on armed forces of the US House of Representatives. That document emphasized that the United States should have such a number of strategic nuclear attack weapons that, under any circumstances, would ensure the destruction of a third or a quarter of the population, as well as about two-thirds of the industry of the Soviet Union.

The main goal of the strategic concept of "limited damage" is to ensure the survival of the United States in a nuclear war. It was based on the requirement to deliver preemptive strikes against nuclear attack weapons at their base, and in addition, to improve their air defense and missile defense, increase the effectiveness of civil defense measures so that the possible damage from the enemy's response was minimal.

In the early 1970s, in terms of improving and partially changing the strategy of "flexible response", the United States of America adopted a strategy of "realistic deterrence". It provided for the deterrence of the enemy by the threat of inevitable annihilation and the organization of the consistent deployment of ever more powerful and destructive means of armed struggle. Under these conditions, the US armed forces were supposed to have | | thousand ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, 656 points

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missiles on 41 nuclear submarines and more than 650 heavy strategic bombers. In the event of a nuclear collision with the enemy, it was supposed to organize a global strategic nuclear offensive and a nuclear offensive in theaters of military operations through the use of these forces, as well as operational tactical means. At the same time, the principle of "undeniable superiority" was replaced by the principle of "defense sufficiency".

In 1984, instead of the strategy of "realistic deterrence", the Pentagon developed the strategic concept of "direct counteraction". It formed the basis of the American military doctrine of the 1980s. The main meaning of the concept is active opposition to the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries on a global and regional scale by achieving complete and undeniable military superiority and winning the leading position of the United States in the world. The concept was based on the multi-variant use of nuclear forces, from delivering single nuclear strikes against individual targets to the massive use of nuclear weapons across the entire range of military, industrial, administrative and political facilities.

Once again, the US military strategy was revised in connection with the collapse of the USSR and a sharp change in the entire military-political situation in the world. Now it was based on a new concept of development and use of armed forces. It proceeds from the categories of risk and the need to repulse suddenly emerging threats in any direction through pre-emptive or retaliatory actions with the composition of forces and in such a way that will be appropriate in a particular situation.

Along with the strategic potentials, some general military-doctrinal guidelines of the United States also changed. Thus, in 1971, instead of setting the global war against the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact, the military-political concept of "one and a half wars" was adopted, taking into account the possibility of waging one general nuclear and one local war in any region. In 1980, it was replaced by the "two and a half wars" concept, which provided for the readiness of the armed forces to conduct two large-scale wars (nuclear and conventional) and one local war in a completely isolated area. Since the mid-1980s, this attitude has been replaced by the concept of "multiple wars". According to it, the United States admitted the possibility of waging two large-scale and several local wars in different regions of the world.

As for NATO, from the moment of its formation until 1963, the North Atlantic bloc officially adhered to the so-called peripheral strategy. It proceeded from the overwhelming military superiority of the USSR and other countries participating in the Warsaw Pact in Europe, especially in ground forces. With this in mind, NATO armed forces were allowed to temporarily leave part of their territory with a subsequent transition to a counteroffensive, during which the use of nuclear weapons was allowed with the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the Eastern European states.

In 1963, simultaneously with the adoption of the "flexible response" strategy, the strategic concept of "forward lines" was recognized as the official strategy of NATO. It assumed the organization of defensive lines as close as possible to the eastern border of the FRG, ruled out a significant retreat into the depths of its territory and provided for various levels of "nuclear damage", i.e., the moment and conditions for the transition to the use of nuclear weapons. In the 1990s, in connection with the unification of Germany and the collapse of the USSR, this concept lost its meaning.

Thus, in the 1950s and 1980s, the Soviet military strategy was corrected and refined taking into account

each of these US strategic concepts. At the same time, both adequate and asymmetric actions were envisaged. od

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However, the general direction of the strategy was determined not by any one, but by the whole combination of the military-political, strategic and military-technical factors listed above. This is what determined the complexity and diversity of the gradual transition to ever more flexible forms.

2. Basic principles of the Soviet military strategy in the postwar years

As already noted, with the advent of nuclear missile weapons, the role of military strategy not only increased, but also became dominant. Although it remained dependent on politics and economics, the reverse influence of strategy on politics increased sharply. In fact, the economic, logistical, scientific, intellectual and military capabilities of the state began to have an unusually strong influence on the goals of policy, the methods and forms of achieving them. Quite often, many political decisions were conditioned by strategic considerations, and sometimes they themselves followed from them. The policy of the USSR, based on military strategy, was formed and carried out, as a rule, in such a way that in the event of a collision with the United States or some other potential adversary, it would be possible to provide a more favorable environment for solving the main military-strategic tasks. Proceeding from this, alliances were concluded, political actions were undertaken aimed at strengthening the strategic positions of the USSR in various regions of the world, and the internal capabilities of the state were mobilized to ensure the successful operation of its Armed Forces.

The development of the Soviet economy was increasingly subordinated to the interests of military strategy. In the Soviet Union, as in the West, a powerful military-industrial complex began to take shape. Every year, its share in the national economy of the country increased, most of whose industries in one way or another worked for defense purposes. Based on the changed conditions of warfare, the geographical distribution of industrial enterprises was revised, new requirements were made for the integration and cooperation of production. Civil defense measures to ensure the protection of the population and economic structures from the attack of a potential enemy have gained wide scope.

The relationship between different areas of military art has also changed, but the traditional relationship between strategy, operational art and tactics has been preserved: the sum of tactical successes leads to a certain operational success, and the combination of the latter gives the final strategic result. At the same time, other regularities not previously known not only appeared, but also acquired decisive significance.

First, there is a possibility that the final goals of the war can be achieved through the direct use of strategic means of combat, the arsenal of which has significantly expanded, and the destructive power has exceeded the integrated capabilities of all operational and tactical means of various branches of the Armed Forces combined. In this scenario, the role of operational art was essentially reduced to completing the success achieved by strategy, and the role of tactics was to realizing the results achieved by operational art. True, in subsequent years, the possibility of a multi-variant war revived the former dependence, but only until the moment of transition to the unlimited use of nuclear weapons.

Secondly, the time parameters of the strategic actions of the Armed Forces have changed. Real prerequisites have been created for achieving the goals of the war, literally in one operation and even with one blow. Correspondingly, profound changes have taken place in the very idea of war as a more or less prolonged

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period of continuation of politics by violent means. In essence, there has been a tendency to turn war into an act of instantaneous action. But again, this turned out to be true only for the unlimited use by the parties of all the accumulated stocks of nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, the spatial possibilities of the strategy have increased manifold. Instead of the classical development of hostilities with their gradual spread to new territories and regions, the typical option is the simultaneous involvement in armed struggle of almost all spatial spheres without exception. All continents, oceans and seas, any point on planet Earth were within the reach of weapons of destruction. As a result, the war acquired a colossal scope: the old boundaries between the front and the rear were erased. The warfare was now based on global and intercontinental operations. Moreover, just as in the previous cases, this pattern could be fully manifested in cases of the deployment of strategic nuclear missile forces.

In other words, the nature of the Soviet military strategy, just like the nature of the US military strategy, was made directly dependent on the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In fact, within the framework of the unified military strategy of the USSR, two directions were formed: the strategy of deep nuclear missile strikes in combination with the actions of all types of the Armed Forces to simultaneously defeat and destroy the economic potential and armed forces of the enemy throughout the depth of its territory with the end of the war in short time; the strategy of waging war with conventional weapons, with the expectation of consistently defeating and destroying the armed forces and the main elements of the enemy's economic potential and achieving victory in both short-term and long-term struggle.

In practice, both of these directions manifested themselves in various combinations and forms. In fact, Soviet military strategy went through at least three qualitatively distinct stages. The first is characterized by the fact that the nuclear strategy was considered the only possible one. The second stage assumed the possibility

coordinated implementation of the strategy of conventional and nuclear war, moreover, with the development of the first into the second, and the third - when, depending on the situation, it was required to ensure equal readiness of the country and the Armed Forces for the separate implementation of the nuclear strategy in one case, and the strategy in the other conventional war with the constant threat of nuclear conflict.

Already in the early 1950s, a new idea about the essence and content of military strategy in the nuclear age was formed in the Soviet Union. It was believed that the range of its problems included the following tasks: the study of the forces, means and methods of conducting military operations by potential adversaries, their economic and moral capabilities; revealing the main features and peculiarities of a possible nuclear war, its general character; determination of the forces and means necessary to achieve strategic objectives in accordance with the set political goals, the economic and moral-political capabilities of the state, the conditions of theaters of war; development of the weapons system and organizational structure of the Armed Forces; determination of nuclear targets, military campaigns and strategic operations; organization of strategic interaction both between nuclear and atomic forces, branches of the Armed Forces, and between strategic groupings in various directions and theaters of military operations; studying the issues of moral and political training of the personnel of the Armed Forces, providing them with human contingents, weapons, material and technical means, and reserves of all kinds.

In the 1960s and 1970s, military strategy was defined "as the highest component of military art, including the theory and practice of preparing the country and

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of the Armed Forces to protect the gains of socialism, planning and conducting strategic operations and war in general. At the same time, the theory of military strategy was considered as a system of scientific knowledge, including the study of the patterns and nature of world nuclear and local conventional wars and methods of their conduct, as well as the development of theoretical foundations for planning, preparing and conducting strategic operations. The practical activities of the Soviet military strategy included: assessment of the conditions of the military-political situation and specific probable adversaries; determination of the strategic tasks of the Armed Forces, as well as the necessary forces and means for conducting strategic actions; development of measures to prepare the Armed Forces, theaters of military operations, the economy and the population of the country for the defense of the socialist Fatherland; planning military operations in general and specific strategic operations; maintaining the Armed Forces in constant combat readiness; organizing the deployment of the Armed Forces and directing them during operations; studying the possibilities of potential adversaries for a surprise attack and waging war.

Later, fundamentally new changes took place in the content of the Soviet military strategy. The most important tasks of military strategy began to include: the study of the nature of both nuclear and conventional world, regional and local wars; development of methods and forms of protecting the state in the conditions of the use by the aggressor of both nuclear and conventional weapons, the development of the Armed Forces, taking into account the importance of ensuring the ability to repel a massive nuclear attack by the aggressor; creation of a system of constant high combat readiness of the Armed Forces and ensuring their organized entry into the war under any conditions; development of the general foundations of the military strategy of the countries of the socialist Commonwealth, in which the international interests of the allied states are organically combined; elaboration of a command and control system for the Armed Forces in the face of the threat of a nuclear attack from the imperialist aggressors and in the course of their unleashing a war. At the same time, the structure of the main military-political and strategic tasks, which were solved not only in peacetime, but also during the war, was radically revised.

Along with typical tasks, the military-political and strategic warning of war acquired special significance. This followed from the directives of the 21st Congress of the CPSU and the new Program of the CPSU adopted by it, which emphasized: "The main issue of our time is the question of war and peace... The main thing is to prevent a thermonuclear war, to prevent it from breaking out." Since the mid-1980s, this attitude has become decisive in the foreign policy of the state. As the most important provision, it entered the officially adopted new Soviet military doctrine and through it led to the active development of strategic aspects of solving this most complex task. Accordingly, the requirements for the combat readiness of the Armed Forces and the organization of their strategic deployment depending on the level of real military threats were changed. A system of military-political and strategic measures was developed to deter potential adversaries, prevent and repel military aggression in new, including its hidden forms.

In the general system of tasks studied and solved by military strategy, the task of strategic warning of the country and the Armed Forces about an enemy nuclear missile attack that is being prepared and has begun has acquired a special role. In its character and content, it went far beyond the scope of the previous task associated with revealing the direct preparation of the enemy for war. Perhaps the whole meaning has changed radically. Now the question of almost instantaneous establishment of the start of the launch of enemy missiles, of determining the scale of

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missiles and possible objects of a nuclear missile attack for the immediate commissioning of their own strategic means of warfare.

This required the creation of a fundamentally new technical intelligence base, constant monitoring of the enemy, the development and implementation of ultra-fast automated control systems, the collection and processing of global information, a radical change in the procedure for making emergency military-political and strategic decisions, and orders to all command instances and directly to combat assets.

With particular acuteness, the strategy faced the task of repelling possible aggression in the event that the enemy used new means of combat. It was now based on: actions to repel a sudden massive nuclear missile attack, carried out simultaneously from all directions and to the entire depth of the country's territory; disruption of the subsequent invasion of the enemy from the air, land and sea; counteracting the destructive impact of the aggressor on the natural environment; active protection of the Armed Forces, the population and the economy of the country from destruction by combat weapons of instantaneous or indefinitely long action.

At the same time, the concept of "surprise" had to be considered from completely different positions, because with the new means it was possible to expect a strike from a potential enemy at any moment, i.e. from a position of peacetime or with an incomplete deployment of the Armed Forces. The very criteria for repulsing an attack have also changed, since it was not possible to prevent or frustrate nuclear missile strikes. Now we could only talk about their maximum weakening, reducing the destructive effects of the attack and guaranteed inflicting an adequate blow on the enemy.

Another task of strategy also assumed a different character—the defeat of the enemy and his withdrawal from the war. There was a prospect not only of crushing the entire structure of the armed forces, but also the destruction of entire states, along with their entire population, economy and infrastructure. The problem of more or less reliable defense of our own military-economic and strategic facilities has come to the fore. It was necessary to develop a whole system of new measures and actions aimed not only at ensuring the survival of the country, but at the same time at organizing reliable protection of troops and the population from weapons of mass destruction, deploying the most complex anti-missile and anti-space defense systems, disrupting similar measures and actions on the part of the enemy.

Civil defense has become a special area of military strategy. For this purpose, civil defense troops and forces were created, a strategy and tactics were developed for eliminating the consequences of a nuclear attack, restoring the combat readiness of the Armed Forces and the vital activity of the most important military and economic structures of the state.

A significant contribution to the formation and development of military-strategic views in the USSR was made by the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the main headquarters of the branches of the Armed Forces, military academies and research organizations. Of decisive importance was the development of new operating instructions.

Unfortunately, in the first post-war years, the practice of strategy developed much faster than theory. As a result, the operational manuals prepared in 1948, 1952 and, finally, in 1955, remained at the project level. The first official manual that considered the tasks of strategy in the nuclear age from fundamentally new positions was the work "Operations of the Armed Forces of the USSR" published by the Ministry of Defense in 1961. But he, in fact, included only about

GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF THE AF military defense of the USSR

Tasks of the Armed Forces in peacetime General tasks of the Armed Forces in war | Deterrence of aggression Reflection of aggression

Maintaining the readiness of the country Protecting the territory and facilities for the war of the country

Participation in local conflicts Defeat of the enemy's armed forces Protection of state borders

Rendering assistance Rendering military assistance to the national economy of the allied states Participation in operations Military construction of expeditionary forces Immediate strategic tasks of the Armed Forces In a nuclear war In a conventional war

Repelling an enemy nuclear attack and ensuring the country's survival

Striking an opponent; inflicting irreparable damage on it Defeat the invasion forces Defeat the main forces of the first country

tag echelon and the capture of border areas

Destruction of enemy aircraft

repulse invasion

enemy

WEP destruction

enemy

Further strategic tasks of the Armed Forces

Sun recovery and extension

Mastering the basic

Withdrawal from the war

Forcing the allies to defeat the enemy of the enemy

Occupation of the country Liberation of the enemy territory ... rii of the allied countries Consolidation of the results of the war and Providing favorable conditions for the conclusion of peace

Scheme 52. Strategic tasks of the Armed Forces (according to the views of the 60s - 80s)

its districts

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theoretical guidelines for military personnel, since its authors recognized that at the operational, and even more so at the strategic level, no operation can be similar to the previous one. At the same time, they pointed out that the structure and content of operations should be determined by the specific situation, in connection with which there could allegedly be no strict recommendations on their planning and conduct.

Only 19 years later, in 1980, the capital guide "Fundamentals of Strategic Operations of the Armed Forces of the USSR" approved by the USSR Defense Council was published. It examined in an expanded form all the questions of strategy and operational art, and gave exhaustive instructions on the work of the bodies of strategic and operational leadership. In 1989, the second, revised edition of the Fundamentals was published.

The fundamental problems of strategy were constantly tested in exercises, theoretically developed and analyzed in numerous academic works, textbooks, monographs, dissertations, and covered in the pages of the Military Thought magazine.

The whole range of new strategic problems is reflected in the work "The Character of Modern Warfare and Its Problems". It was developed in 1953 by a team of authors from the Military Academy of the General Staff. After 6 years, a work no less interesting in this respect, "Modern War and Military Science," was published. An important event in the study of the strategy of nuclear war was the release in 1960-1961. again developed by the General Staff of the fundamental (closed, and later declassified) work "Modern War". But the real sensation was the "Military Strategy", prepared by a team of authors under the leadership of Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovsky. Since this work was not marked "secret", it was republished in many countries of the world. In the last two works, for the first time, the essence of the new Soviet military strategy was outlined in a generalized and concentrated form, and the methods of conducting a nuclear war were revealed.

In subsequent works, the main provisions of the nuclear strategy were developed and refined. Among the most significant academic works on strategy that appeared from 1961 to 1980 are The Initial Period of the War (1964, VAGSh), General Problems of Soviet Military Strategy (1969, VAGSh), Strategic Operation in the theater of operations" (1966, General Staff), "War and Military Art" (1972, General Staff), "Local War" (1968, General Staff), "War and Army" (1977, Ministry of Defense), etc.

Many military scientists, including M.A. Gareev, A.I. Gastilovich, A.A. Danilevich, K.I. Dzhorzhadze, I.G. V. I. Zemskov, S. N. Krasilnikov, V. A. Larionov, N. G. Popov, D. M. Projector, N. A. Sbytov, S. A. Tyushkevich, E. A. Shilovsky, and others

Both in theoretical and practical terms, the defense ministers G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, R.Ya. Malinovsky, A.A. Grechko, S. L. Sokolov, Chiefs of the General Staff V. D. Sokolovsky, M. V. Zakharov, V. G. Kulikov, N. V. Ogarkov, S. F. Akhromeev, prominent military leaders V. I. Varennikov, N. N. Voronov, A. I. Gribkov, S. P. Ivanov, M. M. Kozlov, I. S. Konev, S. M. Shtemenko, etc.

Through the joint efforts of the General Staff and the main staffs of the Armed Forces, military academies and research institutes in the 1950s and 1980s, it was largely possible to successfully solve such fundamental tasks of the strategy as identifying the possible nature of a future war and expedient methods of waging it using new means of armed struggle, the establishment

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strategic periodization of the war, the system of strategic operations of the Armed Forces. The main directions in the development of the Armed Forces, the principles of maintaining their combat readiness, organizing their deployment and commissioning were developed and theoretically substantiated, the theory of strategic offensive and strategic defense was created, the problem of struggle for dominance in space and in the air was theoretically solved. And on the sea.

In the 1950s and 1960s, all the most important principles of the strategy were almost completely revised. First of all, this refers to the existing from [U in BC. e. the principle of concentrating forces and resources in decisive directions*.

Unlike past wars, when success could be achieved only by creating a decisive superiority over the enemy in the main directions by concentrating forces and means in the most important sectors of the front, it has now come to the conclusion that in a nuclear war such an approach is not only has lost its significance, but has also become dangerous in view of the fact that it only increases the threat of destruction of troops by nuclear weapons.

As a result, a demand was put forward to mass the efforts of the troops not by deploying excessively dense groupings of forces and assets, but mainly by maneuvering with nuclear and fire strikes. It was believed that in the changed conditions, the decisive role is acquired not so much by the choice of the direction of the main

strike, as well as the determination of the main areas of application of efforts, as well as the exact calculation of forces and means on the objects of strikes, the establishment of the sequence of their destruction.

The principle of economy of forces began to be considered differently. In contrast to the previous guidelines, which assumed a gradual increase in efforts as the war developed, a new requirement was theoretically substantiated on the need to concentrate all forces and means on the fulfillment of tasks at the very beginning of the war, which, as was assumed, could decisively depend on her success. It was believed that it was hardly reasonable to count on the use of the potential capabilities of the state in a nuclear war, and hence, to reserve most of the forces for conducting military operations in its subsequent periods. According to military theorists, on the contrary, one should strive to put maximum effort into the first strikes against the enemy and into the first operations.

The assessment of the principle of private victory has changed. If in the past it was considered an immutable law that the overall success in a war is made up of many individual successes on various fronts and in various spheres of armed struggle, now they began to proceed from the fact that it is possible and even necessary to achieve decisive results in the shortest possible time with through the simultaneous use of strategic nuclear weapons, and in some cases even without the involvement of operational-tactical forces and assets. Accordingly, it was concluded that victory in a war is no longer the sum of private victories, but is the result of "a one-act application of the entire power of the state accumulated before the war" ""

Of course, this approach to these and other principles of strategy has not remained unchanged. He was unconditionally recognized only in the 50s and the first half of the 60s. Since the mid-1960s, many new installations have been gradually refined. Compromise provisions are being developed that organically combine both new and traditionally classical requirements.

It should be noted that in the first years after the creation of a powerful nuclear missile potential in the USSR, its reassessment was allowed, and therefore the development of the country

* It was first used by the Theban commander Epaminondas against the Spartans in the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC. e.

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tags went in a somewhat one-sided order. The development of methods of strategic actions of the Armed Forces for a long time was carried out on isolated problems, which limited the coordinated development of all areas of military art. Not without subjective interpretation of certain provisions. Insufficient consideration was given to the capabilities of US nuclear weapons and the prospects for potential adversaries to create new means of combat. Only by the end of the 1960s did the approach to these problems become more objective, balanced, and realistic.

It should be emphasized that throughout all the post-war years, despite a number of ramifications, the Soviet military strategy was based on the principles of its indivisibility by spheres of struggle. Therefore, the attempts of some military scientists to substantiate the strategy of certain branches of the Armed Forces as a completely isolated area in the art of war were rejected. Based on the experience of the Great Patriotic War and an objective assessment of the strategic capabilities of each branch of the Armed Forces, the need to develop a unified military strategy based on the strictly coordinated use of all branches of the Armed Forces, and in their close interaction, was confirmed.

The importance of a coherent strategy was justified by the possible nature of a future war, from which flowed, more than ever before, the requirement to have a unified policy in the development of the Armed Forces, a unified strategic plan for the use of troops (forces), centralized leadership of them, carefully coordinated efforts of all types, branches troops and forces, coordinating the actions of the armies and fleets of all allied states in order to achieve victory over the aggressor. At the same time, theoretical thought recognized the need for in-depth development of the problems of the strategic use of each type of the Armed Forces, methods for solving strategic and operational-strategic tasks in the conduct of both joint and independent operations.

It is also quite characteristic that in the first post-war years military strategy continued to develop mainly as a strategy of continental operations. But already from the end of the 1950s, it began to combine elements of air and ocean strategies, and later became the strategy of all-nuclear armed struggle.

Along the way, within the framework of a unified military strategy, two of its areas were formed: the strategy of waging war as a whole and the strategy of war on the continents and theaters of military operations. Marshal Grechko was the first to put forward such an attitude officially at the military-scientific conference of the Armed Forces in 1972. It did not receive a comprehensive theoretical development and detailed coverage in the press, however, it found practical implementation in real strategic planning.

Meanwhile, the expediency of such a bifurcation of the strategy was due to a number of circumstances: the expansion of the scale and spatial scope of the war; the complication of operations in the continental and oceanic theaters of war; the possibility of waging large-scale wars, both global and within the boundaries of certain continents, as well as on other more or less large, but isolated territories with adjacent outer space, air and sea space.

Of course, the strategy of warfare in general and the strategy of war in theaters of operations were interrelated, but the latter was subordinate to the former. They also had significant differences in the scale and nature of the tasks being solved.

The strategy of warfare as a whole coordinated strategic actions in various theaters of war and

theaters of war. It determined the goals and objectives of all the Armed Forces, as well as other means aimed at defeating the armed forces of the enemy, destroying its economic base, withdrawing from the war those states that could become an enemy. Associated mainly with intercon

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Continental actions of strategic offensive and defensive means, it combined in itself the global strategic operations of these means and forces.

The essence of the strategy of warfare in the theaters of operations was to defeat the groupings of troops and forces of the enemy. It covered and considered mainly problems related to the preparation and conduct of operations in continental and ocean theaters.

This approach turned out to be especially expedient after the main commands in the theaters of operations were created in the Soviet Armed Forces, as a result of which the planning of global operations became the prerogative of the General Staff only, and the preparation, planning and conduct of strategic operations in the theater - task of the respective main commands.

In general, during the four post-war decades, the development of military strategy in the USSR was characterized by a transition from the development of the theory of conventional machine warfare using modernized, fully motorized and mechanized armies to the development of the theory of nuclear warfare with the unlimited use of nuclear missile weapons from the very beginning of its and to the end. Then the theory of stage-by-stage war was developed with a gradual transition to the use of more and more destructive means of armed struggle. Finally, the theory of equal readiness began to take shape. This meant both nuclear and conventional warfare with extensive use of high-precision combat weapons and automated command and control systems for troops and weapons.

It should be noted that the theory of conventional machine warfare began to take shape immediately after the end of the Great Patriotic War. It was based on the generalized experience of this war, taking into account the new alignment of military-political forces, restructuring the organizational structure of the Armed Forces and equipping them with effective types of conventional weapons. This meant the creation of jet aviation, the complete motorization of the ground forces, and a sharp increase in their armored forces. Accordingly, more decisive methods of conducting operations and combat actions were developed. With the increased indicators of their scope, special emphasis was placed on highly mobile military operations with inflicting swift and deep strikes on the enemy.

In a generalized form, the theory of conventional machine warfare was reflected in the Field Manual of the Armed Forces, published in 1948. Until 1954, in relation to its provisions and requirements, the construction of the army and navy was carried out. In the same spirit, strategic and operational planning was carried out, and the training of military personnel and staffs was organized.

The formation of the theory of unlimited nuclear war dates back to the 1950s. Initially, nuclear weapons were viewed as exceptionally powerful, but still an auxiliary means of armed struggle. It was believed that the main strategic tasks in the war would be solved by mass armed forces with conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons were supposed to be used mainly for strategic purposes. According to the views that existed at that time, its use on the battlefield is very limited due to the imperfection of the carriers and the insufficient number of nuclear weapons at the disposal of the parties at that time.

Therefore, the manual published in 1954 considered, in essence, not the strategy and tactics of actions in a nuclear war, but only the features of conducting military operations using atomic bombs. In other words, all the classical methods of conducting an operation and combat remained in force. Only some clarifications were made to the issues of building troops, organizing their defense, planning military operations and performing combat missions, because it was necessary to take into account the threat of

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enemy's use of nuclear weapons, as well as the use of their nuclear weapons for tactical and operational purposes.

In a generalized form, these provisions were reflected in the draft combat manuals of 1954-1958. They were completed after an operational exercise in the Carpathian military district, conducted in 1955 under the leadership of N.A. Bulganin, where nuclear strikes against troops were simulated, as well as after a tactical bombs of medium caliber, carried out under the leadership of Marshal Zhukov.

The turning point in the creation of the theory of universal unlimited nuclear war was the beginning of the 60s, when the Strategic Missile Forces were created in the USSR.

Despite the fact that certain provisions on a radical change in the nature of the war were expressed earlier, they were up to 1959-1960. have not been consolidated into a single system. The process of developing the theory of nuclear war in its new version began with the report "On the nature of modern nuclear missile warfare", which was delivered at the Military Academy of the General Staff by Marshal Sokolovsky, Chief of the General Staff. It was prepared on the basis of detailed theoretical studies of the General Staff and the main headquarters of the branches of the Armed Forces. The speaker sharply criticized all the fundamental principles of the pre-nuclear strategy, and then put forward fundamentally new provisions on the nature and methods of warfare and operations, the strategic and operational use of the Armed Forces, the organization of all types of support, operational and strategic rear services.

The most important premises of this report were developed in the already mentioned works "Modern Warfare" and "Military Strategy". The authors of these theoretical works considered nuclear missile strikes of the parties as the main type of military operations. In fact, denying the need for advance deployment of the Armed Forces, they proposed to consider the enemy's economy as the main object of military operations. This led to the following conclusion: "a nuclear missile war, if it does arise, will be waged in fundamentally different ways compared to past wars ... any attempts to transfer to modern conditions without any changes the methods of armed struggle developed in the course of World War II are very dangerous, because these attempts may damage the readiness of the Armed Forces and the country as a whole to repulse aggression!"

And today, many of the ideas put forward in the books "Modern Warfare" and "Military Strategy" amaze with their courage and foresight. True, not all provisions were justified. The authors did not take into account the prospects for the development of both nuclear and conventional weapons and made a mistake in their forecast of the military-political situation. Undoubtedly, one cannot agree with the sweeping denial of all the canons of classical military art. The author's assessments of the objects of armed struggle, the role of conventional means of destruction and the duration of the war were not entirely substantiated either. Nevertheless, such a decisive revision of all views was necessary as air. It made it possible to get rid of long-outdated dogmas in military art, gave a powerful impetus to the development of military thought, especially in the field of strategy, which played an important role in ensuring the country's military security.

In subsequent years, more balanced and objective views on nuclear war were formed, including its possible development and the nature of the operations carried out by the Armed Forces. In accordance with them, all operational plans were revised, and the main directions for the development of the Armed Forces were clarified.

The most important provisions of the theory of nuclear war have been studied and tested in numerous strategic and operational exercises and games. Among them, of particular importance was the strategic

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command and staff exercise under the code name "Decisive Strike". The exercise was attended by the top leadership of the country: General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Defense Council L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N. V. Podgorny designated forces of individual tasks with full-scale use of all control systems and all central command posts without exception.

The idea of the exercise was based on the real plans of the parties for the use of strategic forces, which made it possible to imagine the situation in a nuclear war in the most approximate form. The results of the failure of these plans revealed a picture that shocked all those present. For the first time, the top military-political leadership of the state was able to be convinced of the catastrophic consequences of the first nuclear strikes. Judging by the calculations, it turned out that after the very first preemptive strike against the United States of America, almost 87% of the combat strength of their armed forces, about 80-90 million people, which was at least 70%, and 68-72% of the industrial potential, would die. But the territory of the entire European part of the Soviet Union in this case turned out to be in a zone of continuous radioactive contamination with a radiation level of 300 roentgens per hour and more. The conclusions made on the basis of the exercise made it necessary to make many-sided decisions aimed at developing the means of retaliatory strike and increasing the security of the USSR, and the system of degrees of combat readiness of the Armed Forces was also refined.

Methods of conducting operations in the theaters of military operations, strategic and operational areas were practiced in operational-strategic exercises. The most important of them were "Storm" in 1962, "Typhoon" in 1963, "Dnepr" in 1967, "Neman" in 1968, "Spring Thunder" in 1968, "East" in 1969, "West" in 1969, "North" in 1970, "Ocean" in 1970, etc. The results obtained on the basis of them made it possible to identify the main problems of conducting operations within the framework of an unrestricted nuclear war under various conditions of its initiation and conduct.

And yet, the idea of nuclear war changed not so much under the influence of exercises, but under the influence of real material factors, first of all, it was necessary to take into account the rapid growth of the nuclear missile potentials of the United States and the USSR. In the 1960s, stockpiles of nuclear munitions in the United States increased 15 times, and in the USSR, 25 times. The possibilities of the means of their delivery to the targets have sharply expanded. Of course, all this could not but affect the methods of solving strategic problems.

Initially, the exchange of nuclear missile strikes was viewed in a very simplified way. As a rule, the effectiveness of their own strikes against the enemy was overestimated, and the effectiveness of the opposite side was downplayed. In this regard, the prospects for conducting operations, not to mention the war as a whole, were considered too optimistically. Until now, for some reason, it was believed that under all circumstances the Soviet Union would win. And the moral and political advantages of the socialist state, the vast size of the territory of the USSR and, conversely, the high degree of concentration of the population and economy of the United States, which exceeded the concentration of the population and economy of the Soviet Union by one and a half times, were put at the forefront. Subsequently, assessments became more prudent and realistic, and the simplified scheme of warfare was gradually replaced by a whole system of various operations carried out with the participation of all branches of the Armed Forces.

The nature of the views and assessments of a nuclear missile war was determined by the subjective approach to this problem on the part of the country's top military leadership, primarily defense ministers. For example, Bulganin attached paramount importance to striking the enemy with nuclear weapons, and

because the operations of the ground forces considered unimportant Zhukov, on

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against, he paid all his attention to the development of methods of conducting operations in theaters of operations in the conditions of the use of nuclear weapons. In turn, Malinovsky considered the Strategic Rocket Forces to be a technical branch of the Armed Forces, the use of which, in his opinion, is reduced to a technical act, and therefore has nothing to do with military art. In his opinion, nuclear weapons have radically changed the content of the strategy, but the old classical principles continue to operate in tactics. He was also the first to raise the issue of creating the means of anti-missile defense of the country. Finally, Grechko's activities can be characterized as a decisive course towards equalizing the nuclear balance and establishing a strategic balance.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the development of the theory of staged nuclear war began. It was caused by the realization in both the USSR and the USA of the mutual danger in the event of the unlimited use of nuclear weapons and was based on the transition to its use not from the beginning of the war, but during its development, and at the most critical moment.

The possibility of such a course of action was first substantiated by American politicians and military theorists. A special role in this was played by R. Pana, who put forward the concept of "escalation" of the war, R. Osud, who in the late 50s wrote a work under the very symptomatic title "Limited War", B. Brody - the author of the work "Strategy in the Age of Missile Weapons", M. Taylor, who prepared the book "Unreliable Strategy", etc.

In the USSR, theoretical developments on the problems of a phased war began with criticism of American views. However, very soon, Soviet military theorists came to similar conclusions, recognizing the expediency of a more flexible strategy for a phased nuclear war. In its most detailed form, the concept of this strategy was discussed in 1972 at the military-scientific conference of the Armed Forces. It is noteworthy that in the future all published theoretical works, instructions and guidelines were based on the conclusions of that conference.

In the practical development of methods for conducting a phased nuclear war, an important role was played by the annual strategic and operational-strategic exercises of the Armed Forces, especially the exercises of strategic nuclear forces and operational-strategic exercises with communications equipment and designated troops in the West, East and South. . From 1970 to 1979 8 strategic exercises of the "Center" type were conducted. In the course of them, standard variants of war were worked out, which began with conventional means, then developed into a limited one, and ended with an unlimited nuclear war.

In this regard, exercises such as Udar-7 1, Center-74 and Center-78 were of particular interest, because they were characterized by practical launches of land, sea and air-based missiles. For the first time in the course of these exercises, in a single complex with the deployment of the Armed Forces and their strategic use in war, the issues of transferring the national economy from a peaceful to a war situation, the operation of the economy in a "special period", assessed the extent of damage that could be caused to various industries, agriculture, transport, the minimum possible volume of restoration work was determined. In all cases, military operations were played out in the most detail without the use of nuclear weapons, and most importantly, repelling the enemy's first massive nuclear strike and bringing its strategic nuclear forces into action. This was usually the end of the exercises. But the process of deploying subsequent operations has not been studied due to the exceptional complexity and uncertainty of the situation that may develop after the parties exchange the first massive nuclear strikes.

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In the same years, a coherent system of operational-strategic exercises was created in the theaters of military operations. From 1971] to 1980 9 such exercises were conducted in the West, 7 exercises in the East, 2 exercises in the South, 4 operational-strategic exercises of the Air Defense Forces, 3 operational-strategic exercises of the Air Force, 2 strategic exercises of the Navy. The development of the theory and practice of conducting operational-strategic operations, operations of fronts and fleets was especially influenced by the exercises "Spring-72", "Vostok-72", "Zenith-72", "Strait-72", "Spring-73", "West-73", "East-74", "Amur" (1975), "Transcaucasia" (1975), "West-77", "Atlantic-78", "Vostok-79", "Ocean" (1979), "South-80" and others.

At that time, special attention was paid to working out the issues of command and control of the Armed Forces and the strategic support of their actions. For this purpose, major exercises were specially conducted: Horizon-74, Efir-74, Electron-75, Impulse-76, Kvant-76, etc. This made it possible to study in detail the important - the most fundamental problems of the strategic management of the war, the organization and conduct of strategic intelligence, electronic warfare, strategic camouflage

The implementation of the principles of a phased nuclear war required a radical revision of the system of combat readiness of the Armed Forces, the order of their strategic deployment, and the conduct of the first and subsequent operations. On this basis, a fundamentally different system of strategic actions of the Armed Forces began to take shape. Views on the methods of defeating the enemy have changed: more and more they were inclined towards the consistent withdrawal of the enemy coalition states from the war.

A great influence on the new theoretical principles was exerted by all, without exception, the field of development of the Armed Forces, primarily the development of military equipment and weapons. Along with the improvement of strategic nuclear weapons, priority attention was given to the development of operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons. In addition, stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons were rapidly accumulating in theaters of operations, the system of their storage and transfer to higher

degree of readiness. A well-organized organization of the rocket technical and nuclear technical support service was developed. A major role in this regard was played by special exercises conducted with the central authorities, as well as in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Northern Group of Forces, the Byelorussian and Carpathian military districts, in the Air Force and the Navy.

At the same time, conventional weapons were intensively developed, especially the equipment of the armored forces, artillery, engineering troops, the Air Force, and the country's air defense forces. Thus, the material basis was laid for the emergence, development and implementation of a new theory of war - the theory of equal opportunity of both a world nuclear war in its various variants, and a world conventional war in a qualitatively its new form.

Such a theory was created as the catastrophic consequences of a possible nuclear war and the forced removal of the "nuclear threshold" were revealed. Finally, they came to the conclusion that without the use of nuclear weapons, not only the first, but also subsequent strategic operations in the theaters of military operations, and, in the end, the entire war from its beginning to its complete conclusion, could be carried out.

The question of the possibility of developing full-scale conventional wars, including between the USSR and the USA, the NATO and Warsaw Pact states, was first raised in 1981 at a strategic command and staff exercise conducted under the leadership of Minister of Defense Marshal D. F. Ustinov. In the future, the General Staff, the main headquarters of the branches of the Armed Forces, the Military Academy of the General Staff, the Strategic Research Department, the Institute of Military History

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and other organizations have carefully analyzed it in their theoretical developments.

But in practice, the provisions that arose in connection with this idea were tested on maneuvers, strategic command and staff exercises and games of 1982-1987. This theory was most fully elucidated in the Fundamentals of Training and Conducting Operations of the Armed Forces (published in 1981 and republished in 1989), as well as in the conclusions on the largest strategic exercise of the Armed Forces in all post-war years. with the designated troops and forces of the fleet, held in 1988 by the Minister of Defense, General of the Army D.T. Yazov.

It should be emphasized that before the collapse of the USSR, military operations by conventional means were necessarily lost, taking into account the constant readiness for a sudden transition to nuclear war. Moreover, at the strategic command and staff exercises, which have become widespread since 1984, more and more new options for putting strategic and operational tactical nuclear forces into operation have been systematically studied.

Approximately the same direction in the development of military-strategic views has developed in the US and NATO armed forces. In the 1980s, the largest NATO exercises, especially the OTEM-Ford type, studied in detail how to wage war in Europe using both conventional and nuclear weapons, and, as a rule, with a gradual transition from single nuclear strikes against military targets to limited and, finally, unlimited nuclear war.

By the mid-1980s, when the situation in the world had changed and new views on the war and the strategy of its conduct appeared, both in the USA and the USSR, as well as in other states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the programs for building armed forces were significantly revised. forces and plans for their operational use in theaters of military operations. At the same time, the action plans of the strategic nuclear forces were subjected to significant adjustments. Their characteristic feature has become the multi-variant delivery of the first and subsequent nuclear strikes in such a way as to avoid the inevitable transition to the global use of nuclear weapons, at least as long as it remains possible to limit the scale of military operations and control their development.

In this regard, in the Soviet Union, more and more attention began to be paid to the strategy of strategic defensive lines. Its essence was that a conventional war and its first operations related to limiting the possible aggression of the enemy in the west could be carried out without the spread of full-scale actions of ground forces to the internal territories of the USSR, mainly due to the forces of the first strategic echelon. In other words, at the expense of groups of troops, armies of the Warsaw Pact states, border military districts, fleets and Air Defense Forces, with their partial reinforcement by reserves deployed during mobilization. In principle, this was a special variant of the NATO "forward defense" strategy, but, of course, more ambitious and thoroughly worked out.

In relation to the Soviet doctrine, which reflected the most important officially accepted views on the nature and methods of fulfilling defense tasks, the domestic military strategy occupied a subordinate position. At the same time, she worked out and studied quite specific questions concerning not only the nature of the war, the preparation of the country and the Armed Forces for it, but also the methods of waging it. At the same time, the conclusions and recommendations of the military strategy largely determined the content of the military doctrine, especially with regard to its military technical side.

But one cannot fail to note the certain discrepancy that developed at that time between certain provisions of military doctrine and military strategy. At its core, the military doctrine of the USSR was predominantly defensive in nature.

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It proceeded from the need to actively defend the Soviet state and allied countries from aggression. But at the same time, the main doctrinal requirement was the position that the Soviet Union under no circumstances

conditions should not be the most use nuclear weapons. In solving specific strategic tasks, military strategy, of course, could not ignore this. It is no coincidence that since the end of the 1960s, methods of inflicting preemptive strikes on the enemy have ceased to be considered in military-strategic developments and plans. Hence, the role of defensive actions increased more and more.

However, with all this, the Soviet military strategy always had an extremely decisive offensive character, since it proceeded from the need to completely defeat the enemy and achieve victory at any cost. The demand for uncompromising actions permeated all, without exception, the installations for the development and use of the Armed Forces, and the offensive was considered the main type of military action. It was not until the mid-1980s that the possibility of a deliberate limitation of offensive military operations began to be admitted. In accordance with this, the theory of strategic defense was developed. The growing role of strategic defense in the war was also recognized. Nevertheless, the focus on the decisive defeat of the enemy by deploying a strategic offensive invariably remained decisive.

Another important feature of the military strategy of the 1950s and 1980s was that it developed as a strategy of a socialist military coalition based on the coordinated use of the combined military power of all the Warsaw Pact states and other allied countries. It was during these years that the principles of the coordinated construction and training of allied armies, the conduct of operations by coalition groups of armed forces, their strategic interaction, comprehensive support and organization of command and control were developed.

The development of strategic aspects of the military cooperation of the USSR with developing countries, the provision of international assistance to them, including military means, belongs to the same period. Based on the experience of the participation of Soviet military specialists, as well as some combat units in local wars and military conflicts, primarily in Korea, the Middle East, Vietnam, but especially in Afghanistan, a new theory of waging local wars with the possible participation in them of limited contingents of the Soviet Armed Forces. However, in view of its ideological underpinnings and tendentious ideas about the causes and nature of such wars, many of its provisions did not justify themselves in practice.

3. Strategy for the construction of the Armed Forces

After the end of the Second World War, all official and unofficial documents emphasized that the Armed Forces were created solely for the purpose of protecting the USSR from an attack from outside, however, under certain conditions, they can also perform internal functions.

Throughout all the post-war years, the general direction of building the Armed Forces of the USSR was determined by pragmatic considerations that arose from the actual military-political situation: these are possible military threats to the Soviet state, the predictable nature of a future war, the specific purpose of the Armed Forces of the country, their military policy. - tic and strategic tasks.

The Soviet military strategy considered the construction of the Armed Forces as one of the main elements of nationwide construction. It was believed that it should be carried out taking into account the special nature of the Soviet social system,

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which was tendentiously defined as the most advanced and progressive social system on the globe, and stemmed from the policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Proceeding from these guidelines, it was declared that in the construction of the Armed Forces, the basis of the foundations is the all-round leadership of them by the CPSU. It was emphasized that the measures taken and implemented by the party are of decisive importance for strengthening the combat readiness and combat capability of the army and navy, the combat and morale of the troops, and reliable ensuring the security of the state.

Indeed, not a single decision in the field of defense and development of the Armed Forces was made without the approval of the central party bodies. However, the leading role of the party was overestimated. In addition, due to the insufficient competence of party leaders, gross miscalculations were often made that seriously damaged the country's defense capability, especially at the turn of the 50s-60s and 70s-80s.

After the end of the Second World War, the Armed Forces of the USSR moved around and developed taking into account the probable military clash with the United States, the most powerful state in the world militarily and economically, which also possessed colossal scientific, technical and military-economic potential. According to the views of the Soviet political leadership, they should have successfully resisted the combined armed forces of NATO, Japan, and after a disagreement with the leadership of China and with it. In practice, such an assessment required not only superiority in numbers over the armies of potential opponents, but also a high level of their technical equipment. Even a temporary lag in these matters from the armies of these states was considered unacceptable.

The decisive influence on the general direction of the strategy for the development of the Armed Forces was exerted by the nature of the military tasks facing the Soviet Union in the changed geopolitical situation, the expansion of the volume and the continuously increasing complexity of their solution. In addition to ensuring the security of one's own state, specific tasks arose to protect the entire socialist camp, to provide international military assistance to other countries of a socialist orientation, as well as to the national liberation movement.

Accordingly, the content of the strategic tasks of the Armed Forces has also changed. They were ordered to reflect

possible aggression with the use of nuclear missile weapons from any direction and ensure the survival of the country, gain dominance in space, air and sea, in the shortest possible time defeat the enemy's armed forces and disable its military and economic potential, be ready to intensified actions in local wars both near the borders of the USSR and in remote territories. To accomplish these tasks, it was necessary to solve at least two problems: to create and develop multifaceted, universal Armed Forces with a wide variety of means of strategic, operational and tactical warfare; prepare the army and navy both for a world war and for limited (local) wars and armed conflicts.

In order to build up the potential of the Armed Forces and maintain their combat effectiveness at a modern level, the latest achievements of science and technology were used in military organizational development. Most of the scientific research was subordinated to the interests of defense, which made it possible not only to accelerate the modernization of various types of military equipment that were equipped with the Armed Forces, but also to create new weapons in a short time. As the rearmament

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army and navy carried out a corresponding organizational and structural reorganization of the Armed Forces.

Undoubtedly, the strategy of building the Armed Forces took into account the real possibilities of the country's economy. Based on these considerations, plans for the development of weapons in many cases had to be limited. But taking into account the difficult international situation, an unshakable principle was always in effect: to spare no money, means and efforts for the defense. Often, in the name of fulfilling the most important defense programs and projects, the most urgent social plans were curtailed. Only this made it possible to successfully compete with the United States and other NATO countries, withstanding the powerful pressure of the arms race.

In the post-war construction of the army and navy, new trends in the development of the armed forces of a potential enemy were taken into account. The main requirement was to have a permanent advantage over him in the main means of struggle, especially in firepower, mobility and maneuverability of troops. It was believed that the Soviet Armed Forces should have everything that a potential enemy has or could have. It is no coincidence that many directions in the development of the armed forces in the USSR, the USA and other NATO countries coincided, and almost identical types of weapons and equipment were supplied to equip them with a short time interval. However, due to the special military-geographical position of the USSR and the USA, as well as their desire to find optimal ways and effective means in solving the most important strategic tasks, each of them went his own way on many issues of building up the armed forces.

The Soviet leadership solved most of the problems in the field of defense in a rather peculiar way, proceeding from its own idea of the nature and content of a possible war. This applied both to the general structure of the Armed Forces, and to the composition of strategic nuclear weapons, and to the directions of development of the Ground Forces, the Air Force, especially the Navy, the principles of recruitment and, of course, the direction of combat, morale, psychological and ideological training of personnel.

As already noted, in the first post-war years, the construction of the Armed Forces was carried out taking into account the lessons and experience of the Great Patriotic War. After the transfer of the army and navy from martial law to peace, the reduction of personnel to 2,874 thousand people, i.e. actually up to the level of 1939'6, their active technical modernization.

The ground forces were fully motorized. Mechanized armies and new mechanized divisions were created. The latter organically became part of the rifle corps. At the same time, the airborne troops were restored.

The Air Force developed rapidly. Almost all aviation was replaced by jets. For 8 years (from 1946 to 1953) the specific gravity of the Air Force more than tripled. Long-range and military transport aviation received organizational independence.

Since 1948, the Air Defense Forces have taken shape as an independent branch of the Armed Forces. The country's air defense system was completely reorganized. For this purpose, the entire territory of the USSR was divided into two parts: the border strip, the air defense of which was assigned to the military districts, and the inland territory, covered by air defense formations (regions) of the country's territory. Since 1950, jet fighters began to be supplied for air defense equipment, and then first-generation anti-aircraft missile systems.

Taking into account the confrontation between the United States and Great Britain in the maritime theaters of military operations, there has been a tendency towards an accelerated buildup of the combat power of the Military

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navy. The rate of commissioning of new ships has sharply increased. The share of submarines in the composition of the fleets was constantly increasing. The White Sea, Danube and Dnieper military flotillas were restored.

However, despite the intensive development of the Armed Forces, their structural organization generally remained the same as at the end of the Great Patriotic War.

The situation has changed dramatically since the beginning of the 1950s, when nuclear weapons began to be supplied to the Soviet Armed Forces, and then missiles as the main means of delivering nuclear weapons to targets. The revolution in military affairs caused by this innovation led to a radical revision of the concept of organizational development of the Armed Forces. All the main directions and

fundamental principles of their development. Practically all the traditional provisions of military construction that were still used were recognized as obsolete and not corresponding to the changed conditions. They were replaced not only by new, but often diametrically opposed judgments, and many of them received official recognition. Approaches to assessments of the necessary composition of the Armed Forces, their organization, technical equipment, recruitment, combat and mobilization readiness, training, deployment, and many other installations have undergone a radical break.

Of course, the process of re-equipping the army and navy with new means of combat was not a one-time act. It took at least a whole decade. Although the first atomic bomb was tested in the USSR as early as 1949, the mass equipping of troops with nuclear weapons began much later. They entered the Air Force in 1954, and the Ground Forces, the Navy - only from the beginning of the 60s. The air defense forces received these funds even later.

The first experimental missiles P-1 and R-2 were created on the basis of German technology in 1952-1954, and the medium-range ballistic missile R-5 - in 1955. The first launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile was carried out in August 1957. But only after two years, troops began to form for their use.

It is noteworthy that views on the development of the Armed Forces developed spasmodically. Moreover, the most serious and dynamic changes occur in 1954-1955. and 1959-1960. The new directions that were determined in these short periods of time were also repeatedly corrected and refined, but not as sharply as at the turning points. The struggle between the new and the old in the development of the Armed Forces took place in a fierce clash of different points of view, and mutually exclusive opinions were expressed on many problems.

Some of them had quite natural questions: are multi-million mass armed forces needed in the age of nuclear weapons; Perhaps, instead of them, a mobile army, limited in composition, but well equipped with the latest means of combat, should be created? Supporters of this point of view did not receive serious support, despite the fact that it was actively supported by the head of state N. S. Khrushchev.

Their opponents argued that new weapons and new equipment do not reduce, but, on the contrary, "increase the needs of the Armed Forces in personnel both directly for combat and support units." They insisted that the preservation of mass armies is conditioned by the likelihood of large simultaneous losses from nuclear strikes, the need to create large reserves to replenish troops and restore their combat capability. In their opinion, an increase in the spatial scope of the war, as well as the possibility of formation after

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A massive attack on vast zones of destruction and radioactive contamination of the terrain will also require a large number of troops to guard and defend vast territories, rear facilities and communications. In this regard, it was concluded that multimillion-strong Armed Forces must be available already at the very beginning of the war, since in the conditions of the use of nuclear weapons, military operations will immediately unfold in all theaters of military operations, which means that decisions will be made from the very first hours. - tely and fierce character.

As noted above, after some growth in numbers from 1950 to 1962, the Armed Forces of the USSR were reduced twice. It is noteworthy that the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Sokolovsky, who categorically objected to such actions, was removed from his post. However, subsequently, their composition increased from year to year.

By the end of the 1980s, 6,200,000 people were serving in the Armed Forces, including internal, border and railway troops. They were equipped with 63,900 tanks, 66,880 artillery pieces and mortars, 76,520 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 12,200 combat aircraft and helicopters, and 435 warships. At that time, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff proceeded from specific calculations of the necessary balance of forces to maintain the superior combat potential of the country in conditions where losses could significantly exceed the volume of possible production of weapons and military equipment.

Since 1989, due to the change in the military-political situation in the world and the adoption of a new military doctrine, the Armed Forces of the USSR began to decrease again. By 1990, their number had decreased by 260,000 people. By decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 173,000 students were dismissed from the army and navy. The elimination of medium-range missiles began. The number of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense and military districts was reduced by 20-40%. The Central Asian and Ural military districts, 3 combined arms armies and 6 tank divisions were disbanded. The withdrawal of Soviet formations and units from the territories of Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Mongolia began. Tactical nuclear munitions, air assault and air assault formations and units were withdrawn from all groups of troops.

By the end of 1989, more than 50 formations, units and divisions of the Strategic Missile Forces, Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces and Air Force were disbanded on the territory of the USSR. About 7 thousand tanks, a large number of guns and amphibious assault vehicles were excluded from the combat strength of the Ground Forces, about 600 combat aircraft from the Air Force, 12 submarines and 28 surface ships from the Navy.

The intensive process of reduction of the Armed Forces continued next year as well. The Strategic Missile Forces was disbanded | directorate of the missile army and 6 missile divisions. In the Ground Forces, the administration of the Trans-Baikal Military District was transferred to the staff of the internal district. The number of departments of other military districts, armies and army corps decreased by 5%, and the number of Western and Central groups of troops, Kyiv and Transcaucasian military districts — by 10%. The administration of the 39th

combined arms army (MVA) and 4 tank divisions. 10 motorized rifle divisions and 8 territorial training centers (TUC) were reorganized into bases for storing weapons and military equipment, and 8 divisions into bases for storing property.

In the post-war period, serious disagreements arose regarding the structural organization of the Armed Forces. None of the military leaders had any doubts that the division into types and types of troops was expedient, but the role of individual structural elements was assessed differently. Already at the end of the 1950s, the question arose of the need to withdraw missile formations from the Military

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air forces and formation of a new type — the Strategic Missile Forces. Such a decision was extremely important, as it made it possible to concentrate efforts on the rapid development of strategic missiles and the creation of an effective system for their centralized control. In turn, this predetermined a fundamental difference in the further development of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR and the USA, since the Americans retained intercontinental ballistic formations in the Air Force. missiles.

With the formation of the Strategic Missile Forces, heated discussions unfolded about the priority of various branches of the Armed Forces and their role in a future war. Many military leaders and theoreticians continued to believe that even in the conditions of the use of nuclear weapons, the Ground Forces should be regarded as the main branch of the Armed Forces. They justified their idea by the fact that the Soviet Union is a continental power, and under any circumstances, the ultimate goal of a war in Europe can be achieved only by capturing the territory of enemy states.

It was precisely this point of view that the majority of commanders of military districts adhered to, while Khrushchev and the leadership of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, including Malinovsky, Voronov, and others, believed that in the event of a nuclear war, the main role in solving strategic tasks will be transferred to the Strategic Rocket Forces, while the Ground Forces will only have to use the results of the Strategic Missile Forces strikes to complete the defeat of the enemy. Naturally, this point of view, having received official recognition, became dominant for all subsequent years, up to the 1980s.

Many attempts were made to reconsider also the role of tank troops, artillery, air force and navy. And here the last word was left to Khrushchev, who believed that "missiles, having radically changed the balance of forces, dramatically shifted all concepts."

Since it was urgently necessary to find personnel for the deployment of newly created missile formations and units, two-thirds of the artillery corps and divisions were disbanded, many research institutions involved in artillery topics were reoriented, and the Academy of Artillery Sciences was abolished. As it turned out later, such measures led to the loss of a leading position in the artillery business, and Russia, and then the USSR, occupied it for many years. Subsequently, to restore the lost, it took not only time, but also great efforts.

The need for further development of tanks and aviation was called into question. The opinion has arisen that in the nuclear age these means of armed struggle are increasingly becoming mere anachronisms. Khrushchev took a particularly sharp position on this score. In 1963, at one of the meetings of the Defense Council, he stated: "Modern warfare is in no way like what we see, it is becoming more terrible, more sophisticated, turning from a war of motors into a war of minds."

Developing the same thought, he, according to the memoirs of his son, continued: "Let's take, for example, tanks. During the last war, they served as the core of the offensive and the backbone of the defense. They were invulnerable to small arms and succumbed only to cannon... The fight was on an equal footing... Today, an anti-tank missile destroys armored vehicles at the limit of the range of their own fire... Tanks, self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers become mere traps for crews . And we thoughtlessly give more and more new orders... Aircraft have also practically lost their former importance. Anti-aircraft missiles drastically reduce their combat capabilities. If earlier shooting from the ground into the air did not bring results, now

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one, well, two missiles is enough. And here it is necessary to revise the established views.

In conclusion, the head of state demanded "to review the entire structure of the Armed Forces — to leave a very small but very qualified army"! The core of this army, in his opinion, was to be the Strategic Rocket Forces. In addition, he demanded the creation of a small but very mobile group to protect missiles, the rest of the army should be built on a regional militia basis.

In military circles, these demands were met with very wary and great anxiety. Undoubtedly, to one degree or another, they would have been put into practice if Khrushchev had not been removed from office the following year.

authorities.

With the advent of Brezhnev to the leadership, the Ministry of Defense, represented by Malinovsky and Grechko, relatively easily convinced the new Soviet leader of the inadmissibility of implementing such a reckless strategy in the development of the Armed Forces. From that time on, the course was again taken for the proportional development of all branches of the Armed Forces. The tactical nuclear missile potential, clearly underestimated by Khrushchev, began to be intensively built up, and attention to the improvement of conventional means of combat increased.

Nevertheless, the search for optimal structures of the services of the Armed Forces continued in the future. For a long time there was a heated discussion around the problems related to the role and ways of development of the Military

navy. Until 1986, the main command of the Navy, headed by Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov, defended the concept of building a powerful artillery surface fleet capable of operating anywhere in the world's oceans. The ten-year program he proposed to create such a fleet was resolutely rejected. The fate of the battleships and cruisers under construction was unenviable: they were scrapped, the design of aircraft carriers was stopped. Instead, a course was taken to create an ocean-going submarine nuclear missile fleet, naval missile-carrying aviation, missile, rocket-artillery and anti-submarine ships. The nuclear forces of the fleet began to be regarded as one of the most important constituent elements of the nuclear triad. A new turn in this regard took place at the end of the 1970s, when, in connection with the expansion of local military conflicts that arose in various regions of the world, the role of the combat service of the fleet rose sharply. Since that time, the construction of aircraft carriers began.

In other words, after entering the era of nuclear missile weapons, the Soviet strategy for building up the Armed Forces went through at least three leaps, or rather, through three critical stages.

The first of these dates back to the 1950s and 1960s, when, as a result of the accelerated build-up of the country's nuclear potential, the Armed Forces were equipped with various types of nuclear weapons: small-caliber - from a few units to 20 kilotons, medium - 20-100 kilotons and large - over 100 kilotons. At that time, thermonuclear munitions with a capacity of several tons of TNT up to 50 million tons were created and tested.

All branches of the Armed Forces were intensively re-equipped with missile technology. However, the US continued to maintain its nuclear advantage. By 1962, the ratio of stockpiles of nuclear weapons was 17:1 (5000 - USA, 300-odd - USSR). Only by 1968 did the nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union exceed 1,800 warheads. On this basis, but under the conditions of the continued nuclear advantage of the United States, new methods of waging a nuclear missile war were being formed.

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The second stage covers the 70s. At that time, the principles of achieving military balance and strategic nuclear parity with the United States of America dominated the development of the Armed Forces. The first of these was understood as an approximate balance of the combat power of states and coalitions, expressed in a relatively equal quantitative and qualitative ratio of forces and means of the parties. The essence of the second principle is the equality of capabilities of the USSR and the USA, the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in carrying out a nuclear missile attack, inflicting irreparable damage on the enemy, as well as in repelling a nuclear attack, limiting their own damage and in ensuring the survival of the Soviet Union and - southern states.

It was believed that this would require an approximately equal (but not "mirror") composition of strategic nuclear forces, primarily for land- and sea-based strategic missiles and nuclear warheads. In addition, it was supposed to equalize their qualitative characteristics, to establish interdependent levels of construction of anti-missile and anti-space defense systems (ABM and anti-space defense). During these years, a triad of strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union was created. The total stocks of nuclear weapons in the USSR reached 40-50 thousand units, of which 10-12 thousand are strategic nuclear charges.

The means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target were further developed. The creation of warheads with separable homing warheads made it possible to destroy a huge number of targets and objects in all territories without exception; but this meant that the danger of complete mutual annihilation loomed not only of the warring states, but of all life on the planet. It is good that the politicians of the leading nuclear powers realized this in time.

Finally, the third, perhaps the turning point in the development of the Armed Forces dates back to the 1980s. It is connected both with the further qualitative development of nuclear forces, and with the rapid progress of general-purpose weapons, the accelerated improvement of conventional weapons, the emergence of homing, guided and so-called precision weapons.

At the same time, a new serious organizational restructuring of the Armed Forces was carried out, this time based on the principles of defense sufficiency and the priority of qualitative parameters. Large-scale research was launched in the field of weapons based on new physical principles. As a result, doctrinal guidelines began to be revised, and a new strategy for waging war was born.

Of course, the changes outlined here do not exhaust all the extremely complex processes that were taking place at that time in the Armed Forces. The 50s-80s are associated with the adoption of an exceptionally wide range of various decisions in all areas of military development, with the restructuring of the entire system of training the Armed Forces, training of military personnel, organizing the leadership of the country's defense, with the development of fundamentally new approaches to equipping theaters of military operations, the organization of the rear, etc. Yes, and in technical policy, along with the main directions, there were quite a few zigzags of their own.

However, the most significant thing was that the USSR was included in more and more new rounds of armaments. This was true for the United States as well. In the beginning, military construction was based on one principle: "not to lag behind", to achieve and continue to maintain "military superiority over the enemy". Only from the mid-1980s, when the senselessness and even mutual danger of this approach became obvious, other principles gradually began to come into force: reasonable sufficiency, defense sufficiency, limitation of armaments and armed forces, and finally their adequate reduction.

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The essence of these principles was as follows. Reasonable sufficiency was understood as the correspondence of the military potential of the state to the level of military threats. Defense sufficiency assumed the preservation

armed forces and armaments at a level not exceeding the requirements for guaranteed repulse of aggression. At the same time, the criterion of sufficiency of nuclear forces meant the presence of such a minimum number of nuclear weapons that would ensure reliable deterrence of an aggressor from unleashing a nuclear war, and sufficiency of conventional forces and means meant such a level of combat potential of the general-purpose armed forces that would allow not only to reliably repel an enemy attack by conventional means, but also to exclude the possibility of deploying large-scale offensive operations by groupings of peacetime troops.

The principle of limiting armaments and armed forces was practically embodied in the adoption of mutual contractual obligations to limit strategic offensive weapons (SALT-I and SALT-2 treaties), to reduce and limit strategic offensive arms (START Treaty), and to reduce NATO conventional armed forces and the Warsaw Pact in Europe to certain and jointly established levels.

In accordance with the SALT-2 Treaty, concluded in 1979, strategic offensive weapons were limited to a total number of carriers equal to 2,400 units. Within this framework, no more than 320 launchers on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarines equipped with multiple reentry vehicles, as well as on heavy bombers with cruise missiles with a range of more than 800 km, of which 820 launchers (PU) of ICBMs.

At the same time, the construction of additional hospitals for launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles and their redeployment were prohibited. Qualitative restrictions were introduced on strategic weapons. However, even by the autumn of 1999, this treaty had not been ratified in Russia, although both sides basically complied with its provisions for a year and a half.

In accordance with the START Treaty, concluded on July 31, 1991, i.e., literally on the eve of the collapse of the USSR, a new dynamic for the reduction of strategic offensive arms was provided, as shown in Table 10.

Table 10 Dynamics of reduction of strategic offensive arms of the USA and the USSR

Quantity of manpower and means by stages	USA	USSR	USA	USSR	USA	USSR	USA	USSR	1. Warheads: a) total	10563	10271	6) Tue. h.
ICBM SLBM	8280	9416	8050	9150	6750	7950	14900	6000				
2. Carriers (PU ICBMs, SLBMs, HBs)	2246	2500	2	100	2200	1900	1900	1	600	1	600	

This treaty prohibited the creation of new types of heavy ICBMs, any other types of ICBM launchers, with the exception of infantry and mobile ones, high-speed reloading systems for ICBM launchers, and air-launched cruise missiles.

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multiple reentry vehicles (MIRVs), installation of ballistic missiles on floating craft other than submarines, conversion of heavy bombers for nuclear weapons that are not carriers of nuclear cruise missiles, conversion of heavy bombers intended for non-nuclear weapons into carriers for nuclear weapons, including medium-range cruise missiles, and the production, testing and deployment of means (including missiles) for launching nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit or partial Earth orbit.

When implementing the provisions of the START Treaty, it was supposed to destroy 42% of the nuclear warheads of the parties, to eliminate 36% of the USSR's strategic launchers and 20% of the US strategic launchers.

However, the collapse of the USSR did not allow the practical implementation of the treaty to begin. In this regard, in December 1991 an agreement between the CIS states was concluded in Minsk, and the following year a so-called "market agreement" was reached between the presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States. In accordance with the latter, the parties agreed, after the entry into force of the START Treaty, to reduce their strategic nuclear forces within seven years: in terms of the number of warheads alone, to the level of 3,800-4,250 units, and in 2000-2003. - up to 3,000-3,500 units. This agreement was then the basis of the START-2 Treaty, signed in January 1993.

In accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Arms and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which was concluded in December 1990 in Paris between 16 NATO member states and 6 (after the reunification of Germany) member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, it was envisaged for 40 months from the date of its entry into force, bring their composition to the levels indicated in table 11.

Table [1 Proposed levels of arms limitation

Armament For NATO and ATS states For one state

the entire area Ext. Center. Flanking | governments (regular Central Europe regions | regular parts and Europe warehouses)

total in reg. parts

in regular units

Tanks 7,500 4,700 [3,300] IFVs and APCs 11250 5,900 20,000 | Artillery 5,000 6,000 [3,700] Combat

aircraft — — 5 150 | Drums

helicopters — — 1,500

For the USSR, armament levels were determined mainly on the basis of the last column, namely: 13,300 tanks, 20,000 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 13,700 guns and mortars, 5,150 combat aircraft and | 1,500 combat helicopters. But just as in the case of strategic nuclear forces, this level of armaments had to be changed in connection with the collapse of the USSR.

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review, i.e., determine specific sub-levels for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic countries.

Concrete directions of military development in the postwar years were most clearly manifested in the development of various branches of the Armed Forces.

Strategic Rocket Forces, as already noted, were created in 1960 on the basis of a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of December 17, 1959. By June 1960, a central apparatus had been formed, the first formations and units of the Strategic Missile Forces armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles (R-7), short and medium-range missiles (R-1, R-2 and R-5), and then with ground group launches (R-12 and R-14). The troops included research organizations, training grounds, military educational institutions, support and maintenance units. The first Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces was Chief Marshal of Artillery M. I. Nedelin.

Literally from the first days of its existence, the Strategic Missile Forces turned into troops of constant readiness. Their continuous combat duty was organized. However, at first, due to the design imperfection of the combat systems of the first generation, the time for bringing troops to combat readiness was calculated in many hours, and sometimes even days. For the purpose of combat use, the missiles had to be taken out of the hangars, installed on the launch pads, refueled with fuel components, and the warheads were docked. Yes, and in a filled state, they could only be 10-12 days, after which they needed to be changed. It is clear that in this situation, the Strategic Missile Forces were, in essence, only a means of the first and preemptive, but not a retaliatory strike.

The group of medium-range liquid-propellant missiles, designed to hit targets in Europe, was considered the most powerful. The grouping of ICBMs was initially limited to three combat launches and the R-7 combat training complex powered by liquid oxygen and kerosene (designed by S.P. Korolev). It was only in 1961 that the R-16 ICBMs powered by nitric acid began to enter service (designer M.K. Yangel). By the end of 1962, the Soviet Union had 10-12 twin launches of such missiles.

In 1963, the first silos for R-16 ICBMs were built. From 1964-1965 All ICBMs, as well as the RSD R-14, were built only in the mine version, which made it possible to sharply increase their survivability. The power of nuclear warheads on ICBMs and medium-range missiles (RSMs) already in 1961 reached | megatons, ak 1963 - 2.4 megatons and more. Improved indicators of missile hit accuracy (up to | - 2km). This made it possible to hit large targets with high reliability.

Since 1967, the Strategic Missile Forces began to receive large quantities of second-generation intercontinental strategic missiles: the universal guided ampoule missile UR-100 (designed by V.N. Chelomei) and the powerful global ICBM R-36 with combat power up to 18 megatons (designer M.K. Yangel). Tests of the R-9A ICBM (designer S.P. Korolev) were completed, but it remained in prototypes.

The time of combat readiness of missiles was reduced to several minutes, and then to tens of seconds. The probable deviation did not exceed hundreds of meters. The adoption of these systems meant that a "nuclear shield of the USSR" was being created, based on the construction of single unmanned launches. The composition of the grouping of IRMs and ICBMs already numbered hundreds of launchers, and every year it increased: first by 50-60, and then by 100-150 launches.

From 1970 to 1980 the number of launches is continuously increasing while improving the quality characteristics of combat missile systems. Their accuracy and security are improved. Instead of mine installations with a protection of 2 kg / sq. cm, launches with a protection of up to 20 kg / sq. cm and more are built. For service

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improved missiles UR-100n and UR-100k, R-36m were adopted. A powerful group of R-10 (Pioneer) mobile solid-propellant rockets was created. Solid-propellant missiles of intermediate range (Temp-S) and intercontinental range (TR-1) appeared in mobile and stationary versions. Missile control systems were improved. The development of warheads with multiple individual targeting units began.

In a word, a rather harmonious organizational structure of the Strategic Missile Forces has developed. By that time, the Armed Forces included 6 missile armies, each consisting of 6-10 missile divisions. A unified automated control system for strategic forces of the "Signal" type was created.

The 1980s were marked by a new qualitative leap in the development of the Strategic Missile Forces. Their equipment began to receive missiles of the third and fourth generations - UR-100MR, R-36MR, which in terms of combat capabilities were not inferior to the American Minuteman-3 and MX missiles. Solid-propellant mobile ground- and rail-based missiles of the Topol type were created.

In the process of improving the Strategic Missile Forces, the main directions were: accelerated equipping of combat missile systems with multiple warheads (MIRVs) with 3-4-6-8 and 10 individual guidance units; increasing the accuracy of missile hits (up to several tens of meters); increasing their operational reliability, combat readiness, and survivability; further reduction of launch preparation times, as well as an increase in the ability to overcome the enemy's anti-missile defense.

Equipping missiles with MIRVs made it possible to increase the number of targets by a factor of 6-8. It became possible to ensure the destruction of numerous pinpoint highly protected targets, including missile launches, airfields, naval bases, command and control centers, communications centers, warehouses, etc. Conditions were created for flexible maneuver of nuclear missile strikes, rapid launcher, transition from one program to another and from one plan for the use of the Strategic Missile Forces to another. With the creation of highly protected stationary launches (with protection up to 220 and even up to 300 kg/cm²), as well as mobile launchers in the Strategic Missile Forces, forces of a guaranteed retaliatory strike (nuclear reserve) appeared, capable of carrying out launches at any scale of nuclear enemy attacks.

The throw weights of missiles were increased, their ballistic characteristics were improved, astronomical-geodesic, gravimetric and ballistic support was improved. The widespread use of reconnaissance and navigation satellite systems made it possible to connect the continents topographically, clarify the true geographic coordinates of targets, and thereby ensure their reliable defeat.

The management of the Strategic Missile Forces has risen to a new level. An improved command and control system was put into of the Rocket Forces - "Signal-A" of the operation, combined with the centralized combat command and control system Armed Forces (CBU "Center"). Means were put into service that made it possible to launch missiles when ground control posts were hit (from air control posts and with the help of automatically launched missiles controlled by the Perimeter system). Finally, portable systems for the control and commissioning of strategic nuclear forces were created for the top military and political leadership of the country (the Kazbek system).

Since the beginning of the 1980s, in connection with the developments that began in the United States to create a territorial missile defense system (the SDI program), special attention in the USSR began to be paid to ensuring its breakthrough. For this purpose, maneuvering

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warheads, and the missiles were equipped with warheads with full warheads, traps, their anti-radiation and thermal resistance was enhanced. In addition, various options for launching missiles along direct and reverse trajectories were developed, and MIRVs began to be created using low visibility technology (of the Stealth type).

All this, of course, gave the Strategic Missile Forces completely new qualities. But just then there was a gradual reduction in their quantitative composition. | On July 1988, an agreement between the USA and the USSR on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles (INF) came into force. In accordance with it, all ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5500 km with nuclear and non-nuclear equipment were destroyed. The Soviet Union removed from combat duty and destroyed mobile missiles - R-10 (the Americans call them SS-20), R-12 (SS-4), R-14 (SS-5), cruise missiles RK-55 (STS-X-4), short-range missiles (RMD) - OTR-22 (SS-12), OTR-23 (SS-23).

For its part, the United States destroyed the new Pershing-2 IRMs deployed in Europe, ground-based VGM-109 (Tomahawk) cruise missiles, Pershing-1A and Pershing-1V RMDs. In total, over 36 months, both sides eliminated 898 deployed, 700 non-deployed IRMs and 1,096 IRMs (of which 387 were deployed), 56% of which were missiles of the Soviet Union.

Thus, at the end of the 1980s, for the first time, an entire complex of nuclear missile weapons was destroyed. In this regard, the composition of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces was significantly reduced, and their structure also changed. Instead of the previous two types of troops (medium-range and intercontinental range), only intercontinental-range troops remained, which were divided into stationary and mobile ones. Accordingly, the objects of destruction were redistributed. ICBMs were now aimed at the most important targets in Europe and Asia, and strikes were removed from less significant targets. One way or another, the combat power of the Strategic Missile Forces still exceeded the real needs of nuclear destruction. Until the collapse of the USSR, they continued to be considered the main branch of the Armed Forces, forming the basis of the deterrence forces.

In the 1950s-1980s, the ground forces continued to develop as the second most important and most massive branch of the Armed Forces. It was believed that in the conduct of hostilities, both with and without the use of nuclear weapons, they would play an important role. The main direction of their development was the further increase in firepower, strike force, mobility and survivability of formations, formations and units. For this purpose, they were massively re-equipped with new equipment.

In the first post-war years, motorized rifle and tank troops developed most rapidly. Tank units and subunits were introduced into the composition of motorized rifle divisions and regiments. By the beginning of the 1950s, the total number of tanks in a motorized rifle division exceeded their number in a mechanized corps, and in a tank division it exceeded that of a tank corps during the Great Patriotic War. The main part of the tank fleet in the 60s was made up of modernized tanks of the first post-war generation - T-54 and T-55. Subsequently, the second generation tanks - T-62, T-64, T-64-A and T-64-B with reinforced armor and weapon stabilizers - were supplied to the Ground Forces. All tanks began to be equipped not only with guns, but also with anti-tank missiles, radiation protection equipment, multilayer armor, automatic loading systems, and laser sights.

A particularly sharp jump in the quantitative and qualitative state of the tank fleet occurred in the 70s - 80s, when the rearmament of troops began on third-generation tanks - T-72, T-80 and T-80 UD, equipped with gas turbine

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power plants. The number of tanks in the main groupings of troops increased by 4-5 times. Thanks to this, in the European theaters of operations, the ratio of forces in tanks was 6:1 in favor of the Soviet troops. For the successful conduct of strategic offensive operations in Europe in a nuclear war, such an advantage was considered not only expedient, but also absolutely necessary.

Improved and the quality characteristics of armored vehicles. In the 1970s and 1980s, particular importance was attached to improving the protection of tanks against anti-tank weapons and weapons of mass destruction through the use of combined armor, new alloys, polymers and more advanced technology, the use of dynamic protection systems, and increasing the capabilities of tank armament. - training to defeat armored and other targets at long distances, increase the cruising range and maneuverability of tanks on the battlefield. A new class of armored vehicles was created based on infantry fighting vehicles. The protection was strengthened, the fire and maneuvering capabilities of weapons were increased.

Airborne combat vehicles BMP-D were supplied to equip the airborne troops. The idea of creating a flying infantry fighting vehicle arose, but it was not implemented.

With the transfer of the Ground Forces to a tank basis, not only was the general direction of their construction established, but the tactics and strategy of their use in war were decisively determined.

In the second half of the 1960s, the accelerated development of artillery resumed. At the same time, special emphasis was placed on increasing the range and accuracy of firing, the power and efficiency of artillery ammunition, improving the means of protecting crews and materiel, and increasing mobility. The troops received new artillery systems: first, the 130-mm M-46 cannon, the 152-mm M-47 cannon, the 240-mm mortar, then the Grad, Grom, Uragan rocket systems, and finally the self-propelled artillery installations "Hyacinth", "Carnation", "Acacia".

New artillery ammunition of increased power and volumetric explosion, guided and homing projectiles and mines ("Smelchak" and "Krasnopol"), active-rocket projectiles were created. And the advent of automated artillery fire control systems made it possible to shorten the preparation time by several times and at the same time sharply increase the effectiveness of enemy fire engagement.

But, of course, the most important turning point in the development of artillery and the Ground Forces as a whole was their equipping with cruise missiles, and then with ballistic missiles for tactical and operational-tactical purposes. On this basis, at the beginning of the 1960s, a new branch of the armed forces was created - missile troops and artillery, designed for nuclear and fire destruction of the enemy in battle, army and front-line operations. First, they were equipped with cruise missiles [] 1-5, then first-generation ballistic OTPs on liquid fuel - R-11. and R-17. In subsequent years, missile forces and artillery began to be equipped with TR-1, Luna, Luna-M and Luna-U solid-propellant ballistic missiles and, finally, Tochka, 8-K-14 operational-tactical ballistic missiles (R-300), "Oka". In the 80s, all artillery systems were adapted to fire nuclear projectiles. Thanks to this, it became possible to reliably destroy a wide variety of targets, both with and without the use of nuclear weapons, in a zone up to 300 km or more, that is, throughout the entire depth of army operations.

The anti-tank stability of the Ground Forces increased rapidly. The decisive role in this was played by their equipping with new anti-tank weapons. Starting from the second half of the 60s, anti-tank weapons began to enter the troops

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first-generation guided missiles (ATGM). They were replaced by anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) of the second, third and fourth generations with semi-automatic and automatic guidance systems that ensured the destruction of targets with armor from 750 to 900 mm at ranges from 50 to 5 thousand meters. Since the 80s, systems controlled by a laser beam have become the most common, including anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) Shturm, Konkurs M and Metis-M, etc.

A very important direction in the development of the Ground Forces in the 1970s was the creation of a new type of troops - air assault troops, intended for landing tactical and operational-tactical assault forces, as well as for operations in the nearest tactical and operational depth of the enemy. In a short time, air assault battalions were formed in army formations, and air assault regiments and brigades were formed in military districts. Together with the further development of the airborne troops, their use made it possible to give the operations of the Ground Forces a deeper ground-air character, increase the pace of offensives, and significantly expand the range of operational and operational-strategic tasks they solve.

At the beginning of the 1980s, another new branch of service, army aviation, received organizational formalization in the Ground Forces. Its core was the army front-line units of transport-combat and combat helicopters, mainly Mi-8, Mi-24 "Shark", etc. Their development was carried out along the path of improving the flight performance of aircraft, their payload, speed and flight range, reinforcement of weapons and onboard equipment, modernization of controls. From year to year, especially over the past decade, combat helicopters and attack aircraft have been equipped with anti-tank and other guided weapons to destroy the entire complex of stationary and mobile targets on the battlefield. This allowed them to perform a wider range of tasks in operations and at the same time changed the combat properties

formations of the Ground Forces, in the sense that it helped to increase their combat independence.

From the very end of the last war, air defense troops acquired decisive importance in increasing the combat potential, especially the survivability of the Ground Forces. They were assigned the main role in covering their groupings of troops on the battlefield and rear facilities in the front line from enemy air strikes, in combating enemy airborne assaults and neutralizing his air reconnaissance, as well as in solving a number of other tasks.

The turning point in their development was the 1960s, when the first S-75 anti-aircraft missile systems, low-altitude and medium-altitude radar stations, Shilka anti-aircraft systems and other means entered service with the Ground Forces in significant quantities. But the radical restructuring of the air defense forces began only in the 70s in connection with equipping them with anti-aircraft missile systems of the second and third generations ("Circle", "Cube", "Tor"), missile and gun systems "Tunguska", new a fleet of radar stations, as well as automated fire control systems of anti-aircraft missile forces (ZRV) of the tactical and operational level.

These assets organically became part of motorized rifle and tank divisions. Army and front-line anti-aircraft missile brigades were formed. On this basis, it was possible to move from the object to the zonal-objective, and then the zonal air defense system, to create a continuous radar field in the front lines, which made it possible to significantly increase the effectiveness of the fight against an air enemy in a wide range of speeds and altitudes. And since the capabilities of air attack weapons grew faster, the necessary reliability of counter-aircraft

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stuff cover was not provided. It was possible to significantly raise it with the entry into service with the Ground Forces of new S-300 V anti-aircraft missile systems. However, many air defense problems still remain unresolved.

Along with the branches of the military, special troops, especially reconnaissance, electronic warfare, engineering, chemical, and communications troops, were rapidly developing in the Ground Forces. A complex of new means of radio engineering and radio reconnaissance, signal and reconnaissance means for various purposes was created, front-line brigades "Spetsnaz" were formed, intended for reconnaissance and sabotage activities.

Engineer-sapper and engineering-technical brigades of the reserve of the Supreme High Command, pontoon-bridge and landing-pontoon units equipped with new parks were formed, which made it possible to force any water obstacles on all theaters on the move and at high rates. Formations and units of chemical defense were deployed to eliminate the consequences of the use of all types of weapons of mass destruction, etc. However, it should be emphasized that a significant gap has formed between the level of development of special forces and the capabilities of combat weapons.

In general, the construction of the Ground Forces in the post-war years was carried out taking into account their use both in offensive and defensive operations in continental theaters, in solving problems of repelling surprise attacks by the enemy, defeating opposing groupings, mastering the main industrial regions. and strategically important centers, the capture of strait zones, etc. At the same time, the main attention was paid to building up the offensive capabilities of the troops, their ability to conduct a non-stop strategic offensive at high rates, using the results of nuclear strikes, aviation and missile forces.

Since the mid-1980s, when a new military doctrine was adopted, this strategic course has been refined. Gradually, priority was given to the priority development of defensive systems of weapons and equipment. The number of tanks in the composition of motorized rifle and tank formations has sharply decreased. Many air assault and pontoon landing units were disbanded. At the same time, the share of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons increased. Nevertheless, right up to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Ground Forces, embodying enormous combat power, played an exceptionally important role in all the strategic plans of the state.

The air defense troops in the first post-war years developed as anti-aircraft. Since 1947, they began to receive jet fighters MiG-15, MiG-17, and from the mid-1950s, the first anti-aircraft missile systems. On the basis of the stationary S-25 anti-aircraft missile systems, the Moskva all-round anti-aircraft missile defense system was deployed. Then the accelerated re-equipment of the troops with mobile S-75 anti-aircraft missile divisions began.

To cover the most important administrative, political and industrial centers, low-altitude anti-aircraft systems S-125 were deployed. Fighter aviation was gradually re-equipped with MiG-19 and MiG-21 fighter-interceptors. At the same time, anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft searchlight and other technically obsolete formations and units were disbanded.

At the end of the 1950s, along with the anti-aircraft object air defense system in the main air operational areas, primarily in the west and south of the country, a frontier air defense system began to be created. Air defense areas were transformed into air defense armies. In addition to them, powerful associations were created - districts

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Air defense to cover the Moscow and Baku industrial regions. They deployed divisions and

Since the mid-1960s, new fighters - SU-7, SU-9, etc. - have been supplied to the troops. Soon, long-range anti-aircraft missile systems - S-200 - were adopted. A completely re-equipped radar fleet made it possible to switch from an anti-aircraft object to a zonal-territorial air defense system.

The subsequent development of the anti-aircraft defense of the Air Defense Forces went in the direction of expanding their capabilities to combat low-altitude and stratospheric high-speed small-sized targets in the conditions of the enemy's widespread use of various electronic interference, with cruise missiles of all types, including American Tomahawk, carrier aircraft of the enemy even before they reach the missile launch line, as well as to destroy stealth aircraft created on the basis of the Stealth technology.

The anti-aircraft missile forces now have a new all-altitude and multi-channel medium-range anti-aircraft missile system — S-300-PM, designed to combat all modern means of air attack and operational-tactical missiles (OTR) of the enemy, which has a high fire performance and high noise immunity. And for the destruction of high-altitude high-speed targets on the distant approaches to defended objects, long-range air defense systems - S-400 - began to be created.

As the main type of interceptor aircraft, air defense aviation received all-altitude aviation systems with missile and cannon armament - MiGG-23, Su-27, capable of combating the main means of air attack within a radius of 600-800 km or more. To create barriers for long-range interception "Barrier", long-range radar patrol aircraft "Shmel", all-altitude aviation systems MiG-31, designed both to intercept high-altitude high-speed targets and to destroy small targets and air-to-ground missiles, were put into service. ". Development began on an all-altitude long-range interception aircraft system with a range of 2,500-3,000 km, capable of destroying cruise missile carriers at long range.

The radio engineering troops have also undergone a major transformation. They were now based on automated radar complexes for various purposes, high-potential radar stations of program review, automated low-altitude radar stations (RLS), passive location systems and other means. To cover the most important objects, electronic warfare units of type "C" were deployed. Various kinds of camouflage parts have been widely used.

But of particular importance for increasing the effectiveness of anti-aircraft warfare was the creation and widespread introduction of automated command and control systems (ACS) for troops and weapons. The air defense formations were armed with ACS of the Almaz type, automated control systems for anti-aircraft missiles and fighter aircraft of the operational-tactical and tactical level. The ACS of the air defense of the European part of the Soviet Union became part of the unified air defense system of the Warsaw Pact member states.

The appearance of strategic missile weapons as the main means of armed struggle made it necessary already in the 60s to reconsider the entire concept of the USSR air defense. Along with anti-aircraft defense, the need arose to create anti-missile and anti-space defense. First of all, a reliable missile attack warning system (SPRN) was needed.

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In solving this problem, the Soviet Union and the United States of America followed approximately the same path. Initially, on the main North-Western nuclear missile axis, two nodes of over-the-horizon location were built, similar to the American "Bimoroz" system, which ensured the detection of warheads at ranges up to 5,000 km. Then similar nodes were deployed in other directions (southwest, south and east). At the same time, the construction of stations for over-the-horizon location with a detection range of up to 10,000 km began. Finally, the space system for detecting rocket launches came into operation. As a result of the efforts made, early warning echelons (one space and two ground) were equipped, which ensured the detection of the beginning, scale and objects of a nuclear missile attack with informed output of information to the central command posts of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces and the Air Defense Forces.

The warning time for launches of small-sized missiles was increased to 30-35 minutes, and for launches of IRMs and SLBMs - up to 5-8 minutes, which made it possible to assess the situation and make a timely decision to put our own strategic nuclear forces.

For the purpose of anti-missile defense, like the American Safeguard system, at the end of the 60s, the Moscow missile defense system began to be created, based on the use of short-range and long-range anti-missiles (A-35 system, then A-135). But it ensured the interception of only single and simple space targets. Therefore, we started designing the A-235 missile defense system, designed to intercept complex group ballistic targets. However, its deployment was not carried out.

In May 1971, the USA and the USSR signed an anti-missile defense treaty (ABM treaty). Both powers pledged to limit their missile defense systems to two areas: one to cover the capital of the state, and the second to cover one of the ICBM position areas. The parties agreed not to create a territorial air defense system, not to test and deploy sea, air and space-based missile defense components, not to place anti-missile weapons outside the national territory.

Three years later, according to the protocol and the ABM treaty, an agreement was reached between the USA and the USSR on limiting missile defense systems to one area: for the USSR - around Moscow, and for the USA - the area where silo launchers of ICBMs are located, having no more than 100 antimissiles at launch positions. .

In the 1980s, the United States of America launched research on the creation of a large-scale territorial missile defense system with space-based elements - SDI. This forced the Soviet Union to engage in similar developments, which, however, were discontinued with the collapse of the USSR.

In the late 1970s, both powers, along with missile defense, paid special attention to the creation of an anti-space defense system designed to gain dominance in space, intercept and destroy enemy military space objects and protect their orbital systems. For this purpose, the first ground-based anti-satellite strike systems "IS" and then "IS-M" were created in the USSR, and the development of the missile anti-space complex "Naryad" began.

In contrast, in the United States, the main focus has been on the deployment of air-launched anti-satellite assets. The Americans created and tested the Asat anti-satellite system. Placed on F-15 aircraft with anti-space missiles, it ensured the defeat of artificial Earth satellites (AES) at altitudes up to | thousand km. At the same time, work began on the creation of orbital anti-satellite interception systems.

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Since the mid-1980s, the development of strike anti-space weapons in both the USSR and the USA has been frozen. Only the information and computing network functioned, although research work in this direction did not stop.

At the same time, in the Soviet Union, the troops of the early warning missile system, missile defense and anti-aircraft missile defense, as well as the means of controlling outer space (SKKP) were united into the rocket and space defense troops. It was they who formed the basis of the strategic defensive deterrence forces. And the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, put forward the idea of creating a unified Air Defense Force on the territories of the corresponding military districts. He justified his idea by the fact that only united military and territorial air defense systems can ensure their more efficient and coordinated use both in peacetime and in wartime. The exercises conducted for this purpose showed that with the organization of a unified Air Defense Force, the centralization of control over all forces and means of air defense will increase, there will be no need to develop two air defense plans, conditions will arise for the rational organization of combat duty, and it will be possible to create a single radar field.

It was assumed that the deployment of air defense forces and means of the district (front) under the new system would take place in a more organized manner, according to a single plan and under the unified leadership of the district (front) commander. At the same time, thanks to the flexible maneuver of air defense forces and means, it will be possible to quickly concentrate their efforts on the main directions. As a result, it would be possible to create favorable conditions for inflicting a decisive defeat on the air enemy, and, therefore, preventing his breakthrough into the interior of the country.

At the same time, military theorists have come to the conclusion that the creation of a unified Air Defense Forces will require a serious clarification of the functions of the commander-in-chief and the main headquarters of the country's Air Defense Forces, as well as the chief and headquarters of the Air Defense Forces of the Ground Forces, not to mention the creation of a unified automated control system for all forces. mi and air defense systems. Great difficulties arose due to the need to restructure the warning and communication systems, re-equip command posts and solve other problems. Therefore, in the end, Marshal Ogarkov's idea had to be abandoned.

During the post-war years, the Air Force was at least three times re-equipped with new aircraft and underwent a radical organizational restructuring. Moreover, their role as a branch of the Armed Forces was either overestimated or downplayed. Immediately after the end of the Great Patriotic War, the general line in the construction of the Air Force was its transformation into a universal multi-purpose service of the Armed Forces. It was intended for independent or joint actions to gain air supremacy and solve a whole range of other strategic, operational and tactical tasks in operations of all types, both with and without the use of nuclear weapons.

In a relatively short time, all aviation was re-equipped with supersonic jet aircraft. Along with bombs, air-to-air, air-to-ground, air-to-ship and air-to-radar missiles began to form the basis of aviation weapons. This gave the Air Force fundamentally new combat properties.

Of particular importance was strategic (long-range) aviation, which included corps, divisions and units of strategic and long-range bombers, reconnaissance aircraft and special-purpose aircraft. Initially, it was equipped with relatively imperfect Tu-16 and M-4 bombers. The situation, however, has changed since the 1970s, when long-range aviation began to be re-equipped with Tu-22 medium bombers, then Tu-22M, and finally

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Tu-22MZ, Tu-95 and Tu-95 MS intercontinental aircraft, and then Tu-160 with long-range cruise missiles.

The high speed and considerable range of these aircraft, significantly increased in connection with the introduction of in-flight refueling systems, equipping them with means of overcoming air defense, the latest on-board equipment (means of automation, navigation, protection against anti-aircraft missiles) allowed long-range aviation operate successfully in any meteorological conditions without entering enemy air defense zones, deliver effective strikes against ground targets throughout the entire depth of continental theaters of operations, destroy air formations and ship groups, and disrupt ocean and sea communications of the enemy.

Front-line aviation developed exceptionally rapidly. Along with bomber, fighter, reconnaissance and auxiliary aviation, fighter-bomber aviation was also created in its composition, which became a reliable means of destroying ground and air targets. Army (military) aviation also became an integral part of front-line aviation, which included part of combat and transport-combat helicopters, and then attack aircraft.

In the 1960s, the front-line aviation fleet was based on the Su-17, Su-17M fighter-bombers, Su-17M fighters, Su-17 -9, MiGG-21 and a number of other types with improved combat characteristics.

But a particularly stormy breakthrough in aviation occurred in the 70s, when aircraft with variable wing geometry, reinforced power plants and powerful missile weapons appeared. At that time, the Air Force was equipped with: front-line bombers - Su-24 and Su-24M, fighter-bombers - Su-17MZ and M4, MiG-27 and MiG-27M, attack aircraft - Su-25, front-line fighters - MiGG- 23, MiGG-25, combat helicopters - Mi-24, etc.

With the advent of these aviation complexes, the flight speeds of front-line aircraft increased by 2-3 times, reaching 3-3.5M. Their range increased by 1.5-2 times, bomb load - by 1.5-1.8 times. It became possible to hit targets without entering air defense zones with a minimum consumption of ammunition. The dependence of aviation on basing conditions and weather has decreased. In the future, aircraft with vertical and short takeoffs were created. The new control and guidance systems, more advanced navigation instruments and radar sights, which entered service, made it possible to reach targets with high accuracy and hit them from maximum distances.

In the 1980s, front-line aviation began to be re-equipped with the fourth generation of aircraft. It was equipped with improved front-line bombers (Su-24M), army attack aircraft (Su-25TK and Il-102), fighter-bombers (Su-24M), air superiority fighters (Su-27), light front-line fighters (MigG-29), combat helicopters (Mi-28), new air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles of short, medium and long range, guided bombs with laser homing heads and other means. This further expanded the combat capabilities of the Air Force, especially in conventional warfare.

The role of military transport aviation has sharply increased as the main means of ensuring strategic maneuver and landing operational airborne assault forces behind enemy lines. With its re-equipment with the new Il-76MD and An-124 (Ruslan) heavy-duty military transport aircraft, the total payload capacity of the VTA increased by 3-4, and the radius of application - by 2.5 times. Significantly increased its ability to overcome enemy air defenses.

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Along with the development of aviation technology and the change in the nature of the tasks of the Air Force, the organizational structure of aviation associations, formations and units, the control system, basing, airfield technical and engineering support were improved, measures were taken to increase the survivability of aviation on the ground and in air.

In the mid-1980s, air armies of strategic aviation were created. At the same time, the air armies of front-line aviation were disbanded. Instead, united air forces of the fronts and military districts were formed, which also included fighter aviation units of border air defense formations.

Army aviation, while remaining organizationally part of the unified Air Force, was transferred to operational subordination to the commanders of combined arms and tank armies. Responsibility for its combat use was assigned to the combined arms command, and for special training and all types of support - to the commanders of the Air Force. It was believed that such an approach would simplify aviation control, promote closer interaction with ground forces, and reduce the time it takes to bring missions to aviation formations and units.

As it soon turned out, these transformations did not justify themselves. Intractable problems arose in the preparation of aviation and its combat use. Therefore, by the beginning of the 1990s, everything was back to normal. The air armies of front-line aviation were restored, and the air defense fighter aircraft, withdrawn from the Air Force, entered the Ground Forces.

At the same time, a comprehensive program for the qualitative development of the Air Force was adopted. It was planned to create fifth-generation aircraft, close the gap with the United States in propulsion systems and on-board equipment, equip Air Force command posts with more advanced systems for automated aviation control, ensure the possibility of flying in zero visibility, etc. It was planned to complete the development of hypersonic aircraft, aircraft with nuclear propulsion systems, aerospace aircraft. However, after the collapse of the USSR, the implementation of these programs was suspended.

The navy of the USSR has been completely renewed over the four post-war decades. Possessing enormous strategic capabilities, it emerged from coastal waters and closed seas, mastered the expanses of the world's oceans, acquired the ability, both independently and in cooperation with other branches of the Armed Forces, to conduct decisive strategic operations in all oceanic and maritime military theaters. actions.

Its share, role and importance in the overall composition of the Armed Forces has increased several times. However, in terms of its combat power, it was still significantly inferior to the naval forces of a potential enemy. Nevertheless, the balance of forces on the oceans became more favorable, and in the closed seas it changed in favor of the USSR. Under such conditions, and most importantly, thanks to the new weapons, the Soviet Navy was able not only to

to actively fight the US and NATO naval forces in the ocean theater of operations, but also to deliver powerful strikes to the entire depth of the enemy's land territory. In essence, it has become a branch of the Armed Forces of global action.

A genuine revolution in the Navy was caused by equipping it with missiles and nuclear power plants, the emergence of qualitatively new branches in its composition - nuclear missile submarines, naval missile-carrying aviation, missile submarine strike forces, ship and aviation anti-submarine forces, coastal missile and artillery troops, as well as aircraft carriers.

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Submarine forces of strategic and general purpose developed intensively. The first missile submarines were equipped with P-5 cruise missiles (designer V.N. Chelomey) with a relatively limited firing range of 500 km. In 1955, the R-21 medium-range ballistic missile (designer V.P. Makeev) was launched for the first time from a submarine. However, in terms of its characteristics, it was significantly inferior to the American Polaris rocket.

At the end of the 1960s, nuclear submarines of new projects with intercontinental range missiles (R-27 and R-29) began to be put into operation, which made it possible not only to catch up, but also to bypass the United States. A true triumph of Soviet shipbuilding was the creation of nuclear missile submarines Typhoon, which had twenty ballistic missiles on board. In other words, it became possible to inflict unavoidable massed nuclear missile strikes on targets on the American continent not from combat patrol zones, as previously assumed, but from their own coastal regions and even directly from their own bases.

With the quantitative increase of nuclear missile boats, their qualitative improvement continued. Indicators of autonomy, range and stealth of navigation were improved, the firing range and accuracy of hitting targets were increased, the combat information and control systems of underwater missile launches were modernized, etc.

In the 1980s, the problems of increasing the underwater speed of boats (up to 70 km and more), the depth of their immersion (up to 700 m and more), increasing the secrecy of actions and combat stability, reducing noise and improving the characteristics of hydroacoustic systems were solved. . The construction of deep-sea boats with a dive of a thousand meters and with a higher speed began. Boats with anti-radar, radio-transparent and anti-noise coatings, ultra-small and unmanned submarines - automatic machines with remote control were put into operation. Submarine ballistic missiles, like ICBMs, began to be equipped with multiple warheads with 10 blocks.

Naval missile-carrying aviation became the second most important branch of the fleet forces. The basis of its armament was Tu-22M missile carriers. Their use made it possible to conduct a successful fight against enemy aircraft carrier formations and other naval groupings, and at a considerable distance from their coasts, to destroy naval bases, coastal command posts, and disrupt the enemy's sea and ocean communications.

The composition was increased and the tactical and technical characteristics of anti-submarine aviation were improved. It was equipped with Pe-12 amphibious aircraft (since the 80s - Albatross), Ka-25 and Ka-50 anti-submarine helicopters with radar and sonar equipment, missiles and depth charges.

Since the 1980s, ship-based aviation has also rapidly developed: vertical take-off aircraft Yak-38, Yak-40, multipurpose ship-based fighter Yak-141. This made it possible to significantly increase the combat stability of naval groupings at sea, and more successfully solve the tasks of landing and providing fire support for amphibious assault forces.

The development of surface ships proceeded along the path of increasing their speed, maneuverability, cruising range, improving armament (cruise and anti-aircraft missiles, long-range deep-seated homing torpedoes, missile torpedoes, naval jet forces, bombing rocket launchers, etc.). The surface forces of the fleet were based on missile and missile-artillery cruisers, large and medium anti-submarine ships, and air defense ships.

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The composition of the anti-submarine forces was rapidly increasing. Equipping them with new equipment for detecting nuclear missile submarines (SSBNs) (including a slight change in the temperature gradient, the chemical composition of water and magnetic anomaly), as well as the introduction of automation tools for signal transmission processes, made it possible to dramatically increase the efficiency of detecting submarines. and targeting them with anti-submarine forces of the fleet.

Simultaneously with the ships of the oceanic zone, the composition of coastal forces was strengthened, primarily torpedo and missile boats with cruise missiles [-15.

From year to year, the capabilities of amphibious (landing) forces increased. Large, medium and small ships, hovercraft came to equip them in ever-increasing quantities. Ekranoplans were developed with a speed of several hundred kilometers per hour, which would solve the problem of a sudden landing of advanced landing echelons on an unequipped coast. In all fleets, on this basis, squadrons of landing forces were created, formed by brigade, and in the Pacific Fleet - a division of marines. The problem of capturing the strait zones and enveloping the enemy from the sea during the offensive in coastal areas was put on a real basis.

With the entry into service of new long-range and medium-range coastal missile systems, the coastal missile and artillery troops have changed radically. Their use made it possible to create a reliable coastal defense on vast sections of the sea coast, to cover naval bases and other important objects from attacks from the sea.

In the postwar years, the Navy, as before, consisted of four fleets: Northern, Pacific, Baltic and Black Sea. However, their composition, structure and role have changed dramatically. The most powerful were the Northern and Pacific fleets, intended for operations in ocean theaters. It was on these fleets that the bulk of the naval strategic nuclear forces were concentrated, missile submarine flotillas were formed, and squadrons of large surface forces were formed.

The sphere of operations of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets was limited to closed maritime theaters, but at the same time their operational zones expanded: the first - to the North, and the second - to the Mediterranean Sea, where quite strong ship groups constantly carried out combat service.

However, it must be admitted that, despite the efforts made, it was not possible to equal the probable adversary in terms of naval combat power of the USSR. Many of the weaknesses of the Soviet Navy were never overcome. Basing remained the bottleneck. The absence of forward naval bases (Naval Bases) (except for Swineujsie in the Baltic and Cam Ranh in the Pacific Ocean), as well as the need to overcome narrowness and straits when deploying naval forces in the ocean area, had a negative effect. In addition, the combat stability of naval groupings of surface forces continued to remain low. The Soviet Union was almost an order of magnitude inferior to the potential enemy in terms of the noise of submarines.

An extremely difficult situation developed with the repair of ships: many of them were under repair for 7-10 years. For decades, the timely restoration of the resource of ships was not ensured, there were not enough funds for their maintenance and power supply of the piers. For a long time, the practice of commissioning unfinished ships prevailed. Some issues of centralized control of forces, organization of nuclear technical support, and rescue service were not resolved with sufficient reliability. All this made it difficult to solve many problems in the operations of the fleets, and, consequently, limited the possibilities of the Soviet strategy for waging war at sea.

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A fundamentally new direction in the development of the Armed Forces was the creation and development of military space forces. They included launching, control and orbital groupings of space vehicles for military purposes. Compared with other means, they had a number of advantages: global action, the ability to solve assigned tasks in peacetime and wartime, versatility and a high degree of autonomy, and the ability to operate in orbits for a long time. This could not fail to predetermine the expediency of using military space assets in all forms of strategic actions of the Armed Forces.

In the 1980s, in addition to space early warning systems, space tools for monitoring outer space, detecting nuclear explosions, reconnaissance, and navigation appeared. Space-based strike assets were developed - "space-to-ground" and "space-to-space". As a result, the struggle in space in the form of mutual destruction of spacecraft in orbit acquired great importance. Gaining dominance in space has become one of the important strategic tasks of the Armed Forces. In the future, it was not excluded that space could have a major and direct impact on achieving victory over the enemy.

The military-technical revolution in military affairs directly affected the organization of the Logistics of the Armed Forces. Three circumstances were of decisive importance: the need to increase the survivability of the rear, meet the multiply increased needs of the Armed Forces in material and technical means, and create logistics support systems for new types of the Armed Forces and combat arms.

In the 60s, the strategic Logistics of the Armed Forces included central arsenals, bases, warehouses with stocks of materiel. He also had special troops: railway, automobile, pipeline, engineering and airfield, aviation technical, as well as an auxiliary fleet, repair and construction, medical and other units, institutions, divisions. Ensuring the activities of the rear was entrusted to parts of the engineering and chemical troops, signal troops, air defense and security forces, which were part of it.

In accordance with the new tasks facing the rear and the changed conditions for conducting strategic operations, measures were taken to increase its mobility and maneuverability, and to mechanize work. Formations, units and all bodies of logistic and technical support were radically reorganized.

Instead of the previously existing front and army supply bases, mobile logistics brigades were formed. The doubling of the carrying capacity of the vehicles of the brigades in comparison with the bases made it possible to maintain stocks of materiel for two days of combat operations. The brigades included new structural elements: automobile parts, parts of mass refueling of equipment with fuel, equipment repair companies, road commandant units and security units. Such an organization allowed the brigades to maintain supplies and supply material to the troops on their own, organize engineering equipment for deployment areas, regulate traffic, perform loading and unloading operations, and carry out defense and rear protection.

In order to quickly transfer the Logistics of the Armed Forces from a peaceful to a military situation, the structure of military-type formations, automotive and other equipment created in the national economy was revised. It was considered

It is very important that these funds come from the national economy not separately, but in the form of automobile convoys for various purposes, road and bridge detachments, special formations of the Ministry of Railways and the Ministry of Transport Construction.

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In connection with the multiple increase in possible sanitary losses (by 10–20 times), a radical reorganization of the medical service was carried out: mobile units of medical support were created, the structure of hospital bases, and the mechanism for evacuating the wounded and injured were revised.

The system of technical support of the Armed Forces has also undergone a radical restructuring. In the Ministry of Defence, the branches of the Armed Forces, in the military districts and in the fleets, offices of deputies for armaments were formed. New technical services for nuclear and missile technical support were created. At the operational level, all repair bodies were united into single front-line and army repair brigades and bases. Special formations and units were formed for the storage and assembly of nuclear weapons and missiles.

The fuel service was reorganized. Units were created to provide troops with rocket fuel, pipeline brigades and regiments were formed. Stationary pipelines, deployed in advance at all theaters, were brought from fuel production sites to front-line rear bases, large airfields and ports. Field pipelines were supposed to be deployed in wartime, since they were considered one of the most important means of supplying troops with fuel, the need for which, compared with the Great Patriotic War, increased 15-18 times.

Taking into account the huge scope of strategic operations and the sharply increased vulnerability of communications on the part of a potential enemy, a fundamentally different concept of transport support was developed. Its essence was the integrated use of all types of transport: road, rail, sea (ocean), air. The formed special formations and units were intended for the rapid restoration and construction of roads, the deployment of temporary transshipment areas (TSR) on the routes of interrupted traffic and water lines.

The principles of command and control of the rear were also revised. Rear control points were created in all links. The very structure of the rear services was changed, new forms and methods of their work were developed, and automated systems for managing the rear of the strategic and operational level were mastered.

Since the mid-1980s, in connection with the adoption of the defensive military doctrine, some of the previously established conceptual problems of the rear have been clarified. In particular, the idea was put forward of a transition to stationary protected rear structures not only at the strategic but also at the operational level.

The danger of nuclear war forced a number of radical measures to be taken to increase the survivability of the Armed Forces, the population and the economy of the country. The most important element of the defense potential of the state was the civil defense of the USSR. In a short time, a new concept was worked out, the probable consequences of a large-scale nuclear attack and the necessary measures to eliminate them were determined. A centralized system for warning about a nuclear missile attack has been formed.

Work has begun to improve the security of the most important economic facilities, build radiation shelters for the population, create emergency supplies of food, water, fuel, strategic materials, and equip protected civil defense command posts. Troops and special formations of civil defense forces were created to carry out emergency rescue operations. Plans were developed for the implementation of the entire range of work in the operational areas of civil defense.

Initially, the main way to protect the population was its mass evacuation from the most threatened areas to the countryside. According to

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From 20 to 50 million people were subject to compliance with the evacuation plan. However, due to the growing scale of a possible nuclear missile attack by the enemy, this method of protecting the population was recognized as absolutely unrealistic, since almost the entire territory of the country became threatened. Under such conditions, the main efforts of civil defense were switched to the construction of protective structures.

With the end of the Second World War, the tasks of the border and internal troops that were part of the Armed Forces of the USSR changed greatly. There was a need to protect the new state borders of the Soviet Union. In this regard, new border districts, detachments and commandant's offices, brigades and divisions of border patrol ships were formed. They were equipped with new military equipment, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, special signal systems, etc.

In 1957, the border troops were transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the State Security Committee. In wartime, it was planned to transfer them to the operational subordination of the commanders of the corresponding fronts and fleets. The order of their combat use was determined when repulsing the aggression of a potential enemy, conducting the first defensive and offensive operations, and performing tasks to combat sabotage and reconnaissance activities of the enemy.

Internal troops underwent a serious reorganization. Their composition has been significantly reduced. Districts and divisions of internal troops were formed. Along with special tasks, they were entrusted with the protection and defense of the most important inland areas and facilities of the country's territory, combating air and sea

landings, sabotage and reconnaissance forces of the enemy, together with the civil defense troops, participation in measures to eliminate the consequences of a nuclear attack.

Radical shifts have taken place in the content of operational, combat and mobilization training of the Armed Forces. It was completely reoriented to the conditions of a nuclear missile war. A system of major strategic and operational-strategic exercises, maneuvers and drills was introduced into practice. And the widespread research and military scientific work contributed to the active search for additional measures to increase the combat power of the Armed Forces and the defense potential of the entire country.

Thus, in the post-war years, the strategy of military development was subordinated to the main goal - the creation of a reliable material basis for the successful implementation of the entire range of new defense tasks that arose before the state and the Armed Forces in the nuclear age. In general, this strategy has largely justified itself. However, during its implementation, many serious miscalculations were made that had a negative impact on the leading areas of defense construction. The main ones are exceeding reasonable limits in the build-up of armaments, violating the principles of the proportional development of the services of the Armed Forces. |

Serious disproportions arose in equipping the Armed Forces with combat and support means. Their combat effectiveness was extremely negatively affected by the multi-type of weapons, duplication of production of many systems of weapons and equipment. Thus, by the mid-1980s, the Armed Forces were equipped with 62 main types of artillery and small arms (7 in the USA), 60 brands of armored vehicles (16 in the USA), of which 5 types of tanks (1 in the USA).), 26 types of air defense weapons (in the USA - 3), 10 types of space reconnaissance equipment (in the USA - 5), 26 communication systems (in the USA - 4), 8 types of front-line aircraft (in the USA - 5), 5 types of nuclear submarines (in the USA - 2), 9 projects of large

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surface ships (in the USA - 4). Needless to say, this led to the complication and rise in the cost of equipment, making it difficult to master, maintain and operate in the troops.

These and other shortcomings limited the strategic capabilities of the Armed Forces. Nevertheless, they were able to successfully resist any potential adversary, and, if necessary, repel aggression in any of its forms.

4. Development of views on the nature of war

Revealing the possible nature of a future war has always been, and still is today, the most complex and important task of military strategy. Only on the basis of a correct scientific forecast of its probable occurrence, and even more so its course and outcome, could the political and military leadership of the USSR expediently solve the issues of building the Armed Forces, strategic planning, and preparing the country for defense.

The Great Patriotic War was a convincing example of the influence of pre-war assessments regarding the nature of the impending tragedy on those major strategic miscalculations that the Soviet leadership made in preparing the state and the Armed Forces for war, especially for its initial period.

Under the conditions of the possible use of nuclear missile weapons, determining the nature of war has become even more important, and this task has become incredibly complicated. And not only because there was no experience in the practical use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, and the secondary consequences of its massive use did not lend themselves to any reliable analysis, but also because fundamentally new political, strategic and military-technical circumstances that no one has ever encountered before. It was necessary to take into account the radically changed alignment of military-political forces, the sharp expansion of possible military threats, the change in their nature, but not least the fact that the main enemy is not near the borders of the Soviet Union, but across the ocean, even on another continent. In this scenario, most of the previous ideas about the political and strategic face of the war lost their force. It was necessary not only to revise the already established views on the war and the methods of its conduct, but also to find fundamentally different criteria for its evaluation. Everything was complicated by the fact that the military-political and strategic situation in the world, the means of conducting armed struggle were constantly and very dramatically changing. Therefore, almost every 3-5 years, and sometimes more often, it was necessary to refine previous estimates and conclusions, to revise theoretical forecasts, estimates of the possible course and outcome of the war, and all strategic concepts.

True, the conclusions about the possible political nature of the war turned out to be more stable, although they were corrected, especially after the aggravation of relations with China. Based on the new alignment of military and political forces, the formation of two world systems that developed in diametrically opposite directions, and also taking into account the main contradictions of the era, the USSR believed that, in terms of their socio-political content, wars of various types were possible, if not inevitable: between two social public systems; between individual capitalist and socialist states; between the imperialist countries and the peoples waging a war of national liberation. The idea of wars between different capitalist states was also admitted, not to mention civil wars between antagonistic classes in capitalist states. There was an opinion that it is possible

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the emergence of world and local wars. The war with the participation of the Soviet Union was unequivocally regarded as a world war of two social systems. It was only in the mid-1960s that the possibility of involving the USSR in local wars of varying intensity began to be recognized.

Many were convinced that sooner or later the clash of the socialist camp with the capitalist world would lead to a world global war. It was believed that if the aggressor imposed such a war on the Soviet Union and other socialist states, then this would be the greatest test of all the military, economic and moral forces of the peoples. In this case, the bloc of imperialist powers and the states supporting or jointly acting with it will be opposed by an alliance of countries of the socialist Commonwealth, the basis of which will be the organization of the Warsaw Pact.

On the part of the USSR and its allies, such a war was regarded as a nationwide and just one. As it seemed to the Soviet leadership, the people and the Armed Forces, together with the armies of the allied countries, would defend their socialist Fatherland, uphold the independence, territorial integrity, security of the Soviet state and other fraternal socialist countries, fulfilling their internationalist duty. And the war unleashed by the aggressor was qualified by him as an imperialist, predatory war, and therefore unjust and anti-people. It was assumed that in the course of it "the imperialist states would strive to defeat the USSR, liquidate the socio-political system of the states of the socialist Commonwealth and restore capitalism in them"?? In the 1950s and 1960s, the opinion was established that the war would turn out to be absolutely uncompromising, because the parties in it would pursue the most decisive class goals and strive to achieve them at any cost.

At the same time, it was emphasized that the USSR and other socialist countries have many important advantages due to the "progressive nature of the socialist social system, the great mobilizing power of the ideas of communist construction, an advantageous geographical position, the presence of a vast, compactly occupied territory, the possibility of rapid mobility. - the lysis of all forces for the conduct of war. They can "count on the active support of the colonial and dependent countries waging a courageous struggle against imperialism and colonialism, as well as on the support of the peoples of the capitalist states who are vitally interested in maintaining peace." Proceeding from this and on the basis of an assessment of the correlation of forces, the conclusion followed that the socialist camp had everything necessary for successfully repulsing the attack of any aggressor, defeating it and achieving complete victory, and that under any conditions a future world war would end in the complete defeat of the imperialist states that instigated the war. Imperialism as a system will be buried."

However, in the 1960s, but especially since the beginning of the 1970s, these assessments lost their former categorical character. Already at the 20th] Congress of the CPSU, it was concluded that "a world war is not fatally inevitable, that even before the complete victory of socialism on earth, with the preservation of capitalism in part of the world, there is a real opportunity to exclude war from the life of society, which, regardless of the social structure states, peoples must live in peace, that disputes arising between states must be resolved peacefully, and not by war. This conclusion was justified by the fact that "further successes in building a communist society will have a profound impact on the entire international situation, will lead to the strengthening of the forces of peace and the weakening of the forces of war, will cause enormous changes not only in our country, but in everything world, there will be decisive shifts in the field of economics on the world stage in favor of socialism"??.

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Since 1970, the possibility of deliberately limiting the scale of the means of struggle used in war has been theoretically allowed. The thesis "about the imminent death of imperialism in the war" was even withdrawn. And later (from the mid-1980s) a position was put forward about the impossibility of achieving victory in a nuclear war.

Due to the presence of two opposite world social systems and major military-political alliances, as well as due to the intertwining of interests of many states, it was commonly believed that a world war would inevitably acquire a coalition, bloc character. It will require pooling the efforts and resources of all allied countries, clear coordination of military and other actions with the distribution of military-political and strategic tasks, and sometimes even areas of military operations. It was understood that the aggressive coalition would be represented by the largest imperialist powers, to which the rest of the capitalist countries would join voluntarily, or even under compulsion. The basis of this coalition will be the NATO member states led by the United States, which have large combat-ready groupings of armed forces united by a common leadership already in peacetime. It was not excluded that on the eve of the war some states would withdraw from the imperialist coalition. But this coalition can be enlarged by the addition of previously neutral capitalist countries or other states pursuing anti-socialist goals.

The opposite coalition will be formed by the states of the socialist Commonwealth headed by the Soviet Union. This coalition will be distinguished by the complete unity of goals in the war, "due to the unity of the policy of the communist and workers' parties standing at the head of the states, a single Marxist-Leninist ideology, a common social and economic structure." In accordance with the ideological guidelines, it was not ruled out that the system of socialist states united by the Warsaw Pact could be joined by other countries that remain neutral in peacetime and are not included in any military

political alliances.

The actual development of events made it necessary to make certain adjustments to such a simplified scheme. I had to admit that on each side, states pursuing their own national goals could also take part in the war. And as a force hostile to the USSR, it is possible that not only various imperialist blocs and alliances led by the United States, but also China, which was then pursuing an anti-Soviet policy, could act. This, according to ideologists, will significantly complicate the political content of the war and give it even more contradictory features.

As for the views on the strategic nature of a future war, they have been repeatedly subjected to a radical revision, and sometimes even a radical breakdown. All ideas about its

possible strategic appearance, characteristic features and features, forms and methods of armed struggle, temporal and spatial parameters of military operations.

Initially, theoretical views on the nature of a future war differed little from the ideas that had taken shape at the end of the Second World War. At the same time, there was no doubt that it would be characterized by even greater decisiveness of goals, a further expansion of the scope of military operations, and their enormous maneuverability. It was noted that such a war would be waged simultaneously in several theaters of military operations, and therefore would require greater flexibility in the organization and conduct of armed struggle. That is why, in order to achieve its goals, it will be necessary to carry out a system of large-scale strategic operations with the participation of all branches of the Armed Forces. In this case, the Land Forces, which form the basis of the Armed Forces of the USSR, will play a decisive role. The defeat of the enemy was supposed to be carried out mainly on the continental theater of operations. Simultaneously

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the increased importance of the Air Force and the Navy, the possibility of deploying and conducting large-scale operations in the airspace and in maritime theaters of military operations were taken into account.

The enormous destructive potential of atomic weapons was also recognized, but its decisive influence on the war was, in essence, denied. Almost all the problems associated with the use of these weapons, both in theoretical developments and in official guidelines, were passed over in silence.

Since the second half of the 1950s, views on the nature of a possible war have changed radically. We came to the conclusion that the future world war is primarily a nuclear missile war. The basis of its conduct will be the mass use of nuclear missiles by all branches of the Armed Forces. The use of these weapons "will naturally lead to significant changes in the military-strategic goals of the parties, will cause a radical break in the methods of warfare and military operations."

Because of this, a world nuclear war will have qualitatively new features: uncompromising political and utmost decisiveness of the military goals of the opposing sides; unlimited use of all means of mass destruction, primarily strategic nuclear weapons, catastrophic consequences of their use not only for the belligerents, but also for states not participating in the war; the possibility of destruction and annihilation in the shortest possible time of the most important administrative and political centers and cities, the main economic regions; infliction of massive irreparable damage to the population and the Armed Forces already in the first strikes; a progressive increase in losses as a result of the damaging effects of secondary factors - radioactive, chemical and biological (bacteriological) contamination of vast territories, the atmosphere, water areas of the seas and oceans, as well as irreversible environmental changes in the natural environment; the impossibility of continuing organized military operations in conventional, and sometimes in any other forms.

Based on this, a conclusion was made about the need to ensure the highest combat readiness of the Armed Forces. The sharply growing role of economic, political, and moral-psychological factors in the war was emphasized. With good reason, it was believed that the potential of the economy of the belligerent states could have a decisive influence on the development and final results of the war, since the ability of the state to withstand the incredible stress of war largely depends on the state and level of development of industry, agriculture and transport. , production of the necessary means of struggle, providing them to the Armed Forces and replenishing their huge losses.

It was noted that nuclear weapons, primarily missiles with nuclear warheads, would become the main means of waging war and solving the main strategic and operational tasks. As for the conventional weapons of the Ground Forces, the Air Force and the Navy, their main task will be to use the results of nuclear destruction for the final defeat of the enemy. True, for some time some military theorists and especially military practitioners continued to adhere to a different point of view, believing that it would be more expedient to assign nuclear weapons an auxiliary role as a means of supporting all branches of the Armed Forces, mainly the Ground Forces.

But this position was sharply criticized on the grounds that the main power of the Armed Forces is concentrated only in nuclear weapons and that, in terms of their capabilities, they go far beyond the limits of ensuring combat operations of troops. Moreover, its massive use will make it possible in a short time to destroy not only the means of warfare of the enemy, but also to wipe entire cities from the face of the earth.

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states. And this will give the whole war an unprecedentedly destructive and destructive character.

It was believed that the methods of influencing the enemy, the forms and methods of armed struggle would differ in principle from all wars of the past. The decisive method of waging war will be massive nuclear missile strikes, and the main objects of these strikes will be strategic means of armed struggle, industrial and administrative centers, the most important links of state and military administration, groupings of armed forces deployed in theaters of military operations. Already after the first such strikes, a country with a small territory can be withdrawn from the war almost immediately, and in large states most of the vital administrative, political and industrial centers are destroyed, which will decisively undermine their ability to wage war.

Particular importance was attached to the use of the entire might of the Armed Forces, especially nuclear weapons, with the aim of achieving decisive results from the very first minutes of the war, and even before

destroy the main nuclear weapons and the most important elements of the military-economic potential. In the Operations Manual, published in 1963, it was emphasized that any delay in the deployment of such actions, and even more so oriented towards passive defense, is like death.

It was assumed that simultaneously with the actions of the strategic nuclear forces, large-scale offensive operations in the continental theaters would immediately begin. Their main features are the massive use of nuclear weapons to the entire depth of the enemy's location, highly maneuverable combat operations and their development in separate directions. It was not excluded that the use of new means of combat would lead to the elimination of the former linearity in the formations and actions of troops, to deep mutual penetrations of the parties, the deployment of focal combat operations in the rear, and to frequent and abrupt changes in the position of the front. At the same time, the methods of operational and strategic maneuver will change. At the same time, maneuver by large formations and formations of the Ground Forces, as was the case in the past war, will be replaced mainly by maneuver with nuclear strikes. This will make it possible in a short time to transfer efforts to any direction, in a word, quickly change the situation and thereby ensure successful operations of the troops.

Operations in the sea and ocean theaters of military operations were presented in a different way. It was assumed that the clashes between ship groupings of the naval forces would take the form of an exchange of missile strikes at long ranges. Moreover, not so much the direct destruction of ships as the destruction of their bases, as well as the destruction of economic objects on the coast and in the depths of enemy territory by strikes from the sea, will acquire the greatest importance.

In contrast to previous views, it was believed that the center of gravity of the armed struggle would be shifted from the zone of direct combat contact between the parties, as was customary in past wars, to the depths of the enemy, including the most remote areas. True, later this conclusion was somewhat refined: along with strikes against remote targets, gradually more and more attention began to be paid to the defeat of directly opposing enemy groupings.

The spatial and temporal characteristics of the war were assessed in a new way. It seemed that a world nuclear war from the very beginning would acquire a global scope. This was associated with the utmost decisiveness of the political and military goals of the parties, with the military-geographical location of the two leading countries that led the military coalitions opposing each other, and most importantly, with the huge

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the range of new weapons capable of inflicting powerful strikes on the most distant targets. It was assumed that the war that had immediately unfolded in Europe and Asia would spread to other continents and cover all areas without exception in the rear of the belligerent states.

As for the temporal characteristics of the war, the assessment of its possible duration, in the post-war years the theoretical foundations and officially recognized guidelines have changed several times. Initially, the prevailing opinion was that a nuclear missile war would be short-lived, literally lightning-fast. Such a blitzkrieg approach remained dominant not only in the 50s, but also in the early 60s.

The top military leadership of the country believed that modern means of combat would not only ensure the destruction of hostile countries in a matter of hours, but also make it possible to achieve victory over the enemy in a short time. The decisive role in this, according to S. S. Biryuzov, M. V. Zakharov, K. S. Moskalenko, V. D. Sokolovsky and other military leaders, should be played by the first nuclear strike lasting no more than 30 minutes.

Since the mid-1960s, more cautious conclusions have been drawn on this score. So, in 1963, the Minister of Defense, Marshal R. Ya. Malinovsky, at a military scientific conference of the Armed Forces of the USSR, declared that to fight for a long time means to fight badly, to fight with great casualties, to ineptly use new equipment, this is the fate of the stragglers, and we don't want to be one of them. Nevertheless, he emphasized that the availability of technical capabilities to achieve the goals of the war in a short time does not mean that all the training of the USSR and its Armed Forces should be oriented towards an easy victory and in a short time.

Other statements of Marshal Malinovsky are also quite characteristic in this respect. Thus, in his work Vigilantly to Guard Peace, he noted: "Now no one can deny the possibility of a fleeting war, primarily because the very first surprise nuclear missile strikes can inflict unprecedented destruction, exterminate a huge number of troops in places of their usual quartering and destroy a significant part of the population of large cities. At the same time, it is quite clear that, depending on the conditions for the outbreak of war, armed struggle for life and death will not be limited to nuclear strikes. It can drag on, require a long and extreme effort of all the forces of the army and the country as a whole.

Proceeding from this attitude, a demand was put forward for a thorough and comprehensive preparation of the Armed Forces, the economy of the state and its people for a serious and intense struggle. Since the end of the 1960s, it has been constantly emphasized that short-term wars can most likely arise if one of the parties has a decisive military superiority and makes full use of the element of surprise at the start of aggression. However, even under these conditions, it can theoretically take on a protracted character if appropriate measures are not provided for repelling aggression. In the 1960s, this position was expressed even more clearly. As before, it was believed that nuclear weapons and other fast-acting means of armed struggle predetermine the possibility of a short-lived war. However, in a war between large states, even with massive losses, the possibility of continuing the struggle will remain. As a result, it was concluded that a war of coalitions with powerful military and economic potentials, as well as armed forces with a fairly high degree of survivability and mobility, would not be limited to strikes by strategic nuclear forces. Most likely, it will result in rather long actions with the participation of all

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Xia forces and means. Therefore, it is necessary to rely on the equal readiness of the opposing armed forces for both short-term and long-term world war.

Finally, in the 1980s there was another sharp turn in views on the duration of such a war. It was concluded that in the war of two powerful military coalitions with multimillion-strong armed forces, large human resources, huge economic and military capabilities, vast territories, as well as the ability to repeatedly restore their military potential, it is hardly possible at all to win a quick victory. That is why the idea of preparing, first of all, for a long, protracted war prevailed.

Consequently, in historical terms, at least three successive views on the nature of a future world war can be traced. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was recognized that it could be waged from beginning to end only in the form of an unlimited nuclear missile war. In the 1970s, it was considered mainly as a phased one, with a gradual transition to the use of more and more destructive means of armed struggle. Finally, in the 1980s, the possibility of two types of world war, nuclear and conventional, was recognized, although the probability of the former was increasingly questioned.

And how did the theory of strategy represent the nature and content of these three variants of war?

In the early post-war years, military theorists viewed an unrestricted world nuclear war as an exchange of massive nuclear strikes. Over time, the scheme of its conduct became more and more complicated. First of all, the expected scale, spatial and temporal boundaries of the use of missiles and nuclear weapons were expanding, and ever greater importance was attached to the use of conventional means of combat, coordinated with them. But, as before, it was believed that the basis of the armed struggle would be the first massive nuclear strikes, thanks to which it was supposed to solve the main tasks of the war.

Official documents stated that most likely an unrestricted nuclear war would begin with a surprise nuclear attack by the enemy and, consequently, its repulse by the USSR. However, both the theory and practice of strategic planning considered the Soviet Armed Forces to deliver a pre-emptive nuclear missile strike against the aggressor as the main course of action.

This option was determined not only by the unpredictably grave consequences of the first US surprise nuclear strike, but also by the fact that the nuclear forces of the USSR were simply not ready for a different course of action. By this time, the grouping of Soviet missiles as the main means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target was limited by a small number of unprotected ground launches, and it took many hours to prepare them for use. In addition, the Soviet Union was significantly inferior to the USA and NATO in aviation.

Only with the development of strategic and operational nuclear missile weapons, when full-fledged strategic nuclear forces were created in the USSR by the 1970s and 1980s, did other options for putting them into operation began to be developed, primarily by inflicting counter or retaliatory blows.

Prior to this, the war was presented in the form of missile, air and anti-aircraft operations of various scales, and missile operations were considered the main of them, which were assigned a leading role in the system of all other operations. It was assumed that with their help it would be possible to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy and ensure the disruption of his nuclear missile strikes. Based on this approach, the tasks of such operations were determined: the destruction of enemy aircraft and missiles, the maximum reduction of the aggressor's ability to use nuclear weapons against the Armed Forces and rear facilities of the Soviet Union. Simultaneously with them

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the tasks of disorganizing the rear, undermining the military-economic potential, and suppressing the enemy's will to resist were to be solved.

At the same time, a series of air operations was planned in the theaters of military operations with the aim of destroying the most important enemy groupings. As a result of their implementation, it was supposed to seize the strategic initiative. Since similar actions were also expected from the enemy, they were opposed by anti-aircraft operations with the participation of the Air Force, Air Defense Forces of the country's territory and military air defense. A large role was assigned to measures of anti-nuclear, anti-chemical and anti-bacteriological protection.

At the end of the 60s, the strategic goals of the war were envisaged to be realized in three ways:

— infliction of nuclear strikes on administrative-political and scientific-industrial centers, as well as strategic means of warfare, the most important groupings of troops and objects in the deep rear of the countries of the enemy coalition;

- active anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense of their country and groupings of the Armed Forces;
- conducting operations with decisive goals in land and sea theaters.

It was assumed that nuclear strikes by the Strategic Missile Forces, long-range aviation formations and nuclear submarines against vital rear facilities, ICBM bases and strategic airfields

enemy aviation will allow in a short time to completely disorganize its rear, the system of state administration and economy, and in addition, to destroy strategic means of warfare, as well as significantly weaken the groupings of ground forces and fleet forces in the depths of theaters of military operations. As a result, the military power of enemy states will be undermined and favorable conditions will be created for the subsequent conduct of hostilities by all branches of the Armed Forces.

In the 1970s, a new, more complete scheme of unrestricted nuclear war took shape. It was believed that it would be based on the actions of strategic nuclear forces, strategic operations in continental and ocean theaters, strategic actions of the country's Air Defense Forces to repel enemy aerospace attacks, as well as air operations to defeat its aviation and nuclear missile groups.

The actions of strategic nuclear forces were considered as the main and determining form of strategic actions of the Armed Forces. They will include the first nuclear strike, and the most powerful one, with subsequent strikes against pre-planned and newly identified targets. The duration of the action was estimated at several days.

It was believed that simultaneously with the use of strategic nuclear forces in the main air and missile areas, the Air Defense Forces of the country would begin to repel an air and space attack by the enemy, and all means of anti-aircraft, anti-missile and anti-space defense would take part in their actions.

There was no doubt that as a result of such actions, both sides would suffer huge losses, accompanied by the destruction of the most important military-economic and administrative-political centers, the violation of the system of state and military administration, transport and rear services. Vast areas of radioactive contamination, destruction, blockages, fires will appear on vast territories. For a long time, further actions in many areas will be impossible, and in some cases the need for them will disappear altogether. The troops will begin to eliminate the consequences of nuclear strikes and restore the combat capability of the Armed Forces groupings.

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However, despite the complexity of the situation, after nuclear strikes immediately or some time later, decisive operations can unfold, and first in the form of nuclear strikes, and then land forces, aviation and naval forces will come into action with the aim of complete the defeat of the enemy and achieve his surrender.

The theory of a phased nuclear war began to take shape in the first half of the 1970s. The possible nature of such a war was comprehensively studied and analyzed first at the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, then at military scientific conferences at the Ministry of Defense (1972), then by the branches of the Armed Forces, at the Military Academy of the General Staff (1975) and finally at military districts, groups of troops and fleets.

Taking into account the mutual danger of the unlimited use of nuclear weapons and the further development of conventional means of warfare, first in the United States and then in the Soviet Union, completely different views began to dominate: the transition to the unlimited use of nuclear weapons can only be justified in a critical situation, and before it arises, it is necessary take all measures to keep the war at the lowest possible level.

This attitude led to the assumption that in the event of a world war, developing most likely in stages, it would include several periods: military operations with the use of conventional weapons; military operations with limited use of nuclear weapons; military operations with unlimited use of nuclear weapons; one or even several periods of final hostilities. Within the framework of each of them, certain strategic tasks will be carried out, military actions corresponding to the means of struggle used will be used. It was not ruled out that under certain conditions certain periods of war may be absent altogether, and sometimes it may begin immediately with the unlimited use of all types of weapons.

In characterizing the views that took shape in the early 1980s on the possible development of such a war, it should be noted that they proceeded from a wide variety of options. The following model was considered as a typical scheme.

The period of hostilities may begin with the infliction of massive fire strikes by conventional weapons from the air, land and sea, which the enemy will try to repel. At the same time, the main aviation forces, air defense forces, fleet combat service forces, and combat-ready groupings of troops created in advance at the borders will be simultaneously put into action. This will be followed by the deployment and entry into battle of the main forces of the Ground Forces and Navy. The duration of such a period was estimated in different ways: from several hours to 3–7, 15–20, and even 45 days.

Initially, it was believed that during this period certain strategic tasks would be carried out on the continental and oceanic (marine) theaters of operations, the first army, sea, and sometimes the first front-line operations, as well as air and anti-aircraft operations, would be carried out. In the mid-1980s, the possibility was not ruled out that in a number of cases, even without the use of nuclear weapons, it would be possible to complete the first and even subsequent strategic operations in continental and ocean theaters.

The most important feature of this period is that, as it seemed, military operations would have to be carried out under the constant threat of the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy. The latter circumstance will not only have a serious impact on the operational formation and methods of action of troops, on the basing of aviation and fleet, on the choice of methods for deploying reserves, but will also require the constant readiness of nuclear weapons for immediate nuclear strikes.

It was not excluded that in a critical situation the enemy would switch to a limited use of nuclear weapons, trying to strike at groupings of troops and individual targets in theaters of military operations.

And what should be the reaction of the Soviet Union to such actions? In the mid-1970s, the leaders of the state unequivocally stated that in response to any, even limited, use of nuclear weapons, the USSR would immediately launch a massive strike using all of its nuclear potential. This attitude was due to the fact that in the event of a limited use of nuclear weapons, the parties would find themselves in an unequal position: while many objects on the territory of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states would be subjected to nuclear strikes, the territory of the United States would remain intact and intact. However, already at the end of the 1970s, it was recognized as expedient to respond to enemy actions with a proportionate use of nuclear weapons to inflict adequate damage.

It was believed that this period of the world war would be short in duration - from 3 to 5 days. During this time, a small number of tactical and operational-tactical nuclear weapons can be selectively used against certain groupings of troops and objects in certain areas. At the same time, both sides will continue the operations and hostilities they have begun, but in more active forms.

It was not excluded that, in view of the obviousness of unpredictable threats, the war would end at the stage of limited use of nuclear weapons. But another prospect was considered more probable: the parties' transition to the unlimited use of all means of armed struggle, primarily strategic nuclear weapons.

The period of hostilities with the unlimited use of nuclear weapons was seen as the main and decisive period of the war. It was assumed that it would begin with repelling a nuclear attack by the enemy and inflicting simultaneous massive nuclear strikes against him not only by strategic forces, but by the entire composition of operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons. The duration of this period was determined within 5–7 days. It was understood that the basis of military operations would be the operations of strategic nuclear forces and strategic operations to repel an enemy aerospace attack. At the same time, strategic operations on continental or oceanic theaters of operations can continue or only begin, with the delivery of massive strikes with operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons. After the first massive nuclear strikes, organized combat operations on land, in the air and at sea will be carried out in some isolated directions (in areas, zones) only by groupings of troops (forces) that have retained their combat capability. The main thing will be the preparation and delivery of subsequent nuclear strikes, the disruption and reflection of enemy nuclear strikes. Together with measures to restore the combat capability of the Armed Forces and prepare them for the performance of subsequent tasks, rescue and urgent emergency recovery work will be carried out on the territory of the country.

In the final period of hostilities, which will begin after the parties have used up the main stocks of nuclear weapons, it was supposed to introduce restrictions on the scale of the operation until the final strategic goals of the war were achieved. At this time, both in the theater of operations and in the interior of the country, an extremely difficult situation will arise: vast territories will be devastated, and all large cities will turn into ruins, vast areas, atmosphere and water spaces will have lethal levels of radiation. And the composition of the Armed Forces will be reduced hundreds of times. But even in such conditions, the possibility of continuing the war was admitted. It is true that the armed struggle would then assume completely different forms. At its first stage, the main task will be the restoration of military

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the properties of individual groupings of the Armed Forces and especially important elements of the country's economy; the next stage is the conduct of limited combat operations by the forces of individual detachments using conventional means; at the third stage, of course, after the decline in the main levels of radiation, the conduct of operations by partially restored groupings of troops and fleet forces.

It was not ruled out that, under certain conditions, the final military operations could take the form of unique, newly organized front-line, army and navy operations with a gradual increase in the composition of the active army through the use of remaining human resources, stocks of weapons and equipment, ammunition, fuel and other material resources, as well as their receipt from the national economy as military production is restored. The purpose of such actions may be to capture the remaining vital areas of the enemy in the theater of operations and force him to capitulate.

In the mid-1980s, the theory of a phased world war was replaced, as already noted, by the concept of the equal probability of a world nuclear and world conventional war. After analyzing the development of the situation, the experts concluded that due to the catastrophic consequences for both sides of the massive use of nuclear weapons, as well as due to the availability of highly effective conventional weapons control systems, the likelihood of a conventional world war is increasing. However, the danger of an aggressor unleashing a nuclear war, including through a surprise nuclear attack, could not be ruled out.

The likelihood of such a war was made directly dependent on the preservation of strategic nuclear parity, the delivery of so-called "disarming" and "decapitation" strikes, as well as the creation of effective large-scale missile defense systems with space-based elements.

It was expected that strategic nuclear parity could be violated if one of the parties achieved a sharp lead in the creation of weapons based on new physical principles. But in view of the extreme complexity of the problems that arose in this regard, such a danger was essentially ruled out until 2000. However,

The huge nuclear potentials accumulated by the 1980s (over 40-50 thousand charges on each side) required a re-evaluation of the unpredictable consequences of their unlimited use. Not only the direct results arising after many thousands of nuclear strikes were taken into account, but also the probability of secondary irreversible changes in the natural environment: the possibility of the onset of the so-called "nuclear winter" and "nuclear night". The conducted studies have confirmed that in this case, all life on the planet will inevitably perish. Moreover, even from the unilateral use of nuclear weapons, not only the enemy will be destroyed, but also the one who decides to launch a nuclear strike. As a result, both the USA and the USSR came to the conclusion that a war with the unlimited use of all available nuclear forces is impossible.

The Soviet military strategy tried to find a way out of the situation in four directions:

- reduction of nuclear potentials to mutually acceptable extremely low levels;
- the use of new, strictly controlled methods of conducting a limited nuclear war;
- infliction of forceful "disarming" strikes;
- Deployment of large-scale and highly effective anti-missile defense systems.

It is noteworthy that all these directions began to be implemented from the mid-80s. Deliberate the reduction of nuclear potentials has found its manifestation

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The main goal was to conclude treaties on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms: first on START in 1991, and then on START II in 1993. The principle of controlled nuclear war was embodied in the idea of "reasonable sufficiency". The principle of a "disarming" strike was developed in the development of the so-called Super-EMP weapon, a special type of nuclear weapon based on the use of high-altitude explosions of thermonuclear munitions with directed hard electromagnetic radiation. Its power was supposed to instantly disable all control systems and put most of the guided weapon systems, including strategic missiles, into a non-combat ready state. In accordance with the same principle, it was supposed to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike using high-precision MIRVs against enemy missile launch sites.

It should be emphasized that the danger of this trend in the USSR was not properly assessed. Moreover, in view of the refusal to use nuclear weapons first, this method of action was officially denied. Thus, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff, at a press conference in Moscow on December 5, 1983, stated: "general" nuclear strike, i.e., such a strike that would deprive the USSR of the opportunity to inflict a retaliatory nuclear strike on the aggressor.

Is such a goal achievable? The answer here is unequivocal - no, not yet. In modern conditions, given that the parties have large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and various systems for their deployment, with widely developed, repeatedly duplicated control systems, this is impossible. Retribution in all cases will inevitably follow. Therefore, only adventurers and suicides can bet on such a nuclear strike".

Great concern in the Soviet Union was caused by the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of American President R. Reagan. Quite rightly, it was assessed as an attempt to create conditions for the first massive nuclear strike with impunity. In response to this, the USSR launched research both of a similar nature (on the creation of a large-scale territorial missile defense system) and on the development of effective means and methods for guaranteedly overcoming a potential adversary's missile defense system.

The nature of a conventional war was now assessed in a fundamentally different way. It was believed that such a war could be general or limited. A general war can spread to entire continents, and under certain conditions it can take on a global dimension. Limited conventional warfare will be localized and fought with only part of the armed forces. Moreover, in modern conditions, both types of warfare will be distinguished by the widespread use of highly effective guided (high-precision all-day and all-weather) weapons, the latest automated reconnaissance and target designation, electronic warfare, especially space-based combat and maintenance systems. During the course of the war, nuclear power plants, facilities for the storage and production of highly toxic substances will be hit, which will lead to the contamination of vast territories. In a short time, over large areas, it will be possible to defeat large groupings of armed forces. In short, a conventional war will take on some of the features of a limited nuclear war.

With this in mind, new methods of conducting all types of strategic, front-line, air and anti-aircraft, space and anti-space, ocean and sea operations using the latest and promising types of conventional weapons were developed and began to be mastered. In their most complete form, these

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The methods were tested and studied in 1988 at the strategic exercise of the Armed Forces in the European part of the USSR, conducted under the leadership of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, General of the Army D.T. Yazov.

Thus, the views of the Soviet military strategy on the nature of a future war were constantly changing, undergoing a radical revision in certain periods. On their basis, provisions were developed for the development of specific problems of the highest field of military art, namely: maintaining combat readiness

of the Armed Forces, the theory and practice of their deployment, views on the initial period of the war, improvement of the forms and methods of military operations of the Armed Forces.

5. Development of the system of combat readiness of the Armed Forces, views on their deployment and on the initial period of the war

In the last few decades of the twentieth century. both the Soviet Union and the United States of America, all the states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO had to reckon with the dramatically changed conditions for the possible entry of the armed forces into the war. As already noted, both sides proceeded from the fact that it would most likely begin with sudden massive strikes throughout the entire depth of the occupied territories.

At the same time, the USSR did not rule out the possibility that the war against it and other socialist states would be unleashed by the aggressor after a gradual increase in tension in the international situation or under conditions of a sharp, even sudden aggravation of it. With this in mind, the possibility of a threatened period of varying duration (long or short) was allowed, which is characterized by a high intensity of political relations between states and the intensification of direct preparations for war, the expansion of military conflicts.

It was assumed that the aggressor could use this period to strengthen his political positions in various regions, advance the covert transfer of the economy to martial law, strengthen his groupings of armed forces in theaters of military operations, destabilize the political situation and economically isolate the countries he was preparing to attack. .

The Soviet Union and its Armed Forces, in turn, will use this period to complete preparations for repelling possible aggression, disrupt probable military provocations by the enemy, increase the readiness of the country's economy to perform tasks in wartime conditions, and carry out the necessary measures to transfer the Armed Forces. Forces to martial law, their deployment in the required volume, to strengthen the protection of groupings of troops and naval forces, the most important rear facilities, military and state administration systems. , for which it was envisaged the early introduction of a state of emergency in the country or in its individual regions.

But still, the dominant view was the installation of the absence of a threatened period. At the same time, it was not at all ruled out that the aggressor, in the calculation of taking him by surprise, that is, without obvious signs of preparing an attack, could start a war unexpectedly. using modern means of combat, as well as large combat-ready groupings of troops and forces previously created or additionally deployed in theaters of military operations.

Under such conditions, the problem of the organized entry of the Armed Forces into the war acquired particular importance. The main role in its successful solution is played by

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the organization of strategic reconnaissance, the creation of a reliable system of strategic warning, the constant maintenance of the Armed Forces in high combat readiness, careful planning and flexible conduct of their strategic deployment, the development of various methods of action of the Armed Forces in repelling a surprise attack and conducting the first operations.

Taking into account the memorable hard lessons of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in the Soviet Union, already in the first post-war years, constant monitoring of the daily activities of a potential enemy, especially the state of its strategic nuclear forces, was organized. For this purpose, first of all, operational and strategic means of reconnaissance were involved: agents, formations and parts of the radio engineering and radio reconnaissance "Osnaz". Later, various systems of survey and detailed photo-radio-electronic, radar and television space reconnaissance using reconnaissance satellites were developed, mastered and began to be widely used.

Automated processing of information received from these media using the Dozor automatic control system in combination with a missile attack warning system, a space control system, and the use of air defense, fleet and air force reconnaissance equipment made it possible to form a unified strategic warning system for the Armed Forces. It was believed that it should ensure the receipt of reliable data on the preparation of an enemy attack already at its earliest stage.

Particular attention was paid to identifying changes in the nature of the activities of the armed forces of a potential enemy and the state of readiness of strategic nuclear attack weapons, and specifying objects for delivering first strikes. The situation at the ICBM bases was carefully monitored. The patrols of US strategic aircraft under the Giant Spear plan and combat patrols of nuclear submarines were constantly monitored. Each campaign was recorded, and even more so the exit of American aircraft carriers into combat maneuvering areas. Active reconnaissance was carried out on all major US and NATO exercises, especially such as Autumn Fordis and Redforgers, meaning that under their cover covert deployment of NATO military forces in Europe could be carried out.

Throughout the post-war years, the Soviet Armed Forces, taking into account the changing conditions for the start and conduct of war, carried out versatile work to improve their combat readiness. Especially much was done in this area from 1956 to 1983. Ministers of Defense of the USSR G. K. Zhukov, R. Ya. Malinovsky, A. A. Grechko, D. F. Ustinov and S. L. Sokolov.

According to the level of combat readiness, the Armed Forces were divided into several categories. At the same time, most of the troops, forces and means, capable of immediately starting to carry out combat missions, even without

additional deployment, referred to the troops of constant readiness. These are the Strategic Rocket Forces, all groups of forces, a significant part of the Air Defense Forces, the Air Force and the Navy. The second category included formations with a short readiness period (1-2 days), which required partial additional staffing, since they could not perform combat missions in peacetime states; most of them were part of the border military districts. In addition, there were troops of a reduced composition with terms of mobilization readiness from 3-5 (M3Z-M5)3 ° to 10-15 days and from 10 to 15 days from the beginning of the war. The fourth category included framed formations and units with a deployment period of 20 to 30 days, also from the start of the war.

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In the 1950s and 1970s, a staged system of combat readiness operated in the Armed Forces of the USSR. Initially, it provided for three levels of troop readiness: permanent, advanced, and full. The troops were in constant readiness in peacetime. Increased readiness provided for the implementation of measures that significantly reduced the time for their preparation for combat missions, but without mobilization. Upon full readiness, the troops were mobilized, dispersed, brought equipment into combat readiness and reached a level that would allow them to immediately start combat operations. The content of the measures for each degree of readiness was systematically refined in order to ensure greater secrecy of operations, increase the security of the troops, and achieve their comprehensive preparation for the fulfillment of the assigned tasks.

In connection with the increased probability of a surprise attack by the enemy in the 1980s, another degree was introduced in the Soviet Armed Forces between high and full readiness - military danger, according to which measures were taken to disperse and partially deploy troops. In general, the new four-stage readiness system made it possible to respond more flexibly to changes in the level of military threats.

From the 1950s to the 1980s, inclusive, the time for bringing all troops to combat readiness was reduced by several times. In the Strategic Missile Forces it was already calculated in seconds and minutes, in the Air Defense Forces - in tens of minutes, in the Ground Forces - in hours, in the Navy - in days. With the help of this, incomparably more favorable conditions were created for repelling a sudden enemy attack.

Meanwhile, the problem of increasing the security of the troops and forces of the fleet, organizing their withdrawal from the enemy's impending strike was becoming increasingly important. To this end, in the 60s, aviation and navy were transferred to a more dispersed basing system. The network of operational, hidden and alternate airfields has been significantly expanded. Fleet dispersal points were created and forward bases were formed. Aviation dispersal time was reduced to 1.5 hours. The terms for the formations of the Ground Forces to leave their places of permanent deployment were increased to 40-45 minutes, and the withdrawal of the main forces of the fleet from the bases - up to 6-10 hours.

Measures were taken to further disperse stocks of material and technical equipment and organize their rapid transfer to probable areas of hostilities. The protection of military and rear facilities in the theater has been strengthened. At the same time, accelerated construction of fleet bases, protected control points and communication centers began, and from the end of the 70s, shelters for front-line aircraft. Spare areas for the withdrawal of troops on combat alert were equipped in engineering terms.

Back in the 1950s, in order to increase the readiness of troops to repel a surprise enemy attack and deliver immediate retaliatory strikes, a system of constant combat duty and combat service was developed and put into operation. Subsequently, it was repeatedly refined and improved. At the end of the 70s, 100% of the Strategic Missile Forces, 60-70% of the Air Defense Forces, up to 10-15% of the Air Force were on combat duty. Almost 50% of the missile submarines, 6-7% of the permanent readiness forces, as well as operational squadrons and other formations operating in the Mediterranean and North Seas, the Indian and Pacific Oceans were on combat service in the fleets.

Since the 1980s, a combat alert system has been introduced to destroy priority enemy targets. Specially dedicated missile units with missiles in conventional equipment, units and subunits were involved in its carrying.

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front-line aviation, some missile ships of the fleet. The task of these forces was to deliver an immediate retaliatory strike in the event of a sudden enemy attack, while ensuring the destruction of its especially important targets and facilities in the main operational areas.

The views on the organization of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces were also changing. In the 1950s, for example, there was an opinion that in a future war there would be no need for their strategic deployment. The troops and forces of the fleet will have to start and conduct operations with the composition of forces that is available in the theater of operations in peacetime; in extreme cases, it will be necessary to carry out the operational deployment of TROOPS.

However, the General Staff very soon came to the conclusion that even in the conditions of a nuclear missile war one cannot do without a full-scale strategic deployment of the Armed Forces. At the same time, in practice, the former point of view was still adhered to. In accordance with it, it was believed that even in peacetime one should have such Armed Forces that, in the event of a surprise attack by the aggressor, could successfully conduct active operations even before the arrival of the formations deployed for mobilization. But the modeling of the situation showed that the indicated forces and means would be clearly not enough to solve even the top-priority strategic tasks. Therefore, a multiple increase in their composition will be required, a mobilization

deployment of the Armed Forces, the timely build-up of the efforts of the first strategic echelon, the commissioning of mobilized formations and formations of the second echelon and reserve.

It also became obvious that in the changed conditions the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces cannot be identified with similar attitudes on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Now this term was understood as the most complex set of measures and actions to bring the Armed Forces to full combat readiness with their parallel mobilization, concentration and creation of strategic groupings, completion of their direct preparation for war.

The main components of the strategic deployment were: the transfer of the Armed Forces from a peaceful to a military position; operational deployment of troops and forces in theaters of military operations; advancement of troops from the depths to the theater of operations; carrying out inter-theatre strategic regroupings, creating and deploying strategic reserves; deployment of a strategic rear, strategic command and control systems, territorial and civil defense forces.

The task of moving troops from the depths of the country to the theaters of military operations acquired a fundamentally different character. Its scale increased sharply, especially in the European theater of operations, where, in order to strengthen the troops of the first strategic echelon, it was necessary to regroup the troops, aviation and rear services of four fronts at a distance of 800-1000 km in the shortest possible time. This regrouping itself turned the advance into the most complicated strategic operation, as a result of which it was supposed to drastically change the balance of forces in all strategic and operational directions of the North-Western, Western and South-Western theater of operations.

The content of the remaining elements of strategic deployment has become much more complicated, and most importantly, its temporal and spatial parameters have undergone changes, not to mention the requirements for its organization and conduct. It was assumed that the strategic deployment would extend not only to the entire territory of the country and the adjacent waters of the seas and oceans, but also to cover the territories of all allied states. The latter circumstance required centralized planning, advance preparation of theaters of military operations.

Basic e

Transfer of the armed forces from peaceful to martial law

Troop mobilization

Bringing the aircraft to full combat readiness

Preparing the Armed Forces for military operations

Strengthening groups

Reformation of military units into fronts

Additional

Deployment of strategic reserves

Creation of reserves

®

fronts and armies

Deployment of reserves of types of aircraft Creation of reserves of weapons

Deployment

PROVISION OF FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR ENTRY INTO WAR

elements

military deployment

Creation of opera groups by directions

Creation of aviation groupings of the forces of the fleet

Deployment

Deployment of cover opera forces

DEPLOYMENT PURPOSE

strategic deployment

Inter-theater regroupings of forces

The advancement of troops to the theater

Operational

Transfer of forces to other theaters

Relocation of the Air Force to other theaters of operations Transfer of fleet forces to other theaters

Transfer of materiel

Advancement of fronts of the 2nd echelon

Relocation of aviation reserve forces Rebazir fleet forces to forward areas

Expeditionary force deployment

Departure of groups of duty forces

Deployment of bodies strategic. hands-va

elements of a strategic

Deployment Deployment of the Armed Forces Logistics System Deployment of the main forces of the rear of the center Deployment of the forward echelons of the rear of the center

Deployed systems neither VDR

communications and Creation of strategic reserves of mat funds

USSR civil defense systems

Deployment of Territorial Defense Forces

Creation of a system of defense territories Deployment of anti-airborne assault forces

Deployment of PDO forces on the coast

Scheme 53. Strategic deployment of the Armed Forces

(according to the views of the 60s - 80s)

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vii and inland regions of the country, primarily on the equipment of road directions and air routes.

The requirements for the secrecy of deployment, but especially for the reliability of its implementation, were sharply increased. The question of measures to prevent disruption of the mobilization and operational deployment of troops in the theaters of military operations has become very acute. Now this task was not limited to the operational cover of the borders. It became necessary to organize a strategic cover for the mobilization and deployment of the Armed Forces. Operational cover became only one of the elements of this system, and its content also changed. It was necessary not only to reliably hold the border lines, but also to ensure that the duty forces repel a sudden enemy invasion from the air, land and sea.

Of particular importance was the problem of the organized completion of the deployment in the course of the war that had already begun. We had to take seriously the fact that the enemy could destroy communications, bridges on water barriers, forward airfields in a short time. It was necessary to think over and plan in advance a set of measures to restore traffic routes, organize the overcoming of zones of destruction and contamination, and provide for a variant of new deployment methods.

Consequently, the question arose on the agenda of developing a more flexible system of strategic deployment, conducting it according to various options (in full-scale and limited form with the gradual implementation of individual measures) with a wide maneuver of deployed forces both along the front and in depth.

In the theory of strategy, in close connection with the problems of strategic deployment, the issues of conducting operations in the initial period of the war were considered and solved. It should be noted that at various stages of post-war construction, the role of this period was assessed differently, which means that its content was also determined differently.

In the first post-war years, the concept of the initial period of the war was interpreted mainly taking into account the experience of the past war. It was believed that the basis of its content would be large-scale operations on land, in the air and at sea, carried out with the most decisive goals, while simultaneously completing the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces and transferring the national economy to work according to wartime plans. The increased influence of these operations on the further course and outcome of the war was especially emphasized. At the same time, many new requirements that arose in connection with the advent of atomic weapons were not always taken into account, and sometimes even ignored.

It was believed that in the initial period of the war, both sides would strive to seize the strategic initiative as quickly as possible and preempt the enemy in delivering the first blows. Attempts by the attackers to take advantage of the temporary unavailability of the opposite side will force them to start combat operations with ground forces long before the completion of their full concentration according to the deployment plan. Based

It was assumed that the initial operations would begin with limited forces, and those could build up as the mobilized troops approached.

A characteristic feature of the offensive operations of this period will be actions in separate directions, the absence of continuous fronts, and a low density of forces and means. The most important feature of such operations will be the infliction of swift strikes to a great depth, including against suitable enemy reserves, with the aim of disrupting the deployment of its armed forces. Air and sea landings will find wide application in the course of their implementation.

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Among the main features of the defensive operations of the initial period were: the absence of a continuous front of defense; high activity of the actions of groupings of troops defending the most important areas; a wide maneuver of forces and means from one direction to another; inflicting powerful counterattacks. The main goal of such actions will be to gain the time necessary to concentrate sufficient forces and means with a subsequent transition to the offensive.

A more detailed study of the entire complex of issues relating to the initial period of the war began only at the end of the 1950s. This was required by the sharply increased danger of a surprise nuclear missile attack. The draft Operations Manual, published in 1958, and subsequent official manuals, as well as numerous publications, carefully analyzed the lessons of the initial period of the last war, examined the impact of new means of combat on the nature of the first operations, considered possible ways to management. Particular attention was paid to the fundamental change in the strategic content of the initial period of the war. For example, in the work "Military Strategy" it was emphasized that "its initial period will be of decisive importance for the outcome of the entire war. At the same time, its main problem is considered to be the development of methods for reliably repelling a sudden nuclear attack, as well as methods for disrupting the aggressive plans of the enemy by inflicting a crushing blow on him in a timely manner.

The same provision runs like a red thread in the speeches of many Soviet military leaders. Marshal S.S. Biryuzov wrote in one of his articles: "In modern conditions, a surprise attack by an aggressor can entail much more serious consequences. Consequently, officers, generals, and admirals should always focus on the most important task of the initial period of a war—the disruption of a sudden enemy strike and the immediate delivery of a crushing retaliatory blow. And only an army with perfect nuclear missile weapons is capable of solving this problem. It is strategic missiles that can deliver a decisive retaliatory strike against the enemy's main targets—its armed forces, and primarily against strategic nuclear attack weapons. As a result of such a strike, its main goals can be achieved already in the first days of the war.

A similar idea was expressed by the head of the Department of Strategy of the Military Academy of the General Staff, Colonel General N. A. Lomov. In his article "On the Soviet Military Doctrine," he noted: "A new world war can be the result of either a sudden attack by an aggressive bloc, or the outgrowth of a local war. Realistically evaluating the situation, one should consider that against the USSR and other socialist countries the imperialists are preparing precisely a surprise nuclear attack. Therefore, the Soviet military doctrine considers the most important, the most important and top-priority task of the Armed Forces: to be in constant readiness to reliably repel a surprise attack by the enemy and to disrupt his criminal plans.

Disrupting the enemy's nuclear offensive and seizing the strategic initiative—such is one of the main tasks of the initial period of a war. A particularly important role in solving this problem belongs to the Strategic Missile Forces, as well as the Air Defense Forces of the country"?33.

In the 1960s, the opinion was established that the initial period of the war would become not only the decisive, but possibly the only period of the war. It was believed that its main goal would be to disrupt the enemy's nuclear attack and inflict a crushing defeat on him. To achieve it, it was proposed to solve a complex set of strategic tasks. Among the most important of them were: the destruction of the aggressor's means of nuclear attack; rout of deployed or deploying

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its groupings of troops (forces) in the main directions of land and sea theaters of military operations; disruption of mobilization measures and strategic deployment of the armed forces; disorganization of state and military administration; destruction and annihilation of the main sectors of the economy, especially the industry that produces nuclear weapons and their means of delivering them to the target; the capture of important political and economic centers and regions, the capture of which will prevent the enemy from conducting successful military operations in the future; moral and physical suppression of the enemy's will to resist.

In achieving the main goal of the initial period of the war, special attention was paid to seizing the strategic initiative and imposing one's will on the enemy. Regarding this issue, Army General S. M. Shtemenko wrote: "From the very first minutes of the war, a fierce struggle will unfold to seize the strategic initiative. To this end, the belligerents apparently use most of the nuclear warheads, missiles and carrier aircraft available at the beginning of the war.

At the same time, in his opinion, active hostilities on a huge scale should unfold, which will immediately cover both the front and the deep rear. Along with the operations of the air and anti-aircraft forces, as well as ground forces, General Shtemenko proposed the widespread use of air and sea landings,

which will help complete the defeat of the main enemy groupings in the theater.

At the same time, it was believed that an offensive in the main strategic directions could be combined with an active defense in secondary theaters. In any case, the operations being carried out will be distinguished by the utmost decisiveness, enormous exertion of forces and capabilities, the highest dynamism and maneuverability, and the massive use of all types of missiles and nuclear weapons of various capacities. It was noted that in no case should one confine oneself to passive repulsion of enemy strikes, all the more unacceptable is a withdrawal into the interior of the country with the loss of a significant territory, as was the case in the last war. In this, as, indeed, in a number of other issues, one could clearly see an underestimation of the enemy, a simplified approach to the problem of the initial period of the war and the prospects for its possible development.

Particular importance in achieving the goals of the initial period in a nuclear missile war was attached to the preparation and delivery of the first nuclear missile strikes against the enemy. With their help, it was supposed to destroy the main groupings of its armed forces, destroy the most important elements of the economic base, and disrupt the system of state administration. It was believed that these actions could fulfill the main military-political tasks of the initial period of the war, which consisted in defeating the aggressor and undermining his ability to continue the war.

It was assumed that the first nuclear strikes would be delivered by decision of the top political leadership of the country. In this case, after receiving the order, the task of the military leadership is to carefully plan them, prepare and carry out this action in the shortest possible time, excluding the dispersion of forces and means. According to the views of that time, strikes should be planned against the most important areas and targets, the defeat of which would change the balance of forces in our favor to the greatest extent and create favorable conditions for further actions.

It was expected that immediately or some time after the nuclear strikes, the surviving ground groupings, supported by aviation, would go over to a decisive offensive, and where the troops suffered the greatest losses, it would be possible to organize an active defense. In the oceanic and sea theaters of military operations, the surviving forces of the fleet will solve the tasks of destroying aircraft carrier formations against

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nickname, his missile submarines, the disruption of sea and ocean traffic and the protection of their communications.

The duration of the initial period of the war was determined taking into account the possibility of fulfilling the entire complex of listed tasks, as well as the time required to use the accumulated stock of nuclear weapons, complete the mobilization and operational deployment of the Armed Forces. In principle, it was believed that it would be relatively short.

However, all these theoretical calculations contradicted general ideas about the possible nature of a nuclear missile war. Indeed, on the one hand, it was believed that all the main tasks of the war would be solved literally in a matter of hours by the first strike of strategic nuclear forces. On the other hand, it was assumed that in the initial period only its immediate goals would be achieved. At the same time, it was argued that further actions after nuclear strikes could be reduced to a simple occupation of the enemy's lifeless territories, although a whole system of large-scale operations was envisaged.

Taking into account the analysis of these contradictions in the 70s, it was concluded that in relation to an unlimited nuclear war, which will begin and end with nuclear strikes, the concept of "the initial period of the war" loses its former meaning. It was believed that in such a war the culminating point is its first hours, in connection with which the developed strategic periodization of the war turns out to be unrealistic. Consequently, a transition to a different periodization was necessary, which would proceed not from the sequence of strategic tasks being solved, but from the nature of the means of armed struggle used.

The new strategic periodization was based on completely different criteria. Instead of the initial and subsequent periods of war, four main elements were now considered: a period of hostilities with the use of only conventional weapons; a period of limited use of nuclear weapons; a decisive period of unrestricted use of nuclear weapons; the final period of the war. The theory, however, did not exclude the possibility that certain combinations of these periods could find application in practice.

This concept lasted fourteen years. In 1983-1984, when new strategic views were developed regarding possible long-term military operations using only conventional weapons, within which not only the first front-line, but also the first strategic operations were allowed, the concept of the "initial period of the war" was restored. . However, now it had a fundamentally different basis.

Since then, the initial period of the war has come to be understood as the first and most important stage of the war, during which the military-political delimitation of states will take place, the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the parties will be completed, operations prepared in peacetime will begin and will be carried out, aimed at achieving the nearest or the main military-political goals of the war. At the same time, the restructuring of the entire economy and economic system of states from a peaceful to a military situation will begin, with the mobilization of all resources for waging war.

It was believed that the main features of this period of the war would be: the extreme complexity and dynamism of the military-political and strategic situation; performance of tasks by groupings created in peacetime and deployed on mobilization; direct dependence of the course of hostilities on the level of combat readiness of the armed forces of the parties when they enter the war, strategic and operational surprise; maximum decisiveness and activity of military operations, but a particularly sharp and intense struggle for the capture and

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positives; widespread use of high-precision weapons; the need to perform suddenly emerging tasks; the use of new, previously unknown means of armed struggle.

It was assumed that the main goal of military operations in the initial period would be to repulse and disrupt enemy aggression. At the same time, the first and even the second strategic operations can be carried out to repel an enemy aerospace attack, the first front-line, and sometimes strategic defensive, and then counter-offensive operations in the theater, several air operations of long-range aviation, strategic actions will begin on ocean theaters. Thanks to the joint efforts of all branches of the Armed Forces, conditions must be created for achieving a radical change in the conduct of war. When it came to the timing of the initial period, it was emphasized that in a conventional war it would, as a rule, be long. In time, this stage can stretch for 2-3 months, or even more. Its results will have a decisive influence on the subsequent course of the war.

Changed views demanded that special attention be paid to advance planning and comprehensive preparation of operations in the initial period of the war, without which, as they thought, one could not count on success. It was proposed to develop several options for actions (defensive and offensive), and to choose the appropriate option in accordance with the general political decision or immediately before the start of the war, depending on the situation in the threatened period.

In this regard, great importance was attached to the systematic adjustment of plans and the implementation of practical measures to prepare the first operations in peacetime, taking into account the continuous improvement of the means and methods of armed struggle, the development of the economy and science, as well as changes in the international situation.

6. System of strategic actions of the Armed Forces

As is known, the most important categories of military strategy are the types, forms, and methods of military operations. Taken together, they constitute a whole system of strategic actions of the armed forces, covering all types of operations of a strategic and operational-strategic scale, as well as a complex of other interrelated operations and actions aimed at achieving the goals of the war. The fundamental requirements of the military doctrine of the state, the nature of the future war, the tasks and combat capabilities of the armed forces have a decisive influence on their content and development.

After World War II, a fundamentally different system of strategic actions began to take shape in the Soviet Union. This process was complex and contradictory.

In the first post-war period (1945-1953), the Soviet military strategy, as already noted, was based on traditional means of warfare and proceeded entirely from the generalized experience of the recently ended war. It was developed taking into account the increased military and economic capabilities of the state, new US and NATO military doctrines, as well as a serious aggravation of the military and political situation in the world. It was believed that the goals of a future war could be achieved only by joint efforts of all branches of the Armed Forces with the main role of the Ground Forces, and all other branches of the Armed Forces should conduct military operations in their interests. This led to the conclusion that the main types of strategic actions include offensive, counteroffensive and defense.

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The strategic offensive was recognized as the main type of strategic actions. It was envisaged to carry it out in the form of strategic and front-line offensive operations. Strategic operations, as in the years of the last war, were supposed to be carried out by the forces of several front-line formations with the involvement of long-range aviation, airborne troops, the Air Defense Forces of the country, and in operations in coastal areas, the Navy. The goal of the strategic offensive was to completely defeat the main enemy grouping (consisting of 70-100 divisions) in the main strategic axes and achieve a radical change in the situation in one or another theater of operations.

In connection with the growth of the economic and military might of the USSR, the development of the Armed Forces, their complete mechanization and motorization, views on strategic offensive operations have changed. Now it was believed that they would pursue more decisive goals, and their achievement was supposed to be achieved by solving a number of simultaneous and sequential tasks, each of which was the content of the corresponding front-line operation.

The front-line formations belonged to the highest operational, and since 1953 - to the operational-strategic formations of the Armed Forces. They were able to independently defeat large enemy groupings deployed in separate operational or strategic directions. Basically, the methods of their actions remained the same as in the years of the last war, i.e., an operational breakthrough, the encirclement and destruction of the opposing enemy, the dissection of his strategic (operational) front, the fragmentation of the front with the subsequent destruction of encircled groupings, etc. .

Particular attention was paid to the encirclement as the most effective way to defeat the enemy. It was supposed to be carried out by strikes in converging directions or by one or two enveloping strikes in order to press the enemy against a natural barrier (for example, to the sea); at the same time, it was supposed to dismember and destroy the pressed enemy. An indispensable condition for the success of an encirclement operation is the blocking of an isolated grouping from the air, and in coastal directions from the sea.

One of the important methods of conducting a strategic offensive was considered to be the cutting of a large enemy grouping by delivering powerful blows to the entire depth of the operation by interacting fronts, followed by its destruction piecemeal. In achieving the goal of the operation of dissection, a large role was assigned to the massive use of armored and mechanized troops and aircraft operating in the main direction.

It was planned to crush the enemy's strategic front by delivering a series of strong blows in a wide zone with the development of an offensive in depth along parallel or divergent directions. This method ensured the secrecy of the preparation of the operation and made it difficult for the enemy to maneuver, since it pinned down his forces on a wide front. However, to break through the defenses in several areas, it was necessary to attract a large number of troops and equipment? ° °.

In accordance with theoretical guidelines, the opinion has been established that a strategic offensive can be carried out in one or two, or even in three strategic directions with access to a strategically important line. However, to completely defeat the enemy in the theater of operations, it was necessary to carry out several more simultaneous and successive strategic operations, closely related to each other by a common goal and a single plan.

In comparison with the last war, the spatial indicators of strategic operations have increased by about one and a half times. So, in a strategic exercise, which

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was carried out in 1948 in Ukraine with the involvement of the troops of the Carpathian, Odessa, Kiev, Taurida military districts and the forces of the Black Sea Fleet, the strategic operation was planned on a front of 1200 km and to a depth of 750 km. And in 1950, during maneuvers in Belarus, a similar operation was supposed to be carried out in a strip of up to 1000 km and to a depth of 700-850 km.

In each specific case, as a rule, 890-120 divisions or more, 20-30 thousand guns and mortars, 6-8 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 4-6 thousand combat aircraft were involved in the operation. This made it possible to create higher densities of forces and means in the directions of the main strikes, but especially in the breakthrough areas.

An important role in strategic offensive operations was assigned to the Air Force, the Air Defense Forces, the airborne troops, and the Navy. They could not only participate in the operations of the fronts, solving the tasks determined by the plan of such actions, but also conduct independent operations.

The presence of large reserves at the disposal of the Supreme High Command was considered an indispensable condition for the successful conduct of strategic operations.

In accordance with the theoretical views that took shape in the 1950s, the strategic offensive should have been different from similar actions during the Great Patriotic War by higher activity, decisiveness and continuity of action, wide maneuver of forces and means, firm and continuous command and control of troops. .

The strategic counteroffensive began to be regarded as a special, most complex type of offensive. It was believed that it could be carried out by the forces of one or several fronts with the aim of eliminating the enemy offensive, inflicting a decisive defeat on his main strike force, seizing the strategic initiative, restoring the lost position, capturing important areas and advantageous lines. In the event of its successful implementation, it could develop into a general strategic offensive.

To achieve the goals of a counteroffensive, it was necessary, first of all, to exhaust the forces of the advancing enemy, to maintain the combat readiness of one's troops during defensive battles, to regroup and concentrate reserves in a timely manner, to gain air supremacy, and to create the necessary superiority in forces and means in decisive directions.

It was assumed that the counteroffensive could begin in various conditions of the situation. Most often - after stopping the enemy by the defenders, as well as during the ongoing advance of his grouping.

In individual cases, above all, if the adversary's advance threatened to lose politically, economically, and militarily important regions and lines, or if strategic surprise had been clearly achieved, a counteroffensive was allowed if forces were equal or even if their overall ratio was unfavorable.

Thus, the theory of the strategic offensive remained basically on the positions of the war years. As before, there was an opinion about the creation of high operational densities of forces and means in the main directions, especially in breakthrough areas.

Strategic defense was not given due attention. It was recognized only as a temporary form of strategic action. It was assumed that it could be organized under the pressure of circumstances and carried out in the form of strategic defensive operations of several fronts, closely cooperating with long-range aviation, the Air Defense Forces, and, in coastal areas, with the forces of the fleet.

As in the last war, the main goal of this type of strategic action was to repel, slow down, and at best stop on

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advance of the enemy, bleed his strike groups, buy time to create favorable

conditions for the subsequent transition to the offensive. It was also possible to conduct defense to secure important areas or lines captured from the enemy, as well as to cover the border areas of the country or individual directions. At the same time, post-war theory insistently emphasized that defense, as a type of military action on a strategic scale, achieves only limited goals, so its application can only be of a temporary nature. It was considered reasonable to resort to strategic defense in those conditions when, in the current situation, an offensive turned out to be impossible or inexpedient, or it was necessary to ensure an offensive in other, more promising areas of the theater of operations.

The Operations Manual, developed in early 1952, set out clear requirements for strategic defense. It indicated that it should be deeply echeloned, active, irresistible in anti-tank, anti-air and anti-amphibious relations. Along with a powerful first echelon, it was recommended to have strong second echelons and reserves for various purposes in the defensive grouping. Methods of conducting strategic defense could be very diverse. Their choice largely depended on the conditions of the situation, primarily on the nature of the enemy offensive. Based on the experience of the last war, the main methods were recognized as persistent and active defense of the occupied lines by the troops of the first echelon, powerful counter-training, army and front-line counterattacks, defeat of advancing enemy groupings by massive air strikes, artillery and other means of combat.

In general, the development of the theory of strategic defense in those years went in the direction of reducing the time for its preparation, improving the methods of using the branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms, increasing the stability of defense, which was reflected in an increase in the depth of its construction, the requirements for careful equipment in engineering terms. defensive lines, active use of strategic reserves.

Views on the strategic use of the Air Force, the Air Defense Forces and the Navy received their further development in the first post-war years.

One of the forms of strategic use of the Air Force was the air operation. It was supposed to be carried out with the aim of gaining air supremacy and destroying important objects in the rear of the enemy. To carry out the air operation, it was planned to involve several armies of front-line and long-range aviation, as well as aviation of the fleets and air defense of the country.

Based on the experience of the war, it was believed that the conquest of air supremacy and its strong retention is one of the most important conditions for the successful conduct of military operations on land and sea, the reliable protection of vital centers in the interior of the country, especially in the initial period of the war. The defeat of enemy aircraft in air battles was seen as the main way to gain and maintain air supremacy in a particular theater of operations or in the main strategic direction.

Massive strikes against airfields, transport hubs, and enemy government facilities were recognized as the main method of conducting air operations.

In the first post-war years, due to the rapid quantitative and qualitative growth of aviation in the USA and NATO, the creation of atomic bombs, much attention was paid to

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in the USSR, it was given to the strategic use of the country's Air Defense Forces. It was planned to expand the scope of their responsibility to provide reliable air cover for the political, administrative and economic centers of the country and, of course, the main groupings of the Armed Forces. Proceeding from this, the beginning of the development of the theory of anti-aircraft operations was laid.

The strategic use of the Navy was envisaged in the form of independent naval operations and joint actions with the ground forces. Based on the experience of the last war, theoreticians believed that independent naval operations could be carried out with the aim of defeating the groupings of enemy fleet forces, as well as disrupting its maritime and ocean transportation. But still, the main task of the fleet, in their opinion, remained to assist the ground forces in coastal areas.

In the first post-war period, a significant step in the development of strategy was the development of the theory of airborne operations carried out by airborne troops*.

In accordance with accepted views, this form of action included both independent airborne operations and operations carried out in the interests of the ground forces and navy in order to capture strategic and operational facilities, enemy bridgeheads, create a new armed struggle front, and assist the internal forces. resistance in the territory captured by the enemy.

In the mid-1960s, due to a sharp change in the concept regarding the nature of a possible war, views on the methods of strategic actions of the Armed Forces underwent a radical revision. The fact is that the theory of strategic actions that existed until now, assigning the main role to the Ground Forces, no longer met the requirements of a nuclear missile war. The economy, the system of state administration, strategic nuclear weapons, the armed forces of the aggressor - all this became quite within the reach of nuclear missile weapons, and therefore could be destroyed in a short time, and not only to the entire depth of the theater of military operations, but also in outside of it.

Strategic missile troops, strategic aviation and nuclear missile submarines have become capable of solving the main tasks of the war. Nuclear missiles have greatly expanded

the scope of the war. From now on, it could simultaneously cover the entire territory of the states that are part of the enemy coalition, and not just the theaters of military operations, as was the case in the last war. Massed nuclear strikes by strategic means made it possible to achieve political goals in a shorter period of time.

Under such conditions, there was no need to divide strategic actions into strategic offensive and defense. Now strategic defense as such was ruled out altogether. The possibility of conducting it only on an operational, most often on an army scale, was allowed. Military theorists unanimously asserted that a nuclear war has the peculiarity of presenting the Armed Forces with a choice: either attack or suffer defeat. Based on this, the main types of strategic actions were recognized as: missile operations, operations to protect the country's territory and groupings of troops from enemy nuclear strikes, strategic offensive operations in land theaters and military operations in maritime theaters. Each of these types of strategic actions corresponded to quite specific goals and forms of use of forces and means.

Missile operations were supposed to be carried out with the aim of destroying strategic nuclear forces and facilities that form the basis of the military-economic

* In 1946, the Airborne Forces were withdrawn from the Air Force.

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Scheme 54 The system of strategic operations of the Armed Forces of the USSR (according to the views of the 60s - 70s)

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enemy potential, violation of the system of his state and military administration, defeat of the enemy's main groupings of troops. This type of strategic action was embodied in the form of retaliatory nuclear missile strikes by the Strategic Missile Forces, as well as in long-range air operations.

The strategic offensive on land theaters was supposed to be carried out to complete the defeat of enemy groupings, capture strategically important objects (regions) of the enemy and occupy (occupy) its territory.

Special importance was attached to strategic actions to protect the territory of one's own country and one's own groupings of troops from enemy nuclear strikes. This was due to the fact that the successful conduct of the war and ensuring the normal functioning of the state was considered impossible until the

reliable air defense of the state with the use of the latest means of combat. The system of such actions assumed the repulsion of enemy air atomic strikes against the most important administrative, political and economic centers, groupings of missile forces, aviation and navy, areas of formation of reserves and other objects. The defense of the country from enemy nuclear strikes was conceived in the form of anti-aircraft operations of the country's Air Defense Forces. It was assumed that they would be assisted in solving these problems by the Strategic Rocket Forces.

Military operations in the maritime theaters pursued the goal of defeating the groupings of the enemy fleet, disrupting its sea and ocean communications, protecting the communications of the USSR Navy and the coast from sea attacks. It was believed that equipping the fleet with nuclear weapons, nuclear-powered missile submarines and long-range missile aviation would open up great opportunities for it to successfully conduct armed struggle in the sea and ocean.

The actions of all branches of the Armed Forces, as before, were to be strictly coordinated with each other. At the same time, all pre-existing principles of conducting operations were radically revised. Their spatial and temporal standards have undergone a radical change. For example, front-line offensive operations were planned to be carried out in zones 500-600 km wide and up to 1,000 km deep at an average rate of 100 km per day. It was with such a spatial scope that these operations were planned during the exercises "Storm" (1964), "Dnepr" (1967), "West" (1969).

In the 1970s, in connection with the clarification of views on war and the further development of the means of armed struggle, the entire system of strategic actions of the Armed Forces was again revised. As already mentioned, the main forms of strategic operations began to include operations of strategic nuclear forces, strategic operations in continental theaters of operations, strategic operations in oceanic theaters of operations, and strategic actions to repel an enemy aerospace attack. In addition to them, it was planned to conduct air operations in continental and ocean theaters with strategic goals. Electronic warfare has become an integral part of all military operations as one of the main measures for their comprehensive support.

Based on the views on the general nature of strategic actions developed by that time, it was believed that the basis of a future war would be a system of interconnected strategic operations of the Armed Forces, carried out according to a single plan of the Supreme High Command in three areas: on the continents, in aerospace, in the oceans and seas. It was recognized that regardless of the methods of unleashing a war by the aggressor and the difference in the conditions in which the Armed Forces

THE GENERAL POLITICAL PURPOSE OF THE WAR

Military-political tasks by directions and regions

General military-strategic tasks Tasks of the Armed Forces of the Civil Defense

Private military-strategic tasks of the Armed Forces

Deployment Strategic Deployment center. Rear deployment of the sun system. GO S

Global Strategic Operations B

Operation

Military-political tasks

o

by periods of war

Tasks of other formations

Operation-Operation-Operation-Operation-Opera- tions

Strategic operations in theaters of war (regional operations)

Strategic advance (counterattack) operas.

Strategic operations | | Strategic WHO

surgeries for air condi- tional surgeries

nental TVD

on oceanic GVD

to the continent. TVD

Operational - strategic operations

Front. come

Ocean operations (counteroffensive)

Private front Private front Naval operations will defend operations offensive operations will defend operations

closed seas fleets

Air operations! | | Air || |Air Operations in Theater Operations Operations in Theater of Operations in Oceanic GVD Anti-Air Operations
|| | Marine landing operations in the theater of operations in the theater of operations Amphibious operations Anti-amphibious
operations Naval anti-landing operations in the theater of operations landing operations Other operations defense operations GO

Scheme 55 Strategic actions of the Armed Forces of the USSR (according to the views of the 70s - 80s)

The front will defend operations

Air Operations A

Air operations front. aviation

Rocket fire strikes

Fleet Operations Operations

coastal fleets

closed seas

Operations of the Aerospace Forces

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Soviet forces will enter into hostilities, the decisive act of a world nuclear war will be the first strike of strategic nuclear forces.

According to the then existing views, the actions of strategic nuclear forces (SNF) were a system of strategic nuclear strikes carried out by various types of strategic nuclear forces according to a single plan and plan of the Supreme High Command against the most important enemy targets in the theater of operations and other remote territories. The purpose of these actions was to inflict a decisive defeat on the main states of the enemy coalition and withdraw allied countries from the nuclear war. It was assumed that this goal could be achieved by destroying the military-economic base of the enemy, his state and military administration, destroying nuclear weapons, the most important objects and groupings of the armed forces. To carry out these tasks, it was envisaged to involve the Strategic Missile Forces, strategic nuclear missile submarines and long-range aviation.

The most important component of the strategic nuclear forces was the Strategic Rocket Forces. Possessing high combat readiness and exceptional speed, they were capable of carrying out nuclear strikes against the enemy's most important strategic targets located anywhere in the world in tens of minutes. It was believed that even in the event of a sudden nuclear attack by the aggressor, the Strategic Missile Forces would be able to strike back with the main part of the launchers even before the warheads of enemy missiles reached Soviet territory. The tasks assigned to the missile troops were planned to be solved by delivering massive, group and single strikes.

Strategic missile submarines armed with ballistic missiles had high mobility, secrecy of maneuver, freedom in choosing areas of firing positions, low vulnerability and high survivability. Their share in the strategic nuclear forces was constantly increasing. Taking into account these circumstances, it was believed that, depending on the conditions of deployment and the order of commissioning, missile submarines would solve the problem of delivering simultaneous or successive strikes against the most important strategic targets of the enemy, mainly in overseas territory, in order to successfully defeat

of which the short flight time of the missiles was important.

Objects of destruction for missile submarines were determined taking into account the use of other components of the triad of nuclear forces. So, if the main efforts of the Strategic Missile Forces were aimed at destroying the enemy's nuclear missile forces, then missile submarines were used mainly to destroy military economic base facilities, strategic aviation airfields, missile attack warning systems, missile defense facilities and other critical facilities.

Long-range aviation was supposed to be used mainly to destroy the remaining and newly identified strategic targets of the enemy, primarily to destroy the most important parts of the military industry and energy, air bases, operational-tactical missiles at launch positions, nuclear weapons depots, objects of state and military control and groupings of troops, and mainly in areas not affected by the strikes of the Strategic Missile Forces and nuclear missile submarines. Some of its forces were supposed to be used in cooperation with the Navy to strike at enemy sea targets: aircraft carriers, missile submarines, surface anti-submarine forces and facilities supporting their combat activities.

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The actions of the strategic forces were planned, as a rule, in the following sequence: inflicting the first

Nuclear missile strikes by all (or part of) combat-ready launchers of the Strategic Missile Forces; delivering subsequent strikes to the Strategic Missile Forces; conducting maritime operations to destroy enemy ground facilities by strikes from strategic submarines deployed in combat areas in advance or during the outbreak of war; conducting air operations by long-range aviation and, in their dynamics, delivering the first and subsequent strikes using nuclear weapons.

The actions of strategic nuclear forces were supposed to be carried out simultaneously in all theaters of military operations and remote territories. But such an option was also not ruled out, when strikes on some territories would have to be delivered with a shift in time or they would have to be removed altogether.

A special place in the actions of strategic nuclear forces was assigned to massive nuclear strikes against targets in overseas territories, where the main group of strategic missiles and aviation was based, where the production base of the military and economic power of the main probable adversary of the USSR and its allies.

It was believed that the first massive nuclear strike could be launched at the start of a war, after the end of a period of hostilities using conventional weapons, or immediately following a limited use of nuclear weapons. The right to make a decision on its application belonged to the political leadership of the country. It was also within his competence to determine the time and scale of its implementation, as well as the sequence of bringing nuclear forces into action.

It was assumed that the first strike would be delivered on a global scale, and simultaneously against objects located not only in all theaters of operations, but also in overseas territories with the involvement of all combat-ready strategic nuclear forces and means. Along with this strike of strategic nuclear forces, strikes with operational-tactical nuclear weapons were planned.

In the event of a sudden nuclear attack by the aggressor and lack of time to prepare all carriers after the warning about the launch of enemy missiles, only those forces and means that had the highest combat readiness were supposed to be involved in the first strike, the rest were supposed to be introduced as soon as they were ready. . The following variant was also allowed: strategic nuclear forces are involved in the sequential destruction of objects in theaters and overseas territories or selective destruction of targets and objects of certain countries that were part of a hostile coalition.

The Soviet military strategy recognized that, depending on the specific conditions of the military-political situation, the readiness of nuclear forces and the sequence in which they were put into action, the time for the implementation of the first nuclear strike could have a different duration. In the event that by the beginning of a nuclear war all the nuclear forces of the USSR were in full combat readiness, it was considered expedient to deliver this strike at the time set by the Supreme High Command with a volley of ballistic missiles while simultaneously lifting long-range aviation into the air. According to this option, the total duration of the strike, as shown by preliminary calculations, would be 4-5 hours on the continental theater of operations and 10-12 hours on overseas territories.

As a result of the first strikes of the strategic nuclear forces of the parties, the entire strategic situation in the world will radically change. Within a few hours, vital facilities and areas of enemy states will be destroyed, serious damage will be inflicted on enemy groupings, and their control will be disrupted for some time.

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Many cities will be destroyed, and this threatens the population with great losses, the work of the rear will be paralyzed. In some countries, especially those with a small territory, life activity will completely stop.

Subsequent strikes of strategic nuclear forces were supposed to be carried out with the remaining means, taking into account the specific conditions of the situation, the results of the first nuclear strikes of the parties, the state of the strategic nuclear forces and their control systems, reconnaissance results, the number of targets not hit by previous strikes, the speed of retargeting forces and means, recovery time the combat readiness of formations and units of the Strategic Missile Forces, long-range aviation and naval forces, as well as carrying out other measures aimed at eliminating the consequences of a nuclear attack by an aggressor.

Strategic actions to repel an enemy aerospace attack were considered as the second global form of employment of the Armed Forces in nuclear and conventional warfare. The theory of these actions arose on the basis of the theory of anti-aircraft operations of the Air Defense Forces back in the 60s. But then it was essentially only anti-aircraft operations. In the 1970s and especially in the 1980s, the country and the Armed Forces faced a fundamentally different strategic task. The development of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles for various purposes, the possibility of widespread use of military space means required the organization of more reliable protection not only from aerodynamic, but also from ballistic attack weapons of the enemy. The question arose of creating a unified aerospace defense system that organically includes anti-aircraft, anti-missile and anti-space defense, as well as an enemy missile attack warning system and a space control system.

An analysis of the state and directions of development of the aerospace attack forces of potential adversaries, their views on the role, tasks and forms of use of these forces in modern warfare led Soviet military-strategic thought to an unambiguous conclusion: in order to ensure reliable protection of the USSR and the Armed Forces, it is necessary to oppose the strategic actions of the enemy's aerospace attack forces with strategic actions of their own Armed Forces that are appropriate in scale and even more decisive in terms of goals. The main form of such actions was the strategic operation to repel air

Initially, such a strategic operation was planned to be carried out by the Air Defense Forces of the country in cooperation with the air defense forces and means of other branches of the Armed Forces. However, in the course of further research, it turned out that it was impossible to achieve its goals, and even more so to thwart an aerospace attack only by destroying its aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, strike and support means in flight, even with the close interaction of all air defense forces and means. This task will be accomplished only if the forces and means of various branches of the Armed Forces are involved, and moreover, to destroy enemy aerospace attack means not only in flight, but also on land, sea and in space.

In this regard, a strategic operation to repel an enemy aerospace attack began to be viewed as a set of coordinated and interconnected in terms of purpose, place and time of air defense operations, strikes and combat operations of all branches of the Armed Forces with the decisive role of the country's Air Defense Forces, carried out according to a single plan and under general leadership of the Supreme High Command.

It was planned to involve in such a strategic operation: individual armies (districts) of air defense, formations (units) of anti-aircraft

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missile and anti-space defense, formations (formations) of missile attack warning, air defense troops and air forces of fronts, military districts, fleets, individual air armies, electronic warfare units of fronts, military districts, fleets and the reserve of the Supreme Head - nocommands, as well as strategic nuclear weapons and missile forces of the fronts.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the following were considered the most important components of a strategic operation to repel an enemy aerospace attack: the first and subsequent anti-aircraft operations, as well as the systematic combat operations of individual air defense formations; combat operations of formations (formations) of antimissile and antispace defense; the first and subsequent air defense operations in the continental theater; combat operations of air defense forces and means on ocean theaters of operations; combat operations of the air defense forces, fighter aviation of the internal districts; strikes by a part of the strategic nuclear forces, front-line aviation, missile troops and artillery of the fronts against missile and air bases, command posts and navigation systems of the enemy; combat operations of part of the forces of the fleets to destroy enemy missile submarines and aircraft carrier formations.

At the same time, it was assumed that in the system of a strategic operation to repel an aerospace attack by the enemy, strikes by other branches of the Armed Forces would be delivered both according to the plans for the operation of strategic nuclear forces and according to the plan of strategic operations in continental and ocean theaters. However, all of them will be carried out in a single plan for the aerospace operation.

The spatial scope of a strategic operation to repel an aerospace attack, according to theorists, depended on the content and nature of the war, the width of the aggressor's invasion front, and the depth of its penetration into the airspace of the USSR. The probability that the enemy will carry out an aerospace attack either on a global scale or simultaneously in the main theaters of military operations was taken into account. It was not ruled out that in most cases such an operation could cover all or several strategic military space areas, and, moreover, to the entire depth of the country's territory.

According to the then prevailing views, the duration of this operation was determined from the moment the enemy's aerospace attack forces were detected until the time when the aggressor would be forced to abandon further conduct of his aerospace operation. Theoretical calculations and the experience of many strategic exercises (such as "Zenith") have shown that a strategic operation to repel an airborne enemy attack can last from 2-3 to 5-7 days or more. Its characteristic features are the decisiveness of goals, the exceptional complexity of the situation, the transience and abrupt changes, high maneuverability, tension and intensity of combat operations, the need for repeated restoration of the destroyed aerospace defense system, a large volume of tasks and the complexity of control.

The indispensable conditions for the successful conduct of the operation were recognized as a clear organization of the interaction of forces and means that were part of all types of the Armed Forces and carried out combat operations in various theaters of operations, a high degree of automation of command and control, high professional, physical and moral and psychological training of personnel. In this regard, particular importance was attached to such issues as the timely opening of preparations, identification of the beginning of an enemy missile and air attack, determination of the formation of its forces and

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possible intentions for their use, establishing the procedure for using electronic countermeasures, radio navigation and control systems for enemy aerospace attacks, as well as a clear organization of all types of support.

Air operations were originally supposed to be carried out only within the framework of strategic operations in continental and ocean theaters. Subsequently, they could also be carried out on the scale of operations of strategic nuclear forces.

According to the views that had developed by the end of the 1970s, air operations were military operations of the Air Force and aviation of other branches of the Armed Forces, including the allied armies, coordinated in terms of objectives, place and time, carried out according to a single plan and plan on one or more adjacent

continental and ocean theaters. They were planned to be carried out not only at the beginning of the war with the use of conventional weapons, but also in the case of the use of nuclear weapons.

It was believed that the goal of the air operation should be to change the balance of forces in the air in favor of the Soviet side, to decisively weaken the enemy's nuclear missile group and provide favorable conditions for the operations of its ground forces and the Navy. To achieve it, it was necessary to perform a complex set of operational tasks. The most important of them are the following: destruction of enemy aircraft and personnel; destruction, blocking and mining of airfields; destruction of operational and tactical nuclear complexes, depots and points of supply of nuclear weapons; defeat and suppression of anti-aircraft missile systems and anti-aircraft artillery; destruction and suppression of control points for aviation, missile weapons and air defense systems. The fulfillment of the listed complex of tasks was assigned mainly to the long-range and front-line fighter aviation of the associations of the Air Defense Forces of the country and the aviation of the fleet.

The concept of the air operation was worked out on the basis of the experience of exercises of the "Air" type. It was assumed that it would include interconnected massive air strikes, layered actions of the Air Force against selected objects and targets, as well as a system of air battles and battles. As for the most important principles of conducting an air operation, the theory of strategy proceeded from the need for a decisive massing of the efforts of aviation, other forces and means to defeat the main aviation and nuclear missile grouping of the enemy in a short time, a combination of surprise strikes and continuity of impact on the enemy aviation in the air and at airfields, the implementation of a deep maneuver of forces for the consistent defeat of enemy air groupings and nuclear weapons in various directions and theater of operations.

In accordance with the views of the 1970s, strategic operations in the continental theaters of military operations were a fundamentally new form of strategic operations of the Armed Forces. It differed from those used during the Great Patriotic War and proposed by the theory in the 1950s and 1960s in the following three circumstances.

First of all, it was assumed that the basis of such operations would be coordinated fire and nuclear strikes carried out at the very beginning of the war throughout the entire depth of the continent. In terms of its scope, such an operation should cover the entire theater of operations both in front and in depth. Finally, such a strategic operation will combine a complex of offensive and defensive actions, but with the priority of the former.

According to the views formed in the late 70s, the strategic operation in the continental theater was a set of coordinated and mutually

The purpose of the operation: the defeat of the armed forces in the theater and

WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WAR defined state

Strategic indicators of the operation

Front of attack: Depth of advance: Duration` 1000-1500 km 90-1200 km up to 30-35 days

The main strategic tasks of the Armed Forces in the operation

Immediate (performed first Further (performed by subsequent front operations) tasks by front operations) tasks Depth Duration. Pace Depth Duration Pace 500-600 km! | 10— 12 days | | 20 km / day. 600-700 km! | 12-20 days | 120 km/day Perv. opera up to 300 km

First opera 250-300 km

Second opera. up to 350 km

Second opera 250-300 km

Elements of Operations

1) the first front | | 2) second front-line 3) private 4) air

offensive operations

5) anti-aircraft 6) landing 7) fleet operations 8) operations operations in the theater of operations operations in the theater of mobile operations forces

Separate massive missile and fire gifts

offensive defensive operations in the theater operations operations

Composition of participating forces

- fronts - 2-4

- combined arms and tank armies - 6-10 - air armies - 2-3 - divisions -. 25-30 - fleets, VDD - 1 -2

Scheme 56 The structure of a strategic offensive operation in the continental theater of operations (according to the views of the 70s - 80s)

related in purpose, place and time of strikes, operations and combat actions of various types of the Armed Forces, united by a single plan and carried out under the general leadership of the Supreme High Command to achieve the strategic goal of the war in a given theater. The specific composition of the grouping of the Armed Forces for such an operation was determined taking into account the specifics of the theater of operations, the purpose of the operation, the strategic tasks to be solved in it, and other factors were also taken into account. It was assumed that several fronts, a fleet, as well as formations and formations of other branches of the Armed Forces would participate in such an operation.

The theory recognized that in a nuclear war, the main role in a strategic operation in a continental theater of operations would belong to formations and formations of medium-range missiles, which were entrusted with the destruction of strategic and operational-tactical nuclear weapons of the enemy, stockpiles of his nuclear weapons. in the depths of the theatre, the destruction of centers and objects of the military economy, the destruction of state administration posts, command posts and communication centers of the strategic and operational levels of command, the defeat of large groupings of the enemy's armed forces, as well as the destruction of communication centers and the destruction of other equally important objects.

When using conventional weapons, the main role in such an operation belonged to the Ground Forces, whose main task was to defeat the opposing enemy groupings and seize his territory.

In the course of a strategic operation in the theater of operations, Air Force formations and formations had to solve the tasks of destroying or weakening enemy aviation and nuclear missile groups, supporting combat operations of ground troops, naval forces and landing forces, covering them from air strikes, and combating reserve forces. you of the enemy, the destruction of his military industry facilities and communication centers, the disorganization of state and military administration, the disruption of the enemy's operational-strategic transportation, air reconnaissance, the transfer of friendly troops and materiel by air. They could perform these tasks both independently and in cooperation with the forces and means of other branches of the Armed Forces.

Border (front-line) formations and formations of the Air Defense Forces of the country were supposed to cover the most important economic regions and centers, large communication centers and other important objects, as well as groupings of the Armed Forces, objects of operational rear and rear of the center from enemy attacks from aerospace. , naval bases.

The fleet was tasked with defeating the main groupings of the enemy's naval forces in the marine part of the theater of operations, destroying its ground facilities on the coast and in depth, assisting the troops of the fronts in the offensive in coastal areas, forcing wide water barriers and capturing strait zones, to ensure amphibious landings, blocking enemy groupings pressed to the sea, disruption of his amphibious operations, disruption of maritime transportation and ensuring the transportation of friendly troops by sea and magical funds.

Based on the experience of strategic exercises conducted in the 70s ("Spring-73", "West-74", "West-77", "East-74", "South-80", etc.), during the strategic operation in the theater included: massive nuclear strikes on objects and targets within the boundaries of the theater (in a nuclear war); massive missile and fire and air strikes (when conducting combat operations by conventional means); first and subsequent offensive operations; the first and subsequent front-line defensive operations; air operations in the theater of operations with the participation of aviation of various branches of the Armed Forces; one or two long-range aviation operations to solve independent tasks; one or two airborne operations; border fighting (with

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front-line) associations and formations of the Air Defense Forces of the country; naval operations of the fleets to defeat the enemy in the maritime theaters of operations and in the areas of the ocean adjacent to the continental theater of operations, as well as to assist the troops of the fronts operating in coastal areas.

It is noteworthy that the actions tested during the exercises became the basis for real strategic planning of operations in the West, East and South. At the same time, it was believed that in a nuclear war in each theater of operations, combat operations would be limited to conducting only one strategic operation. At first it was assumed that even in a conventional war a continuous offensive would ensure the completion of the defeat of the enemy throughout the entire depth of the theatre. However, later it had to be recognized that in a number of cases, in order to achieve this goal, not one, but two or even three successive strategic operations:

The duration of a strategic operation was determined by the time needed for ground forces to capture vital areas of enemy territory. Thus, in the Western theater of operations, the depth of which was 1,200–1,500 km from the state borders of the countries that were part of the Warsaw Pact, the duration of a strategic operation with an average daily front advance rate of 30–35 km was determined to be 30–35 days or more. A similar operation on the Eastern Theater of Operations was calculated within 40-45 days. In the case of the use of nuclear weapons by the parties, decisive importance for achieving success was given to the skillful delivery of the first massive nuclear strike against the enemy, the skillful use of its results, the effective repulsion of the enemy's nuclear offensive and the rapid restoration of the combat capability of friendly troops.

In operations using only conventional weapons, the defeat of the enemy was supposed to be carried out successively by the forces of front-line formations and aviation of the Navy. A special role in achieving this goal was assigned to the first front-line offensive, and in the secondary directions - to the first defensive operations, during which it was planned to seize the strategic initiative, ensuring that

the fulfillment by associations of the nearest strategic tasks. At the same time, the indicators of the scope of such operations had to be revised again. The dynamics of these changes is presented in Table 12.

The table shows that every 5-10 years the scope of the operation changed. Gradually, the strategic operation spreads to the entire theater of operations, and the depth of the front-line operation first increases to | thousand km, and then reduced by 1.5-2 times, reaching the parameters of the early 50s. Approximately the same trend emerged in the dynamics of changes in the rate of advance: at first they increased to 100 km per day, and in 1985 they decreased to 25-30 km per day.

Changes in indicators of the scope of the operation are due not only to the development of means of armed struggle. This is largely due to a subjective approach to strategic planning, and most importantly, not always a correct assessment of the real conditions of a nuclear war and a deliberate downplaying of the enemy's capabilities. It is quite obvious that even in the case of the unilateral use of nuclear weapons, due to the great destruction and losses, an offensive rate of 100 km per day would be absolutely unrealistic if the enemy used massive nuclear weapons in response. And with his preemptive strike, they would most likely be reduced to zero. In any case, for a long time the troops could not conduct any offensive operations.

Thus, it was only in the 1980s that the Soviet strategy succeeded in fully understanding the realities and adjusting the indicators of the scope of operations to acceptable parameters.

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Table 12 Indicators of the scope of strategic and front-line offensive operations (according to the experience of exercises)

Width	Depth	Average pace	- Duration
front of operations	offensive rate of operation (km)	(km)	(km/day) (day)
1945-1953	up to 1000	700-800	20-25 30-35
1954-1960	up to 1000	up to 1000	50-80 up to 20
1961-1970	up to 1000	1000-1200	80-100 20-25
1971-1980	entire theater of operations	40-90 30-35	(1500-2500 (1500 or more) and more)
1981-1985	entire theater of operations	entire theater of operations	entire theater of operations
entire theater of operations	in 20-95	45-50	(1500-2500 nuclear war, and more and more)
1000-1500	conventional war)	Front-line	operations
1945-1953	300-500	350-500	20-25 15-20
1954-1960	500-600	to 600	70-80 12-15
1961-1970	up to 600	up to 1000	up to 100
10-12	1971-1980	500 or more	700-750 up to 50
15-20	1981-1985	500 or more	500-700 25-30 20-25
in conventional war)			

It should be emphasized that since the mid-1970s, the approach to the very essence of the methods of action in a strategic operation in the theater began to change. In fact, it turned into a ground-rocket-air operation. At the same time, in terms of importance, combat in the air began to be recognized as important, and in some circumstances even more relevant than combat operations on the ground.

In the actions of the Ground Forces, special attention was now paid to the rapid breakthroughs and raids of the so-called operational-maneuvering groups into the depths of the enemy's defenses. But the task of gaining air supremacy from the very beginning of the war was especially acute. Rocket and fire superiority over the aggressor acquired a central place in operations. In achieving the goals of the operation, the importance of fighting at sea increased, taking into account the growing capabilities of the enemy.

The approach to strategic defense has also changed. As already noted, in the 60s strategic defense was generally denied. However, in the 1970s, military-theoretical views on this type of strategic actions began to be restored in their rights. The theory of a front-line defensive operation was developed. At the same time, it was believed that in the Western theater of operations the front could conduct such an operation in the zone of 500-600 km, and in the Eastern theater - 1,000-2,000 km. The front defense was supposed to be created to a depth of up to 300 km, within which it was planned to equip 3-4 defensive lines: the first of two lines, then an army line, one or two front lines.

In all cases, the front-line defensive operation was planned to be carried out with the utmost activity, inflicting retaliatory missile-fire, aviation, and in nuclei

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In any war, first of all, nuclear strikes, to carry out decisive counterattacks and to carry out a swift maneuver of forces and means. It was aimed at creating conditions for a counteroffensive and a decisive offensive.

Front-line defensive operations were systematically practiced in numerous exercises held in all strategic directions. They were also provided for in real plans. Since the mid-1970s, almost all front-line formations have been preparing to conduct either defensive or offensive operations with the outbreak of war. However, regardless of the situation, the offensive option remained the main method of action.

As for strategic defense, it was conceived only within the framework of a single strategic operation in the theater of operations. It was supposed to be one of the particular elements of the operation designed to repel a surprise attack by the aggressor. It was planned to achieve this goal within a short time (no more than 5-7 days) by conducting the first army, in extreme cases, the first front-line defensive operations. In the future, it was supposed to launch a rapid strategic offensive to the entire depth of the theater. It is noteworthy that in the course of a strategic offensive, separate defensive operations were not excluded for a short time, mainly on an army or frontal scale, to repel counterattacks or an enemy counteroffensive that had begun.

It is important to note that questions relating to the strategic defensive operation in the theater of operations in relation to the East, and then to the West, were raised only in the early 1980s. However, this was done very timidly. In those years, they were considered only in theory, and they were never practiced during exercises.

The theory of a strategic defensive operation in a theater of operations received its official recognition only in the 1980s. It was reflected in the second edition of the Fundamentals of the preparation and conduct of operations of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and was tested for the first time at the Center-84 exercise. In 1988, it was worked out most carefully under the leadership of the Minister of Defense, General Yazov, at a strategic exercise in the European part of the USSR.

A strategic operation in the oceanic theater of operations began to be developed in the mid-1970s. The main military-theoretical provisions were tested in the strategic exercises "Atlantic" (1978) and "Ocean" (1979). The General Staff and the main headquarters of the Navy participated in its development. An important role in this regard belonged to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet S. G. Gorshkov. The theory of the strategic operation in the ocean theater took shape in its final form by 1980. At the same time, it was actually planned for the Atlantic and Pacific theaters of military operations.

In essence, a strategic operation in the oceanic theater of operations was a set of coordinated operations and combat operations of the fleets, as well as formations and formations of other branches of the Armed Forces, carried out according to a single concept and plan in order to defeat the main groupings of the enemy's naval forces, disrupt or weaken its strikes from oceanic and sea directions against objects of the USSR and the Armed Forces, prohibition (violation) of ocean strategic transportation, blockade of island states or seizure of their territories, as well as creating favorable conditions for the Soviet fleet to solve other strategic tasks that may arise during the course of the war.

It was planned to involve the forces of one or two fleets, individual formations and units of long-range front-line and military transport aviation, armies operating in coastal areas, airborne troops, coastal formations of the Air Defense Forces to participate in the strategic operation in the ocean theater of operations. countries. IN

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In some cases, the use of the Strategic Missile Forces was not ruled out.

The main task of the forces in the strategic operation in the ocean theater was to destroy missile submarines, aircraft carrier formations, and the main groupings of enemy anti-submarine forces. First of all, it was required to disable its strategic submarine nuclear missile system, which was a collection of interrelated elements. It included nuclear missile submarines - carriers of missile systems, coastal and floating facilities for basing and logistics of missile submarines, ground and space navigation systems for submarine operations, missile submarine control systems, etc.

This task turned out to be extremely difficult. The practice of the 1970s showed that the total area of possible enemy submarine maneuvering areas exceeds 20 million square meters. km. Therefore, even in conditions of continuous monitoring of them, even in peacetime, it is practically impossible to detect and destroy them with the outbreak of war before they launch missiles. That is why, along with search and strike operations, special attention was paid to solving the tasks of destroying submarines at their bases and when they left the naval base.

The second most important set of tasks was to destroy the enemy's oceanic nuclear formations—his main means of gaining dominance in the ocean theater. They posed a serious threat not only to the USSR Naval Forces, but also to other important facilities and groupings of troops in coastal areas. The solution to this problem was achieved by inflicting coordinated strikes against enemy aircraft carriers by naval missile-carrying and long-range aviation, as well as by multi-purpose submarines. It was believed that effective results could be achieved if aircraft carriers could be hit before aircraft carriers were lifted from their decks.

The defeat of the main groupings of anti-submarine forces and the destruction of its anti-submarine surveillance system was planned to be carried out by the successive destruction of forces deployed in the anti-submarine zone and at anti-submarine lines, as well as by disrupting the early warning system for submarines, destroying control and basing posts anti-submarine ships, interception and destruction of anti-submarine aircraft.

The task of combating enemy ocean communications was also considered responsible. It was assumed that the disruption of its streamlined transportation would allow isolating the groupings of its troops concentrated in Europe, which means that they would be doomed to a quick defeat. To this end, it was planned to inflict successive strikes on all elements of communications: ports of loading, convoys at the crossing and ports of unloading. At first, these tasks seemed very real. However, the experience of the Okean exercises showed that the fleet is capable of destroying no more than 10-15% of the enemy's strategic transports moving from the American continent to Europe.

Proceeding from this, subsequently, the Navy was tasked with only a partial disruption of ocean traffic. At the same time, an intensive development of new means began - sea reconnaissance and strike systems, with the help of which it was supposed to increase the effectiveness of the fight against enemy ocean communications several times over.

The success of fleet operations in strategic operations in oceanic theater of operations was closely linked to the timely deployment of forces in areas of forthcoming combat operations. This was due to the fact that, due to the peculiarities of the military

Because of the geographical position of these regions, the fleets had to overcome the narrowness and strait zones controlled by the enemy in order to enter them. Under these conditions, along with the skillful use of combat service forces and their timely build-up, the preventive deployment of the main FORCES acquired special significance.

Proceeding from the content of the main tasks of the strategic operation in the oceanic theater of operations, appropriate groupings of heterogeneous forces and means were envisaged, which included the following elements: destruction of nuclear missile submarines; destruction of aircraft carrier strike groups; destruction of anti-submarine forces; disruption of enemy transportation on ocean communications; ensuring the passage of aviation through the enemy air defense zone; deactivation of anti-submarine defense facilities, surveillance, control and navigation support systems. In addition, for the period of hostilities with the use of conventional weapons in long-range and naval missile-carrying aviation, nuclear reserve forces were created.

On the whole, the composition of the groupings of forces and means, the timing of their formation and operational formation were determined taking into account the developed sequence and methods for solving the main tasks of the operation.

The Soviet military strategy proceeded from the fact that within the framework of a strategic operation in the ocean theater of operations, the following would be carried out: strikes by strategic nuclear forces against coastal and offshore installations and targets in the interests of defeating the naval enemy; the first and subsequent naval operations to defeat the strike forces of the enemy fleet and disrupt or disrupt its ocean transportation; air operations in the ocean theater; combat operations of long-range aviation with strikes against sea and coastal facilities and targets of the enemy; amphibious and airborne operations in order to capture individual island territories; combat operations of the country's Air Defense Forces to cover the fleet's own forces at sea and bases within the range of fighter aircraft and the capabilities of guidance systems.

Like a strategic operation in the continental theater of operations, the operation in the ocean theater was supposed to begin with repelling an enemy attack, inflicting counter and retaliatory missile and fire, air, and in a nuclear war, nuclear strikes against the main enemy naval groupings planned for its coastal facilities in closed seas and operationally important areas of the ocean. Further, it was planned to focus on the destruction or sharp weakening of the strike forces of the enemy fleet deployed in advance or deployed at the beginning of the war, as well as gaining dominance in a zone up to 1,500 km deep from their coasts. Subsequently, these zones expanded to 2,500-3,000 km. They were supposed to destroy the groupings of the second operational echelon of the enemy navy, as well as to deploy active operations to disrupt its ocean communications, blockade and seize island territories by strike and anti-submarine forces introduced into the combat areas.

In the 1980s, all these provisions underwent significant adjustments. The reason is that under conditions of nuclear parity, the probability of a nuclear war has decreased, but the possibility of a conventional world war has increased. In addition, this process was due to the emergence of new high-precision weapon control systems, the accelerated development of means of armed struggle in space, a more realistic approach to planning operations and combat operations, and most importantly, the adoption by the USSR of a new defensive doctrine. The determining factor in the defensive nature of military doctrine was the fact that at the beginning of the war, the main method of using all branches of the Armed Forces would be retaliatory actions.

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Viya to repel aggression. The entire system of operations of the Armed Forces was built in accordance with this fundamental provision.

The strategic deployment of the Armed Forces, which began to be regarded as a special form of their strategic actions, acquired the most important significance in effectively repelling aggression. The new requirements put forward were to strictly take into account the specific conditions of the military-political situation during strategic deployment and to ensure already at the first stage of its possible aggravation, and as the military threat grows, to carry out advance sequential deployment of forces and means in order to to complete it before the start of the war.

Taking into account the above requirements, a new system for bringing troops to combat readiness was developed. It provided for the administrative order and the possibility of emergency deployment of troops and forces, various options for a covert consistent solution to this problem, including without raising troops on alert, deployment under cover of systematic exercises, as well as actions to return their troops from high levels of readiness to lower levels, etc. On the whole, the new system ensured a higher readiness of the Armed Forces to repel a possible enemy attack in any of its forms.

The operation of the strategic nuclear forces has undergone a significant adjustment. In connection with the liquidation of medium-range missiles, the program of targets both in remote territories and in the theater of operations was completely revised. Additional measures were taken to ensure the guaranteed commissioning of strategic nuclear forces in any conditions of the outbreak of war, a set of measures was taken to ensure reliable destruction of area and point targets with a smaller number of weapons. Finally, the theory of the actions of strategic nuclear forces during the prolonged conduct of a conventional war was developed and mastered.

As it turned out, this problem had two aspects. The first consisted in maintaining the constant readiness of nuclear forces for use and strengthening their protection in conventional warfare. And the second was to give the strategic nuclear forces the ability to deliver missile and fire strikes against targets and groups of troops located at any distance, as well as ammunition in conventional equipment.

One of the tasks that arose during the adjustment of the strategic nuclear forces operation was solved by improving the system

combat readiness of the Strategic Missile Forces, long-range aviation and formations of missile submarines, strengthening the security and defense of the positions of missile troops, airfields and bases, organizing special operations to ensure the deployment and combat stability of strategic missile submarines.

In order to deliver missile and fire strikes against objects in remote territories, a new form of use of the Air Force was developed - a strategic air operation in several theaters and in remote military-geographical regions (on other continents). To destroy targets in overseas territories, it was supposed to prepare part of the forces in Europe and Asia using long-range cruise missiles.

However, these operations turned out to be insufficiently researched and studied, and many complex problems were not solved in their theory, namely: ensuring the passage of long-range aviation to strike targets (air defense suppression, cover, etc.); organization of aviation control while simultaneously solving strategic tasks in several theaters; ensuring refueling of aircraft in the air during operations at extreme ranges; increasing the survivability of aviation; interaction, management, etc.

With the adoption of a new defensive military doctrine, the theory of strategic actions in continental theaters of operations underwent a radical revision. Instead of eating

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Three types of operations were developed for the strategic operation: the strategic defensive operation, the strategic counteroffensive operation, and the strategic offensive operation.

The strategic defensive operation was most thoroughly developed. In the 1980s, the possibility of conducting such an operation was envisaged both in secondary and main theaters of operations, including in Europe. It was planned to create a strategic defense throughout the theater to a depth of 450-500 km. The operation was supposed to begin with repulsing an aerospace attack by the enemy and immediately delivering retaliatory missile and air strikes, first by duty forces on priority targets, and then the first massive fire strike on the entire complex of targets.

In the future, it was meant to repel the enemy invasion and defeat his advancing groupings by conducting the first, and if necessary, the second front-line defensive operations. At the same time, fleet operations were planned to repel an attack by an aggressor from the sea and defeat the main groupings of its naval forces, moreover, in limited operational zones and without their expansion. It was also planned to conduct a number of air and anti-air operations in the theater of operations, and in case of a possible enemy invasion from the sea, anti-amphibious operations were being prepared. s

As for the theory of strategic counter-offensive operations in the theater of operations, they were planned at the very beginning of the war after the enemy's aggression was repulsed. For this, it was planned to involve those forces that were conducting strategic defense, as well as second-echelon troops advanced from the depths of the country. The purpose of such an operation was to defeat the invading enemy groupings, restore the situation on the border and transfer military operations to enemy territory up to the established lines. Then it was supposed either to achieve an end to the war, or to launch a strategic offensive with a decisive build-up of it to the entire depth of the theater of military operations.

The strategic offensive operation in the continental theater was now interpreted in a new way. True, as before, the possibility of conducting it with or without the use of nuclear weapons was envisaged. However, the methods of conducting the offensive were revised taking into account the presence of high-precision weapons in the hands of the parties, the possibility of deliberate destruction of nuclear power plants and facilities for the production and storage of highly toxic substances.

The scope of the operation was somewhat reduced. The use of improvised operational-maneuvering groups was excluded. Instead of using them, methods were developed for the operation of tank armies and aviation in isolation from the main forces with the widespread use of operational (airborne division) and operational-tactical airborne (airborne assault brigades) landing forces.

With the creation of the main commands of the Western, South-Western, Southern and Far Eastern directions in the theater of operations, the issues of organization, planning and management of all three types of strategic operations in the theater of operations underwent a radical reworking. Now the issues related to the preparation of these operations were assigned to the command of the areas, and the General Staff was left with the planning of global strategic actions, the operation of strategic nuclear forces and the strategic operation to repel an enemy aerospace attack.

The problems of conducting armed struggle in the oceanic and maritime theaters of military operations have undergone a radical revision. Taking into account the balance of forces by that time, it was considered expedient, instead of a strategic operation in the ocean theater of operations, to carry out naval operations in the strategically important areas of the Mir ocean.

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At the same time, it was planned to solve four main tasks: to ensure the deployment and combat stability of strategic missile submarines; guaranteed to destroy enemy air groupings; disrupt its ocean and sea communications; to assist the troops of the fronts in carrying out defensive and offensive operations in coastal areas. At the same time, the actions of the fleet were envisaged to gain and maintain dominance in the limited zone of the ocean theater, blockade of the strait zones and important coastal areas.

The theory of a strategic operation to repel an enemy aerospace attack was further developed. In particular, the issues of combating all types of cruise missiles were worked out in detail, and in addition, the operation of the rocket and space defense troops was studied and introduced into the general system of actions.

Finally, in the 1980s, for the first time, the theoretical foundations of the operation of space forces were developed in order to solve a complex of both global combat missions that support the Armed Forces in all types of their strategic actions, and tasks to combat the enemy in a special theater of operations - in outer space. . Thus, a completely new page was opened in the theory of Soviet military strategy.

7. Strategy of local wars and military conflicts

In the postwar years, the attention of military theorists and historians was focused not only on the problems of the past World War II, but also on local wars and military conflicts that arose in one or another region of the globe. The fact is that their number increased continuously during this period. So, only from 1950 to 1990. 250 coups d'etat, 127 intrastate, anti-colonial and other wars and conflicts, 25 local interstate wars of various social nature, scale and duration took place in the world. Never before has the world community had to deal with anything like this.

This was explained by many reasons: bloc confrontation between states, the situation of the Cold War, the collapse of the colonial system, the emergence of new antagonisms on economic, territorial, ethnic, religious and intercommunal grounds, etc. Many qualitative and quantitative indicators characterizing the social character underwent changes. and the political content of local wars and armed conflicts, as well as the forms of use of military force in them, the methods of their conduct, and the expected consequences. Despite a number of significant differences, they were united by one thing - the sharply increased danger of escalating into large-scale, including intersystem wars. Directly or indirectly, all these wars and conflicts affected the fundamental interests of world powers, especially the USSR and the USA, affected the general balance of world military and political forces, and seriously affected international and regional security.

safety.

That is why the Soviet Union and the United States of America, pursuing a global policy, could not stand aside. Moreover, very often they themselves were directly or indirectly involved in these wars and conflicts. Participation in them in various forms has become an integral part of the foreign policy and military strategy of these major world powers.

Thus, the USSR, using political, diplomatic and other measures, reacted to almost 130 military clashes that took place in Asia, Africa, Central and

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South America, Europe, and in 88 military conflicts, Soviet weapons were used, which were supplied to the belligerent country directly or through third states. The data given in Table 13 reflect the direct participation of Soviet troops and military specialists in 16 major local wars and military conflicts.

Table 13

Participation of the Soviet Armed Forces in local wars and military conflicts

Wars and conflicts years

War in Korea (1950-1953)

Fighting in Algiers (1962-1964)

Vietnam War

(1965-1974)

Second Arab-Israeli War (1962-1964)

Third Arab-Israeli War (1969-1973)

Fourth Arab-Israeli War (1980-1983)

Fighting in Angola (1975-1979)

Fighting in Mozambique (1975-1979)

Fighting in Ethiopia (1977-1990)

Soviet-Chinese conflict in the Far East and Kazakhstan (1969)

Afghan war (1979-1989)

Berlin Crisis (1948)

The contingents of the Soviet troops and the military years of assistance

aviation corps: several fighter air divisions, more than 5 thousand people, 200 specialists, supplies of equipment

military advisers and specialists, supplies of equipment

military advisers and specialists, several regiments (anti-aircraft missile battalions), ZRV, 3 fighter aviation regiments, supplies of equipment

military advisers and specialists, supplies of equipment

military advisers and specialists, an air defense division (3 brigades), 2 fighter aviation regiments, supplies of those NIKI.

military advisers and specialists, mixed anti-aircraft missile brigade, 3 anti-aircraft missile regiments, 2 anti-aircraft artillery regiments, supplies of equipment

military advisers and specialists, supply of equipment military advisers and specialists, supply of equipment

military advisers and specialists, supplies of equipment. reconnaissance aircraft with Soviet crews

part of the troops of the Far Eastern and Central Asian military districts

40th Army, troops of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 4-5 motorized rifle divisions, an airborne division, 5 separate brigades, 4 separate regiments, 5 air regiments, 3 helicopter regiments, other units totaling 80-104 thousand military personnel and 5-7 thousand employees. A total of 620 thousand people. took part in military operations in Afghanistan, including military advisers and specialists, massive deliveries of equipment

Group of Soviet occupation forces in Germany in 1948: 5-6 divisions, units of the Air Force and Air Defense (blockade of West Berlin and communications)

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Caribbean crisis (1962) Group of forces in Cuba: 2 missile divisions — R-12 and R-14 (60 launchers), 2 air defense divisions (144 launchers), 4 motorized rifle regiments, Il-28 bomber regiment (50 aircraft), MiG-21 (36 aircraft), Mi-4 helicopter regiment (36 helicopters), air regiment, coastal defense missile regiment, 2 missile boat battalions and other units, up to 50,000 in total.

people, transportation and deployment, military advisers and specialists, mass deliveries of equipment

The Polish crisis (1956) 2 divisions of the SGV, were pulled up to the borders in 1956 12 divisions of the GSVG, BVO, PrikVO, airborne divisions and other units

The Hungarian Crisis (1956) at first the Special Corps (2 mechanized divisions, a bomber and fighter division, and other units), then additionally 2 airborne divisions, 7 mechanized infantry divisions, etc., other units, in total - over 60 thousand people

Czechoslovak Crisis Central Group of Forces, troops of the PrikVO, BVO, KVO, GSVG, (1968-1969) SGV

In the mid-1980s, Russian military science was faced with the task of developing methodological foundations and assessments of local wars and conflicts, and most importantly, creating a strategy for local wars and military conflicts that could resist the corresponding concepts adopted in the United States, European NATO countries and other countries. states.

First of all, Soviet military theorists had to investigate the nature of local wars and military conflicts, understand their types and forms, and develop their systematic classification. This work was initiated by the publication of the work "Local War", prepared by the General Staff in 1966. Numerous articles devoted to the same problem appeared on the pages of the journals "Military Thought", "Military History Journal" and other publications. In 1981, the Military Academy of the General Staff completed a comprehensive study "Local Wars"³. Scientific understanding of the experience of local wars and military conflicts is reflected in the abstract collections "NATO States and Military Conflicts" (1987), "Regional Local Conflicts: History and Modernity" (1989)³⁸, as well as in a series of reviews on wars published by the General Staff in Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, etc.

The analysis carried out showed that the systemic classification of local wars and military conflicts should take into account many parameters, but primarily the geographical scale, their place in the general political system of the world, the level of armed struggle, social characteristics, the nature of contradictions, etc. K 90- For many years, it was customary to distinguish between several types of military conflicts in terms of scale: limited global conflicts with the open participation of central power powers and their strategic allies; regional central-peripheral conflicts covering vast areas; local internationalized and non-internationalized conflicts.

A typical example of a limited global conflict is the Caribbean crisis of 1962, which essentially put the whole world on the brink of a planetary nuclear catastrophe. Then the critical confrontation that developed in relations only between the USSR and the USA directly or indirectly affected the security of all states without exception. Unfortunately, understanding the possible unpredictable global consequences,

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which, admittedly, managed to be avoided literally by a miracle, began

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only in the 1990s, when the public became aware not only of the facts and events of that time, but also of the terrible consequences of the Chernobyl tragedy seen with their own eyes.

As experience shows, regional central-peripheral military conflicts radically change the situation both in individual regions and on entire continents. Typical examples of such conflicts are the Vietnam War (1965-1974) and the wars in the Middle East (1962-1983). The Democratic Republic of Vietnam, South Vietnam and the United States took direct part in the war in Southeast Asia. But then the USSR, China, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand were involved in it. From this list it follows that the war has spread to a significant part of the Asia-Pacific region.

In the second case, military operations were conducted between Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. But the troops of the USA, the Soviet Union, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, as well as Iran, Algeria, Tunisia took part in them. In essence, the war, in its spatial scope, engulfed the entire Middle East region and adjacent territories of North Africa.

In the system of international relations, the Soviet military strategy, depending on the place, distinguished between intersystem, interstate and intrastate wars, armed conflicts and clashes. The first took place between countries or groups of countries that were at the junction of various social and social systems (the Vietnamese and Korean wars).

Interstate systemic wars and military conflicts are armed clashes within the same system. Basically, these are wars that arose on the basis of political, ideological and religious differences, economic struggle and territorial disputes.

In the 1950s and 1980s, Soviet military theory unequivocally proceeded from the fact that such wars occur as a result of sharp contradictions only between various states belonging to the capitalist camp. Indeed, at that time there were many acute military conflicts of this kind. These include the Arab-Israeli wars, the Indo-Pakistani war, the Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the Iran-Iraq war, and many others.

A complete surprise for Soviet military theorists was the realization that local military clashes are by no means excluded in the socialist world. The Soviet-Chinese conflict on Damansky Island, the Sino-Vietnamese war, and finally, the events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia showed that sharp contradictions persist under socialism, which means that they can lead not only to political, but also to military confrontation. This made it necessary to revise many dogmatic attitudes and assess the problems of the national security of the USSR from a different perspective.

Soviet military strategy classified intrastate wars as civil wars. But if before it was customary to believe that they arise on a class basis, then in the nuclear era it was necessary to admit that most of these wars are clashes on interethnic, intercommunal, intertribal, historical and national grounds. The 50s-80s were full of such wars and military conflicts. They do not stop to this day, and in their uncompromising and harshness they not only do not concede, but sometimes even surpass interstate local wars.

But the classification of local wars and conflicts according to the levels of their conduct deserves special attention. In the USSR and the USA, on the basis of a generalization of all armed

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of the Cold War period, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, came to approximately the same conclusions. Soviet military theory found it expedient to distinguish between world-class military conflicts, local wars of low, medium, and high intensity.

World-class military conflicts began to include intrastate rebellions, coups, ethnic, intercommunal and religious clashes, mass terrorist and partisan actions, the nutrient medium of which is socio-political tension in society, nationalism, racial intolerance, religious and communal strife, religious fundamentalism.

Interstate local wars of low intensity were presented mainly as border clashes limited in time and space, territorial conflicts, clashes due to immigration processes. As a rule, they fade quickly, and therefore do not cause any aggravation of the international situation.

Particularly widespread, and therefore more dangerous, are local wars of medium intensity. Usually they arose and still arise as a result of deep-seated contradictions. Therefore, they, differing in greater tension and sharpness, are often quite long. Still, their main feature is that they carry the potential danger of expanding to the level of a large-scale war. About 60 local wars in Asia, Africa, and Latin America belong to this type in the 1950s and 1970s.

High-intensity local wars pose a particular threat to humanity. These include regional wars affecting the interests of many countries. They also involve major powers in their orbit, as a result of which the whole world may be on the brink of war. In these high-intensity local wars, usually

faces a complex of interests: political, economic, ideological, territorial, ethnic, religious and others. Since relations are escalating not only between individual states, but also between opposing military-political groups, the situation in the entire region, and sometimes in the world, is sharply heated.

It is worth highlighting one more significant feature inherent in local wars and military conflicts of the 1950s and 1980s. As is known, before the Second World War, developed countries accounted for almost a third of all armed conflicts and 88% of losses. Then the picture changed dramatically: 65% of all conflicts and 90% of losses fell to the share of developing countries. But this does not mean at all that the leading states of the world have receded into the background. On the contrary, the logic of the development of local wars was such that their course and outcome, scale and consequences depended not only and even not so much on the directly belligerent parties, but on the world superpowers standing behind them. That is why it was the USA and the USSR that were the main driving force in most local wars, because their direct or indirect assistance decisively determined the nature of military operations in these wars, allowed the opposing sides to recover losses, which made it possible for them to continue the struggle for a long time. .

Political and strategic decisions made by the leadership of these superpowers, their confrontation most often predetermined the development, course and outcome of a local war. In any case, almost always the US and the USSR were on opposite sides of the barricade. As soon as this principle was not observed, the dynamics of the war changed dramatically. A good example is the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991. Due to the fact that the USSR, which changed its foreign policy course, took the same position as the coalition of interethnic forces led by the United States,

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the war ended in the shortest possible time with an undivided victory over Iraq. There is no doubt that events would have developed quite differently if the Soviet Union had been on the other side. And the fact that under the previous political course he would have taken just such a position is absolutely indisputable.

Analyzing local wars of recent years, the Soviet military strategy came to the conclusion that any armed conflict is preceded by an internal or international crisis, and the conflicts themselves go through several phases: peaceful - the beginning of an aggravation of the situation, intermediate - the beginning of confrontation, deployed - armed struggle , the final one is the end of the conflict.

In the development of a local war, a certain event was of significant importance, which was the beginning of the crisis. In the 50s-70s, in 14% of cases it was some kind of political act in the form of a threat, ultimatum, accusation, demand or protest of one of the parties; in 27% - diplomatic and economic sanctions; in 16% - changes in the daily activities of the armed forces; in AI, a change of political regimes, a coup d'état, an uprising, a rebellion, etc.; in 10% - a demonstration of force in the form of mobilization, movement of troops with clearly aggressive intentions; in 11% - the direct use of military force, violation of borders, border clashes, direct invasion; in 10% - other reasons.

Of course, in any crisis conflict, the turning point is the use of military force. Judging from the experience of recent decades, armed groups come into action at various stages in the development of a crisis. In one case, force was used at the onset of a crisis, in another, with its onset, in a third, during the development of a crisis, or it might not have been used at all. In a word, in each of these options, military operations, different in nature, received a peculiar leap. Therefore, the climax of the struggle could come at different stages of the war (crisis). Sometimes this happened at the very beginning of the war (crisis), but most often the intensity of military operations increased gradually, reaching its maximum intensity on the eve or immediately at the final phase of the war (crisis).

The ways of settling crises are also indicative. The analysis shows that this process was resolved when the sides were exhausted mutually or as a result of negotiations between them. Often it was achieved through the mediation of third countries or international organizations, most often the UN. And finally, the settlement of the crisis situation was carried out through political, economic, and sometimes direct military pressure from the world powers.

Of course, almost all local wars, military conflicts and crises of the 1950s-1980s concealed a certain danger both for the states drawn into their sphere and for international stability as a whole. However, the degree of this danger is not equivalent. Less dangerous were those conflicts that did not seriously affect the interests of major powers and did not threaten the political regime. More dangerous were those wars and conflicts that threatened the territorial integrity of the warring states and their political system. But even more dangerous were those that threatened to disrupt the political and military-strategic balance in the world. The latter, as a rule, assumed an uncompromising character, often causing an acute international crisis.

The participation of the Soviet Union in local wars and military conflicts manifested itself in various forms. Often it was limited to the provision of political, diplomatic, economic and financial assistance to one of the parties, and sometimes to both parties at the same time. In other cases, the USSR sent its advisers

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kov and specialists, carried out the supply of weapons and military equipment, trained national military personnel. Finally, Soviet troops took direct part in a number of armed clashes. The most significant of these events is the Afghan war of 1979-1989. |

Expeditionary troops sent to areas of local wars and conflicts suffered inevitable losses. ABOUT

What losses the Soviet Union suffered in this case can be judged from the data given in Table 14.

Table 14 Losses of Soviet troops in some local wars and conflicts

Wars Losses in personnel (persons) Losses of equipment, and conflicts of sanitary. (units) Korean War 299 * data n.a. n.a. 335 aircraft Polish crisis 15 n.a. helicopters, 147 tanks,

1314 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 433 op. and mortars, 11,369 machine guns

The United States of America also suffered serious losses in local wars. However, in contrast to American society, losses were perceived more calmly in the Soviet Union, but even they, especially during the Afghan war, seriously puzzled the Soviet political and military leadership, forcing them to take certain measures to reduce them. To this end, the organization of troops and the tactics of their actions were improved, military equipment was refined. The training of personnel was carried out more thoroughly. Particular attention was paid to the generalization of combat practice, for which meetings, military scientific conferences were held, and generalized reviews of combat experience were published.

In the course of this painstaking work, important conclusions were drawn not only with regard to a specific local war, but also on general problems of military organizational development. At the same time, strategic and operational views were tested, samples of new types of weapons were tested, directions and plans for the development of the Armed Forces were specified. The experience of the Vietnamese and Afghan wars, as well as the war in the Persian Gulf, is in many ways instructive in this regard.

Based on the experience of the Vietnam War, the principles of conducting air defense were radically revised, and the exceptionally important role of electronic warfare was realized. The war in Afghanistan made it possible to develop methods of defense against homing weapons of the enemy, master the tactics of raids and conduct small-scale ground-air operations. The experience of the Persian Gulf War directed domestic military theorists to revise the entire system

* In addition, 417 people were captured by the Mujahideen, of which 119 were released by 1995. ** In addition, 415 932 people fell ill, of which 411,015 were returned to service, 343 were fired, 574 died.

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views on the conduct of conventional warfare using high-precision guided weapons.

It is noteworthy that after the Afghan war, the strategy for the participation of the Soviet Armed Forces in local wars and conflicts was significantly refined. All the circumstances related to the involvement of the country and the army in such wars were subjected to a more balanced and objective assessment, a system for making decisions, planning and managing military operations was developed, principles for the interaction of all forces and means participating in the war were developed, the procedure for coordinating political, diplomatic, military and economic efforts.

In the early 1990s, more attention began to be paid to comprehensive forecasting of the prospects for waging war, a thorough analysis of the theaters of military operations, options for possible intervention by third countries, as well as national, religious and other features. A great contribution to the development of these issues was made by S. F. Akhromeev, V. I. Varennikov, M. A. Gareev, A. A. Danilevich, P. I. Ivashutin, N. V. Ogarkov, and others.

Domestic military experts have made important conclusions about the expediency of using mobile troops of a special organization in local military conflicts, retrofitted systems of weapons and military equipment, and the creation of appropriate management structures. On their basis, the development of special forms of operations and combat operations in local wars and armed conflicts, including "peacekeeping actions", began. The study of the problem of the evolution of local wars, possible conditions and forms of their escalation into large-scale armed clashes continued.

8. Strategic leadership of the Armed Forces

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, when the army and navy were transferred from a military to a peaceful position, a radical restructuring of the entire system of leadership of the country's defense and control of the Armed Forces, especially at the strategic level, was required.

On September 4, 1945, the State Defense Committee was abolished, and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command also ceased its activities. In February of the following year, the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy were reorganized. The leadership of the army, aviation and navy was headed by the People's Commissariat of the Armed Forces, since March of the same year it has become the Ministry of the Armed Forces. Under him, the Supreme Military Council was created - a collegiate leadership body, which included some members of the Politburo of the Party Central Committee, the Minister of the Armed Forces, the Chief of the General Staff and other military leaders. At the same time, by decision of the Politburo, a single Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces was created for the army and navy, which worked as a department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Until March 1947, I. V. Stalin remained the People's Commissar, and then the Minister of the Armed Forces. He was replaced in this post by N. M. Bulganin, then Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky was appointed minister. In February 1950, the Ministry of the Armed Forces was again divided into two ministries: Military and Naval. The Supreme Military Council, now created under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, has become the highest state body for the leadership of all the Armed Forces. In March 1953, after the death of Stalin, the two defense ministries again

returned into the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, and an advisory body was created under it - the Main Military Council.

The leading role in the control system of the Armed Forces was assigned to the General Staff, main and central departments of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

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Management of the types of the Armed Forces - the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Air Defense Forces and the Navy - was assigned to the respective commanders-in-chief and main headquarters. Under the commanders-in-chief, advisory bodies were created - military councils of the branches of the Armed Forces.

However, the practice of the first post-war years showed the insufficient effectiveness of the functioning of military councils in the status of advisory bodies. Therefore, in the middle of 1950, the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to restore military councils at all levels as collegiate command and control bodies and to significantly expand their rights. From now on, the military councils were entrusted with all responsibility for the state of combat and mobilization readiness of the troops, their political and moral state and discipline. But at the same time, in the implementation of all these measures, one thing remained inviolable - the sole power of the commanders of the troops. It is noteworthy that, in accordance with the above decision, the position of a member of the military council from among career political workers was restored.

. In order to increase the responsibility and expand the rights of the Chief of the General Staff and the commanders-in-chief of all branches of the Armed Forces, in May 1953 it was decided to appoint them simultaneously as Deputy Ministers of Defense of the Armed Forces of the USSR. In the 1950s, species inspectorates were formed, and then the Main Inspectorate of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

The governing bodies of the military branches, as well as the structure of the management of the Logistics of the Armed Forces, underwent a significant restructuring. Since 1958, the position of Chief of Logistics of the Ministry of Defense was established. Subsequently, his rights were expanded: he became chief of the Logistics of the Armed Forces and at the same time deputy minister of defense.

At the end of 1959, as noted above, a decision was made to form the fifth branch of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces. Since 1960, it has been formalized organizationally and begins to fulfill its tasks.

In 1961, with the formation of the Civil Defense of the USSR, its head was directly subordinate to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and at the same time was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense.

A major reorganization was carried out in the governing bodies of the military districts and in the fleets. The military districts were subdivided: to | October 1945 there were 32 military districts on the territory of the USSR. However, it soon became clear that such a large number of them greatly complicates the leadership of troops, makes it difficult to form fronts and armies on their basis, in connection with which a year later 1] districts were abolished. At the end of the 60s, the Armed Forces had 28, and by the beginning of the 80s - 16 military districts: Leningrad, Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Odessa, Transcaucasian, Turkestan, Central Asian, Moscow, Kiev, North Caucasian , Volga, Ural, Siberian, Trans-Baikal and Far East.

The implementation of the allied treaties by the USSR required the formation of new administrative-territorial associations for those troops that were abroad. Units and formations temporarily deployed on the territory of foreign countries were combined into groups of forces: the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany (GDR), the Northern Group of Forces (Poland), the Central Group of Forces (Austria, Hungary) and the Southern Group of Forces (Romania, Bulgaria). In connection with changes in the international situation, they were subsequently reorganized several times.

Thus, in 1949, the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany was transformed into the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. In 1957, in connection with the withdrawal

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Soviet troops from Romania and Bulgaria disbanded the Southern Group of Forces, and in 1956 it was created again, but already on the territory of Hungary. In 1955, when Soviet troops were withdrawn from Austria, the Central Group of Forces was disbanded, but in 1968 it was recreated, but already on the territory of Czechoslovakia. In 1957-1968. the legal status of these associations began to be determined by the corresponding bilateral treaties.

At the same time, there was an active search for expedient forms of fleet management. Initially, the fleets were disaggregated. So, by analogy with the American principle, two fleets are formed on the basis of the Pacific Fleet - the 5th and 7th, but in 1953 they are again merged into the Pacific Fleet. In total, by the end of the 60s, the Navy included four fleets, as well as the Caspian military flotilla and a number of separate naval bases.

In 1957, after the October plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, when, on charges of underestimating the importance of the party leadership in the army, the role of party organizations, party political work in the Armed Forces and the alleged inclination to adventurism both in the foreign policy of the USSR and Zhukov was removed from the post of Minister of Defense in the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, new changes took place in the bodies of the strategic and operational-strategic levels of management. The status of political departments has changed: the position of a member of the military council of the district, group of troops, fleet, army and flotilla was combined with the position of head of the corresponding political department (department). And members of the military councils of the branches of the Armed Forces simultaneously become deputy chiefs of the Glav-PUR of the SA and the Navy.

The composition of military councils was also expanded. As their members, in addition to the head of the political department (political department), the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the union republic or the secretary of the regional committee (district committee) of the party were included as mandatory. The rights were expanded and the responsibility of the headquarters and chiefs of the armed forces of the TROOPS was increased.

Back in 1955, in connection with the complications of the international situation, the USSR Defense Council was created and the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Armed Forces was introduced. The first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. S. Khrushchev becomes it. The Defense Council had broad powers: it made decisions on the most important issues of the country's defense; developed measures to prepare the state and the Armed Forces for war; determined budget appropriations for the army and navy; worked out principal directions for the development of the Armed Forces, established their composition and organizational structure, considered plans for waging war; led the military-technical policy; determined measures to prepare the economy, the population, the territory of the country and the theaters of military operations militarily. Its decisions were formalized by resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Subsequently, the system of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces continued to be adjusted in the direction of increasing the centralization of their management by the highest party structures and the first persons of the state. Thus, in the USSR Constitution of 1977, the priority of the Central Committee of the party and its Politburo in determining the general political line for strengthening the country's defense was fixed, the functions of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR in solving the problems of general leadership of the army and navy were specified.

After the creation of the NATO bloc in April 1949, the leadership of the USSR decided to oppose it with its bloc structure. In this regard, in May 1955, as already mentioned, a military-political alliance was formalized
socialist countries -

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The Warsaw Pact organization, which, along with political and military, also integrated economic efforts. At the same time, a whole system of bodies is being created to govern this organization, as well as the United Armed Forces created within its framework.

The political advisory committee becomes the supreme political body of the union. It includes the general and first secretaries of the central committees of the communist and workers' parties, as well as the heads of governments of the Warsaw Pact member states. At the beginning of 1969, the management structure of the United Armed Forces was finally formed. It included the Committee of Ministers of Defense of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, the Joint Command, the Military Council, the headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Joint Armed Forces. The adopted "Regulations" determined the tasks, functions and procedure for the work of these bodies. The "Regulations on the Unified Air Defense System of the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact" were also approved.

Each allied state placed at the disposal of the Unified Command part of its armed forces, which, nevertheless, was not withdrawn from the subordination of the national command. On the basis of a collectively agreed decision, the post of Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces, starting from the moment of the conclusion of this union and until the termination of its existence (1991), was occupied by Soviet military leaders. Among them are marshals I. S. Konev (1955-1960), A. A. Grechko (1960-1967), I. I. Yakubovsky (1967-1977), V. G. Kulikov (1977-1988), P. G. Lushev (1988-1991).

A serious restructuring in the management of the groupings of the armed forces in the theaters of military operations took place in 1979. In connection with the aggravation of relations with China, the main command of the troops of the Far East was created, and in 1984, when there was a transition to a new system of strategic planning , - the main commands of the Western, South-Western and Southern directions. The first commanders-in-chief of these groups were army generals I. M. Tretyak, N. V. Ogarkov, I. A. Gerasimov, Yu. P. Maksimov.

However, it should be noted that in the higher echelons the serious disagreements that arose on the issue of creating main commands in the theaters of operations were not immediately overcome. There have been several opinions on this matter. Most military leaders and specialists were of the opinion that it was inappropriate to create main commands in the theater of operations, arguing this with references to the experience of the main commands that did not justify itself during the Great Patriotic War. This opinion was shared by all post-war ministers of defense: G. K. Zhukov, R. Ya. Malinovsky, A. A. Grechko. They were actively supported by the chiefs of the General Staff, especially M. V. Zakharov and S. S. Biryuzov. To the references of their opponents that such commands exist in the joint armed forces of NATO, they replied that the system of strategic leadership should be built on their own traditional basis, because the appearance of another intermediate command instance would only complicate management, lead to a loss of time , which is absolutely unacceptable in a nuclear missile war.

Their opponents were of the opinion that the main commands in the theater of operations could be created, but only for wartime, at least in a threatened period. Finally, the third group of military leaders and military theorists insisted that such commands should be created in peacetime, because only in this case it would be possible to rally in advance and comprehensively prepare the personnel of these command and control bodies. They justified their point of view by saying that the

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improvised, the main commands in the theater on the eve of the war will turn out to be inoperable and, therefore, will not cope with their task.

The latter point of view was especially actively defended by N.V. Ogarkov, who was appointed in 1977 as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. He managed to convince Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov that he was right. Soon, in all four main theaters of military operations (directions), as already mentioned above, the main commands were created. They were deployed in Chita, Vinnitsa, Ivano-Frankivsk and Baku. These bodies immediately set to work on planning strategic operations in the theater of operations in peacetime, carrying out the tasks of maintaining the combat readiness of the corresponding groupings of troops, managing the additional equipment of theaters in operational terms, managing the deployment of troops, organizing the protection of state borders, and ensuring interaction between divisions and formations of the Armed Forces, organization of command and control systems for troops (forces), etc. In the course of a possible war, the main commands were entrusted with analyzing and assessing the situation, making decisions on the use of subordinate troops (forces), setting tasks for them and organizing their implementation up to the completion of the first and subsequent strategic operations in the corresponding continental theater of operations.

In the 1960s, in view of the threat of a massive use of nuclear weapons, it was necessary to take emergency measures throughout the entire depth of the territory of the USSR to increase the survivability and reliability of the entire command and control system of the Armed Forces. To this end, in 5-7 years, the main and reserve protected command posts were built, including the Central Command Post (CKP) of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff, the main commands of the directions of all types of the Armed Forces, civil defense, military districts, groups of troops, fleets and troops of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. At all the above command posts, constant combat duty was organized.

In the system of strategic leadership, a special place was given to government command posts and the Central Command Center of the General Staff. The following tasks were assigned to the combat crew of the latter: collection and processing of situational data; ensuring combat duty on automated combat control systems; control over the timely communication to the executors of orders and orders of the highest military leadership; checking the state of combat readiness of troops (forces), communication systems and means, as well as automated control systems.

Subsequently, the created underground control posts were supplemented with air and railway, and in the operational level - field mobile control posts. It was believed that, under any conditions for the outbreak of war, they would ensure the guaranteed transfer of commands and the commissioning of the Armed Forces, especially nuclear missiles for strategic and operational-tactical purposes. Much attention was paid to the interchangeability of command and control posts, the readiness of the Central Command Center of the General Staff to take on certain functions of the command post of the main headquarters of the branches of the Armed Forces, and, if necessary, the high command in the theater of operations.

On the whole, by the beginning of the 1980s, a developed system of control posts had been created, which ensured a high degree of reliability of stable control of the Armed Forces under any scale of an enemy nuclear missile attack.

The most important element of the command and control system of the Armed Forces was the general communication. The changed structure of the Armed Forces, and most importantly, the new conditions for waging war, required a radical restructuring of communications, in other words, its deployment on new principles and a completely different material and technical basis.

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base. In solving this problem, such measures as the creation of a network of secure nodes and an extensive network of redundant and bypass communication channels, the integrated use of all types and means of secret communications, increased protection against electronic interference and the effects of nuclear explosions, and the transition to a new exchange system data, introduction of automated (ACS) and communication systems.

The Soviet military strategy strictly demanded that all the main elements of the command and control system, primarily the protected stationary nodes of command posts from the Headquarters of the Supreme Command to the formations of the Strategic Missile Forces, long-range aviation and missile submarines, as well as the communication centers of the fronts (districts, groups of troops), special communication centers of the General Staff, and in peacetime were constantly kept in working order. Great importance was also attached to ensuring communication through the support (auxiliary) nodes, because it was believed that during the war it would be increased by field means of the signal troops.

The experience of local wars more and more confirmed that sustainable command and control of the Armed Forces can only be ensured through the integrated use of radio, radio relay, tropospheric, space and wire communications with the widespread use of a single unified equipment for classifying all types of information with guaranteed security. .

The role and importance of space communications increased decisively. Already in the 1960s, the initial experience of its practical use convincingly confirmed its clear advantage over other types. It had high mobility, reliability, clear transmission quality, regardless of meteorological conditions and time of day, and most importantly, an almost unlimited range. In the event of nuclear strikes by the enemy, space communications could turn out to be the only sustainable means of command and control of the Armed Forces.

In the interests of maintaining the stability of communications, especially in the face of the massive use of nuclear weapons by the enemy, great importance was attached to the widespread use of repeater aircraft. They were supposed to provide duplication (retransmission) of commands, signals, orders and reports, to carry out simultaneous transmission of information over several lines and channels of wired communication, using ultra-longwave and shortwave radio networks.

The subsequent development of the communication system, the introduction of more advanced equipment, tropospheric and space facilities allowed the General Staff and headquarters of the districts (fronts) to bring in the 80s direct classified communications to the command posts of divisions. This ruled out the multistage nature of the passage of the most important operational information.

Nevertheless, the development of measures to protect communication facilities and nodes from the damaging factors of nuclear explosions, to find opportunities to ensure the stability of the operation of communication equipment in conditions of strong interference, and to increase the throughput, reliability and speed of information transfer remained a serious problem. To solve it, work was launched to create an integrated information network. Its essence was that the transfer of various types of information (telephone, telegraph, phototelegraph) was envisaged in a single digital form.

A program was launched to master the optical range of waves and develop fundamentally new optical-electronic and fiber-optic communication facilities. But nevertheless, the creation of a unified automated communication system acquired the greatest importance in those years. The solution to this problem made it possible to transmit information at lightning speed in warning systems about a rocket and space attack.

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to ensure the reliability of the control of high-speed means of all types of the Armed Forces, to increase the efficiency and stability of COMMUNICATION by several times.

In the 1970s, large-scale work was launched to automate control in the center, in the branches of the Armed Forces, in military districts and in the navy. The command system for centralized combat control (CSBU) "Center" was created and put on combat duty, as well as information and settlement systems of the General Staff and branches of the Armed Forces. At the same time, automated control systems for the Strategic Missile Forces, the Air Defense Forces, the Ground Forces, the Air Force, and the Navy were developed and adopted by the Air Force. Logistics of the Armed Forces and Civil Defense of the USSR.

Particular attention was paid to solving the problem of complete automation of control in the Strategic Missile Forces. The "Signal-A" automated control system adopted for service made it possible to send signals for the launch of missiles and receive the necessary information literally in a matter of seconds. The Automated Missile Attack Warning System (SPRN) created made it possible to immediately receive reliable information about missile launches, their flight trajectories, and the points of expected strikes throughout the territory of the USSR. And for the guaranteed commissioning of nuclear forces in order to strike back at the aggressor, the Kazbek system was developed and put into service.

Along with the development of the material base of management, the methods of work of strategic management bodies were also improved. In the first post-war years, they were based mainly on the experience of the General Staff, the main and central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense during the Great Patriotic War. But already in the early 50s it became clear that the methods practiced were clearly outdated. As a result, many principles of leadership of the Armed Forces have been revised.

True, it was assumed that in the event of war, the supreme body of strategic leadership of the armed struggle and all the Armed Forces of the country, as before, would be the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and it would be headed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but as before it would be the body of collective leadership. Thus, it was planned to ensure the unity of the political and strategic leadership, which in a nuclear missile war will acquire, according to the established opinion, even greater significance.

It was believed that, as in the years of the last war, the General Staff would become the main body of the Supreme Command Headquarters for command and control of the Armed Forces. In wartime, he had to perform a fairly large number of tasks: gathering and analyzing the situation; preparation of proposals for making strategic decisions; strategic planning, organization of management, interaction and support of the actions of the Armed Forces; directing their strategic deployment, conducting all types of strategic operations, manning the Armed Forces, preparing theaters of military operations; coordination of the efforts of the allied armies, etc.

Nevertheless, many management tasks had to be solved in a completely new way. It was necessary to ensure continuous monitoring of the situation on a global scale, i.e. receive data on the development of military events in the shortest possible time in various regions of the globe. It was necessary in a matter of minutes to make decisions and issue orders, to manage strategic operations simultaneously in several continental theaters, as well as in the air, at sea and in space, etc. Never before have the highest strategic leadership bodies of the USSR encountered such problems.

SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES

STAFF OF THE VGK FOR WARTIME MGB and MVD USSR DEFENSE COUNCILS

Border Ministry of Defense of the USSR Railway Troops (Ministry of the Armed Forces) Troops

Domestic Building

military military

General Staff of the Armed Forces

military

Land

military

9[>@EE

Major Direction Commands

Western South-Western Southern Far direction Direction East Direction Commands of operational-strategic formations

Groups of troops Military districts

BVO, PrikVO, GSVG (ZGV)* Poibvo

YuGV ZakVO, SKVO

2, 4, 8, 10, 11,

TsGV SibVO 12 '14A PVO

SGV PriVO, UrVoO Gr. troops in fganistan Transcaucasia

Scheme 57

* Abolished associations are in italics.

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Not only the scope, but also the content of strategic planning has changed. The requirements for its unmistakable accuracy have sharply increased. It was no longer possible to carry it out by a "manual" method, especially to develop measures for the use of strategic nuclear weapons. It was necessary to transfer all this activity to an automated basis using a computer.

Under the new conditions, it became necessary to transfer commands directly to launchers, missile submarines and aviation units, bypassing all intermediate instances. It was necessary to rebuild the entire information processing system with its display on screens, create new means of microfilming, copying and reproduction, processing and storage of data.

Finally, neither the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, nor the General Staff could, as before, exercise control from permanent locations. Reliable command and control of the Armed Forces could be ensured only from permanently operating, perfectly protected and technically equipped command posts, which had to be occupied even before the start of the war. All this and much more forced us to switch to a new structure of strategic command and control bodies, to develop other principles for their actions in a combat situation.

The main emphasis in solving this problem was placed on the highest centralization of management. At the same time, it has become quite obvious that in modern warfare the concentration of all the functions of leadership in one body is not only inexpedient, but even impossible. The sheer volume of tasks in directing the Armed Forces in several theaters of operations, the need to resolve a huge number of issues would hardly allow the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff to deal with operational details. The former centralization of command and control would inevitably have given rise to such an avalanche of information that the strategic link would not have been able to assimilate, study, let alone take the necessary decisions on it. In this regard, it was necessary to strictly delineate the functions between the Headquarters, the General Staff, the commanders in chief and the main headquarters of the Armed Forces, the commands of the fronts and fleets.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the system of command and control of all groupings of the Armed Forces in the operation of strategic nuclear forces, the strategic operation to repel an aerospace attack, and in strategic operations in oceanic theaters of military operations was carefully worked out.

Management of strategic nuclear forces was supposed to be carried out strictly centrally, taking into account specific features and various options for the possible unleashing of a nuclear missile war. The right to make a decision to put them into operation belonged exclusively to the top political leadership of the country, and the General Staff developed the combat missions down to each launcher, missile submarine and any crew of strategic aviation. Flight tasks were calculated at the main headquarters of the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force and Navy.

The orders of the Supreme High Command for the transfer of forces to high and full combat readiness, for the first launch of missiles and the first combat sortie of long-range aviation were supposed to be transmitted from the Central Command of the General Staff via the automated control system of the Combat Control Center (CBU) directly to the command post of missile units and subunits, to Command post of aviation regiments (to airfields) for long-range aviation and missile submarines. These orders were simultaneously received at the Central Command Center of the branches of the Armed Forces, the command post of formations and formations. The collection of information was supposed to be carried out at the same time with its issuance to the Central Command Center of the General Staff.

It was also planned to direct the repulse of the aerospace attack through the General Staff.

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The air defense of the country, separate formations of anti-missile, anti-space defense and formations of missile attack warning were assigned to the commander-in-chief of the country's air defense forces, and the forces and means of air defense of the fronts and fleets - to the commanders of the fronts (fleets). The control system of the Air Defense Forces of the country was built using automated systems at all levels, from subdivisions to the Central Command Post.

The leadership of the strategic operation in the ocean theater by the Supreme High Command was supposed to be carried out through the General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The deployment of forces and the delivery of the first blows were planned to be carried out centrally. In order to coordinate the use of naval forces between the zones of operations of the fleets, demarcation lines were determined, and a single identification system was established.

The direct command of the forces and means of the Navy during the operation was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief and the Main Staff of the Navy. At the same time, it was understood that the control of strategic submarines in the areas of combat patrols would be entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and they could strike only by order of the Supreme High Command with the Central Command of the General Staff.

As for the general-purpose forces of the fleet, the decisive role in managing them was assigned to the main command of the Navy, which was entrusted with planning and organizing the deployment of forces, coordinating the efforts of the fleets, maintaining interaction between groupings of heterogeneous forces, conducting and coordinating measures for all types of operational and special security.

It was planned to direct strategic air operations through the General Staff, and the direct control of aviation in the conduct of these operations through the Commander-in-Chief and the Main Staff of the Air Force. They, relying on the headquarters of long-range aviation, were supposed to direct its independent actions. The use of the Air Force in the theaters of operations was entrusted to the headquarters of the corresponding strategic areas.

The Soviet military strategy attached particular importance to the organization of command and control of coalition groupings of the armed forces. Coordination of measures for the mobilization and distribution of all the forces and resources of the states united by the Warsaw Pact, the implementation of a single strategic goal during the war did not seem in any way possible without a common strategic leadership, clear coordination of their actions and efforts. To this end, it was planned to create a single Supreme High Command of the United Armed Forces. In accordance with established views, this body had to rely in its practical activities on the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the headquarters of the Allied Forces and on the control system that had developed in peacetime.

Along with the centralized leadership of the allied groupings of the armed forces, it was allowed to control the formations and formations of the allied armies that were part of the coalition front (fleet) through the commanders of the fronts (fleets).

When organizing the management of coalition groups, the national characteristics of each allied army, the specific conditions for their staffing and support, as well as all the difficulties associated with the language barrier were taken into account. Therefore, the exchange of information between headquarters of different nationalities was supposed to be in Russian. And to ensure the interaction of the troops, mutual exchange of operational groups and relevant management documents was envisaged.

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In the 1980s, a lot of work was carried out in the General Staff and in all branches of the Armed Forces to improve command and control. In exercises and in combat practice, new means of automation and mechanization were widely used, the transmission of commands and messages by short signals was introduced with might and main, new systems of encryption and cryptography were developed and mastered. Particularly stringent requirements were imposed on the efficiency of command and control, the reduction of planning time, the collection and processing of information, and the communication of orders and directives to the troops. At the same time, vigorous and versatile measures were taken to protect the control and communications systems of the strategic link from attacks by a possible enemy and all types of deliberate active or passive radio interference. The security of nodes and other communication objects increased. All stationary control posts were built with protection that could withstand an impact force of 50 to 100 kg/sq.cm and more.

In general, increasing the continuity, flexibility and stability of command and control at the strategic level has always been considered one of the priority and most important tasks in strengthening the country's defense.

Thus, in the postwar years, the role and influence of military strategy on all aspects of military affairs increased sharply, and the strategic actions of the Armed Forces acquired qualitatively new, and most importantly, effective forms. During this period, there was a qualitative leap in the theory of strategy and methods of leadership of the Armed Forces.

MODERN MILITARY STRATEGY OF RUSSIA AND PROSPECTS FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT

A new sharp turn in the development of domestic military strategy took place in the 1990s. Rather, it was

Moreover, a turn, but a deep break. Literally before our eyes, all the military-political and strategic installations that existed until now were destroyed. Almost simultaneously, many previous ideas about the goals, means and methods of the country's defense were overthrown or debunked, the basic principles of ensuring its security were recognized as erroneous, and the universally recognized provisions on the direction and nature of state military development were completely discarded. Moreover, this happened quite unexpectedly, in an unprecedentedly short time and not due to any military-technical reasons, but solely due to special military-political circumstances of the internal and international order, the analysis and assessment of which deserve special attention. .

The changes were so radical, so striking in their scope and consequences, that in the military history of the past it is simply difficult for them to find even a remote analogue. In a few months, many seemingly unshakable strategic postulates were refuted. All or almost all strategic values formed after October 1917 have lost their force, the official system of defense tasks has been completely revised. Former adversaries suddenly turned into allies or partners, and former allies became either potential enemies or, at best, neutral countries.

Such a dramatic upheaval in politics and strategy is by no means accidental. In part, it was a consequence of the self-dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and then the collapse of the Soviet Union as a centralized state and the emergence in its place of an artificially created Commonwealth of Independent States. As a result, the whole system of interstate relations turned out to be upset. The geopolitical position of all Eastern European states, including Russia, has changed.

Having emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has dramatically changed its domestic and foreign policy. Accordingly, a new military strategy began to take shape. Of course, it does not follow from this that all elements of the Soviet military strategy were completely crossed out without exception. This, fortunately, did not happen. And this time, the general patterns, historical and national traditions turned out to be stronger than political ambitions and other incidental circumstances.

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evidence. Nevertheless, a number of strategic attitudes have undergone a radical adjustment. With regard to the changed situation and the new political goals of the Russian Federation, the ideas about the possible nature of wars, the methods of their conduct, the organization of the country's defense, and the training and use of the Armed Forces have been revised. At the same time, some other provisions, in spite of everything, still retained their vitality.

On the whole, the process of shaping Russia's new military strategy is extremely complex and contradictory, in a clash and sharp struggle of opposing attitudes, views and tendencies. Yes, it cannot be otherwise, since the Russian state itself is at a crossroads, and the prospects for its development are not clear enough. The economy is going through a deep crisis, is in the painful stage of transition to a market economy, and domestic policy has not yet acquired the proper balance. Russia's foreign policy course is even more uncertain. The international situation around the Russian Federation is too unstable. Complex processes that have not yet fully developed are taking place in the near and far abroad. In Russia itself, there are mechanisms that are a source of serious destabilizing and destructive phenomena. Potential hotbeds of tension remain along the entire perimeter of the Russian borders, and a war is going on in a number of regions*.

Russia's new military strategy cannot but take all this into account, one way or another it must respond to the changed conditions. In any case, the strategic principles of the Russian state should be reoriented to new requirements, without taking into account which it is impossible either to correctly judge the modern multidimensional world or to effectively solve the problems of ensuring the country's security and defense. Namely, from these positions today it is possible and necessary to consider the modern military strategy of Russia.

1. The main factors in the formation of Russia's military strategy

Russia's military strategy is now being shaped under the influence of a complex set of various objective and subjective factors. Of these, political factors, both external and internal, are the most significant and decisive. Of course, along with politics, economic, military-technical, social, legal, national-ethnic, military-geographical and other reasons, as before, have a great influence on strategy. But at the moment, their impact on strategy is not as significant, if only because changes in these areas are not as dynamic as in the political sphere. Nevertheless, intertwined with each other, they give many elements of modern strategy new features and, taken together, create an extremely contradictory strategic situation, which is not easy to understand.

It is also important to take into account the circumstance that the above objective factors act far from being straightforward. On the contrary, they often develop in diametrically opposite directions. Moreover, some of them give the strategy a sustainable character, even stabilize the situation. Others, on the contrary, introduce elements of uncertainty and, therefore, have a destabilizing effect on the processes on which international and national security and the reliability of state defense depend. First of all, this applies to foreign policy

It would seem that the open East-West confrontation, which kept the entire planet on the dangerous verge of a military catastrophe and threatened

* The time range of the problems considered in the chapter is the end of 199] d - March 1999

result in a global collision of two systems. Today, the world has lost its bipolar structure, the immediate danger of a world war has been removed, and the preconditions have been created for strengthening international confidence, moving from confrontation to cooperation, and integrating the international political space. In any case, the emerging system of international relations, the mutual interest of many states in maintaining peace, solving environmental problems, and sharing the world's raw materials and energy resources create prerequisites for strengthening political, economic, and military stability.

There is every reason to believe that the interests of developing political and economic ties, strengthening the economy, overcoming the growing crisis, the formation of a single world market will contribute to the positive development of interstate relations. It is possible that the main centers of global rapprochement will be the United States, Germany and Russia. It is quite likely that these three states will succeed in blocking destructive political processes in the world. But one cannot fail to see that in place of the former political and ideological contradictions in international relations, new differences and intractable problems have arisen.

First of all, separatist aspirations are becoming more and more aggravated. They have become a reality in Yugoslavia, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Under certain conditions, similar trends may also appear in other regions of the European, African and Asian continents. The resulting fragmentation of large states will inevitably lead to the formation of new hotbeds of tension, intensification of confrontation and other

no less dangerous.

A particular threat is now posed by the expanding process of the territorial reorganization of the world. The system of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, which had been operating flawlessly for almost five decades, has actually been destroyed. Due to the dismantling of military-strategic parity, the former principles of military-strategic deterrence have ceased to operate. The powers that be are tempted to use the weakness of individual states and state systems to achieve certain economic and political goals through open economic, diplomatic and military pressure.

In a word, international confrontation has by no means disappeared, it has only taken on different forms, moved to other areas. Now, more and more clearly, it is not the ideological or even political, but the economic confrontation of world civilizations, the clash of interests along the North-South line that comes to the fore. Countries of the so-called third world, as well as disintegrating states, are becoming more and more dangerous and destabilizing hotspots. Artificial state formations are also unstable, including the CIS, and specifically Russia itself with many contradictions tearing it apart.

Elements of potential contradictions persist in almost all regions of the world: in Europe and Asia, in Africa and Central America. And if they are not rushed to neutralize, sooner or later they will make themselves felt, and it is possible that in the most tragic way.

Along with this main trend, many other very contradictory moments have appeared in world politics, which cannot but affect the political course of Russia, and, consequently, its military strategy. Take, for example, such a question as disarmament. This process began several years ago, when the arms race reached its peak. Of course, thanks to him, the level of military confrontation is reduced. But, as you know, all agreements and restrictions on the abbreviation

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armaments were developed in relation to the division of the world into two opposite systems, and now the situation has changed dramatically.

All this, taking into account the complex nature of political relations within individual regions, introduces elements of uncertainty into the modern military-political situation, makes it difficult to predict, requires the Russian leadership to pursue a flexible, but at the same time far-sighted and prudent policy, the formation of a balanced strategy, creation of reliable mechanisms and structures for ensuring security.

A fundamentally different situation has also been created in the military-economic area. The military-economic capabilities of Russia cannot be commensurate not only with the capabilities of the Soviet Union, but also with the RSFSR, which was part of it. The fact is that its production capacities have significantly decreased, and most importantly, the former management structures have been destroyed along with inter-republican economic and scientific ties, the common economic space, the core of which was Russia, has ceased to exist. Combined with a shrinking territory and population, this led to a sharp drop in the military and economic potential of the new Russia, which in turn severely limits the possibilities of its military strategy. Now Russia is not only unable to focus on a global military strategy identical to the Soviet military strategy of the 1950s and 1980s, but also cannot effectively oppose the United States and other powers strategically.

The sharply reduced military and economic base no longer allows the Russian state to maintain the Armed Forces of many millions, to create and produce modern types of weapons and military equipment on the same scale, to accumulate the necessary mobilization reserves, to update and restore the technical arsenal of the Armed Forces in a timely manner, to compete equally with the leading countries of the world in the military-economic and military-technical fields. At best, we can only talk about maintaining the military-economic power of the state at the minimum acceptable level. But the biggest danger is that the Russian military-industrial complex continues to steadily collapse. And not only because of

planned conversion, but also due to the spontaneous closure of unique industries, the collapse of advanced technologies, the lack of government orders, the massive drain of qualified personnel and scientific brains abroad.

A serious danger is being created in connection with Russia's growing dependence on the economies of other countries, which, in the event of war, could put the deployment of its Armed Forces and strategic plans in jeopardy. All this makes it necessary to rush to clarify and reassess the volume, scale and nature of the strategic tasks of the Armed Forces, as well as the methods of their actions. In any case, the continuation of military construction on the scale, pace and along the lines outlined at the end of the 1980s is now absolutely unrealistic. All principles of military organizational development, development and training of the Armed Forces are subject to a radical revision, and here one also has to reckon with the inevitability of a sharp reduction in military spending. Therefore, a resolute rejection of the cumbersome, unjustifiably inflated Armed Forces is necessary. The question arises of the transition to the implementation of the principles of "reasonable defense sufficiency" in their most stringent form. Russia can no longer be guided by its former orientation of gaining and maintaining military-strategic and military-technical superiority over a conditional adversary, ensuring a military balance, a strategic balance of power. Its strategy must be restructured to carry out only the most important and urgently needed local tasks, and moreover with limited forces and in more economical ways.

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The military geographical factor has a certain influence on Russia's modern military strategy. It would seem that little has changed in this regard, but in fact the changes are quite significant. Until 1991, Russia was the main component of the USSR, which occupied one sixth of the land with a population of about 260 million people. Formally, its area has remained the same - 17.2 million square meters. km. But in essence, the Russian state was thrown back to the borders of the 17th century, and the population decreased to 148 million people. And this has seriously affected all aspects of its security. The potential capabilities of defense have decreased several times, its mobilization resources have decreased, and the ability to resist large-scale aggression has decreased. The country's vulnerability has increased not only from nuclear, but also from conventional weapons, from large-scale attack and peripheral conflicts. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that Russia is separated by the Ukrainian-White-Russian-Baltic barrier from the Eastern European states, on which it has recently had a great influence. With the exception of Poland, the Russian Federation no longer has common borders with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan; extensive buffer zones have now formed between them. It would seem that this is a positive moment, but this is only at first glance. In fact, there are serious negative consequences behind all this. The spatial corridors that led Russia to the Baltic and Black Seas narrowed, for the possession of which the Russian Empire fought for many centuries.

At the same time, the length of the external borders of the Russian state has increased significantly. Moreover, large sections of land borders turned out to be unprotected in natural terms, and in strategic terms, they were simply open. Many interior regions of the country have turned into border areas, and a number of very important industrial and administrative-political centers have ended up in the border zone. Similar changes have taken place with some areas of fuel and energy resources and reserves of strategic raw materials, centers of production of the most important types of equipment and weapons. But they were systematically created and developed for many years at a safe distance from the borders.

Particularly acute is the question of the impact on the military strategy of the socio-social shifts that have occurred recently in Russia: the Soviet state and social system has been forcibly destroyed, the process of forming capitalist relations and the corresponding new political structures is in full swing. In this regard, fundamental changes are taking place in various strata of Russian society. New social groups are emerging, including the speculative bourgeoisie with its special corporate interests. This causes certain shifts not only in government bodies, but also in the army, navy, and other state structures. The social image of the Armed Forces is changing.

On the whole, the totality of these objective factors is directly or indirectly reflected in the official military-doctrinal guidelines and entails a reorientation of many fundamental military-strategic concepts. In accordance with the changed geopolitical interests of Russia, new defense tasks are coming to the fore, and there is a need to revise the priority areas of military construction. Along with this, the development of modern Russian military strategy is also significantly influenced by subjective factors, and in a number of cases their interaction is decisive.

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2. Features of the current military-political situation in Russia and their influence on military strategy

In order to correctly assess Russia's modern military strategy, it is first of all necessary to thoroughly understand the peculiarities of its geopolitical position, the nature of relations with neighboring states, and the changed parameters of the military-political and strategic space it controls.

Undoubtedly, the Russian Federation still plays an important role in world politics, has a significant, although much less than in the past, influence on the global international situation. Despite the fact that the Western powers are making considerable efforts to limit the scope of its activity, Russia today, due to many political, military and other reasons, is actively influencing international processes, especially in Europe. Of decisive importance in this regard are its relations with the United States of America, on the nature and direction of which the situation in various regions, both in the western and eastern hemispheres, still depends.

As mentioned above, there are currently no main reasons for the ideological, political and military confrontation between Russia and the United States: after the collapse of the USSR, Russia no longer threatens the United States of America. Moreover, the Russian Federation itself is increasingly drawn into the sphere of American influence. Of course, the political and economic interests of the United States and Russia do not coincide in everything. Nevertheless, their capabilities have become so incommensurable that there is no need to seriously talk about Russian-American economic and political confrontation. And, of course, it is absolutely unrealistic to raise the question of a possible military confrontation. The military superiority of the United States is so obvious that any clash between Russia and the United States in the previous global forms is out of the question.

The recent political and military agreements reached between Russia and the United States of America, including on coordinated actions in solving major international problems, deep reductions in strategic nuclear and conventional weapons, zero retargeting of strategic missiles, creation of a unified system of defense against missile attacks, the elimination of certain dangerous weapons, strengthen mutual trust and pave the way for a transition to broader cooperation in the military sphere. But it must be borne in mind that

elements of alienation, mutual caution, and most importantly, a different approach to world problems have not yet been completely overcome. The United States continues to lay claim to political leadership in the world, and this in one way or another infringes on the interests of Russia Federation. The United States is in no way interested in the revival of Russia as a powerful economic power capable of competing on equal terms with America in the world economic market, and this undermines Russia's economic stability and puts it in a dependent position.

Of course, in its aspirations the United States does not intend to go beyond a certain critical point. The political collapse and complete economic collapse of the Russian state are contrary to the interests of the United States, because they can lead to serious pan-European, and possibly global shocks. But even under these conditions, Russian-American contradictions often make themselves felt, and in the future they will probably manifest themselves in an even more open form. It is important, however, to keep

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reap them within acceptable limits. This is necessary both for Russia and for the United States, and for maintaining peace throughout the world.

The issue of contradictions between Russia and the United States in the military field is of particular interest. Of course, now the war between them is unthinkable. Yes, there is no real reason for this. But at the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that the armed forces of Russia and the United States are still structurally designed to fight primarily with each other. We cannot rule out the possibility of emergencies that the United States and Russia may consider mutually dangerous.

Therefore, effective military-political measures are needed to eliminate the possibility of sharp turns in military policy. It is necessary to work out a number of preventive measures, international agreements and actions capable of blocking crisis situations. At the same time, it is important for both states to find ways to mutually agree on promising areas of military development on the basis of mutual consideration of the interests of national and international security.

In the European region, the nature of its political and military relations with the European countries that are members of NATO is of decisive importance for strengthening the military-political position of Russia. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, these relations acquired a more stable character and a qualitatively new meaning. In particular, another circumstance is also very important: Russia and the NATO countries have officially announced that they no longer consider each other a potential enemy. On many political and economic issues, there has been a certain rapprochement between Russia and the FRG, Britain, France, Belgium, Norway and other states of the North Atlantic Alliance. The Alliance's announced intention to reduce NATO's armed forces and the clarification of the political and military concepts of the North Atlantic bloc also have a positive effect on the nature of European relations. The idea of cooperation between European countries on the basis of the Partnership for Peace program can contribute to strengthening European stability and tolerance.

But at the same time, one has to reckon with the still remaining contradictions between Russia and Western European countries, with different approaches to solving the Balkan problem, and especially with the possibility of expanding NATO's sphere of influence to the east and the ever-increasing imbalance of military forces on the European continent. This imbalance will become especially noticeable if a number of Eastern European and Baltic countries are admitted to NATO'. In essence, in this case, the whole of Western and Eastern Europe will oppose Russia with all the dangers that follow from this. Even now, the military superiority of the European NATO countries over Russia and other CIS states has become overwhelming. If Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and then the Baltic states join the North Atlantic bloc, then all reasonable criteria for balance will lose their force.

This situation cannot but cause serious concern. Europe is the most controversial and potentially dangerous region in the world. Enormous human and material resources, gigantic economic potential determine its special position in the world. We must not forget that it was Europe that was already the source of two world and many local wars, for almost half a century it was the main arena of the Cold War, the open political confrontation between the capitalist and socialist states. During the post-war years, the situation in this region has repeatedly brought the world to the brink of war. And now this continent remains the most heavily armed area on the globe. The most modern and effective means of armed struggle are located here. European states have the most

significant mobilization resources, developed military infrastructure. Therefore, major military clashes here are fraught with unpredictable

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possible consequences, the threat of the inevitable escalation of a military conflict into a world war.

Under such conditions, European security cannot but be at the center of attention of all European states, including Russia. The main features of the current situation in Europe are, first of all, the elimination of the former military confrontation between the two blocs - the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, with a sharp reduction in the military-strategic space, which was not so long ago under the control of the USSR, and at the same time, a significant expansion of the scope of NATO, creation of a special vast strip that separates NATO and Eastern European countries from the CIS.

There was a new division of forces. At present, at least four or five groups of states with different political orientations have formed in Europe. Russia's external environment has also changed significantly. Four outer belts of state formations have developed around the Russian Federation. The first is formed by NATO countries; the second is the Eastern European states that were previously part of the Warsaw Pact; the third - the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, as well as neutral European states; the fourth is the countries of the near abroad. Each of these belts has its own characteristics, but all of them are characterized by a common interest in maintaining stability and mutual security.

Over time, there is some leveling of positions: in some cases, the transition of states from openly hostile relations to good-neighbourly relations, and in others - from allied-subordinate relations to mutually beneficial cooperation at various levels. As a result, a military-strategic space was formally formed, in which, it would seem, there are no more enemies, but there are no friends either, which was typical of the very recent past. Now it is customary to talk about near and far abroad. But in practice, everything is much more complicated, because the system of the post-war structure of Europe has collapsed. All Eastern European states that were previously part of the Warsaw Pact (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, p) found themselves in the buffer zone. Russia is separated from them by the Baltic States, Belarus and Ukraine. In relation to Russia, its former allies take an ambivalent position. On the one hand, on the other hand, their interest in cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus is still preserved, and on the other hand, a clear orientation to the West. Moreover, this trend is increasing. The idea of joining NATO is being persistently promoted. In other words, there is a return to the situation of the 30s, when Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were planning a war on two fronts, considering, however, that the main

danger threatens them from the east.

Of course, now none of these countries can openly present any claims against Russia, but potentially such claims are ripening under certain conditions (in the event of the development of destructive processes in Russia, the inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary into NATO, uniting them into a single bloc, advancing NATO's forward echelon to their territory)* they can manifest themselves in one form or another. For this reason, the Middle West for the CIS and Russia should be considered a zone of "relative safety".

In the North European direction, the military-strategic situation for Russia is more favorable. But it also carries a number of potential threats. In the zone formed here of three Scandinavian states and three Baltic republics that left the USSR, events can develop differently. From Scandinavian

* July 8, 1997 Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary received the status of invited to NATO; their final full membership in this bloc was formalized on March 12, 1999.

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With these countries (Finland, Sweden, Norway), friendly, albeit relatively cold, relations are likely to remain, unless the claims already expressed today against a number of regions of Russia (meaning Karelia and the Far North) do not prevail there. Relations with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will depend on the positions of both sides. Russia is fully interested in having friendly and even allied states in their person. Direct interest in the development of economic ties remains on the part of the Baltic States. But all the same, militarily, elements of mistrust do not disappear, which, under certain conditions, can develop into confrontation. This must be prevented even at the expense of some concessions to them. At the same time, it is important to close the strategic gap that has formed in this direction and restore a reliable defense system on the new border.

In the southern European direction, only recently the main danger was the focus of military confrontation in the Balkans, as well as serious contradictions between Hungary and Romania, Moldova and Transnistria. It would seem that they do not directly affect the interests of Russia, but this is only superficially. If the conflict escalates, Russia will be forced to take one position or another and, consequently, find itself in the sphere of military confrontation between the parties.

A special situation develops on the southern border of the Russian state, where it borders on Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. With each of these republics, the nature of its relations is special. In general, they are friendly, but at the same time they are overshadowed by a whole range of serious political, economic and territorial contradictions, which, under certain conditions, can lead to a serious crisis.

The South Asian region is becoming increasingly vulnerable to Russia in military-political and strategic terms. This is due to the fact that the situation here is very contradictory and complex. The positions of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan have not yet been fully determined. In addition, the region is engulfed in interethnic conflicts. which cannot be suppressed. On the contrary, more and more hot spots are constantly emerging. It is important to take into account at least three major factors that can have a negative impact on

influence on the situation. This is the shift of the main center of confrontation from the West-East line to the North-South line, the constant intensification of contradictions on a religious basis, the general explosiveness of the region. The situation could become especially ominous if the Arab states of the Near and Middle East attempt to unite with Azerbaijan and the former Soviet Central Asian republics on the basis of Islamic fundamentalism. To prevent such a situation is one of the main military-political tasks of Russia.

The military-political position of Russia in the Far East and throughout the Asia-Pacific region has recently become stronger, due to favorable changes in its relations with China, Korea and Japan. But the potential military danger continues to persist.

The previous confrontation with China did not remain without consequences. Under certain conditions, it can resume or take on even more acute forms if the mistakes made earlier are not taken into account. But it is possible that the development of relations will go in a relatively favorable direction. In such conditions, it is important to make every effort to ensure that China is approved as a friendly state, which will allow Russia to strengthen security in the East, reduce the composition of the Armed Forces in the eastern direction and avoid dispersion of its forces. Other measures are also needed that could help increase stability in the areas bordering China, in particular,

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to agree on the mutual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, on the creation on a parity basis of a Russian-Chinese missile attack warning system, on reducing the concentration of armed forces in the border areas, removing strike weapons from the zone of direct contact between the parties, and in addition, try to prevent the development of separatist tendencies in the autonomous regions of Russia.

The situation with Japan is more complicated. The main reason causing tension in relations between it and Russia is related to the problem of the northern territories. On the one hand, their return could relieve this tension to a large extent, speed up the signing of a peace treaty and open the way for broader political and economic cooperation. But on the other hand, this would complicate the position of the Pacific Fleet, and besides, it would be a precedent for the extension of Japanese claims to the entire Kuril chain and South Sakhalin.

It seems that over time, especially in the event of a complication of the situation in Russia itself and the strengthening of the Japanese military potential, the leadership of Japan may take a tougher stance on these issues or even try to align with China and Korea, which forces Russia to maintain a stable system here. defense, albeit with more limited forces.

Of particular importance in terms of ensuring strategic stability is the preservation of a stable situation on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States and within Russia. All states included in this Commonwealth, despite many contradictions, are closely connected with each other in political, economic and military relations. Undoubtedly, it is required, if possible, to restore a single economic and military-strategic space of these states, to strengthen and expand inter-republican cooperation in all spheres. Unfortunately, the disagreements between the republics on territorial and other issues have not yet been fully resolved: between Russia and Ukraine over Crimea; between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh; between Russia and Moldova over Transnistria; between Kazakhstan and Russia because of the northwestern regions; between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan because of Karakalpakstan; finally, directly in Russia due to separatist aspirations in the North Caucasus, in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. These same processes led to the Chechen war, and in the future they are fraught with new threats. The situation is further complicated by the fact that territorial problems here are closely intertwined with economic, national and religious contradictions.

The totality of the listed military-political factors, of course, cannot but affect the tasks, content and prospects for the development of the Russian military strategy.

3. The military-strategic position of Russia and the system of military threats

Having turned from a union republic into an independent state, Russia became the legal successor of the USSR, acquired the status of one of the world powers, got the opportunity to pursue its own domestic and foreign policy, have a national Armed Forces, diplomatic, customs and border services, as well as other attributes of statehood. .

It should be noted that in comparison with other states formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia immediately took a special place in the world community. Possessing a larger territory, the largest human and mother

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With natural resources, huge reserves of strategic raw materials, powerful economy, developed science and a wide network of transport links, it formed the core of the CIS. At the same time, it retained its political and economic significance throughout the entire Euro-Asian space. Russia still occupies one of the leading places in the world in terms of economic power, oil, gas, coal production, steel and iron production, and non-ferrous metal smelting. Its military-strategic potential also remains huge. All this allows the Russian Federation to have a great influence on European and world affairs.

Indisputable is the absolutely obvious fact that not only the political and economic, but also the military-strategic position of the Russian Federation has changed radically since the early 1980s:

Firstly, the economic potential of the country was significantly reduced, and secondly, the ratio of military forces changed dramatically in favor of the Western powers. According to calculations, the combat potential of the NATO countries, even with further reductions in conventional weapons, can exceed the capabilities of the CIS countries taken together by 2-3 times, and 5-6 times the potential of Russia alone. Moreover, this indicator is very relative, since it does not reflect the qualitative side of the real combat power of states. One cannot ignore the fact that by now the entire former defensive structure of the USSR, and, consequently, of Russia, has been destroyed. At the same time, NATO military forces continue to build up their military capabilities. Russia, on the other hand, has dropped out of the system of collective defense of the Eastern European countries that has been created for decades and, militarily, has found itself, in essence, isolated. Defense agreements concluded between a number of CIS countries are practically non-existent. The obligations assumed under them are not fulfilled. At best, it comes down to mutual consultations and non-committal decisions of a purely declarative nature. In a word, in ensuring its security, Russia is forced to rely solely on its own

strength.

The destruction of the military defense structure of the Department of Internal Affairs and the USSR had a particularly negative impact on the defensive capabilities of the Russian Federation. Previously, the defense of the Soviet state, and hence Russia, was based on the repulsion of aggression on defensive lines located outside the Russian borders. Now this system has been destroyed. All groupings of the Armed Forces outside Russia have been eliminated, with the exception of symbolic forces in Moldova, the Caucasus and Tajikistan. The main (first) strategic echelon of the Russian Armed Forces in the west and south collapsed. Many basic elements of the second strategic echelon were also dismantled. Internal military districts turned into frontier ones. In all strategic directions, the existing groupings of troops no longer corresponded to the new situation and real defense tasks.

The country's air defense system has been completely disrupted. Its forward echelon has been eliminated. Some air routes turned out to be essentially open. The conditions for basing aviation and navy became sharply complicated. The naval infrastructure in the Baltic and Black Seas is being destroyed.

Russia has lost a significant part of its mobilization reserves, reserves of weapons and military equipment, warehouses and arsenals, protected command posts, training centers, training grounds, etc. 80% of the stations of the ground-based missile attack warning system, many equipped positional areas for means of radio and electronic intelligence, airfields, enterprises of the military industry. The grouping of the Strategic Missile Forces turned out to be fragmented, which is confirmed by the data in Table 15.

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Table 15 Composition of strategic nuclear weapons remaining on the territory of the states of the former USSR

States	—	MKR	SLBM	Heavy. bombs	Total	--	WEARS.	wears.	b/g		wears.		b/g.
Russia	912	397	79	271	1773	6893	Ukraine	176	124	39	420		215 1660
Kazakhstan	98	980	40	240	138	1220	Belarus	81	81	—	—	81	81
Total	1267	6271	158	931	2213	9854							

And although Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan became parties to the START-1 Treaty, assumed obligations to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, at the beginning of 1995 the situation remained rather uncertain. For example, Belarus ratified the START-1 Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol to it, but agreed to bring strategic missiles, parts of rocket and technical support, space communications and air defense systems to Russia only by 1997. Kazakhstan ratified the SALT-1 Treaty, but has not yet joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Ukraine also ratified the SALT-1 and the Lisbon Protocol, but with significant reservations. It is ready to join a nuclear-free status only if it receives reliable guarantees of its security from the Western nuclear powers and Russia. According to the agreement concluded between Russia and Ukraine, the dismantling and destruction of nuclear warheads stationed on the territory of Ukraine should take place only under its direct control. In general, the process of withdrawal and elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in Ukraine is designed for seven years, but it may be delayed for a longer time.

It is clear that in this situation, Russia's nuclear power can no longer compete with the nuclear potential of the United States, especially since the service life of a significant part of strategic missiles is approaching its limit, and the program for deploying new mobile launches is proceeding very slowly. From all this, an unambiguous conclusion suggests itself: the military capabilities of Russia, its strategic position, despite the decrease in the level of military confrontation, have become less favorable.

In assessing the strategic position of any state, including Russia, an important place has always been and is still occupied by the correct definition of who is an ally and who is an adversary, as well as an objective qualification of potential military threats.

In the past, the question of allies and opponents of the USSR was resolved quite simply. The first included all countries of a socialist orientation, the second included the imperialist states led by the United States and their allies. In addition, there has always been a group of states that have taken an intermediate or neutral position. In general, there was a continuous struggle to attract them to our side. At present, the problem is much more complicated. It is practically impossible to unambiguously classify certain states as potential enemies or friends, because any country, depending on the specific conditions of the situation, can quickly change its

position and be on one side or the other of the barrier. Consequently, when evaluating potential allies and adversaries, Russia is forced to proceed not so much from the specific alignment of political forces at the moment,

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how much of the forecast of promising options based on the general principles of military-political analysis.

Among the most important of these are four doctrinal provisions:

1. Russia does not intend to treat any state, any people as its enemy.
2. Russia will not consider any country with a different political system, any of its neighbors, including any state that seceded from the USSR, as a potential adversary. It will not use its Armed Forces and other troops against any state, except for individual or collective self-defence, if there is an armed attack on the Russian Federation, its citizens, territory, Armed Forces or its allies.
3. Russia will consider as its potential allies only democratic states that do not pursue aggressive goals.
4. Russia intends to seek the establishment of friendly allied relations between all countries of the near abroad, as well as the Baltics.

In concrete terms, the Russian Federation intends to resolve the issue of allies and adversaries on the same basis as the United States and NATO, namely: to proceed from the fact that it has no direct enemies, but potential threats remain, or, following American terminology, "categories of risks", which must certainly be taken into account in all strategic calculations and plans.

The essence of this term was revealed in January 1991 in the NATO declaration on the new strategic concept of the North Atlantic bloc, which, in particular, stated: "Unlike the main threat of the past, the remaining risk to the security of allies is multifaceted in nature and has many directions, which complicates its forecasting and evaluation. NATO must be able to respond to such a "risk" so that stability in Europe and the security of the members of the Union will be preserved..."

Judging by the assessment of the NATO leadership, it is unlikely that the "risk to the security of allies" will be the result of deliberate aggression; "most likely it will be the result of the adverse consequences of the instability that may arise due to serious economic, social, political difficulties, including national conflicts and territorial disputes, which many countries in Central and Eastern Europe are already facing"?

Although the modern Russian defense concept is based on the same principles, it is formulated in a slightly different form: certain specific crisis situations are defined in which a military danger develops into an immediate military threat, which allows, on this basis, certain countries to be classified as an enemy.

Such an attitude certainly makes political sense. It corresponds to the defensive orientation of Russia's military strategy, which is focused on repelling unprovoked aggression. But at the same time, its abstract nature does not allow purposefully preparing the country and the Armed Forces for defense. In essence, it follows from it that Russia should consider all states without exception as its probable adversaries. From this it follows that the defense must be built literally from all angles and be ready to wage war against any coalition of hostile forces, which, of course, is not only unbearable, but also unreasonable either politically or strategically. In other words, it turns out that in the long term, almost every country should be considered both as an enemy and as an ally. Moreover, this equally applies not only to the USA, Germany, England, but also to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, to all the Baltic states and even to Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian republics. Therefore, for Russia, a very

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a paradoxical situation: she has to prepare her army and develop a strategy for all occasions.

The strategic analysis of the alignment of military-political forces is closely connected with the assessment of possible military threats. This question is of exceptional importance both theoretically and practically. It is dangerous to underestimate military threats, but it is no less dangerous to overestimate them, since this will inevitably lead to policy mistakes, buildup of the Armed Forces beyond reasonable limits, and, consequently, to disruption of the planned socio-economic programs. Only on the basis of an accurate forecast of real military threats, it is possible to prevent accidents, correctly calculate and distribute the potential resources and capabilities of the state, ensure their rational use, and organize reliable defense with minimal damage to the country's economy and ecology.

As applied to modern Russia, the problem of military threats comes down to clarifying the following questions. Does the military danger for the Russian Federation continue to exist in the changed situation? If there is such a danger, how real is it? Will the military danger decrease or, conversely, increase in the future? What circumstances can turn a potential military danger into a real military threat? Under what conditions can a military threat trigger a military clash of one size or another?

Before answering these questions, one must keep in mind that the nature of modern military threats has changed dramatically. We have to make a special distinction between external and internal military threats, as well as threats of various scales — global, regional and local, real and imaginary threats. At the same time, it should not be overlooked that the likelihood of many threats has dropped sharply. Some of them have left the stage of the possible development of world events altogether. However, a number of new military threats have emerged that, until a few years ago, were considered unlikely or at least insignificant. At the same time, the relationship between external and internal threats has increased. The very structure of military threats has become more complex, their causality has expanded, etc.

In particular, the circumstance that the probability of a world nuclear war has recently decreased has become decisive. At the same time, the danger of regional, local, but especially intrastate conflicts and wars has increased. The nature of the situation that may precede military clashes has also changed dramatically. Finally, the composition of the opposing forces became completely different; the means that can be used for military pressure and the implementation of military threats have also changed.

If in the recent past the Soviet Union and the United States considered each other as "enemy number one", then at present a military clash between the United States and Russia, at least in the near future, is generally excluded. It is not only senseless politically, but also strategically unfeasible. The United States and Russia are mutually interested in stable development based on a rational balance of interests. Unfortunately, one cannot completely rule out a situation where the interests of the United States and Russia may collide. In this situation, the ruling circles of both states may change their political course and, under certain conditions, take the path of economic and military pressure. A sharp turn in the American or Russian political course is also possible if aggressive forces come to power. Of course, the position of the United States and Russia is far from being equivalent. The United States of America has to reckon with Russia only insofar as it still has a huge nuclear potential. As for Russia, having lost its former allies, it is sharply weakened in economic and military

External threats

Regional Private Terrorism Border conflicts

Accidental use of weapons

Global

Threat of nuclear war

Territorial Threats

Violation of the military-strategic balance

Economic contradictions

Religious clashes

National LATE

Areas of external military conflicts

trespassing

At the regional level

Russia's clash with the Baltic countries

Globally

US-Russia clash CIS-NATO clash

Clash of coalitions Asian

Russia clashes with gruppies

east European countries

Private conflicts between Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the Transcaucasian states

and European countries

Clash of world civilizations

Internal threats and potential areas of their occurrence

Clashes on the national-ethnic and economic front. soil

Territorial Clashes

Social Threats

Religious Clashes

North Caucasus Tatarstan Bashkiria

Int. districts of Russia

Far East Siberia

Karachay-Cherkessia

Tatarstan

Buryat-Mongolia |

Diagram 58. The structure of modern military threats to Russia

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In other respects, it is not only unable to effectively resist the West, but, on the contrary, is forced to seek outside help and support.

In order to ensure its guaranteed security, Russia must foresee such a danger in advance, no matter how small it may be, and accordingly take the necessary political, military-strategic and military-technical countermeasures to prevent it. But most importantly, it is necessary to use every opportunity so that the hidden Russian-American contradictions do not again develop into a confrontation, and the confrontation, in turn, does not turn into an armed confrontation.

These measures primarily include the coordination of the military policy of Russia and the United States, the CIS and NATO, their military doctrines, national strategies, as well as the early creation of reliable mechanisms for localizing military threats from both sides. An even deeper and more proportionate reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, the coordinated development of strategic defensive forces, the joint creation of a unified early warning system of a possible attack, the mutual improvement of early warning systems, reconnaissance and other means, could be of great importance in this regard. excluding unauthorized or accidental use of offensive weapons.

Among the external regional military threats, European ones should be distinguished. South Asian and East Asian. The most important and dangerous among them, of course, are the European military threats. Their nature depends on the position of NATO, the prospects for the expansion of the North Atlantic bloc to the east by including the East European states, and even the Baltic states, further building up the combat power of the bloc and developing its strategy.

The expansion of the North Atlantic bloc to the east will mean not only the expansion of NATO's sphere of influence, but also a significant increase in the military potential of the Western powers, as well as the formation of a fundamentally different strategic situation in which Russia, and with it Belarus and Ukraine, will find themselves face to face with a powerful a force that they are unlikely to be able to reliably resist. The inevitable result of such a situation will be the complication of relations between NATO and Russia, including with a united Germany. Taking into account the confluence of economic and military potentials, the FRG has already turned into a powerful state that is able to solve major military-strategic tasks not only on the European continent, but also beyond its borders. True, at present the FRG still recognizes the immutability of European borders. So far, there is no doubt that, due to the favorable state of its economy, Germany at this stage is not interested in a military solution to its political problems. However, this is only for the time being. If the crisis develops in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, their further weakening, the simultaneous change in the political course and the growth of Germany's military power, its attitude towards the Eastern countries may change. It is possible that she will be tempted, using her superiority, to put military pressure on the weakened Russia, Poland and the Czech Republic with the expectation of somehow forcing them to return the territories lost as a result of the defeat in the Second World War - East Prussia (Kaliningrad Region), Silesia, Pomerania. It is no coincidence that statements of this kind are already appearing among revanchist circles in the FRG today, and in a number of cases they are declared almost openly. True, some politicians argue that a clash between Russia and the FRG is physically impossible due to the lack of common borders between them, but with modern means of attack this is no longer significant, as evidenced by the experience of many local conflicts.

Potentially dangerous centers of military threats are also ripening in the territories of the former allies of the USSR - in Poland, Hungary, and Romania. Of course, at present

The military-strategic position of Russia and the system of military threats 513

At the same time, a certain economic dependence of these countries on Russia still remains. But their orientation towards the West is becoming more and more obvious, and it is possible that it will soon become dominant. Under such conditions, hostile attitudes towards Russia may gradually increase. Of course, on their own, neither Poland, nor Hungary, nor Romania are in a position to exert military pressure on the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus. However, in the event of an undermining of the Russian nuclear potential, or the dismemberment of Russia, or a kind of formation within the framework of NATO, or a completely separate local bloc of Eastern European countries, Poland and other former allies of the USSR will constitute a very significant force that can threaten Russia.

And what can Russia expect from the Baltic countries? Certainly, in view of the weakness of their armies, they do not represent for her

real danger. But their territory can become an important springboard for the deployment of active actions by third countries. In any case, it cannot be discounted even now.

The nature of military threats on Russia's southern borders will be determined by the situation in Transcaucasia, the North Caucasus, in particular, developments in Chechnya, Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the policies of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. We have to reckon with the fact that after the collapse of the USSR, this region became even more explosive, especially since numerous contradictions of a political, economic, ethnic, religious and territorial nature intertwine and collide here. Some of them, which have matured over decades and even centuries, are now making themselves felt in full force.

In the Middle East, the military threat to Russia has not yet taken on acute forms. But it can also become real if the Iranian leadership attempts to seize leadership in the region, extend its influence to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and other regions where the population professing Islam prevails. It is no coincidence that, using internal instability in these states, Iran is trying to create a local pro-Iranian infrastructure here, such as the Army of Allah party, etc. . Human. If earlier this did not pose a danger to the USSR, today, when the North Caucasian grouping of Russia is inferior to it in strength, it will not be easy to counter such a threat.

In the Middle East, the military situation has also become very alarming lately, and there is no hope that it will improve. Afghanistan and the Tajik opposition are becoming increasingly active. In the event of intervention by third forces (Pakistan and China), the situation here could also become extremely difficult, which would require Russia to divert significant forces to this area.

The military threat in the Far East is currently less dangerous. But in the long term, especially in case of mistakes on the part of the Russian and Chinese leadership, they can become aggravated and even become extraordinary.

In recent years, internal military threats have become especially dangerous for Russia. Attempts to forcefully suppress internal contradictions have not yet yielded positive results. On the contrary, they only reinforce separatist aspirations. If such processes continue to grow, there will be a real danger of destabilization of the internal situation in Russia. It is impossible to exclude the emergence of individual local conflicts on social, territorial, national and religious grounds. At least by the end of 1996, there were 20-25 hotbeds of dangerous voltage. In the future, the situation may worsen due to mass migration of the population, the growth of terrorism, the development of militant nationalism and other negative phenomena, which will not only undermine the unity of the Russian

NATIONAL SECURITY

Military Economic

Ecological

Political

Elements of military security

Security levels

The main directions of ensuring national military security

Creation of legal foundations Maintaining the combat readiness of the Armed Forces Development of a system of international agreements Participation in international security structures Localization of internal. conflicts Expanding confidence-building measures Maintaining stability in the regions Development of retaliatory military actions

Creation of a mechanism for non-proliferation of strategically dangerous types of weapons

Operations to disarm illegal military formations

Structure of national military security

RF PRESIDENT

Russian Security Council

Strong structure

Internal Troops Border Troops Armed Forces FSB Forces

Non-power structures

Political org-tion Economic structure Society. org-tion Public opinion

Possible actions to ensure military security

Ensuring internal security Ensuring external security

Declaring a state of emergency \ action of containment

Protection of public order Military counter-threats Blocking internal conflicts Localization of conflicts

Armed warning collision Reflection of aggression in war

Carrying out measures to disarm illegal groups

Carrying out operational-search activities

Diagram 59. The structure of ensuring the national security of Russia

New concept of military doctrine 515

Federation, but will also cause an international escalation of violence, with all the ensuing consequences that are difficult to predict.

The main roots of internal local conflicts in Russia lie in its historical past. They are due to various reasons, including the arbitrary establishment of provincial borders by the tsarist regime, and in Soviet times, the forcible deportation of peoples and the voluntary change of territorial-administrative borders. Now, to all this, the mistakes of the Russian leadership in social and national policy are added, the clash of contradictions in religious, economic and other

soil.

Finally, there is another category of threats that cannot be ignored. It is associated with socio-political tension in the country, the deterioration of the economic situation, as well as the danger of the degeneration of democratic structures into a totalitarian or autocratic regime. All this increases the social discontent of the population, primarily in large administrative and political centers and some underdeveloped areas, which, under certain conditions, can develop into a permanent civil war.

In the general set of tasks, the issues discussed above have a direct impact on Russia's military strategy and require the determination within its framework of effective measures to prevent and repulse both external and internal threats. There is an urgent need to develop a comprehensive concept of strengthening the country's defense in relation to the situation, the creation of less cumbersome but more effective Armed Forces and peacekeeping formations, not to mention an in-depth study of methods of strategic action in all types of political and military clashes.

4. New concept of Russian military doctrine

The changed political and military situation required a radical revision of the military doctrines of most European and many Asian countries. Currently, this process is developing everywhere and interconnected. The military doctrines of the USA, NATO, Germany, Great Britain, France and all Eastern European states have been specified. The military doctrines of the Baltic, Transcaucasian and Central Asian countries that seceded from the USSR are being developed anew.

Of particular importance, from the point of view of Russia's military interests, are the refinements made to the military concepts of the United States and the North Atlantic bloc. A departure from the previous concept of "forward lines" and a restructuring of defense based on a "reduced presence" has been officially announced. It was recognized that it is necessary to change some principles of the "flexible response strategy", taking into account the lower level of military threat from the east and the readiness for the rapid deployment of forces of the so-called forward echelon to potential threat zones, including on the territory of Eastern European and Baltic states.

The document adopted at the session of the NATO Council on November 8, 1991 in Rome, on this occasion states: "The goals of the alliance are purely defensive ... the forces of the allies must be able to protect the borders of the Union, stop the advance of aggression for as long as possible distant frontiers, maintain or restore the territorial integrity of the allied states and quickly end the war, forcing the aggressor to reconsider his decision, stop the offensive and withdraw troops".

With regard to the new military doctrine of NATO, the military doctrine of the FRG has been revised. The development of new military doctrines of the Eastern European states is being completed.

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states: Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Romania. All of them are formally defensive in nature, but now they proceed from the primary defense of their countries from a threat not from the west, as was the case before, but from the east. The preparation of new military doctrines in the post-Soviet republics is being completed: in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, as well as in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This task has become extremely acute for Russia as well. Until 1991, the Russian Federation focused mainly on the military doctrine of the USSR, adopted in 1987. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this doctrine lost its force. Moreover, many of its guidelines came into conflict with the new socio-political structure of the Russian state, its geopolitical position, economic opportunities and national security requirements.

The formation of a new Russian military doctrine was extremely difficult and contradictory. Within a year and a half, at least seven different variants of it were developed. The first of them, in fact, reproduced in a somewhat more precise form the main provisions of the former Soviet military doctrine, with the only difference that the new political environment of Russia was taken into account, the changed nature of the threats, the organization of the country's defense was envisaged within the framework of the collective defense not of the Warsaw Pact, but of the CIS countries. . Subsequent options gradually included more and more installations, including those that never existed in the past.

The events of October 31, 1993, were the impetus that required speeding up the completion of this work. In a short time, a fundamentally new version of the military doctrine was created. In November of the same year, at a meeting of the Security Council, its draft was approved, and then put into effect by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1833.

The promulgated main provisions of the military doctrine indicated that it is "a system of views officially adopted in the state on the prevention of war, armed conflicts, on military development, preparing the country for defense, organizing counteraction to threats to the military security of the state, on the use of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation to protect the vital interests of the Russian Federation"?. At the same time, it was emphasized that the military security of the country is supposed to be ensured by the totality of means available to Russia, with the priority given to political, diplomatic and other peaceful efforts. It was noted that the Armed Forces "can be used only as a last resort in case of aggression against the Russian Federation or its allies; to conduct peacekeeping operations in accordance with the decisions of the UN Security Council or international obligations; for the suppression of armed conflicts and any unlawful armed violence on state borders and within the territory of the country".

It is easy to see that in these and some other issues the new military doctrine of Russia is to some extent consistent with individual doctrinal guidelines of the US and NATO, or even repeats them. However, it was nevertheless based on fundamentally different requirements arising from the specific conditions of Russia and the special nature of the national tasks facing it. In the adopted military doctrine, the following characteristic features are of the greatest importance.

It includes not two, as it was before, but three interrelated sections: political, military-strategic and military-technical. Thus, all the main constituent elements that determine the conditions for ensuring the military security of the state, the nature and methods of fulfilling the defense tasks facing it are more clearly revealed.

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For the first time, the measures of external and internal security of Russia, the organization of national and collective defense within the framework of the CIS, at the regional and global levels are distinguished.

The pre-existing propaganda obligation to not be the first to use nuclear weapons has been removed, and instead the conditions under which such weapons can be used in retaliatory, reciprocal and pre-emptive variants are defined. E

The former doctrinal guidelines for the deployment and use of the Armed Forces within national borders have been revised; Taking into account the new realities, the possibility of deploying and operating the Armed Forces in foreign territories to perform certain military tasks is envisaged.

For the first time, the possibility of using the Armed Forces to carry out peacekeeping operations on the basis of UN decisions is envisaged.

It is allowed to use the Armed Forces in internal conflicts and to suppress illegal actions, armed clashes, separate the opposing sides and protect strategic military facilities on the territory of Russia.

The new military doctrine, developed by the mid-1990s, presupposed and still presupposes a radical restructuring of the entire military system of the state and its Armed Forces, with the main efforts being concentrated on improving the specific structures of the army and navy and improving their qualitative characteristics. In particular, they envisaged a gradual transition to a mixed system of manning troops, the creation of new groupings of the Armed Forces and other infrastructure within the borders of Russia. It was supposed to prioritize the development of forces and means designed to deter aggression, as well as mobile forces capable of quickly moving to remote areas and starting maneuverable combat operations in the direction where a threat to the security of the Russian Federation could arise. On the whole, this military doctrine, while retaining its defensive orientation, would acquire a more resolute, active and multifaceted character.

Of course, this does not mean that all provisions of this military doctrine are unshakable. In essence, the declared doctrine was a transitional military doctrine. But at present, not all of its requirements have turned out to be acceptable in practice. For example, it was revealed that doctrinal guidelines do not correspond to real military threats, the conditions for the emergence and conduct of modern wars, and, in addition, the insufficient validity of the requirements put forward for the construction and training of the Armed Forces, and the methods of conducting military operations. In this regard, work began to clarify many of the provisions of this document. At the same time, the question arose of developing a supranational and interstate military doctrine of the CIS, which would define the most important tasks and principles of the collective defense of the Commonwealth countries, the directions of their strategic cooperation. Such a doctrine, obviously, should include a system of general guidelines on the procedure for the joint protection of the interests and territorial integrity of the allied countries, based on the agreement reached that any actions directed against any state that has signed a collective security treaty "will be considered as an encroachment on common interests and cause appropriate responses using both national and international associations of military structures.

What are the main guidelines and military criteria for the political division of Russia's military doctrine? It defines the attitude of the state to the war, its possible political nature, direction

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goals and defense tasks, general principles of organization of national and collective security, political measures to prevent war and maintain international security. The most important of them are as follows.

Attitude to the war and its political character. At present, Russia proceeds from the fact that war as a means of resolving interstate, inter-republican and intra-republican contradictions has become obsolete, that is, it has become unacceptable. First of all, this applies to a nuclear war, in which there can be neither winners nor losers. It has long been clear to everyone that such a war will end only with the inevitable mutual destruction of both sides, a global catastrophe, the death of the entire civilization. Ordinary large-scale wars are now becoming extremely dangerous in their destructive consequences, not only because of the inevitable colossal losses, but also because of the likelihood

the possibility of their escalation into a nuclear war. In this regard, they also cease to be a rational means
politicians.

The most common today are local wars. In view of their limited scale and the usual inequality of the belligerent forces, it is quite possible to achieve victory, but their very unleashing carries the threat of an escalation of hostilities into a large-scale war. In addition, it must be remembered that any local war is associated with huge material and moral-political costs, large losses in the personnel of the armed forces of the parties and among the population.

With this in mind, the prevention of war in all its forms and types is put forward as a priority political and military-strategic task.

As for the political nature of possible wars, at present the Russian military doctrine proceeds from the fact that the main type of war for which the Soviet Union was preparing in previous years, namely, a world war as a global clash of two world social systems, is removed from the agenda. It is impossible because there is no longer a split in the world into two opposing camps—socialist and capitalist. Nevertheless, wars between individual countries of capitalist and socialist orientation, between democratic and totalitarian states, and finally, between states and groups of states with identical sociopolitical regimes, but pursuing different interests and goals, cannot be ruled out.

It is assumed that at present the probability of not only a world global war with the use of nuclear weapons, but also with the use of conventional means of armed struggle is sharply limited. At the same time, there is a clear trend towards an increase in the diversity of military clashes. In particular, in modern conditions, given the still high level of military confrontation in the world, the presence of major contradictions, as well as the likelihood of an accidental military clash, the possibility of large-scale general and limited wars, regional wars between groups of states, local wars between individual states both in remote areas and in close proximity to the borders of Russia, civil wars in the state, private military conflicts of various

intensity.

It is most likely that in these wars and conflicts not only traditional, but also the latest highly effective types of weapons will be used, excluding weapons of mass destruction. However, in the event of a clash between large states possessing nuclear weapons, it cannot be ruled out that, under certain conditions, they will also be used on a limited scale, either accidentally or deliberately by one or even both sides.

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Another characteristic political feature of all modern wars, according to the current military-doctrinal principles of Russia, is that the predominant motive for unleashing them will apparently be socio-economic, religious and ethnic reasons, territorial and other disputes, which will by no means reduce their bitterness.

Therefore, it is important to take all measures so that Russia does not become involved in any of these wars. If this cannot be avoided, it is necessary to make every effort to end the war in the shortest possible time and with minimal losses for yourself.

The main military-political goals and objectives of Russia. The general military-political goals of Russia are purely defensive in nature. At the same time, one should proceed from the fact that its sphere of interests is not limited to the national territory. It extends to the entire military-political space of the former USSR and, to a limited extent, to individual, especially important regions of Europe, Asia and Africa.

Russia's main military-political goal is to preserve peace and international stability, prevent war, ensure national security and the security of the CIS, and protect the vital political and economic interests of the Russian state. It expects to solve this problem without resorting to political, ideological, economic, and even more so military violence, unless the same violence is used against it by other countries.

In the event of aggression, the main military-political goal of Russia is to repel aggression and eliminate its consequences, protect the independence and territorial integrity of its state, and under certain

conditions and other countries. In the latter case, it can use those forces and means that will prove necessary in a particular situation or will follow from collective defense obligations.

When repelling aggression from outside, Russia, proceeding from the principle of defense sufficiency, intends to limit its actions mainly to defense frameworks, resorting to both defensive and offensive actions for this. Under any conditions, however, it will look for ways to bring the war to a speedy end and establish a just peace. The Russian Federation under no circumstances intends to seek to seize foreign territories or change the existing political system of the enemy. But this does not mean that, if necessary, military operations will not be transferred to enemy territory.

One of the most important military-political tasks of Russia will be the prevention of internal wars and conflicts both in Russia itself and within the CIS. If such a conflict arises, then Russia will make every effort to achieve its speedy settlement by political means and the cessation of hostilities.

Military-political measures to maintain peace and international stability. The content of the new military doctrine of Russia was expanded through a set of policy views, military-political measures and actions aimed at maintaining international stability, preventing war, inter-republican and intra-republican conflicts. Among these doctrinal guidelines, the most important are: the integration of national security systems into the new systems of international, European and Asia-Pacific security; taking steps to reduce

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in the future and to the mutual refusal to deploy military bases outside national borders; development of confidence-building measures in Europe and other regions of the world; readiness to build relations with all neighboring states on the basis of mutual consideration of security interests; development of political and military contacts with the United States, NATO countries, Eastern European countries, China, Japan, as well as with other interested states; conclusion of agreements to prevent possible conflicts and crises in the zones of direct contact; creation of reliable international mechanisms for the prevention of aggression, including through the formation of unified European and Asian representative military-political bodies (councils) for the prevention and analysis of conflict situations, as well as through the establishment of direct hotlines of communication, including between strategic command posts, and other activities; development of additional restrictions on the activities of the armed forces, especially in potentially dangerous areas; "nullification" of targeted programs for the use of strategic nuclear forces, their redirection to the ocean expanses and the limitation of their combat readiness; joint improvement of national and creation of joint reconnaissance and warning systems for missile and air attacks; organization of mutual exchange of political and strategic, including intelligence, information in order to prevent and localize possible military conflicts in various parts of the world.

A special system of measures is supposed to be developed to maintain and ensure military security in the military-political space of the CIS. So far, such a system is only being formed. But its basis, apparently, can be formed by the following main measures: the creation of interstate mobile forces to localize conflicts; establishing a procedure for making joint decisions in case of conflicts between the republics and within the republics of the CIS; strict limitation of the composition of the Armed Forces beyond defense sufficiency; organization of operational interaction between the Commonwealth countries and their armed forces in case of conflict situations for their localization at the very beginning; establishment of security zones (separation of forces) in areas of possible conflicts; the creation of emergency administration bodies to regulate political and economic relations and guide military measures in the event of armed clashes.

Of course, this list is far from exhausting all the political and military measures necessary to prevent and limit military clashes. Moreover, as the experience of military operations in Chechnya has shown, the effectiveness of many of them may turn out to be low or even fruitless if mistakes are made in their practical implementation.

The main guidelines and criteria for the military-strategic section of the Russian military doctrine. The military-strategic part of the military doctrine assesses the strategic image of possible wars and conflicts, the content of military-strategic tasks, directions of military construction, methods of using the Armed Forces, organizing the leadership of the state's defense, preparing the population and the country for war*. All these questions, as is well known, are directly related to military strategy. The doctrine on this score defines only general and fundamental requirements related primarily to the direction of the military-strategic course of the state. Depending on the scale of the tasks to be solved, it is presented from three perspectives.

The long-range strategic course of Russia is supposed to be carried out on the basis of prudent military rapprochement with the United States, European NATO countries and

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China. Accordingly, it is meant to develop a strategy that would make it possible to finally get rid of the military confrontation with these states, would open the way for broader cooperation with them in the military sphere, but at the same time would preserve elements of strategic deterrence and reliable reflection unprovoked aggression, wherever it comes from. Moreover, it is planned

proceed from the possibility of multi-variant development of Russian-American, Russian-NATO and Russian-Chinese relations, develop a strategy corresponding primarily to the most complex and dangerous of these options.

Russia's short-range strategic course is supposed to be built on a differentiated attitude towards various groups of neighboring states with the expectation of creating a belt around Russia, if not allied, then at least friendly or at least neutral states. In this regard, it is considered most important to prevent the formation in this strategic space of military-political blocs hostile to Russia, such as an alliance of the Baltic countries or an alliance of Eastern European countries with an anti-Russian orientation, as well as the expansion of NATO to the east. Russia's new military strategy also takes into account the likelihood of acute conflict situations arising in this belt, any of which could jeopardize its interests. Therefore, the development and preparation of appropriate response or pre-emptive actions to counter such a threat are expected.

The internal strategic course of Russia should have as its goal the strategic consolidation of all countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States with the formation within their territories of a single strategic defensive space and the comprehensive development of all forms of military and military-technical cooperation. It is based on the former principles of collective defense, but with the countries of the near abroad or predominantly relying on their own national forces and military means.

Russia's new military doctrine determines the nature of military operations in armed conflicts at all levels, from large-scale wars to low-intensity military clashes. It is especially emphasized that modern wars "can be distinguished by a wide range of means of armed struggle used and the participation in the war of various military formations - from regular armed forces to irregular and militias forces." For the first time, factors are established that can lead to the escalation of local conflicts into large-scale wars. Among them, deliberate actions aimed at disrupting the functioning of strategic nuclear forces, missile attack warning systems, nuclear power facilities and the chemical industry stand out in particular. The tasks of the Armed Forces in peacetime and wartime are considered in detail. The fundamental guidelines for organizing the strategic leadership of the Armed Forces on the eve and during the war are given.

As the main principles of the development of the Armed Forces, it is emphasized that the military command and control bodies are under the control of the highest bodies of state power, the centralization of military leadership and unity of command, the correspondence of organizational structures, combat strength and strength of the Armed Forces to the nature of their tasks, international obligations and economic opportunities of Russia. It is assumed that its Armed Forces should be created in accordance with the requirements of reasonable defense sufficiency, be reasonably limited in composition, but at the same time have a powerful combat potential, high mobility and the ability to fight in all types of wars and military conflicts, against any opponents in the most diverse, including

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favorable conditions. It is proposed to consider the most important qualities of the Armed Forces: their universality, structural harmony, the ability to use in full force or part of the forces, centrally and decentralized, constant readiness for immediate use, etc.

Particularly analyzed in the military doctrine are methods of repelling aggression, inflicting defeat on the enemy, peacekeeping operations, preventing and suppressing internal military conflicts. It is pointed out that in the event of aggression, the actions of the Armed Forces must be extremely resolute, calculated to inflict a crushing defeat on the enemy. At the same time, deliberate limitation of the scope and objectives of military operations is allowed. The possibility of compromises is not excluded, if this does not contradict the interests of ensuring the security of the state.

The main guidelines and criteria for the military-technical and economic sections of the Russian military doctrine. This part of the military doctrine contains provisions and requirements that determine the goals and direction of Russia's military-technical policy, the principles of technical equipment of the Armed Forces, the nature of military-technical cooperation with other states, the development of the military-industrial base, and the preparation of the economy for defense. , disarmament and military conversion processes'.

The main goal of Russia's military-technical policy is the timely equipping and material support of the Armed Forces with effective weapons systems, military equipment and property in quantities necessary and sufficient to guarantee the protection of the interests of society and the state. To this end, it is envisaged the creation of national weapons systems that ensure a further increase in the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces, equipping the army and navy with predominantly new types of weapons and military equipment, the use of the latest technologies in military production, the further development of the production and mobilization capabilities of the military industry, as well as the development of military-technical ties with other states.

At the same time, it is taken into account that of all the CIS states, today only Russia is able to develop and produce modern, and even more promising types of weapons on its own. This ensures its military-technical independence and at the same time opens up great opportunities for military-economic cooperation with other Commonwealth countries.

The military doctrine of Russia in the mid-1990s proceeded from the fact that in modern conditions, scientific and technological progress imposes increased requirements on armaments, military equipment and military production. In particular, the issue of developing long-term programs for the development of weapons and

technology. There was a need for a serious restructuring of many military-industrial sectors, improvement of the system of state military orders, introduction of new financial and economic mechanisms into military production, taking into account the transition to market relations and the introduction of a competitive contract system of orders.

In matters of technical equipment of the Armed Forces, the new military doctrine of Russia was based on the recognition of the inexpediency or impossibility of continuing the struggle for military-technical superiority over the enemy, but it also did not allow lagging behind the leading powers in key military technologies. The doctrine imposed some restrictions on the creation of the most destructive means of armed struggle and at the same time required the advanced development of fundamental and applied research that would allow the effective

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respond positively to emerging military-technical threats. It gave preference to the development and production of highly effective command and control systems for troops and weapons, communications, reconnaissance, missile attack warning, electronic warfare, high-precision mobile non-nuclear weapons, as well as their information support. Particular attention was paid to maintaining a high level of strategic weapons systems, improving the individual technical equipment of military personnel and improving the ergonomic characteristics of weapons in the "man-machine" system?.

The military doctrine attaches great importance to the further development of the defense industrial potential of the country. At the same time, attention is drawn to the rational, balanced development of the military economy and its infrastructure, the creation and further development of capacities for the production and repair of weapons, military and special equipment, the development and implementation of additional measures to increase the mobilization readiness of the national economy and creation of powerful state mobilization reserves.

The development of military-technical cooperation with other states, primarily within the framework of the CIS, is recognized as important. The need is pointed out for the fastest restoration and expansion on a mutually beneficial basis of cooperative ties between enterprises that form the military-industrial complex and sectoral research organizations of the Commonwealth of Independent States¹⁰.

A special place in the doctrine is given to the rational development of military conversion, however, with the expectation that this process does not damage the country's defense capability.

In 1994-1995. A number of official and author's publications were devoted to substantiating the new concept of military doctrine. Of greatest interest was the article by the former Minister of Defense, PS Grachev, "Military Doctrine and the Security of Russia"!'. In it, he argued that "the military doctrine allows the peoples of our country and the world community to correctly understand the goals and tasks of Russia in the field of the struggle to prevent possible armed conflicts and wars, in preparation for repelling possible aggression against Russia and protecting its vital interests" . For the sake of justice, it should be noted that from the very beginning the new military doctrine aroused not only approval, but also serious objections from various circles of Russian society, especially in the military environment. Three of its provisions have received the most criticism.

First of all, opponents emphasized the uncertainty of the so-called transitional period, for which the military doctrine is designed. They noted the abstract nature of the military-political and strategic guidelines relating to this particular period, the lack of a deep analysis of the political and military-strategic situation in the country, as well as its development trends. In their opinion, the provisions of the military doctrine do not consider the place and interests of Russia in the new multipolar world, do not define a long-term policy towards the former main adversary - the United States and NATO, and therefore it is difficult, as they believe, to rationally analyze and predict military threats, determine the possible direction of their development.

The absence in the doctrine of a specific assessment of possible theaters of military operations, forms and methods of armed struggle, especially in a large-scale war, was also sharply criticized. All this, in the opinion of a number of observers, caused a certain alertness abroad. In any case, the unwillingness to speak out in an official doctrinal document about Russia's future military-political relations with the United States, NATO, China, and Japan is perceived by critics as an attempt to hide the true goals and intentions of Russia.

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They were no less wary of a change in the nuclear policy of the Russian Federation. A number of experts assessed the new directive on the possibility of the preventive use of nuclear weapons as a disguised threat to the West, a readiness to be the first to unleash a nuclear war.

But a special rejection was caused by the installation, first recorded in the military doctrine, of the possibility of using the Armed Forces in internal military conflicts to prevent or suppress unrest in the country. The prospect of army intervention in the internal life of the state was perceived as a serious potential danger to Russian democracy, associated with the desire of certain political circles to secure the role that they had to play in the events of October 3-4, 1993, and with an attempt to hold on to power by force of arms.

A sharp discussion unfolded on other principles of the new doctrine. In fact, it reflected the existing discord in Russian political life and the inconsistency of approaches to ensuring the country's security. This was most clearly manifested against the backdrop of the development of the war in Chechnya. Already at the very beginning of it, various approaches to its evaluation were revealed. At the same time, a discrepancy was revealed between the official assessment

the combat capability of the Armed Forces and their real state. The unjustifiedness of some military-strategic installations was indicated. In particular, they discussed the role and purpose of mobile forces, the ability of the Armed Forces, built to meet the requirements of a large-scale war, to solve problems in internal military conflicts, the imperfection of the organizational structure and some principles of command and control of federal troops.

Nevertheless, the new military doctrine put into effect still constitutes the main ideological base on the basis of which the most important provisions of the modern Russian military strategy are developed.

5. Creation, development and reform of the Russian Armed Forces

The question of the creation of the national Armed Forces of Russia did not arise immediately, and it was far from being solved unequivocally. After the collapse of the USSR, for quite a long time, the political and military leadership of Russia defended the need to preserve the Common Armed Forces of the CIS. It was believed that they would have a single structure and unified leading central bodies, perform tasks in a single military-strategic space in the interests of the entire Commonwealth. This position, however, ran into open opposition from Ukraine, the Transcaucasian and Central Asian states. It was necessary to develop a new version, according to which it was supposed to create two types of military formations: the inter-supranational Joint Armed Forces of the CIS and the national armed forces in each republic. It was planned to include all strategic offensive nuclear forces, primarily the Strategic Missile Forces, as well as the Air Defense Forces, long-range aviation, the main forces of the fleet, space forces and some other means of central subordination, into the combined armed forces. The national armed forces were supposed to be created on the basis of a proportional division between the republics of the Ground Forces, the Air Force, general forces, the Navy, as well as special troops and rear services.

The leadership of the Joint Armed Forces was to be carried out by the Minister of Defense and the Joint Staff of the CIS, and the leadership of the national armed forces was to be carried out by the ministers of defense and the general staffs of the respective republics.

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However, this option was not accepted either. Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Armenia began unilaterally to form their own armies, using the troops and stocks of materiel located on their territory. All combat weapons on the territory of the respective republics were declared their national property. The Kiev, Carpathian, Odessa and Belorussian military districts, suddenly withdrawn from central subordination, turned into an object of division. The Transcaucasian and Central Asian districts were fragmented, the Baltic district was transformed into the North-Western group of troops, and the Western, Central and Northern groups of troops were to be disbanded.

These are the conditions under which Russia was forced to start creating its own Armed Forces. They were formed by the Decree of the President of Russia dated May 7, 1992. They included the Strategic Missile Forces, the Ground Forces, the Air Defense Forces, the Air Force and the Navy, as well as the Airborne Forces, military space forces, rear units, construction troops located within the territorial boundaries of the Russian Federation. Of the former military districts in the Armed Forces of Russia, eight military districts have been preserved: Leningrad, Moscow, North Caucasus, Volga, Ural, Siberian, Trans-Baikal and Far East, as well as three groups of troops: Western (disbanded in August 1994), Northern (disbanded in 1993 1994), North-Western (disbanded in September 1994) and Transcaucasian (existed until 1995), four fleets - Northern, Pacific, Baltic, Black Sea, as well as separate armies of the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force, Air Defense and the newly formed Transcaucasian Group of Forces instead of the ZakVO.

At the time of its creation, the Russian Armed Forces consisted of 2.8 million people. They were equipped with 912 MKRs, 79 Tu-160, Tu-95MS, Tu-95K and Tu-95K22 heavy bombers, as well as 62 nuclear submarines with strategic missiles. As for conventional weapons, according to the agreement of May 15, 1992, they were divided among the seven states of the Commonwealth in accordance with the Vienna agreements based on the following quotas.

Table 16 Conventional Arms Quotas

Types of weapons*

Countries tanks infantry fighting vehicles artillery systems combat attack aircraft helicopters

Russia** 3450 890

Ukraine 1900 330 Belarus 260 80

Azerbaijan 100 50 Armenia 100 50 Georgia 100 50 Moldova 50 50

—=,—=———A———

Central Asian republics 1085 185

* Denominator - total; the numerator is in storage. * Only in the European part.

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In fact, the equipment of the armies of all Commonwealth countries turned out to be significantly more than

It was assumed at the outset that the equipment was subject to reduction due to the agreements mentioned above, as well as due to the impossibility of maintaining an armed force of this magnitude.

Special mention should be made of the general purpose forces of the Russian Armed Forces. They included all the troops that were by May 1992 on the territory of the former RSFSR, the troops that were withdrawn from Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and subsequently from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; some formations and units were added to them, mainly aviation, air defense, special forces, redeployed from Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics.

Thus, the usual military potential of Russia turned out to be quite impressive. However, formations and units withdrawn from other territories were placed not on the basis of strategic expediency, but most often on the basis of the availability of barracks and housing stock. As a result, their new deployment in many cases did not meet the requirements of the real situation. And it became even more complicated due to the fact that the distribution of armaments in accordance with the treaty on the reduction of conventional arms came into sharp conflict with the necessary alignment of forces in the theaters of military operations. Table 17 shows which weapons and military equipment arsenals Russia was allowed to have in the center and on the flanks.

Table 17 Distribution of Russian AME quotas by areas

Military regions

Military equipment Leningrad and Moscow, Volga-North Caucasian, Ural, Kaliningrad region

tanks

of which in storage BMP

of which in storage Artic systems Combat aircraft Attack helicopters

These restrictions were the artificial barrier that prevents the creation of a rational grouping of the Armed Forces and their effective use in solving defense problems. The fact is that the most tense regions turned out to be just on the flanks, where the levels of the composition of the Armed Forces permitted by the treaty are minimal. An uneasy situation was created around the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. With his separation, he lost many of his fighting qualities. There was a need for a rational solution to the issues of distribution of warships for various purposes, basing, and maintaining the coastal infrastructure of the fleet. In the changed situation, it was necessary to review all the tasks and methods of using the fleet in the Black Sea-Mediterranean basin, and the organization of interaction between the Russian and Ukrainian Navies*. Exceptionally difficult problems also arose in connection with the disbanding of the Western and Northwestern

* Settlement of the problem of financing the Russian Black Sea Fleet and its use of the main base in Sevastopol on a lease for 20 years was carried out on May 31, 1997 during the state visit to Ukraine of the President of the Russian Federation.

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group of forces, the Baku District and the 2nd Air Defense Army, the Caspian Military Flotilla and a number of other formations, with the creation of bases in Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan. All this caused a serious organizational restructuring of the army and navy.

One of the decisive elements that determined the content of Russia's military strategy was the establishment of a new purpose, tasks and combat composition of the Armed Forces and other troops, their organizational structure, equipment and the nature of training for combat use.

The purpose of the Armed Forces is disclosed in the relevant provisions of the military doctrine, in the Law on Defense, and in other official documents. It states that they are intended to prevent wars and military conflicts, deter potential aggressors from unleashing any wars that threaten the interests of the Russian Federation, and armed defense of the country. Based on this, the following strategic tasks are assigned to the Armed Forces:

- 1) together with the forces and means of the foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, timely detection of an impending armed attack or a threatening development of the situation, as well as warning the top leadership of the state about them;
- 2) maintaining the composition and state of the strategic nuclear forces at a level that would ensure guaranteed infliction of the specified damage to the aggressor in any situation;
- 3) maintaining the combat potential of groupings of troops and general-purpose forces in peacetime at a level that ensures the repulsion of aggression on a local or national scale;
- 4) ensuring the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces and other troops within the framework of state measures to transfer the country from a peaceful to a military situation;
- 5) protection of the state border in the airspace, surface and underwater environment;
- 6) repelling a possible attack by an aggressor from outer space, from air, land, sea and other directions;

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holding important areas of its territory and ensuring the protection and survivability of the country's main facilities.

In addition, the Armed Forces are entrusted with participation in peacekeeping operations, assistance to internal and border troops in preventing and suppressing internal conflicts, protecting communications and important state facilities, combating terrorism, assisting the population and civil defense forces in elimination of consequences of accidents, catastrophes and natural disasters.

The combat composition of the Armed Forces is established taking into account the entire range of these tasks, as well as the specific conditions of the situation, the composition of the armed forces of potential adversaries and the possible nature of military threats.

As early as 1993, it became clear that Russia was not in a position to maintain the Armed Forces of 3-4 million. Therefore, the question arose about their reduction. Initially, as the initial calculated figure for the level of the Armed Forces necessary to reliably ensure the security of the country, the norm was taken to be 1–1.5% of the total population of Rossini, i.e. 1.4–1.5 million people. By the way, most European armies are quite within this standard. But it soon became clear that Russia cannot be guided by such a purely formal indicator, since, among other things, one should take into account its special geopolitical position, the huge length of its borders, the low population density beyond the Urals, the variety of threats, etc. That is why, when calculating the size of the Armed Forces began to be based not on abstract figures, but on quite specific military

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political, strategic and military-geographic conditions, as well as the emerging balance of forces and the dynamics of the possible development of the military-political situation in the world. Of no small importance can be the demographic situation in the country (decline in the birth rate), the availability of trained human resources and stocks of weapons, the ability of the economy to implement and satisfy the needs of the country and, at the same time, the planned military and social programs.

A comprehensive analysis of all these factors gave grounds to believe that under modern conditions the relative composition of the Armed Forces in peacetime should range from 1.8 million to 2.2 million people. Later, however, budgetary difficulties that arose and a drastic reduction in military production forced us to abandon such an optimal composition and go for a reduction in the number of peacetime Armed Forces to 1.5 million people, which was confirmed by the corresponding decision. But for wartime, it is nevertheless envisaged to increase the Armed Forces at least 5-6 times, i.e., to bring them up to 66-8

million people.

Of course, the reduction of the Armed Forces to the indicated level cannot be carried out mechanically. Their radical restructuring is required, the strengthening of the most important components, the decisive abolition of obsolete and unimportant structures.

In recent years, the development of the Armed Forces has been based on five main requirements: improving the quality characteristics of the army and navy; compliance of the army and navy with the real level of military threats; proportionate development of all branches of the Armed Forces and branches of service, offensive and defensive armaments; abolition of cumbersome organizational structures; their rational restructuring, taking into account the nature of possible military clashes.

For the coming years, it was intended to maintain the five-service structure of the Armed Forces. At the same time, their gradual reorganization began. First of all, the main parameters of Russia's strategic nuclear forces were specified. Their composition and structure began to be brought into line with the START-1 Treaty. Missile systems that were outside Russian borders were removed from combat duty. Two missile armies and several missile divisions have been disbanded. The plans for the rearmament of the Strategic Missile Forces have been revised. The main attention is focused on the replacement of stationary systems with mobile missile systems. The composition and basing of strategic aviation have been changed. Missile submarines with obsolete missiles have been decommissioned. Accordingly, strategic funds were redirected.

The strategic defensive forces of the country, mainly the early warning forces, were to be further developed. Due to the fact that a significant part of the over-the-horizon PRN stations ended up in the territories of the Baltic and Ukraine, it was necessary to take measures to restore the radar field. Agreements were signed on the temporary abandonment of some of the existing stations (Skrunda, Mukachevo), the construction of new stations to bridge the gaps that had formed in the controlled space, and on strengthening the constellation of PRN space assets.

General-purpose forces, primarily the Ground Forces, the Air Defense Forces of the country and the Air Force, underwent a major reorganization. Particular attention was paid to the creation of the so-called mobile forces. This was justified by the fact that Russia would not be able to keep large groupings of the Armed Forces in all strategic directions. In view of this, and also because of the unpredictability of the situation and the growing likelihood of local wars, it was concluded that the former system of deploying forces along the entire perimeter of state borders is losing its former significance. There was a need to create a special grouping of troops, which could be transferred in the shortest possible time to the direction where

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threatens the security of the country. The basis of such a grouping, as expected, was to be formed by airborne troops, airborne assault units, formations and units of the marine corps, mobile units of the ground forces of a special organization, as well as military transport and combat aviation.

In 1994, this idea began to be put into practice. At that time it seemed that it was impeccable, but the events in Chechnya had already shown that mobile troops were unsuitable for performing a number of tasks. In this regard, the conclusion was that the rejection of typical associations and connections was at least premature.

In the Ground Forces, the number of combined arms and tank armies was drastically reduced, and army corps began to be created instead. Many motorized rifle and tank divisions were reorganized into motorized rifle brigades. In formations and units, the number of tanks and other heavy military equipment has significantly decreased.

There was a major reorganization in the Air Force. Army aviation was transferred to the Ground Forces as one of the branches of service, front-line air armies were abolished, a reserve air force was created, and the aviation rear was rebuilt.

The United Air Defense Forces of the country were transferred to a new organizational structure, their operational boundaries were revised taking into account the new air-operational areas. New air defense zones and areas have been formed. Rebuilt groupies. roving RTV and ZRV in the border areas in the west and south. The command of the aerospace defense forces was created.

The organizational structure of the fleet was simplified. A number of flotillas, squadrons and other large fleet formations have been disbanded. The composition of the forces of constant readiness has been revised. The coast guard troops were transferred to the new organization. The combat service system was reorganized. The composition of forces constantly on combat duty in remote areas of the ocean and seas has been sharply reduced.

Major changes have taken place in the administrative structures of the Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff were restructured to meet the new challenges. Some main and central administrations have been merged or abolished altogether. The main commands of the directions were also liquidated. At the same time, many new management structures have been created. The composition of the departments of military districts and fleets has been specified.

All these and other measures were carried out and are being carried out as part of the announced military reform, which provided for a complete restructuring of the entire defense system of the country. A deep reform of the Armed Forces began as early as 1992. But then it was carried out without a clearly defined concept and a general program in certain areas. Later, such programs and the concept were defined, the goals, content, timing and stages of the reform were specifically established. In particular, before 1996 it was planned to create new groupings of troops and forces on the territory of the Russian Federation, improve the type structure of troops, complete the withdrawal of formations and units located outside Russia, and make the transition to a mixed recruitment system that would combine the service based on the conscription of citizens for active military service on an extraterritorial basis with service on a voluntary basis (under contract).

From 1996 to 2000 it is planned to complete the reorganization of the structure of the Armed Forces, transfer them to a four-service organization, complete the transition to a mixed manning system, strengthen the groupings of troops in critical areas, and create a new infrastructure on the territory of the Russian Federation. Finally, from 2000 to 2010 it is planned to completely restructure the Armed Forces in accordance with the future system of defense missions, it is planned to transfer them to a qualitatively new military-technical base. By this time in

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As part of the Armed Forces, it is planned to have full-fledged strategic deterrence forces, strategic defensive forces, general-purpose forces, mobile forces, special forces for various purposes and a semi-stationary strategic rear. All troops must be re-equipped with modern, highly efficient and high-precision weapon systems, new models of armored, artillery, aviation, engineering and other military equipment. The aviation fleet and a significant part of the military air defense facilities will be completely renewed, and some new ships of the fleet will be put into operation. Space troops, reconnaissance equipment, communications and information systems will be further developed. A transition will be made to automated means and systems for command and control of troops and weapons of a new generation. Robotic combat equipment and artificial intelligence will be widely used.

Along with the reconstruction of the organizational structure and updating the technical equipment of the Armed Forces, it was planned to carry out a deep reform of the entire system of training military personnel, command and control, organization of research work, reorganize the network of research institutes, rebuild the entire military industrial complex based on the introduction of the most advanced military technologies and a new organization of production.

Of course, all of the listed areas of military reform could not be considered completely settled. The fact is that life and the real situation required their serious adjustment or even a radical revision, especially since the Armed Forces experienced great difficulties: many measures were not implemented on time, additional requirements arose that had to be taken into account in the construction of the Armed Forces. Strengths, weaknesses that had not previously manifested themselves were revealed. It is likely that new ideas will appear that will require serious scientific substantiation and deep experimental verification during the implementation of the final stages of the reform.

As the military reform progresses in Russia, a new system of the country's defense will take shape. It will be based on the coordinated use of strike forces of strategic deterrence, strategic defensive forces, general-purpose forces and mobile forces based on a developed military infrastructure tied to a modified slicing of theater, strategic and aerospace

directions. This will make it possible to reliably ensure the security of Russia, to guarantee it against any accidents.

Of course, all this is a matter for the future, but for now the reforms are proceeding with great difficulty. The state of the Armed Forces causes serious concern. Their combat readiness and combat capability are declining from year to year. The limited military budget does not allow providing the troops with new military equipment in the required quantity, continuing capital construction, and improving the system of basing forces. The Ground Forces found themselves in a particularly difficult situation: many formations are only 25-30% manned. In addition, they are burdened with a large number of defective equipment and weapons, and do not have the required stocks of materiel.

The fleet of combat aircraft, anti-aircraft missile systems, but especially radar equipment, is gradually wearing out. An increasing number of ships are being withdrawn from service due to lack of maintenance.

The established system of operational, combat and mobilization training of troops has been disrupted. It was necessary to completely abandon such major forms of combat coordination of command and control agencies and troops as operational maneuvers and strategic exercises with designated forces. Army, divisional and regimental exercises have practically ceased to be conducted. Combat raid in front-line aviation

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zilis 5-6 times. The composition of the combat duty and combat service forces has sharply decreased. In a number of units, combat training has been reduced to single training or training of small subunits. The number of collection events has been reduced.

All this not only puts the Armed Forces in front of serious problems, but also makes it difficult to implement the new strategic principles necessary to ensure reliable defense of the country.

An analysis of the long-term prospects for the development of the Russian Armed Forces — for the second, third and subsequent decades of the 20th century — is incomparably more complex! century, not to mention the long-term forecasting of the military-political situation, the future of the Russian Federation itself, its economy, social structure, and most importantly, the identification of the results of scientific and technological progress. In this case, you will have to reckon with a number of uncertainties. And the point here is not only that all political, economic, military and other processes will go faster and more dynamically, but also that they will be influenced to a greater extent than ever before by many random factors. In all areas of military affairs, including military development, one will inevitably have to face many phenomena that are difficult to predict.

Therefore, it is impossible to build any one typical model of the Armed Forces of the third millennium. One can only talk about a number of possible options for the army of the future and about the trends that will determine its contours.

But one thing is clear: in the first half of the next century, the Russian Armed Forces will acquire a qualitatively new look. If over the past fifty years practically nothing has remained from the army of the period of the Great Patriotic War, then over the next five decades, radical changes will take place in its structure and equipment. Profound shifts can be considered inevitable if the process of disengagement of military-political forces intensifies, dangerous centers of international, inter-civilizational and intra-civilizational tensions arise, new confrontational blocs are formed, the interests of Russia and the United States openly clash, and the threat to Russian security from others increases. far-abroad countries, and most importantly, there will be major military-technological breakthroughs. New means of combat will be developed and implemented, including weapons based on new physical principles.

At least with a sufficient degree of certainty, the following characteristic features of the Russian Armed Forces of the future can be foreseen.

First, its professional core will be significantly strengthened. Apparently, the peacetime army will become professional, and will be recruited mainly through voluntary recruitment for military service.

Secondly, the proportions between the means of strategic and operational purposes, as well as between the branches of the Armed Forces and the types of troops intended for operations in various spatial spheres will change: on the ground, in the air, at sea and in space. The relative weight and importance of strategic offensive and defensive forces will rise sharply. Apparently, the number and relative share of the ground forces, and possibly the naval forces, will decrease, but at the same time the share of the Air Force, Air Defense Forces and space-based forces will increase. Already in comparison with the Second World War, in all the armies of the world, the relative composition of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces increased from 10-12% to 25-30% in relation to the total number of armed forces. In the future, this trend will become even more pronounced. Some branches of the Armed Forces may be integrated and unified, but at the same time new types of troops and forces will arise to solve certain types of new tasks.

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Thirdly, in organizational building the tendency to increase the mobility of all components of the Armed Forces, the rejection of bulky military structures at all levels, the creation of universal formations and units of a modular type will prevail.

Fourth, the nature of the administrative and information bodies and structures of the Armed Forces will change dramatically. They will be based on multifunctional automated systems for various purposes. Accordingly, at all levels there will be fundamental changes in the content and nature of management activities.

Finally, along with the unified ones, specialized formations can be created, designed to conduct large-scale wars, but especially for conducting special operations in local wars and conflicts.

It must be assumed that in the next 30-50 years, nuclear weapons will remain in the equipment of both the Russian Armed Forces and other nuclear powers. Accordingly, the strategic nuclear deterrence forces will remain, but their composition and structure may change significantly. Apparently, they will be based on a relatively small group of land, sea, and possibly space-based mobile assets with next-generation nuclear weapons.

Strategic non-nuclear offensive forces can also be created using reconnaissance and strike systems and combat assets based on new physical principles, as well as multifunctional strategic defensive forces for territorial protection of the country and the Armed Forces from all means of enemy air and space attack.

A powerful component of the Armed Forces will be the General Purpose Air Force, adapted for independent operations in the airspace and conducting all types of air and anti-aircraft operations.

Naval forces are likely to be significantly reduced. They will be based on missile ships of new projects, as well as maritime reconnaissance and strike systems.

The ground forces, in all likelihood, will turn into general-purpose ground-air forces. In addition, special troops of mobile forces and special forces can be formed.

Of course, other options for organizing the promising Armed Forces cannot be ruled out. More or less definitely it will be possible to judge them approximately at the beginning of the next millennium.

6. On the strategic nature of modern wars and methods of strategic employment of the Armed Forces

Russia's modern military strategy takes a fundamentally new view of the conditions for the emergence, nature and methods of conducting possible wars and armed conflicts. This means that the country and the Armed Forces must be ready to prevent and conduct a much more diverse arsenal of large-scale and local wars, military conflicts at various levels. Consequently, there is a need for a more flexible and diverse military strategy that ensures the effective solution of defense tasks in various types and types of wars and conflicts.

Certain political circles believe that the changed conditions rule out the possibility of a nuclear war, both now and in the future. In reality, however, the danger of such a war is not only not excluded, but in time it may become even more real, although, of course, in comparison with those

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according to the ideas that were formed about it in the 70s and 80s, it will be completely different. It must be assumed that a large-scale nuclear war can be unleashed only as a result of an unfavorable combination of accidents or fatal mistakes. It is possible that it will arise as a result of the escalation of hostilities.

But it is most likely that a nuclear war will not be global, but limited, and most importantly, controlled. Apparently, until such a possibility is reached, no one will decide on a nuclear war. This means that both belligerents will try, relying on new information structures, to keep the nuclear war within some limited framework, they will try to end it before it assumes uncontrollable forms. Not all, but only some of the available means of struggle will be used. Each side will do everything to make full use of its nuclear potential to inflict maximum damage on the enemy, but at the same time it cannot rule out defeat for itself and its allies.

Strategically, the basis of a large-scale nuclear war will be the global operations of strike strategic nuclear and strategic defensive forces. Such operations will begin and will be conducted in all spatial spheres with maximum tension. As a result, many cities, military and other facilities can be destroyed almost simultaneously, the main military-political and administrative centers, entire industrial regions are destroyed, and the population and armed forces of both sides will suffer incalculable losses. Vast territories and water areas will be subjected to radioactive contamination. Many areas will turn into a radioactive desert, the effect of "nuclear night" and "nuclear winter" is not ruled out. And this means that not only the conduct, but even the analysis of an unlimited nuclear war in the strategic plan is devoid of real meaning, because it is impossible to achieve victory in such a war.

With this in mind, in practical terms, we can only speak of a strategy of limited nuclear war. In such a war, Russia's military strategy can pursue three goals: 1) cause irreparable damage to the enemy, which, however, does not go beyond the danger for its own state; 2) to ensure the survival of the population and the most important elements of the country's economy; 3) to prevent the expansion of the scale of the war, to keep military operations within the boundaries of certain territories (regions) with an acceptable number of nuclear weapons used.

Of course, in the case of a clash of nuclear powers, the conduct of such a war involves a certain compromise. Already at the very beginning of it, coordinated decisions must be made that will prevent a nuclear escalation and force the parties to stop active hostilities, at least with the use of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

Even under modern conditions, large-scale conventional warfare will also assume extremely complex strategic features and forms. Its main feature will be that in the course of hostilities, both sides will try to use new highly effective means of combat, primarily high-precision weapons, reconnaissance and strike systems, increased power ammunition, etc. It is very likely that the belligerent states will not limit themselves to traditional objects - mi beats. Priority destruction of nuclear power facilities, bases for the storage and production of especially hazardous chemicals, dams, and power plants may become of great importance. As a result, in addition to the damaging results of fire exposure, extensive (but still local) zones of infection, destruction, flooding, and fires are formed. In other words, to some extent, a situation similar to the consequences of a limited nuclear war will arise.

Under such conditions, massive losses are inevitable, the full recovery of which is hardly possible. Therefore, the intensity of hostilities will periodically

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either increase or decrease. A fierce struggle will unfold in all spatial spheres, but it will acquire a particularly tense character in the air. A trial exchange of powerful fire strikes, as well as all types of offensive and defensive operations on a strategic, frontal and army scale, will find wide application in such a war.

As for local wars and external armed conflicts, their scale, forms and methods of waging will depend on the political goals and nature of military clashes, the composition and capabilities of the parties involved, the attitude of third countries towards them, as well as on the characteristics of the theater of operations. Most often, traditional means of combat will be used in their conduct, but in limited quantities they can be used, including in the order of ground tests, and new means of destruction, as was the case in Vietnam, the Middle East, Afghanistan and during conflict in the Persian Gulf. Hostilities may be limited to a relatively small area, but in some cases they will spread over an entire region, and their duration may vary widely, from a few days to several years. Most likely, the armed struggle in such wars will develop spasmodically, that is, it will go through a series of stages with a periodic increase and decrease in the activity of ongoing operations.

Internal conflicts and civil wars can be even more complex, contradictory and difficult to predict strategic character. They will closely intertwine the typical actions of regular troops with the actions of irregular forces, militias and guerrilla struggle. Particularly acute forms can take internal conflicts in the border areas, where direct or indirect intervention of other states is not ruled out. In such wars, measures must be taken in advance in case of probable aggression from outside.

When waging all types of both large-scale and local wars, the Russian military strategy proceeds from achieving victory in the shortest possible time (if only because modern Russia is not in a position to wage a long war). In the course of a war, it is envisaged to use various types, methods and forms of military operations on a tactical, operational and strategic scale, it is allowed to use all types of conventional weapons, mainly high-precision combat systems, "which best suit the current situation, initiatives and defeating the aggressor!?. At the same time, it is supposed to organize and conduct operations in such a way that the armed struggle does not get out of control and does not exceed a dangerous level. To do this, certain restrictions may be imposed on the ways of performing certain strategic and operational tasks. They relate mainly to such actions that can cause a conventional war to escalate into a general nuclear war.

Special mention should be made of the strategic nature of possible wars with the use of promising types of weapons, primarily weapons based on new physical principles. Obviously, such a war will differ significantly not only from classical, but also from all possible variants of large-scale and limited nuclear wars. In this case, the main sphere of struggle will be, first of all, space. Military operations there may begin long before major strategic operations are launched on land, in the air and on the seas. Their main content will be the mutual, including covert, destruction of space-based combat and support assets. Only after this task is solved to some extent, intercontinental, continental and oceanic land-air and air-sea operations of various scales can be deployed. Apparently, they will cover vast areas, and

main

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efforts will be concentrated on defeating objects and groupings of the armed forces, mainly in the interior regions of the country. In the border areas, military operations in such a case may pursue auxiliary goals.

Methods of strategic use of the Armed Forces. The uncertainty of the military-political situation in the world, the diversity of military threats, the need to maintain the country's constant readiness to repel aggression and wage various types of wars dramatically expand the scope of Russia's modern military strategy, complicating its content. There is a need to develop a more flexible strategy, find new methods of action for the Armed Forces, conduct nuclear and conventional, large-scale and regional wars, armed conflicts of high, medium and low intensity. This means that the modern military strategy of Russia, along with the traditional general guidelines, must be supplemented with a number of new principles, concretized and enriched by a set of additional requirements arising from the specific features of a possible pre-war situation and the unusual nature of modern wars. As before, it should be based, on the one hand, on the readiness of the Armed Forces to use

various forms and methods of combat operations, including those that are or may be in the arsenal of the armed forces of a potential enemy, and on the other hand, the ability to effectively resist them.

At the end of the 1980s, and especially with the formation of the Russian Armed Forces, in theory, in the official statements of individual politicians and strategists, and then at the official state level, the position was put forward that, taking into account the defensive orientation of the military doctrine, Russia's military strategy should be in its basis is also defensive. Based on this, the following guiding strategic principles were justified:

1. Under no circumstances will Russia be the first to start hostilities, let alone the first to use nuclear weapons.
2. The Russian Armed Forces will not develop, master and use any actions designed to carry out a surprise attack or a preventive strike against the enemy.
3. During the course of the war, the Russian Armed Forces will not deliver deliberate strikes against large cities, cultural centers, and also against a number of other civilian objects, unless the enemy himself resorts to such actions.
4. Aggression can and will be repulsed mainly through retaliatory, primarily defensive and counter-offensive actions.
5. It is not envisaged, and in a number of cases the possibility of the deployment of large-scale offensive operations by the Russian Armed Forces from the very beginning of the war is completely excluded.

In accordance with this, the scope of the principles of defense sufficiency began to expand. Some began to prove the expediency of reducing offensive weapons, the need to abandon the use of such formations as air assault troops, operational maneuver groups, to justify the possibility of conducting active operations only on their own territory, etc.

It soon became clear, however, that such attitudes doomed the Russian Armed Forces to passivity, knowingly placed them at a disadvantage, and even more than that, pushed the aggressor to reckless and adventurist actions. [Essentially, in the event of a critical situation, Russian troops in such a situation would be forced to passively wait for an enemy strike, and after it was struck, only fight back from the aggressor.

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Further analysis convincingly showed not only the inexpediency, but also the danger of such a strategy. Therefore, already in 1992-1993. she was rejected. And besides, it was concluded that a defensive military doctrine does not at all mean the need to focus on a passive defensive strategy. On the contrary, the actions of the Armed Forces in this case should be as active and resolute as possible, aimed at the complete defeat of the aggressor. And this can only be achieved by a defensive-offensive strategy, that is, with a reasonable combination of defense, counter-offensive and offensive.

With this in mind, almost all of the above-mentioned strategic restrictions on the actions of the Armed Forces have been lifted. Since 1993, Russia's strategy has become offensive-defensive. And the question of the priority of this or that type of military action has generally disappeared. Both attack and defense are now recognized as rational and possible in equal measure. The use of this or that type of military action is now made dependent not on abstract political motives, but on the specific tasks and capabilities of the Armed Forces, taking into account the real situation.

From this provision flow specific methods of employing the Armed Forces in operations and in war. Russia and its Armed Forces do not intend to take any actions that could lead to an aggravation of the international military-political situation or create a real threat to this or that state. But any military threat from the aggressor will certainly be taken in response. In this case, the actions of the Russian Armed Forces can be adequate, and under certain conditions even pre-emptive. In particular, when the military danger grows, the troops and forces of the fleet can be brought to the highest degree of readiness, deployed and take limited and sometimes large-scale preventive actions. As a rule, this will take place in the event of a dangerous build-up of groupings of troops (forces) near the Russian borders, the entry of foreign troops into the territory of states adjacent to Russia (unless, of course, this is related to measures to restore and maintain peace by decision of the UN Security Council), attacks on objects and structures on the state border of the Russian Federation, unleashing border conflicts and armed provocations, disrupting the functioning of the PRN, ABM and PKO systems, armed terrorism, etc.

In all these and similar cases, additional troops, primarily mobile forces, can be transferred to threatened areas, followed by the deployment of the necessary groupings of troops, and in addition, private operations with limited targets can be organized and individual strikes prepared. In the event of a local attack, a limited grouping of the Russian Armed Forces will most often be used. It can conduct air, anti-aircraft, defensive, counter-offensive or offensive operations on a front or army scale, prepare and carry out missile, fire and air strikes against certain categories of enemy objects and targets. If the conflict becomes protracted, then additional forces may be involved. Then a whole system of successive and simultaneous operations is organized with the successive defeat of individual enemy groupings and the capture of key areas on its territory.

Fundamentally different methods of action will be required in the event of the outbreak and conduct of a large-scale war. Such a war, as a rule, from the very beginning will require the involvement of all or most of the Armed Forces and the full mobilization of the country's efforts. It is assumed that a large-scale war can be waged on one or simultaneously on several continents, land, sea and ocean theaters of military operations, and under certain conditions is capable of spreading

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to thread on outer space. In order to achieve the set strategic goals in such a war, in most cases it will be necessary to carry out not only front-line, but also a number of strategic operations (possibly, operations of groups of fronts) with the participation of all branches of the Armed Forces. Each such operation will usually be carried out in several strategic and aerospace directions, as well as in adjacent sea areas to a depth of 300-400, and under certain conditions, 500-600 km.

As to the nature of the operations themselves, there are currently different views on this matter. Based on the experience of Operation Desert Storm, the opinion was expressed that the main role would shift to aerospace, air and air defense operations using high-precision aircraft weapons. Indeed, the possibility and importance of such operations have increased significantly. However, the final goals of the war can hardly be achieved only by these operations, because in none of the local wars did the fight in the air lead to the complete defeat of the enemy. So it was in Vietnam, in the Middle East, in Afghanistan, so it was during the war in the Persian Gulf. For 38 days, the Americans massively bombed Iraqi targets. But only after the ground forces went on the offensive, the war was completed on the fourth day. Apparently, such a situation will be even more characteristic of a large-scale war of the future. At the same time, it is obvious that now air operations can be carried out not in 5-7 days, as was commonly believed in the 1970s and 1980s, but continuously for many weeks and even months. As a result, a situation should be created that will allow the grouping of ground forces, supported by the Air Force and the Navy, to repel aggression and quickly solve the main tasks of completing the defeat of the enemy in the course of highly maneuverable military operations.

It must be assumed that the nature of strategic, front-line and army operations of all kinds will change significantly. First of all, this concerns counteroffensive and offensive operations. They will most likely begin with air and sea supremacy, powerful missile and fire strikes, and a decisive offensive by mobile troops, followed by the deployment of the main forces. It is assumed that in the course of strategic offensive and counter-offensive operations, simultaneous and successive front-line offensive and sometimes private defensive operations, large-scale landing operations, and deep cutting strikes can be carried out. The troops will strive to capture the enemy's most important centers in the shortest possible time, carry out swift raids on his rear, envelop, encircle, dissect and destroy the most dangerous enemy groupings. In a strategic offensive, the main forces of the ground forces will apparently have to complete the defeat of the enemy's main forces, ensure the capture of the most important areas in the depths of his territory, defeat the reserves, deprive the opposing side of the material base, which it can use to reproduce the military equipment and weapons. It is very important to skillfully combine military operations in all spatial spheres with highly effective activities of all types of reconnaissance with flexible coordination of fire damage and strikes by ground forces, positional and maneuver forms of combat, close interaction of all branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms!3.

In strategic defense, the main role in repelling an enemy offensive will most likely belong to the groupings of the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Air Defense Forces and the Navy deployed in the main strategic directions. They will have to prevent the enemy from gaining dominance in the air and at sea, to keep the

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main areas of their territory, stop and bleed the invading enemy groupings, isolate them, and then destroy the invading forces by counterattacks and going on the counteroffensive, restore the situation, and, if necessary, transfer military operations to enemy territory. Mobile forces in such operations will apparently be used to localize the gaps that have formed, and most importantly, to cut off the groups that have broken through and their subsequent defeat. The forces of the fleet will fight to maintain dominance in the closed seas, defend their communications and fight on the enemy's communications.

Both in the strategic offensive and in the strategic defense, the modern Russian military strategy attaches special importance to the infliction of massive air and missile strikes on the enemy. They can be proactive, reciprocal, or reciprocal. As a rule, large forces of operational missile troops, aviation, long-range artillery, and, in coastal areas, fleet forces will be involved in their application. It is expected that strikes will be carried out at decisive moments of the operation to the entire depth of the enemy's formation to destroy his strike assets, aviation, reserves, the most important air force and navy bases, command posts, communication centers, etc. In the intervals between them layered aviation operations can be organized, individual missile and artillery-fire strikes can be delivered against pinpoint and highly protected targets.

An important issue is the use of nuclear weapons in war and, in particular, the infliction of retaliatory, retaliatory and pre-emptive nuclear strikes against the enemy. It has already been pointed out above that nuclear weapons can be used only when their role as a deterrent is completely exhausted, or in a critical situation, when one side or another is on the verge of defeat. Under such conditions, strikes can be delivered with a limited number of weapons or the entire nuclear potential can be used at once. There are various ways to bring nuclear weapons into action. In the 80s, the possibility of applying

The possibility of a preemptive nuclear strike by the Soviet Armed Forces was ruled out altogether. At that time, it was only about retaliatory and retaliatory strikes, and only after the enemy uses or begins to use nuclear weapons.

In modern military strategy, the approach to this issue has changed dramatically. As in the strategy of the Western powers, the new Russian military-strategic concept proceeds from the admissibility of delivering not only retaliatory and retaliatory, but also preemptive nuclear strikes. At the doctrinal level, the conditions were determined under which nuclear weapons could be used in the event of an armed attack on Russia or its allies of a nuclear state or a state bound by a treaty with a country possessing nuclear weapons.

In other words, a fairly wide range of options is implied when a preventive nuclear strike can be launched. In practice, however, these formal features can hardly serve as a basis for putting nuclear weapons into operation in any quantity and any form. Each time, the situation will be carefully analyzed and a specific decision will be made, and the immediate delivery of a nuclear strike may be preceded by a preliminary warning.

It is a completely different matter if the enemy himself starts a nuclear war. In this case, the decision on a retaliatory nuclear strike will be made immediately based on the data of the missile attack warning system or reliable information about the nuclear strikes of the enemy on certain objects of Russia and its allies.

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The methods of conducting so-called peacekeeping operations by the Russian Armed Forces require special consideration. This is a completely new type of military activity, in which the Russian army has not yet had experience. It is assumed that peacekeeping operations will be undertaken by the decision of the UN Security Council or the relevant regional body of collective security with the consent of the leadership of Russia, and on the territory of the Russian Federation - by decision of the President with the consent of the Federal Assembly. To do this, the necessary expeditionary groupings of troops can be created, which, under international control, will be transferred to the conflict area. Their main task is to localize hostilities and assist in their cessation. To this end, delimitation zones of the opposing sides can be created, private operations to disarm individual groups can be carried out, and security and defense of nuclear power facilities, chemical and bacteriological production facilities can be organized. In some cases, special operations may be carried out to prevent the supply of weapons, military equipment, ammunition and special military equipment to the conflict area. It is these tasks, in particular, that Russian peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia, Georgia, Moldova, Transnistria, and Tajikistan have performed and are performing. But, of course, the specific situation may require other actions, for which you also need to be prepared.

Strategic categories of time and space. The modern military strategy of Russia is forced to look for new approaches to solving the problem of time and space. As already noted, in the Soviet period, the military strategy focused mainly on a long war, although it recognized the need to solve the main tasks of defeating the enemy in the shortest possible time. Today, the orientation towards a long-term war is dangerous and inexpedient. Russia will not be able to withstand prolonged military tension, especially in the fight against a strong adversary. In any case, it is no longer able to fully compensate for the possible combat losses of the Armed Forces over the course of several years. Therefore, the demand to end the war as soon as possible is of particular importance.

The bet on a fleeting war, however, has nothing to do with blitzkrieg. The point is that the war should either be completed within a few months, maximum in 1-2 years, or terminated at a certain stage, preferably more favorable for the Russian troops. As for the operational and strategic tasks, the timing of their implementation should be determined in accordance with the real possibilities and conditions of the situation. However, it is important to pre-empt the enemy in actions, to deploy the Armed Forces as quickly as possible, to deliver fire strikes as early as possible, to prepare operations in a short time, to conduct them at a higher pace than is available to the enemy. As before, this is the main and determining condition for seizing and keeping the strategic initiative in one's hands.

Approaches to the categories of strategic space are changing dramatically. It is known that in connection with the collapse of the USSR, the size of the territory on which the Russian Armed Forces are located and within which their deployment is possible, has significantly decreased. Because of this, the Russian Federation is extremely interested in maintaining at least limited control over the entire strategic space of the former USSR, which is more than 22 million square meters. km. Such control can be carried out by conducting reconnaissance throughout the depths of the CIS and other neighboring countries, maintaining Russian military and naval bases in certain areas (in Transcaucasia, Moldova, Belarus, Sevastopol, Ukraine, Armenia,

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Georgia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, etc.), as well as through joint military activities in accordance with the agreement on military cooperation concluded in January 1995.

The military-strategic space occupied by the countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltics must be considered lost for Russia. Moreover, this spatial area is gradually coming under the control of NATO. This implies at least three circumstances:

— internal strategic lines are being reduced along which the maneuver of the Russian Armed Forces is possible

during their strategic deployment, but at the same time, the vulnerability of the country's interior regions increases;

- the importance of border areas is increasing, which, under the new conditions,

must be held at all costs; - the depth of space is expanding, within which it is to be

apply

missile and air fire strikes and conduct operations in the event of the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the enemy.

In any case, the modern strategic plans of the Russian Federation must take into account the growing value of spatial factors, expand the sphere of influence on the enemy, persistently strive to achieve superiority over him in maneuver, the reach of means of armed struggle and ensure their effective use to solve problems on the largest possible territories.

and in a short time.

Equipment for theaters of war. Great difficulties arise for Russia in creating a new infrastructure, primarily in the operational equipment of possible theaters of military operations. As already mentioned, the military infrastructure created in the post-war years turned out to be either destroyed in the west and south or moved to neighboring states. Consequently, it is necessary to create a new infrastructure in these areas for the changed system of military threats and the resulting defense tasks.

One way or another, it is impossible to resolve this issue on the previous grounds due to many reasons: lack of funds, lack of time, uncertainty of the situation, and most importantly, because of the uncertainty of the possible nature of military operations on

this or that TVD.

One thing is clear: first of all, new infrastructure needs to be created in the northwest, west and southeast. The program of its construction should provide for: the development of an airfield network, the preparation of position areas for mobile missile defense systems of the Strategic Missile Forces and Air Defense Systems, the Air Defense Forces, the creation of new fleet bases; construction of protected control points, nodes and communication lines; development of the road network, restoration of the border protection system, and finally, reconnaissance and preliminary preparation of fortification equipment of the most important defensive lines, including linking individual structures to the terrain, development of documentation, etc.

It is necessary to start without delay the operational preparation of the Baltic and North Caucasian directions in view of the complexity of the situation developing there. At the same time, minimum work must be carried out to ensure the deployment of the Armed Forces in the main directions of the Western theater of operations. Finally, further development (but on a limited scale) of the infrastructure of the Eastern theater of operations is required. As for the southwestern, southern and southeastern directions (Ukrainian, North Caucasian, Central Asian), it will apparently be necessary to implement special measures on their borders that will make it possible in emergency conditions to quickly concentrate, unfold

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develop and use the appropriate Air Force groupings and formations of operational mobile forces.

Leadership of the country's defense and organization of command and control of the Armed Forces. In accordance with the new Constitution and the Law on Defense, the overall leadership of the country's defense and the Armed Forces is entrusted to the President of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Commander of the Russian Armed Forces. The highest bodies of state power and administration of the Russian Federation, as well as its constituent entities, together with local self-government bodies, bear full responsibility for ensuring military security, the state of defense capability, combat and mobilization readiness and combat capability of the Armed Forces within the limits of their powers, certain Constitution.

All activities related to solving the problems of ensuring the country's security are organized, controlled and coordinated by the President of the Russian Federation. He also heads the Security Council, a constitutional body that prepares decisions of the President of Russia in the field of ensuring the security of citizens, society and the state."

The direct command of the Armed Forces is entrusted to the Ministry of Defense and its bodies — the General Staff, main and central directorates, commanders-in-chief and main headquarters of branches of the Armed Forces. In addition, the possibility of creating the main commands of certain regions was considered.

For the duration of the war, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command headed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is created to lead the united Armed Forces. Its working body will be the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

It should be noted that the expediency of such a system of leadership is confirmed by the practice of the Great Patriotic War and the post-war period. At the official level, it is supported by the top political leadership of the country. At the same time, there is another point of view, according to which it is advisable to divide the command and control system of the Armed Forces (by analogy with the United States) into two trunks: administrative and operational. According to the supporters of this position, it is necessary to create two interconnected management systems:

an administrative-military-political system, which should be carried out by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, transformed into a civilian body, with the subordination of central departments to it, which are intended to resolve issues related to the conduct of military, military-technical, budgetary and personnel policy, as well as with the management of orders and purchases of weapons;

— an operational-strategic (military-strategic) system implemented by the General Staff, directly subordinate to the President of the country, as well as by the main commands of the branches of the Armed Forces to resolve issues related to operational-strategic planning, maintaining the combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces Forces and their operational-strategic use.

Undoubtedly, these proposals have a certain meaning, but on the whole they contradict the long-term tradition that has developed in the Russian army, and most importantly, they significantly complicate the structure of interaction between state and military authorities. Therefore, the adoption of such a system is quite a problem TYCHICALLY.

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As before, in case of war, military districts are to be transformed into fronts and armies. In addition, the formation of commands of theaters of military operations on the basis of commands of operational strategic regions is not ruled out.

Among the practical tasks of organizing the strategic leadership of the Armed Forces, at least five problems are currently acquiring particular urgency.

First of all, this is the problem of restoring on the national territory a system of protected operational strategic and operational command posts in newly emerging strategic directions. It is clear that the creation of such points in a short time is unthinkable. Therefore, for the coming years and the entire transitional period, it is necessary to focus on the use of mainly mobile command and control posts in the theater - field, railway, air, having for them an appropriate network of main and spare areas prepared in engineering respect, communication line leads, as well as camouflage and cover from air strikes, including protective equipment against precision-guided weapons. At the same time, there is a need to modernize the protected central command posts, their re-equipment and technical re-equipment, taking into account the increased vulnerability to high-precision weapons and the changed structure of the Armed Forces. It may be necessary to create additional reserve command posts in areas located at a greater distance from the modern Russian borders.

The second problem is the technical modernization of systems and controls. This applies primarily to the use of automated control systems by troops and weapons, as well as communication systems. Most of them no longer meet the new requirements. Over time, their moral and physical aging will reach such a level that their effective use will be impossible. Consequently, a planned re-equipment of the Armed Forces with new domestic command and control systems for troops and weapons with enhanced capabilities and extremely high protection against enemy electronic countermeasures is required. Their development is underway, but too slowly, and implementation is delayed due to lack of funds. This problem must be solved urgently and, moreover, on a super-priority basis, otherwise the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces cannot be used to the full extent.

The third problem is the organizational restructuring of the governing bodies. Even now, the central administrative structures have turned out to be excessively cumbersome, and most importantly, not adapted to the new conditions of warfare. The war in Chechnya confirmed this with all evidence. But to an even greater extent, there was a gap between the authorities and the requirements of a large-scale war. Today, many central organs and the organisms created in them are adapted mainly for solving peacetime problems. Some of them in case of war will be completely unnecessary. At the same time, the organs of command intended for direct control of military operations have been curtailed or weakened. This also applies to the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the main headquarters of the Armed Forces, as well as some main and central departments of the Ministry of Defense. This gap must be bridged, because it is too dangerous to hope for a restructuring of command and control bodies in relation to military conditions with the beginning of an aggravation of the situation, and even more so with the outbreak of war. In this regard, we already have the sad experience of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. To repeat the mistake would be not only unforgivable stupidity, but also a crime.

Of course, the issue of restoring regional bodies of strategic leadership also needs to be considered. There is an acute issue of organizing leadership structures for command and control of the Armed Forces in the east, south,

Definition of political goals and objectives

POSSIBLE WARRIORS

Evaluation of military-watered. and Development Strate

logical plans

Decision making Setting goals

A. System of basic strategic planning documents

1) Strategic plan 2) Strategic plan 3) Mobilization use of the Armed Forces Deployment of the Armed Forces 4) Plan for the development of the Armed Forces 5) Plan for the development of weapons and military equipment 6) Plan for the use of types of aircraft b. ope-egic. 7) Plan of operations

Strategic nuclear forces 8) Strategic plan. op 9) Strategy plan | walkie-talkies to repel the VKN air operation 10) Strategic plan. op- 11) Plans of operations for 12) Plan for the use of radios on the continent theater of ocean. Theater of Space Forces a: 14) Application plan 15) Plan of territorial-arms of service | military defense 16) strategic plan 17) melting and non-melting 18) other disinformation documents
COMMUNICATIONS

B. The system of basic documents for operational planning 1) Plans for the front. and | | 2) Operational plan | | 3) Plans obespeche-| | 4) Plan for the use of naval operations | | | new deployment of operations of mobile forces

B. Systems of other documents |

3) Psychic Warfare Plan

4) Military plans 5) Civil plan 6) Plans for the use of the Armed Forces

defense cooperation | in local conflicts

Diagram 60. Strategic application planning system

2) Plan for the diplomatic support of the war

1) Plan for the transfer of n / x to martial law

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west and center of the country. But it needs to be addressed thoroughly with the prospect of repulsing aggression and conducting maneuverable combat operations in a big war in all potentially possible theaters of operations.

The fourth problem is the restructuring of the system of operational and strategic planning for wartime. Today, all operational documents, including strategic, mobilization, organizational and operational plans developed in previous years, are not only outdated, but also completely depreciated. Instead, documents of a temporary nature have been prepared. However, in a large-scale war of the future, they cannot ensure the successful actions of the Armed Forces during their deployment and performance of combat missions. Everything is further complicated by the fact that there is still no clear idea of a new system of strategic planning, of what strategic plans for waging war should be. It is quite clear that modern strategic planning cannot be based on mythical threats; it is required to clearly present possible scenarios of the pre-war situation and the beginning of the war in its various forms and variants. The development of such scenarios should form the basis of strategic planning.

Meanwhile, now she is shackled by formal motives, the desire to avoid political accusations. But such an attitude does enormous damage to the true combat readiness of the Armed Forces. The events in Chechnya have once again shown how dangerous biased and simplistic forecasting of the situation is and what it can lead to when waging war on one's own territory. Consequently, strategic planning needs to be approached from a different perspective, focusing not only on the most favorable, but above all on the most complex and dangerous military-political scenario. Then, taking this into account, it is necessary to evaluate various options for the possible development of events, work them out in exercises, and only then put them into real plans at the strategic and operational level.

The fifth problem is the development of a clear mechanism for making strategic decisions. At present, such a mechanism has been defined only in the event that strategic nuclear forces are put into action. The procedure for making, formalizing and communicating decisions on the use of general-purpose forces has not even been worked out. The failure of impromptu decisions is again clearly confirmed by the experience of the Chechen events. In a large-scale war, such a superficial approach could lead to unpredictably dire consequences.

Therefore, the problem is to understand in detail the following questions: who and in what areas evaluates the pre-war situation; at what level, when and what decisions are made; how they are arranged; how specific operational planning is carried out; what, in what form and by what means are issued executive directives and orders; how their implementation is organized; what measures are taken to ensure decisions and how they are monitored. It is especially necessary to determine the possibility of using modern automated top-level control systems and high-performance computers to predict the situation, calculate options for action, plan operations and determine their consequences.

So, the domestic military strategy, like other areas of the state's activity in the military sphere, is currently in its infancy. A lot has already been done to develop it. A significant contribution was made by the General Staff, the main headquarters of the branches of the Armed Forces, the Military Academy of the General Staff, other scientific and research organizations of the Ministry of Defense, many practitioners of military affairs and prominent military scientists.

But there are still many problems waiting to be solved. A detailed development of the basic principles of the Russian military strategy for the transition period is necessary.

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rhod. It is required to determine the characteristic features and peculiarities of the strategy for conducting large-scale and local wars, military conflicts of varying intensity. Possible methods of strategic actions in various operations should be developed and justified, taking into account modern and future

In the military-political situation, the most important strategic tasks of the Armed Forces were determined, and theoretical principles for their solution were developed. On all these issues, new fundamental works and official guidelines are urgently needed, the preparation and publication of which should be accelerated as much as possible.

7. Prospects for the development of Russia's military strategy and military security system

It is not easy to give even an approximate answer to the questions in which direction and how Russia's military strategy may develop in the future, if only because there is still no clarity on the main thing: what will happen in the future with Europe and Asia, the Commonwealth of Independent States and with Russia itself; whether the NATO bloc will survive and what forms it will take; whether it will be possible to build an effective system of global European and Asian security or will it remain a dream; whether the CIS will survive, whether this Commonwealth will develop in the direction of integration or, conversely, disintegration; whether it will be possible to ensure the unity of Russia or whether separate state formations will arise instead of it; in what direction will scientific and technological progress develop; What shape will the armed forces and means of struggle take on in the third millennium? All these are far from idle questions that confront politicians and strategists around the world.

It is quite likely that in an unfavorable development of events, the domestic military strategy will bear all the negative features of society. At best, it will be able to retain its traditional features, but it will still be internally contradictory, passive and inconsistent. In the worst case scenario, it may lose its independence and become an appendage of NATO's military strategy, dependent on US military policy and strategy.

But it's better to be optimistic. Let's assume none of this happens. Russia, having overcome all its difficulties, will retain the status of a great power, and in the political sphere it will be able to curb separatist aspirations and maintain its integrity. Economic stabilization will come in the country and the revival of the national economy will begin. Many social problems will be solved to a greater or lesser extent. It will be possible to maintain the military-industrial complex at the required level and overcome the crisis in the development of science and technology. After the completion of the military reform, the Armed Forces of the country will also restore their combat power.

In what direction can the domestic military strategy develop in such a course of events?

With a sufficient degree of certainty, it can be expected that military policy and military strategy will enter a new stage in their development. Of course, a fundamentally new military strategy will be adjusted, and most likely developed, which will concentrate some elements of the traditional Russian military strategy; but, of course, it will be seriously different both from the Soviet military strategy and from the strategy of the transition period. It will be a strategy of active and resolute actions based on the highest achievements of science and technology, based on the rational application of subtle military technologies and new methods of armed struggle in all spatial spheres. Of course, these are only the most general outlines of the strategy. Specific strategic concepts will depend on many circumstances.

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In the military-technical field, a lot can depend, on the one hand, on whether it will be possible to create weapons based on new physical principles, deploy space-based strike systems, form an effective territorial missile defense system, and, on the other hand, how the disarmament process will proceed.

As is known, according to the START-2 Treaty, in 7-10 years it is envisaged to leave a limited number of nuclear weapons in the equipment of the armed forces of the United States and Russia. Possible dynamics of this process is presented in Table 18.

Table 18 Dynamics of strategic offensive arms reduction Stages of reduction Number of warheads on carriers. ICBM SLBM HB Total
Russia at the time of signing START-1 2084 10271

after implementation of START-1 1800 1100 6000 7 years after ratification of START-2 2160 440-880 | 3800-4250 10 years after ratification 1700-1750 | 750-800 | 3000-3500

USA at the time of START signing: -1 5760 2353 10563 after START-1 implementation 3500 1100 6000 7 years after START-2 ratification 2160 440-880 | 3800-4250 10 years after ratification 1700-1750 | 750-800 | 3000-3500

Thus, in the case of ratification of the START-2 Russia on | | January 2003 will be armed with 1,055 ICBMs, 344 SLBM missiles and 79 heavy bombers, as well as 3,000-3,500 strategic nuclear weapons.

An analysis of these figures shows that both sides will have formally equal deterrence capabilities, but the implementation of START-2 forces Russia to completely rebuild its strategic nuclear forces, eliminate the most effective ICBMs equipped with RCh, and destroy all launches of heavy missiles. And this will require huge financial costs, and in general it is hardly feasible in a short time. The creation and deployment of new strategic missile systems of the Topol-M type in mobile and silo versions instead of obsolete ICBMs will only partially solve the complex problems associated with this.

The question is quite natural: are there enough remaining delivery vehicles and warheads to carry out deterrence tasks? Evaluative analysis gives a positive result. Therefore, it is possible to go further along the path of gradually reducing the strategic nuclear potentials of all the world's nuclear states, but, of course, on a strictly parity and equal basis. At the same time, one must also take into account some dangerous moments that may arise with such a decision. This is the creation by one of the parties (most likely the United States of America) of a highly effective missile defense system with space-based elements, the deployment of new

types of long-range cruise missiles with nuclear warheads and high-precision guidance systems, as well as the further development of "information war" means, which can significantly upset the balance of strategic forces. Under such conditions, complex problems will arise that could seriously undermine the foundations of international security.

The military-political situation, including the possible structure of European military security and collective security of the CIS, will have an even more significant impact on Russia's long-term military strategy. Already now in

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In this area, many very difficult questions arise: How to build a military security system? What might be its purpose? What are the constituent elements of this system? What can be its internal and external structure? How should it be organized and what should be the mechanism of its action in peacetime and in case of war? How can the national defense structures of individual states, as well as the collective security of the CIS, be included in the general system of pan-European and Asian security?

These problems require urgent theoretical study. At the same time, it would be a mistake to proceed only from the current military-political situation. We must take into account the immediate and long-term prospects for the possible development of the situation not only in Europe and Asia, but throughout the world. Accordingly, it is important to explore various options for the formation of a political and actually military security system. Among them, at least five main options should be specially considered, each of which, in one way or another, can influence Russia's military policy and strategy. The main essence of these most important versions is as follows.

1. The military security system of Europe, covering the entire European continent from the Atlantic to the Urals, is formed on the basis of NATO with the transformation of this bloc and the expansion of its spheres of responsibility to Eastern European countries, including in the future the territories of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States.

2. The military security system is being created on the basis of interaction between two alliances — NATO and the defensive alliance of the CIS (on the basis of a treaty on collective European-Asian defense).

3. The system of European military security is being formed in the context of the creation and coordinated existence of several blocs: NATO, the Union of Eastern European States, the Union of the Baltic States, the Union of four European-Asian countries, the Union of three Slavic countries (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) and so on.

4. The military security system is being created on a bloc-free basis under the conditions of . the dissolution of NATO (it would be more expedient to transform it into a political structure) and the refusal to form other closed military-political organizations.

5. The Asian security system is organized in unity with the European security system or as an independent structure with the participation of the United States, Russia, China, Japan and other Asian states.

Of course, one cannot ignore intermediate options, such as the formation of individual elements of military security within the framework of the modernized Partnership for Peace program, the dissolution of the CIS, or, conversely, the strengthening of its integration ties.

A critical assessment of each of these models naturally assumes different conditions of the military-political situation that may arise by the beginning of the third millennium and even in a more distant future. Of course, it is extremely difficult to give an unambiguous forecast of what Europe and Asia will look like in 10-20 years, and even more so in 50 years. However, at least five scenarios of the possible development of the political situation can be foreseen with sufficient certainty.

1. Europe is consolidated on the basis of the idea of a single European home, the creation of a common economic and monetary space, the formation of a European system of collective defense with the inclusion of the transformed national military systems of all or most states. The NATO military organization is being reorganized into a pan-European political structure. Eastern European countries and the CIS will become NATO members. The US military presence will be reduced, and all hotbeds of military clashes will be neutralized.

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2. There will be further rapprochement between the Eastern European and Western European countries on the basis of their entry into NATO and the intensification of confrontation with Russia. At the same time, the CIS will disintegrate or remain in a formal form.

3. The division of Europe will intensify. Internal contradictions in NATO will increase. Several separate military-political blocs are being formed, opposing each other. Contradictions between individual states will intensify. This option is especially dangerous, and therefore it should be prevented as far as possible.

4. In Asia, there will be a rapprochement on an anti-Russian basis between Japan and China, and possibly a number of other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

5. A relatively stable situation will be established on the Asian continent based on the improvement of relations between China and Japan with Russia.

It is hardly worth analyzing the consequences of each of these scenarios today. I would like, however,

pay attention to the fact that any attempt to build military security in Europe and Asia on the opposition of the interests of the United States and NATO (in any form), as well as China and Japan, to the interests of Russia and the CIS is fraught with the most serious consequences. It seems not only erroneous, but also very dangerous, the already partially realized option of NATO expansion by admitting only the Eastern European states and the Baltic states, excluding Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, into this union. This will inevitably lead to an increase in tension, mistrust, and a growing trend of another split in the world. It is understandable, because with such a decision, Russia will find itself in political and military isolation in the face of an international military-political coalition, which will become an expanded North Atlantic alliance.

It seems that under these conditions, certain problems will also arise within NATO, since the ground will be created for additional contradictions in front of its very heterogeneous members. The former stability of the bloc will be violated, the system of military planning and building of the united armed forces will become more complicated. Consequently, in the common interest, only two options can be considered the most acceptable: the creation of an international military security system based on the inclusion in NATO of all European states, without limitation, including Russia; formation of a bloc-free system based on the further development of the OSCE process and the transformation of NATO into a political structure. It is expedient to proceed from these options when evaluating a promising security model and developing a long-term strategy for Russia.

At present, there is practically no effective military security system in both Europe and Asia. In Europe, only some of its elements have been created, related to maintaining the parity of military forces, establishing control over the activities of the armed forces, their training, exchanging information on a number of defense issues, and organizing hot lines. This, however, is completely insufficient for the effective provision of military security in the 20th century. The situation is even more complicated in Asia, where all security issues are far from being fully resolved, mainly on the basis of mutually uncoordinated bilateral agreements.

It seems that the new military security system should include both national and interstate defense structures, provide for the coordination and reduction of the defense organisms of all European, and possibly Asian states, the coordinated direction of their combat activities, the training of the armed forces, and the organization of coordinated military planning. - nia. Its most important constituent elements can be the following five blocks: joint military command and control bodies; combined communication systems and mutual

Purpose: ensuring joint security of the countries of the European and Asian regions

Joint governance structures

Supreme Political Security Council Collective Security Committee Services Council

state security

Supervisory Board Military Coordination Military Technical Center Council

Interethnic military structures Joint system Joint system Joint strategic intelligence ma. warnings air defense system Joint systems Joint groupings International missile defense and anti-aircraft defense mobile forces peacekeeping forces

Council of Ministers

Council of Foreign Ministers

defense

The system of actions of the collective security forces

Collective assessment of the situation and threats

Acceptance of collective

decision

Technical Basics

Legal basis

1) Construction approval

1) Unified military political. doctrine

2) Unified concept of defense

3) Unified planning system

2) Unified control system

national armed forces 2) Coordination of military plans 3) Joint development of defensive weapon systems

Precautionary actions

Scheme 61. A promising system of collective security

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noah information; integrated systems of military intelligence, strategic warning, including its main component — early warning systems; integrated missile defense and air defense systems; unified interethnic groupings of mobile forces for prompt response to dangerous situations.

With all this, neither the European, nor the Asian, nor the united European-Asian military security systems can and most importantly should not oppose the world community. On the contrary, they are fully obliged to comply with the strengthening of international security on a global scale, the positive development of international relations, the neutralization of hotbeds of tension and the resolution of emerging disputable problems in various regions of the world. At the same time, such systems should correspond to the political goals of its member states, contribute to the strengthening of regional peace, the prevention of possible aggression, and the exclusion of war and intrastate conflicts.

It is important that each of these systems be of a deterrent nature, ensure the localization of possible hotbeds of tension, and provide for the use of weapons only as a last resort. Their military structures should be based on defensive means, and the measures taken should not be directed against this or that group of countries.

A prospective military security system must be sufficiently flexible, constantly improved and periodically modified depending on the specific political and military-strategic situation. In organizational terms, it must be multifaceted, rely on the latest military technologies and ensure the possibility of reliably repulsing aggression, no matter where it comes from.

Undoubtedly, the formation of new models of regional and national military security systems, as well as the formation of a military strategy corresponding to them, will require the creation of a similar material and legal base. To do this, it is necessary to have mutually agreed programs for the development of the armed forces of the United States, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, and all European and Asian countries for at least 10-15 years in advance. It is necessary to develop specific criteria for defense sufficiency for each state and group of powers in a certain region, to mutually link military doctrines and national strategic concepts, to develop strictly coordinated plans for military development, training of armed forces and their use in critical situations. It is especially important to organize and ensure the coordinated work of the joint bodies of the military-political and strategic leadership, monitoring and coordination structures, jointly develop a unified strategic concept of military security, as well as determine a mutually agreed procedure for assessing the military-political and strategic situation, the level of military threats, preparing recommendations on the directions of building up the armed forces and coordinating their actions, managing joint military security systems, planning and organizing the implementation of military actions to defend and protect the interests of individual states, localize conflicts, etc.

The creation of a collective defense system, of course, by no means excludes the constant improvement of Russia's national defense structures and the development of a promising national military strategy. In the future, the Russian Armed Forces can develop taking into account international agreements ("START-3", "Vienna-2.3"), but

ration and distribution by directions

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(TVD), based on the real capabilities of new weapons and the nature of potential threats.

It must be assumed that Russia's long-term military strategy will be designed to repel aggression both within the framework of the collective military security systems of Europe, Asia and the CIS, and on its own. And the last option is the most important. In this case, Russia's military strategy should be designed to repel aggression from the most dangerous directions, as well as to consistently and sequentially defeat opponents. Of great importance in such conditions is the flexible inter-theater manner in forces and means, primarily mobile means, pinning down the enemy in one direction and resolutely concentrating efforts in others, isolating secondary opponents and defeating them piece by piece, skillfully combining strategic operations with decisive targets with strategic defense and private offensive operations of mobile and other forces.

Russia's military strategy can be expected to remain fundamentally continental. However, the role of military operations in the air and space will gradually increase. Under certain conditions, large-scale air, aerospace, anti-air and anti-space operations can take a leading place in armed struggle and even form its basis. Of particular importance will be massed and group missile and fire strikes against the complex of the main objects and targets of the enemy throughout the entire depth of its territory, the widespread use of operational sea and air assault forces, and specially created mobile groups.

The mobilization and operational deployment of the Armed Forces may take on a different character, not only for large-scale, but also for local wars. As a rule, it will be carried out in a short time, in stages, mainly in covert forms.

The economic preparation of the country to repel aggression will also require significant adjustments. It will be necessary to set commensurable marginal levels for the development of the military economy in peacetime and wartime, provide for measures of cooperation in military production, coordinate plans for the conversion and mobilization preparation of the economy, and clarify the procedure for implementing certain defense military-technical programs. The transfer of the economy to martial law will be carried out more dynamically, most often in a short time.

Particular attention should be paid to increasing the viability of the economy, restructuring the entire system of military training of the population for defense, based on the new nature of wars and the updated provisions of the Law on Defense, as well as other legislative acts of the Russian state.

Undoubtedly, the possible contours of Russia's future military strategy, as the situation and trends in its development become clearer, will emerge more clearly and definitely.

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The considered aspects of the development of military-strategic thought and practical military activity of the Russian state, its political and military strategy clearly testify to the enormous military-theoretical wealth accumulated in Russia over its thousand-year history, the originality and uniqueness of the highest field of Russian military art. It did not develop in isolation from the global process, but its peculiar way is characterized by a specific style.

Russian military strategy has always been active. Its most distinctive features were: the use of potential opportunities in

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branch and national Russian Armed Forces, the use of various forms, types and methods of military operations, the resolute concentration of efforts on the main directions against the most dangerous enemy, the creation and skillful use of large reserves, the centralized leadership of the armed struggle.

In the theory of strategy, special importance has always been attached to the correct determination of the possible nature of a future war, the establishment of a rational structure of the Armed Forces, the development of new methods and techniques of strategic actions, taking into account the state and prospects for the development of the political situation, the economy and the means of armed struggle.

From this, however, it does not follow that the development of domestic military strategy proceeded in a straight line. Unfortunately, there have been periods of stagnation, departure from traditional paths, more than once the domestic strategy has undergone sharp turns, breaks and recessions. Often on the eve of and during major wars major strategic miscalculations were made. This led to military failures, and sometimes to heavy defeats. But on the whole, Russian military strategy has been fundamentally victorious.

The study of Russia's military strategy in past eras is still of inestimable importance, since it makes it possible to creatively solve the problems of ensuring the security of the state and strengthening its defense. At the same time, it should be taken into account that at this stage of historical development, Russia faces completely different military tasks, and the requirements for ensuring its security are changing radically. It is necessary to look for and find fundamentally new approaches to organizing the defense of the state, and, consequently, to develop an appropriate national military strategy. This is one of the important and priority tasks that is now facing all branches of state power, other state structures, scientific research centers and military personnel in Russia.

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? Soviet military encyclopedia. M., 1979. T. 7. S. 69; World economy and international relations. 1982. No. 3. S. 13.

3 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary. M., 1983. S. 158.

1 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw Pact) was signed by Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania, USSR, Czechoslovakia. Since 1962, representatives of Albania have not taken part in the work of the Department of Internal Affairs.

5 National Economy of the USSR in 1978: Statistical Yearbook. M., 1979. S. 142-146; National Economy of the USSR in 1984: Statistical Yearbook. M., 1985. S. 161-170: Truth. 1984. Jan 29

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7 Maragte (USA). 1972. V. 55. No. 9. S. 24.

8 Military strategy. M., 1968. 3rd ed. pp. 15-19.

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10 Ibid. S. 563.

|! Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. M., 1975. S. 97.

12 Military strategy. S. 21.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid. pp. 21-22.

15 Ibid. S. 332.

16 CPSU and the construction of the Soviet Armed Forces. M., 1967. S. 356.

17 Military strategy. S. 295.

18 Khrushchev S. Nikita Khrushchev: Crises and missiles. M., 1994. T. 2. S. 425.

1 Ibid. pp. 425-496.

20 Precision weapons are weapons that ensure guaranteed hitting of targets at any range with a probability exceeding 0.9 and higher (with a maximum deviation from targets at short distances within a meter, at medium distances - tens of meters, and at intercontinental ranges - about 100-200 m). Based on the principle of "shot - defeat". The typical types of such weapons in the US Army initially included Copperhead artillery shells, Helfire anti-tank systems, Exoset and Kh-31 anti-ship missiles, and the Wolai bomb; in the USSR - the Krasnopol artillery shell, the Metis-M, Konkurs-M, Shturm-S anti-tank systems, the Harpoon anti-ship missiles, etc. Subsequently, a wide class of such weapons for various purposes was created.

21 Weapons based on new physical principles - new means of armed struggle, the damaging effect of which is based on the use of directed high-energy radiation and fields, neutral or charged particles, as well as on other non-traditional methods of hitting people and military equipment. To them

relate:

a) laser weapons using low-energy and high-energy power laser devices (gas, chemical, solid-propellant, liquid lasers) to destroy with narrowly directed light beams;

6) accelerating weapons based on the principles of beams of elementary particles, neutrons and hydrogen atoms;

c) microwave - weapons with directed radiation of ultra-high radio waves of millimeter and centimeter range;

d) infrasonic weapons based on the damaging effect of sound vibrations from one to 30 hertz;

e) geophysical weapons based on the initiation of catastrophic natural phenomena.

In addition, some other promising types of weapons also belong to this class.

2? Sokolovsky V. D. Future war and problems of the Soviet military doctrine (Lecture for the faculty and graduate students of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces). M., 1959. S. 5.

23 Military strategy. pp. 997, 953.

24 Materials XXI Congress of the CPSU. M., 1959. S. 119.

570 Notes

25 Military strategy C 293

26 Ibid C 243.

27 Malinovsky R. Ya Vigilantly stand guard over the world M , 1962. S. 26

28 A super-EMP weapon is a special type of nuclear weapon based on the use of high-altitude explosions of thermonuclear munitions with directed hard electromagnetic radiation.

30 Index MZ-M5 - the time of readiness of associations, formations and units by the third-fifth day of mobilization.

31 Military strategy. S. 255

32 [citation from: Problems of the revolution in military affairs: Collection of articles. M.. 1965 S. 27.

33 Ibid. pp. 80-84.

1 Cited. on Problems of revolution in military affairs. pp. 80-81.

35 History of military art. M., 1984. S. 447-448.

36 Local war / Under the editorship of S K Skorobogatkina M , 1966.

37 Local wars /Ed. I. E. Shavrova. M., 1981

38 NATO states and military conflicts. M., 1987, Regional and local conflicts. history and modernity M., 1989.

Chapter Six

On March 112, 1999, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were admitted to NATO. As a result of this action, the combat strength of the European grouping of forces of the bloc increased by almost 13 divisions, approximately 360 thousand military personnel and more than 8 thousand units of military equipment were replenished almost entirely of Soviet production, including 3.6 thousand tanks, 4 thousand .armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, almost 400 combat aircraft.

2TASS. International express information. 1991. October 8. L. 33.

3 Red Star. November 19, 1993

1 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

TT there.

8 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

10. Ibid.

'! Independent newspaper. 1994. April 13.

12 Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Summary). M. 1993 S. 7.

13 Ibid. S. 7.

1 Ibid. C. 4.

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LIST OF CONVENTIONAL ABBREVIATIONS

AVIADARM - Field Directorate of Aviation and Aeronautics of the active army ADD - long-range aviation

AZPAC (Azap apd Russ Soipey, AZRAS) – Asia Pacific Council

AON - Special Purpose Army

ACS - automated control system

ASNR - aviation strategic nuclear forces

BMP - infantry fighting vehicle

SLBM - combat missile on a submarine BTR - armored personnel carrier

VAD - military highway

Air Force - Air Force

Air Force - Supreme Military Council

VVT - weapons and military equipment

VGK - Supreme Commander-in-Chief VGSh - All-Russian General Staff

VDV - Airborne Troops

VMB - naval base

Navy - naval forces

Navy - navy

VNOS - aerial surveillance, warning and communication

VOSO - military messages

VOKhR - internal security of the Republic VPR - temporary transshipment area VRK - military revolutionary council
Vsebyurovoyenkom - All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars

Vsevobuch - universal military training Vseroglavshstab - All-Russian main headquarters

VSNNKh — Supreme Council of the National Economy VSUR — Armed Forces of the South of Russia VTA — military
transport aviation VTsIK — All-Russian Central Executive Committee

VChK — All-Russian Extraordinary Commission

GVIU — Main Military Engineering Directorate

GK - High Command

GKO — State Defense Committee

GlavPUR — Main political department

Glavsnabprodarm — Main Directorate for Supply of the Red Army and Red Navy

Glavvpraform - Main Directorate for the Formation and Manning of Troops

Fuels and Lubricants GUGSH - Main Directorate of the General Staff

General Staff - General Staff

DZOT - long-term earthen firing point

ZRV - anti-aircraft missile troops

ZRK - anti-aircraft missile system

AES is an artificial satellite of the earth Comintern - Communist International

Komorsi - Commander of the Naval Forces

Komuch Republic – Committee of members of the Constituent Assembly

KP - command post

KP(6)U - Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine

CPSU — Communist Party of the Soviet Union

KSBUS — command combat control system

KUVNAS — advanced training courses for senior officers

ICBM - intercontinental ballistic missiles

MOR - naval defense area

MP - mobilization plan

MPVO — local air defense

NSNF - naval strategic nuclear forces

People's Commissariat - People's Commissariat People's Commissariat of Military Affairs - People's Commissar for Military Affairs

People's Commissar for Military Affairs - People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs

NPO - People's Commissariat of Defense Regional Committee - Regional Committee

ATS - Warsaw Pact Organization Allied Armed Forces OKW - High Command of the Wehrmacht

OKH (OegKottapyo eg Neuges, OKN) - United Nations High Command of the Land Forces - United Nations

Oprodkom — special food commission SALT — limitation of strategic arms

Osoaviakhim — Society for the Promotion of Defense, Aviation and Chemical Construction

OTR - operational-tactical air defense missile - air defense

PKO - anti-space defense SSBN - large nuclear missile submarine

ABM - anti-missile defense Politburo - Political Bureau

ATGM - anti-tank guided missile ATGM - anti-tank guided missile

PU - launcher

POISOT - artillery and anti-aircraft fire control device

district committee - district committee

RAF is a car van radio station

Revolutionary Military Council - Revolutionary Military Council

RVSN - Strategic Rocket Forces

RVSR - Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic

RGK - reserve of the High Command MIRV - divided warhead of the Red Army - Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army RKKVF - Workers 'and Peasants' Red Air Fleet

RCP(b) - Workers' and Peasants' Party (Bolsheviks)

RLS - radar station

List of conditional abbreviations

RMD - short-range missile

RSB - radio station aircraft battery RSD - medium-range missile

INF - medium and short range missiles SA - Soviet Army

SAU - self-propelled artillery mount

ka SEATO (Zosh!-Ea\$1 Aza Tgea{u Ogowapihayop, ZEATO) — Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

CENTO (Seschga{Tgeayu Ograp12aNop, CEMTO) - Central Treaty Organization SKKP - Means of Control of Outer Space

START - Strategic Offensive Weapons

SNK — Council of People's Commissars Council of People's Commissars — Council of People's Commissars SDI — Strategic Defense Initiative

SPRN - missile attack warning system

SU - self-propelled unit

CMEA — Council for Mutual Economic Assistance SNF — strategic nuclear forces TAON — special-purpose heavy artillery

TVD - theater of war

TUTs - Territorial Training Center ONS - Office of the Head of Construction UR - fortified area; guided missile

USON - communication center for special purposes USSN - communication center for special purposes

Frontkomsnab - interfront commission for the supply of military organizations

CBU — Combat Control Center Tsekodarf — Central Committee of the Armies and Navy in the Field

CEC — Central Executive Committee

Central Committee - Central Committee

TsKP - Central Command Post TsUPVOSO - Central Directorate of Military Communications

TsUS - Central Supply Directorate Chrezkomsnab - Extraordinary Commission for the Supply of the Red Army

Chusosnabarm — Extraordinary Commissioner of the Defense Council for the supply of the Red Army and the Red Navy

COMPUTER - electronic computer EMP - electromagnetic radiation

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